Response to Betzler and Löschke
Simon Keller
My book Partiality tells a story about why we should give special treatment to
people with whom we share special relationships, even though those people are no
more important than other people.1 Why should I favor my own child, when I know
that other children matter just as much as her? What reasons do I have sometimes to
be partial, rather than impartial? The answer offered in my book is a version of the
“individuals view.” It says that the best explanation of our “reasons of partiality” is
grounded in the value of the people with whom our special relationships are shared.
According to the individuals view, my reason to favor my own child is ultimately to
do with her special value, not with how much she matters to me or with the value of
our parent-child relationship.
I am grateful for the careful criticisms offered by Betzler and Löschke. I will
try to answer some questions raised by their commentaries while also giving a decent
overall sense of the content of the book. In the first two sections I will explain how I
present and respond to the problem of partiality; this will involve pointing to some
places in Löschke’s commentary at which I think I am misinterpreted. Then I will go
over the two broad views that I reject: the relationships view, which Löschke favors in
his commentary, and the projects view, which Betzler develops in hers.
The puzzle of partiality
The puzzle of partiality is the puzzle of saying why there are special reasons
within special relationships: relationships like those between friends, close family
1
Simon Keller, Partiality (Princeton University Press, 2013).
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members, and romantic partners. It is a puzzle, not because anyone (much) doubts that
reasons of partiality exist, but because their existence is difficult to explain within the
compelling “impartialist” picture of ethics. On the impartialist picture, all people
matter, and they matter because of how they are inherently. No one matters more just
because she stands in some relationship to you. From within that picture, special
relationships look as though they are morally irrelevant, and it is difficult to see how
they could produce special reasons. The question, then, is how to make room for
reasons of partiality while retaining whatever is correct about the impartialist picture.
There are several different respects in which your being in a special
relationship can make a difference to your ethical situation (Partiality, pp. 2-4, 144). I
want to mention two of them here. First, if you share a special relationship with
someone then you can be permitted to prioritize her over others. Second, if you share
a special relationship with someone then you have a moral duty to prioritize her over
others. It is one thing to explain special permissions of partiality, another to explain
special duties.
In identifying ethical questions about special relationships, I speak of the
problem of “partiality.” Löschke asks why I do not instead speak of the problem of
“agent-relativity,” and why, when I do speak of agent-relativity, I do not do so in the
“standard” manner; I do not define agent-relative reasons as always involving
ineliminable back-reference to the agent (Löschke, 676-7). The reason why I do not
take agent-relativity as my defining topic is it arises in many contexts beyond special
relationships. Talk of “partiality” seems better to capture the ethics of special
relationships in particular. I characterize agent-relativity as I do in order to give a
place in the debate to views on which reasons of partiality can be reduced to agentneutral reasons: most obviously, the utilitarian view that we should give special
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treatment to our nearest and dearest because that will promote overall utility. In
setting up the problem, I wanted to leave open the possibility that the agent-relative
nature of partiality can ultimately be explained by deeper agent-neutral
considerations.
I need to be clear, however, that I eventually reject that possibility. Löschke
ascribes to me the claim that all agent-relative reasons can be reduced to agent-neutral
reasons, citing an example in which I show how some agent-relative reasons can be so
reduced (Löschke, 676-7). His rendering of my view here is misleading. My way of
characterizing agent-relativity “allows for the existence of agent-relative reasons that
are reducible to agent-neutral reasons” – that is all the example is supposed to
illustrate (Partiality, 17). It is not my view that reasons of partiality, or agent-relative
reasons generally, are in fact reducible to agent-neutral reasons (Partiality, see
especially 127-129 and 150-152).
My defense of the individuals view
No one has more value than anyone else just because she shares a special
relationship with you. The challenge for the individuals view is to say how you can
nevertheless have reason to treat a person differently, just in response to her value.
My response to the challenge has two elements.
