Notes on Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory
by Ian Hacking.
Prepared by Andrew D. Cling
for PHL/PY 317 Philosophy of Mind
Spring 2009
What follows is a summary of some of the main lines of discussion and argument in
Hacking’s book. Comments inside brackets—‘[,’ ‘]’—are my own, intended to provoke
further reflection.
Introduction
A chief topic of the book is the attempt to transform the way in which the soul is
understood by making it the subject of scientific understanding. The soul is not an
unchanging essence or locus of personal identity. Rather, it is “the strange mix of aspects
of a person that may be … imagined as inner.” (6) This transformation is closely related
to the complex ways in which ways of understanding people interact with the kinds of
people who are understood. This has public and private dimensions. [It concerns, among
other things, institutions for describing, predicting, explaining, and controlling behavior.]
It has implications for the ways in which individuals experience and understand their
lives by giving their memories a new organization and new meanings. (6)
Chapter One “Is it Real?”
Unlike schizophrenia, multiple-personality disorder is not characterized by
inappropriate or even bizarre connections between thinking, feeling, and action. In 1980,
the diagnostic criteria (individually necessary—conditions that must be satisfied by
anyone with the disorder—and jointly sufficient—conditions such that whoever satisfies
all of them has the disorder) for multiple-personality disorder specified by the current
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, DSM-III
were:
A. The existence within the individual of two or more distinct personalities, each
of which is dominant at a particular time.
B. The personality that is dominant at any particular time determines the
individual’s behavior.
C. Each individual personality is complex and integrated with its own unique
behavior pattern and social relationships. (10)
In 1987, DSM-III-R was modified to read (significantly, condition C was dropped):
A. The existence within the individual of two or more distinct personalities or
personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving,
relating to, and thinking about the environment and self).
B. At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take full control
of the person’s behavior. (note 10, p. 269)
Notes on Hacking’ s Rewriting the Soul, page 2
In 1994, DSM-IV added the condition that the person making the diagnosis must have
reason to believe that the patient suffers from amnesia. This reason could either be
personally witnessing amnesiac behavior or hearing reports of amnesia made by the
patient. By 1994, therefore, memory loss was an official necessary condition of having
multiple-personality disorder. (10, see pp. 19, 22)
Multiple personality disorder is real in the sense that there are people who satisfy
the specified conditions. The question ‘Is it real?’ is unclear, however. Following Austin,
we should recognize that definite sense attaches to such a question only if two conditions
are satisfied: (i) ‘it is real’ is replaced by ‘it is a real N’ or ‘it is real N’ where the ‘N’ is to
be replaced by some noun, and (ii) there is a clear sense of one way in which the thing
designated by ‘it’ might not be or might not have been a real N. (11) So, we might ask, is
multiple personality a real psychiatric entity, a real biomedical disease entity, or a real
disorder? [Consider, in this context, the different terms used for objects of psychiatric
interest: ‘disease,’ ‘defect,’ ‘malfunction,’ ‘disorder,’ et cetera. What does each of these
suggest about how to think about what is being described? ‘Disease’ suggests that the
person with it suffers, whereas ‘disorder’ suggests a kind of less-than-ideal
disorganization. ‘Malfunction’ suggests that something is not up to performing its proper
function. Are these the same? It seems not, for it seems that one might be unable to
perform one’s proper function but not suffer for it, for example. This is important for
Hacking since, as he notes later, “[n]ames organize our thoughts.” (17) See also
Hacking’s discussion of ‘disorder’ on p. 17.]
Multiple personality is not normally iatrogenic (=caused by the interaction of
physicians and patients). We should reject the notion that there is a useful distinction
between being real and being the product of specific historical or social circumstances.
[Chattel slavery was real, for example, despite the fact that it can exist only against the
backdrop of historically located social, political, and economic institutions. But does it
make sense to wonder whether the distribution of the underlying personality patterns that
are necessary conditions for having multiple personality is relatively constant across
different societies, whether or not the ways in which those personality patterns are
expressed might vary from society to society? If so, wouldn’t this be evidence that
multiple personality is a real non-socially-determined personality pattern as opposed to a
pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving that is created and sustained by specific social
practices and institutions?]. The major theme of this book is the relations between
“multiplicity, memory, discourse, knowledge, and history.” (12)
There are two ways to classify mental disorders: (i) by means of observable
symptoms (how they look), and (ii) by means of theories about what causes the disorders.
