Chapter One
ETHNOCENTRISM AND EMANCIPATORY IR
THEORY*
Amitav Acharya
IR Theory as Alienation
" I have been a st]-alzgei-irz a strange larzd"
Bible, Exodus, 2:22; also found in Sophocles in Oedipus at Colonus
" I , a str-a~zgerand a$-aid
Irz a world I never- made"
A.E. Houseman, Last Poenzs
The first encounter of a culturally self-conscious non-Westerner with IR
theory may be best captured in the Biblical (an ironic source for the purpose
of this chapter) concept of alienation. Alienation hiis something to do with
feeling estranged or lackina a sense of belonging. It results from many
B
sources. For Durkheim, allenation was rooted in -:he weakening of one's
societal and religious tradition. Marx saw alienation as the product of the
separation of the worker from the means of production. Freud viewed it as
the effect of a separation between the conscious slid unconscious parts of
mind. More generally, a random internet search of the concept produced
the following definition: "estrangement from other people, society, or
world, 'a blocking or dissociation of a person's fzelings' produced by a
shallow and depersonalized society."'
In IR theory, I argue, alienation afflicts those who find the great debates and
theoretical breakthroughs of IR taking place with complete disregard for the
totality of world culture and experience - especially of their own.
The discipline called International Relations has seen endless contestations
and compromises involving one school deconst~ucting,exposing, and
seeking to overcome the imperfections, dominations, and exclusions of
another. The early debates were known as 'inter-paradigmatic,' and pitted
*
1
This chapter owes its inspiration to discussions in the IR Core Course in the Political Science
Department at York University during the Fall of 1997. It owes a deep intellectual debt to the students
in the course: 1-yler Amood, Gi Bin Hong, Matina Ka~ellas,Rodn?y Loeppky, Massoud Moin, and
Deniz Roman. I remain solely responsible for the views expressed.
Encarfa Online Concise Encyclopedia, http://encarta.rnsn.corn.
the Idealists against the Realists, the behaviouralists against classical
approachists, and pluralists against structuralists. More recent debates have
been less grandiose, but equally vicious: between neo-liberals and neorealists over relative gains; between rationalists and constructivists over
identity and interests; between positivists and post-positivists on
epistemology and ontology. Whatever the outcomes of these debates and
their implications for IR theory-building, one thing is missing from the
picture: a concern with the persisting ethnocentrism of the field and the
willingness of theorists to deal with it beyond a most superficial sort of
acknowledgement. The aim of this chapter, written from the perspective of
someone who has become more interested in IR theory after overcoming a
great deal of initial reluctance, is not to start a new debate, and certainly not
another inter-paradigm debate. Rather, the chapter's intent is to underscore
this critical flaw in the discipline, and urge on the view that the theoretical
debates in IR should not just be about a 'search for thinking space,' but also
about overcoming alienation.
IR Theory, Social Anthropology, and the Problem of Centrism
Among the social science disciplines, anthropologists have a particular
fascination with centrism. Contemporary IR theorists might see their own
field as more glamorous, dealing with peace, power, and hegemony, while
anthropologists are left to deal with 'primitive cultures.' But, IR theory lags
behind Anthropology in acknowledging its centrism. Levi-Strauss's
critique of the category 'barbarian' has no equivalent in Intelnational
Relations. The subject of ethnocentrism does not figure in the interparadigm debate, and it is a measure of the extent of the issue's neglect that
there has been only one really serious scholarly attempt to examine the
phenomenon in International Relations, Ken Booth's Strategy a n d
Ethi~oce~ztl-ism,
published in 1979.'
While the problem of ethnocentrism in IR is similar to that in Anthropology
or Sociology (indeed, Ken Booth's pioneering study borrowed definitions
from these fields), there is an important element which is special to IR. The
anthropologist's definition of ethnocentrism is non-exclusionary. If
anything, an anthropologist, no matter how ethnocentric he/she may be. will
not be influenced by it to the extent that he/she will simply ignore
phenomena that do not conform to hisher mental framework. Indeed, the
business of anthropologists is to investigate any unusual phenomena;
'primitive societies or societies that are culturally different from one's own
are studied with great interest precisely because of that commitment. In IR,
howeyer, such curiosity is noticeably lacking. Therefore ethnocentrism in
IR takes on an added dimension. In'IR, ethnocentrism creates the basis for
exclusion and ignorance.
7
2
Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
All forms of centrism require the creation of the notion of the outside. As
a social practice, ethnocentrism starts with the marking off of others as nonmembers. It is produced and reproduced by the dcnial of the identity of
others. Ethnocentrism is closely llnked to territoi-iality, defined by The
Social Scie~zceE~zcyclopediaas "bounded spaces ir:. the exercise of power
and influence" which indicates a "differential access to people and things.""