First, I argue that persons have a special kind of incommensurable value, from
which it follows that once you are exposed to one person’s value, it can make special
demands on you, independently of the existence of other similarly structured values
(Partiality, 139-144). This explains why you can have permission to give differential
treatment to one person once you have become vulnerable to her value, as usually
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happens within a special relationship. This is what Löschke calls the “particularist”
element of my view (Löschke, 678).
Second, I argue that social and biological considerations can make it desirable,
and sometimes compulsory, for people to respond to the value of some people and not
others: for a parent to become vulnerable to the value of her own child rather than a
neighbor’s child, for example (Partiality, 144-152). This explains why there are moral
duties of partiality and why those duties vary with cultural context. They explain why
a parent in a society with family-based parenting practices can have different duties
from a parent in a society in which children are raised communally. This second
element of the view I would call “universalist.” Löschke calls it “consequentialist,”
which I think is a little misleading (Löschke, 679). The wider considerations that
determine duties of partiality need not (only) concern overall best consequences; they
could also be considerations of individual rights, for example.
That, anyway, is the view. It is not supposed to be obvious. The arguments for
it are in the book! But let me turn to some of Löschke’s objections.
Löschke worries that the view’s universalist element will lead it to say that
you should neglect a person with whom you share a special relationship if you can
thereby produce greater goods for other people (Löschke, 677-8). I seek to avoid this
result in the book by saying that universalist considerations can only tell us to whose
special value we ought to become vulnerable. Once you are vulnerable to a particular
person’s value, you respond to the person properly by responding to her needs and
interests directly, because they are hers. This is the proper response, I argue, because
it best acknowledges the incommensurable nature of a person’s value. Universalist
considerations might explain why, in this society, you should pay special attention to
the self-standing value of your child, in preference to other children. But once you are
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exposed to your child’s value, it makes demands upon you in its own right, not by
way of universalist considerations (Partiality, 139-144, 150-152).
As Löschke notes, my view here is, in one sense, particularist. It depends upon
the idea that you can respond properly to a person’s value by responding to it in its
own right, not as an instantiation of a value held by people in general. But this is
different from the kind of particularism that worries Löschke, on which reasons
behave unpredictably and do not generate “fixed norms” (Löschke, 679). A person’s
value may be deeply particular and it may generate reasons whose character is not
derived from any impartial perspective, but still, the value is there, and the reasons it
generates can be predictable and systematic. You may not have children, but you may
know that if you do have a child, then you should come to love her and take special
responsibility for her, and you may know a good deal about what sorts of actions that
will require. That involves knowing something about how you should respond to her
special value in preference to the similar value of other children, well in advance of
actually encountering that value.
The book offers a number of arguments for the individuals view, but the main
one is the argument from the “phenomenology of partiality.” Using a series of
examples, I try to show that when you act well towards another person within a
special relationship, you are moved by considerations of her in her own right, not in
her capacity as a participant in one of your projects or in one of your relationships. I
argue that the experience of acting well towards another person within a special
relationship has (defeasible) authority, and hence that if that experience involves
treating certain considerations as reasons, then we should conclude (tentatively) that
they really are reasons (Partiality, 25-27, 84-96).
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Löschke doubts that the phenomenology of partiality reveals much about our
reasons of partiality. He suggests that it might tell us what reasons we have to act well
towards someone to whom we are already partial – “reasons from partiality” – but
does not think it can tell us what reasons we have to be partial towards someone in the
first place – “reasons for partiality” (Löschke, 680-2). The distinction is well-taken,
but we should not assume that reasons from partiality are sharply different from
reasons for partiality, or that phenomenological considerations are relevant only to
uncovering reasons from partiality. Consider two cases.
Imagine, first, a man who sees no reason to treat his own children differently
from other children. It may be impossible to change his mind just by arguing with him
(Partiality, 151). Perhaps we can explain to him why it makes sense (around here,
now) for parents to take special care of their own children, but that will take him only
so far. What is more likely to work is to have him spend time with his children,
become acquainted with their distinctive perspectives and interests, and become
vulnerable to their value as individuals and their own special points of view. It is by
having that experience, if I am right, that the father is most likely to find reasons for
partiality towards his children, not just reasons from partiality.