(12) The DSMs classify disorders by their symptoms and thus leave open the question of
the causes of those symptoms. This is one way in which the question is it real? is left
open by DSM. [Why? Because things that are alike with respect to their observable
properties might be very different with respect to their underlying causes. Having a rash,
for example, might be caused by contact with a poisonous plant or by infection. One way
in which a type can be real is by being the sort of thing that is produced by a common
cause. Types that are picked out only by symptoms might not be real disease entities in
the sense that there is a single underlying cause of that cluster of symptoms. This doesn’t
make the symptoms or the accompanying suffering unreal, however.] One way in which
we can be confident that a thing is real is by understanding its causes. Another way is by
Notes on Hacking’ s Rewriting the Soul, page 3
being able to “intervene and change it.” (12) [These are related: if we know the cause of
something, we might have an idea about how to control it by preventing it or eliminating
it once it has come into existence, and if we learn how to control something, that
knowledge can provide us with clues about its cause.] What therapy is appropriate for
multiple personality disorder? Should therapists encourage the personality states of a
multiple to become integrated, or should all of the personality states of a multiple be
encouraged to manifest themselves [to facilitate understanding, e.g.]? (12–13)
“[D]isease and disorder are identified according to an underlying vision of health
of humanity, of what kinds of being we are, and what can go wrong with us. That is why
… the multiple personality field is so full of models of dissociation.” (13) [‘Dissociation’
refers to the failure of different psychological states or processes to be appropriately
connected to one another. So when a person “spaces out” and cannot remember what has
happened for a span of time when he or she was otherwise awake and conscious, there is
mild dissociation: data normally available to memory is not. Dissociation becomes
pathological when it inhibits proper order, proper functioning, or causes significant
distress to the subject of dissociation. The presence within the same body of distinct
personalities or personality states that are not psychologically integrated in a normal
way—for example, by significant memory failures—would be an extreme form of
dissociation.] The standard theory of multiple personality is that it is caused by repeated
childhood trauma, often the result of sexual abuse. According to this theory, the mind
dissociates itself from the trauma by creating an alternative personality (an alter) which
contains a memory of the trauma to which the original personality lacks access. (13) [In a
review of Hacking’s book in Philosophy of Science, Lynn Stephens asks whether this
mechanism is not too complex: if the experience of trauma is given to a distinct
personality, why must it also be forgotten? In fact, notes Stephens, sometimes multiples
cannot remember traumatic events and sometimes they are remembered, but as the
experiences of someone else. What needs to be explained is this curious combination of
amnesia and alienation. A theory of memory alone cannot, says Stephens, suffice for
understanding the curious symptom of recollecting traumatic events as not being one’s
own trauma (see Philosophy of Science, 1997, 185–187).] According to the standard
theory, the memories of trauma can be recovered in therapy using such techniques as
hypnosis. However, many recovered memories are of ritual satanic abuse and there is no
corroborating evidence of widespread ritual satanic abuse. This has caused doubt about
whether other recovered memories are false memories. Debate about multiple personality
has thus taken on a distinctive moral component.
It is common for persons to be given more than one psychiatric diagnosis. In such
cases, the diagnostician may judge that one of the disorders—the superordinate
disorder—is the underlying cause of the others—the subordinate disorders. Skeptics and
advocates of multiple personality disorder frequently disagree about whether it is the
superordinate (advocates) or subordinate (skeptics) disorder. Hacking’s interest is not
about whether multiple personality is real in any of these deeper senses, but about a
collection of ideas about persons and memory came into being and how it has affected
human experience, customs, and scientific understanding. (16) This is important because
“[n]ames organize our thoughts.” (17) In 1994 DSM-IV replaced ‘Multiple Personality
Disorder’ with ‘Dissociative Identity Disorder.’ (17) This represents a shift of focus
among some who study multiple personality from separate, integrated personalities to
Notes on Hacking’ s Rewriting the Soul, page 4
aspects of personality, consciousness, and memory that are not fully integrated. On this
view, the problem is not that there are too many personalities but there is less than one.
(18) In the 1994 DSM-IV the official diagnostic criteria became these:
A. The presence of two or more distinct identities or personalities or personality
states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and
thinking about the environment and self).
B. At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of
the person’s behavior.
C. Inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be
explained by ordinary forgetfulness.
D. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance
(e.g. blackouts or chaotic behavior during Alcohol Intoxication) or a general
medical condition (e.g., complex partial seizures). Note: In children the symptoms
are not attributable to imaginary playmates or other fantasy play. (19)
Two constants across all of the changes in diagnostic criteria are the importance of
memory and of childhood pain. Therapy for multiple personality or dissociative identity
is to be centered on the recovery of memories of trauma experienced in childhood. (20)
Why do all sides take it for granted that an understanding of memory is the key to
understanding the soul?
Chapter Two “What is it Like?”