Imagine, second, that you are losing motivation to act well towards your
mother. Perhaps you are feeling annoyed or angry with her, and cannot be bothered
making any special effort for her sake. The best way to reinvigorate your motivation
in such a case is to renew your acquaintance with your mother, finding a way to
escape from yourself and to think more closely of her and her interests (Partiality,
93). This, again, would be an experience of finding reasons for partiality, not just
reasons from partiality. There is phenomenological evidence that can be brought to
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bear on each of Löschke’s questions. If the arguments in my book are correct, then the
evidence in both cases supports the individuals view.
The relationships view
The most popular account of reasons of partiality is the “relationships view,”
on which reasons of partiality arise from the self-standing value or reason-giving
force of relationships (Partiality, 12-13, 45-48). Löschke supports a version of the
view, suggesting that relationships are intrinsically valuable because they contribute
directly to the good life, and that they generate special reasons because that is a
condition of their existence (Löschke, 679-80). In the book I argue at length against
this suggestion, but I want to pick up here on Löschke’s qualification regarding
destructive relationships. Destructive relationships, Löschke says, are not intrinsically
valuable because they do not contribute to good lives.
Whether a relationship contributes to good lives – whether or not it is
destructive – depends on what it does for the individuals within the relationship. A
friendship characterized mostly by competition and jealousy, for example, might be
destructive, because it ultimately makes the two friends less happy and less virtuous.
This puts a condition on the value of relationships: a friendship (for example) is
valuable only if it contributes in the right ways to the lives of the individuals within
the relationship. Once the qualification is in place, the explanation of whether and
why a friendship is valuable will always refer back to the value of individuals.
Further, in explaining what special reasons, exactly, a particular friendship generates,
we will ask how that particular friendship can enhance the lives of the particular
individuals within it (Partiality, 97-98).
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Perhaps there remains a sense in which the value of special relationships can
be called “intrinsic.” The crucial point, for my purposes, is that all the important work
in determining the normative significance of relationships is done by the value of
individuals. Take, for example, Löschke’s claim that a genuinely valuable friendship
must involve special duties between the friends. If that is right, then the reason must
be that there is some profound contribution to individual lives that can only be made
by friendships that involve special duties. The task is then to identify that contribution
and explain its significance. The value of individuals remains crucial, and claims
about the self-standing significance of relationships become explanatorily redundant,
at best.
The projects view
The projects view says that we have reasons of partiality because we
incorporate special relationships within our personal projects. The chapter arguing
against the projects view is the shortest of my book. Betzler’s commentary shows that
the projects view deserves more careful consideration, and also – I would like to think
– that when the projects view is given a more sophisticated expression, it has affinities
with the view I defend.
In responding to Betzler’s commentary, I will explain how I see the ethical
significance of personal projects in light of her remarks, and what connections I see
between personal projects and reasons of partiality. Let me start with three cases.
Consider first a competitive runner. The runner may desire to improve her best
times and to achieve certain placings in her races, and may be committed to the
running lifestyle. She may believe that running gives her life meaning and makes her
healthier, but those thoughts will not motivate her to go out and train on a cold
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morning or to push herself harder during a race. She values running not
“narcissistically,” but for its own sake (Betzler, 690). She need not, however, take
herself to have a duty to run, and she need not be acting wrongly if she stops running.
If she were to give up running to pursue other interests, nobody could complain.
Does the competitive runner, as described, have running as a project? On
Betzler’s conception, it is not clear that she does. The runner has reasons to continue
to run, produced by her commitment to running, but they are not reasons it would be
wrong for her to ignore (Betzler, 691).