An important feature of human social behavior is the “looping effect of human
kinds.” [This is a feedback mechanism whereby what one person S1 thinks about another
S2 affects what S1 does and says about S2 which, in turn affects what S2 thinks, which
affects what S2 says and does, which, again, affects what S1 thinks, and so on (adapted
from Daniel T. Gilbert, “Attribution and Interpersonal Perception”). So we have a loop
from the thinking and behavior of one person to the thinking and behavior of another and
back to the thinking and behavior of the first person, and so on.] This looping effect is
particularly potent in therapeutic relationships because persons tend to speak and act as
they are expected to by persons in authority, therapists e.g. (21)
The phenomena of multiple personality are described very differently by
proponents and skeptics. It is difficult to describe individual persons and even more
difficult to describe kinds of persons. The DSMs attempt to describe multiple personality
by means of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Yet amnesia,
condition C in the DSM-IV criteria, is usually, but not always, present in cases of multiple
personality. So it is not a true necessary condition. In general, we are able to use general
terms without a grasp of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing’s falling under
those terms. Satisfying a cluster of symptoms is sufficient. Wittgenstein suggested that
many general terms apply to objects in virtue of “family resemblances” and not because
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Theoretical linguists describe the structure of
categories in terms of a prototype: types are structured by a thing in the type that is
exemplary of what it is to be an instance of the type (e.g. robin is the prototypical bird,
but ostrich is not). Objects fall into the type depending upon their degrees of similarity,
along numerous axes, to the prototype. Instances of the type are not arranged along a
Notes on Hacking’ s Rewriting the Soul, page 5
single axis: the structure is better described as ‘radial.’ (24) Thinking of psychiatric kinds
as prototypes is exemplified by the Casebook that is a companion to DSM. “One can
make a very strong argument, in the philosophy of language, that what people understand
by a word is not a definition, but a prototype and the class of example structurally
arranged around the prototype.” (24)
During the 1980s the prototype of a multiple was of a middle class white woman
in her 30s who comes for treatment for severe depression and has lots of missing time
from her narrative accounts. There may be foggy memories of troubling events,
flashbacks, severe mood swings, and bad hallucinations. She has problems with
alcoholism or drug addiction and has volatile intimate relationships. She has a large
number of alters, about 16, including child alters, helpers, and at least one male alter. She
was sexually abused while she was a child. She cannot remember significant portions of
her past and frequently “comes to” with no memory of the recent past. She is depressed
and often thinks of suicide (see summary of prototype on p. 33).
The alternative personalities of a multiple—the alters—are typically quite
different in personality, outlook, and even gender from the “host” personality. Some
alters are aware of the others, some are not. Some therapists think that introducing alters
to one another is required in order to integrate the personality.
During the 1970s, the standard etiology of multiple personality was introduced.
According to this account, multiple personalities are formed in a single person as a
defense against remembering childhood trauma, especially the trauma of sexual abuse.
Multiples are highly suggestible and are easily hypnotized. Most persons who satisfy the
DSM criteria undergo trance states.
Chapter 17 “An Indeterminacy in the Past”
Different sentences describing actions can vary in truth value (true, false) even if
the only difference between them is that they contain different terms for the same things.
For example, even if the minister is the Cuban spy, it can be true that Frank intended to
give $1500 to the minister but false that Frank intended to give $1500 to the Cuban spy.
Hacking thinks that some sentences describing intentional actions are indeterminate: they
can lack truth value (true, false) at one time but have truth value at a later time. His key
argument for this is given on pp. 249–250 of Rewriting the Soul. Here is my attempt to
reconstruct that argument:
(1) A statement describing an action has a truth value (=is true or false) only if the
terms that appear in the statement describing the action are available at the time
the action is described.
(2) Some statements describing actions include terms that are not available at the time
the action is performed but are available later.
(3) ∴Some statement describing actions do not have a truth value (= are neither
true nor false) at the time the described actions are performed but are true (or
Notes on Hacking’ s Rewriting the Soul, page 6
false) at a later time.
(4) If the terms appearing in a statement D describing an action A are not
available at the time A occurs and it is not inevitable that those terms will ever
be available, then statement D is indeterminate at the time the action it
describes occurs.
(5) Some statements describing actions contain terms that are not available at the
time the actions occur and it is not inevitable that those terms will ever be
available.
(6) ∴ Some statements describing actions are indeterminate at the time of the
action.
[If (1) and (2) were true, then (3) would have to be true. The same goes for the second
argument: if (4) and (5) are true, (6) must be true. The key argument is the inference from
(1) and (2) to (3). If (3) is false, then either (1) is false, (2) is false, or both. The key claim
in this argument is (1). What is the evidence for (1)? I take it that a key piece of evidence
is provided by the fact that some action descriptions are true and others are false even if
the objects or states of affairs described are the same or necessarily connected. So, for
example, even if my sawing a board in half is necessarily connected with my damaging a
table (these events are the same or necessarily connected) it might be true that I
intentionally sawed a board in half but false that I intentionally damaged the table. This
indicates that the truth value (truth, falsehood) of an action description depends not only
on the features of the event that are partly constitutive of the action, but also upon the
way in which the action is understood by the agent. So if the type of action an agent
performs is partly determined by the way in which that action is understood, and an agent
can come to understand his or her actions differently after a passage of time—as a result
of the availability of new terms for describing those actions—descriptions of actions that
lack truth value at one time can have truth value later. So, for example, it might not be
true in 1960 that in 1960 Sally’s father is a child abuser but it might be true in 2009 that
in 1960 Sally’s father was a child abuser.
Question: Can a single statement describing an action lack truth value for one person but
have truth value for another person at the same time? Suppose one person has, but the
other lacks, access to the relevant descriptions at that time. If so, then not only does
Hacking’s view imply that propositions that lack truth value at one time can have truth
value at another time, but it implies that a given proposition can both have and lack a
truth value at a single time. To whom must the relevant descriptive terms be available? If
a term is never available to an agent, can that term ever be used in a true description of
that agent’s intentions? Is it only agents who can learn to truly redescribe their own
earlier actions in new terms?]