Second, consider Betzler’s case of Jacques, who is committed to preserving
historic neighborhoods of New Orleans. Like the competitive runner, Jacques has
non-narcissistic motives to pursue certain activities over time, and has agent-relative
reasons to respond to certain values. The difference is that the value of the historic
architecture of New Orleans exists independently of Jacques’ commitment to it.
Whatever Jacques thinks or does, the architecture is significant and its preservation
matters. Once Jacques comes to understand and respond to its value, he will see
reasons why it would be regrettable, at the least, for him to lose his concern for New
Orleans architecture and take up other interests instead. That is why there is room to
say that it would be wrong for Jacques to ignore the reasons produced by his project.
Still, New Orleans’ historic architecture is not the only valuable thing in the world. If
Jacques find himself no longer to be affectively engaged by his project, and if he
decides, with proper consideration and sensitivity, to change his interests direct his
efforts elsewhere, that need not evince any kind of vice. He cannot ignore his reasons,
but that does not mean that it would be wrong for him to relinquish his project.
Third, consider a variant of the Jacques case. Imagine that Jacques has an
obligation, independent of his initial subjective commitments, to become involved in
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preserving historic neighborhoods of New Orleans. Perhaps his family owns some
historic buildings in New Orleans, and perhaps ownership of historic buildings in
New Orleans comes with a requirement that owners contribute to the preservation of
the city’s architectural character. Imagine that Jacques’ commitment to preserving
New Orleans architecture is nevertheless wholehearted. He has a personal project in
all the respects explained in Betzler’s version of the example.
How are the personal commitments, in the three cases described, like the
commitments we have within personal relationships? The commitment of the
competitive runner is unlike a commitment you could have to another person, because
the values to which the runner responds – running fast, improving her best times, and
so on – have value for her only insofar as she cares about them. No person has value
only insofar as you care about her.
The commitments found in the other two cases, however, do mirror
commitments found within personal relationships. As described in Betzler’s original
case, Jacques’ commitment to historic New Orleans architecture is structurally similar
to the commitment you might have to a romantic partner, for example. You are not
obliged to enter into a romantic relationship with anyone in particular – or with
anyone at all – but once you are in a romantic relationship, you can come to have
special reasons and duties within it. It can be wrong for you simply to abandon the
relationship. The value to which you become vulnerable in your romantic partner is
real and makes demands on you. Nevertheless, a romantic relationship is valuable
partly because it exists as an expression of continuing free choice by both partners. A
romantic relationship can end without anyone acting wrongly.
The third case, in which Jacques has a pre-existing obligation to commit
himself to preserving New Orleans architecture, is similar to cases in which you have
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a duty to take special care of someone, independently of your pre-existing
commitments. You might have a duty to look after your father, for example. To
explain how Jacques could have his duty to preserve New Orleans architecture, I
needed to imagine a wider social arrangement under which he is given special
responsibility for the historic architecture of New Orleans. In the same way, if I am
right, we need to go beyond the value of your father – and beyond the relationship
you share with your father, considered in isolation – to explain why you could have a
duty to prioritize him over other people. We can explain why your father merits
special treatment just by understanding his value, but we cannot explain why you are
the one to provide that special treatment without looking at a wider social context.
There is more to personal projects than I acknowledge in the book. It may be
possible to get from an understanding of the normative force of personal projects to
an explanation of reasons of partiality. In any such explanation, however,
considerations of the value of the objects of personal projects will be central. The
nature of the reasons arising from a project depends upon the value of the activities
involved in the project. The question of whether it is wrong, and in what sense, to
abandon a project depends on the value at the heart of the project and the context
within which the agent becomes oriented to that value. When a project concerns a
personal relationship, the relevant value is the value of the individuals within the
relationship.
I think that the projects view can be made most plausible by bringing it within
the individuals view. Any account of reasons of partiality will include a story about
the normative significance of relationships, and it will say something about why we
can and should form certain projects. But underlying and directing the account, I
continue to think, must be the self-standing inherent value of individual persons.
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