To understand the multiple dimensions of ethnocentrism, w e turn to the
following sources:
The Dictio17a1-)%
ofAnthr-opology:"universal tendenc). to judge or interpret
other cultures according to the criteria of one's own ~ u l t u r e . " ~
I~ztel-~zational
Encyclopedia of the Social Scielzces: "attitude that 'one's
way of life is to be preferred to all others."15
Macnzillarz Dictionary of Alzthr-opology:"the habit or tendency to judge
or interpret other cultures according to the criteria of one's own ~ u l t u r e . " ~
The Macnzilla~z Stziderzt E~zcyclopedia of Sociologv: "the tendency to
evaluate matters by reference to the values shared in the subject's own
ethnic group as if that group were the centre of e~erything."~
The Cor~ciseOxford Dictionary of Sociology: "the practice of studying
and making judgments about other societies in tenns of one's own
cultural assumptions or bias. Ethnocentrism often suggests that the way
something is done in other societies is inferior to t:le way it is done in
one's own s o c i e t ~ . " ~
Ken Booth (Strategy arzd Ethnoce1zt1-isnz):the inabil [ty to "see the world
through the eyes of a different national or ethnic group: it is the inability
to put aside one's own cultural attitudes and imaginatively recreate the
world from the perspective of those belonging to a different group."9
Ken Booth identifies three meanings of ethnocentrism: (1) as a term to
describe feelings of group centrality and superior it:^; (2) as a technical
term to describe faulty methodology in social sciences; and, (3) as a
synonym for being "culture-bound."lo
Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, eds., The Social Science Encyclopeclia, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,
1996).
4 Thomas Barfield, ed., The Dictionary of Anthropology (Cambridge: Blzckwell, 1997).
5 David Bidney, "Culture," in David Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vo1.3
(London: Macrnillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), p.546.
6 Charlotte Seymour-Smith, ed., Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology (London: Macmillan Reference
Books, 1986), p.97.
7 Michael Mann, ed., The Macmillan Student Encyclopedia of Sociology (London: Macmillan, 1983).
8 Gordon Marshall, ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), p.158.
9 Booth, op. cit., p.15.
10 Ibid.
3
Ethnocentrism in IR presents itself in many forms and dimensions. I will
list three main forms here, and these are closely related.
The first, and perhaps most commonplace tendency, is to simply ignore the
non-Western other. It means not bothering to know about the experience of
the other. In a chapter entitled "Theory of World Politics" in his 1989 book,
Inter-izatiorzal Zr?stitz~tiorzsarzd State Power-,Robert Keohane, a leading IR
theorist, penned the following confession:
An unfortunate limitation of this chapter is that its scope is restricted to
work published in English, principally in the United States. I recognize
that this reflects the Americanocentrism of scholarship in the United
States, and I regret it. But I am not sufficiently well-read in works
published elsewhere ro comment intelligently on them."
In acknowledging his limitations, Keohane pointed to the "distinctively
American stamp that has been placed on the international relations field."
Other examples of ethnocentrism abound and are not the least bit confined
to mainstream theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism. It should
surprise no one familiar with the discipline that one of the most influential
books on multilateralism to emerge in recent years, edited by John Ruggie,
does not contain a single chapter dealing with multilateralism in the Third
World (NATO and CSCE are duly accounted for, however) or between the
exclusion of the non-West is equally
North and the South.1-e
pronounced in Security Studies, as Security Studies as a discipline
developed primarily as a study of American national security and the
'central East-West strategic balance' with scant attention to regional
security issues in the Third World.13
The celebration of the Cold War as a 'long peace,' rooted in Waltz's neorealist assertion that bipolar international systems are more 'stable' than
multipolar ones, takes us to another level of blindness.14 Such
generalizations may seem particularly absurd to those with a modicum of
sympathy for the victims of Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, and the
India-Pakistani conflicts, not to mention the victims themselves. While
Keohane at least provided an honest acknowledgement, most other
theorists, including many of the post-modem, post-structuralist critics of
11 Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert 0 . Keohane, ed.,
lnternational Institutions and State Powec Essays in lnternational Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview
Press. 1989), n.1, p.67.
12 John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of An Institutional Form (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993).
13 Amitav Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies," in Keith Krause
and Michael Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997), pp.299-327.
14 On the 'long peace' argument, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the
Post-War lnternational System," lnternational Security. 10:4 (Spring 1986); On the 'stability' of
bipolarity, see, Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of the Bipolar World," Daedalus, 93:3 (1964), and
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of lnternational Politics (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979).
'mainstream' scholars llke Keohane, simply do not bother with confessions,
even as they celebrate dissidence in IR theory and claim to engage in
developing an emancipatory discourse that would liberate and empower the
marginalised scholars of the discipline.
A second manifestation of ethnocentrism in IR is the tendency to view
world politics from the prism of one's own national 01. 'bloc' experience and
perspective, or what anthropologists may see as "the tendency to assess
other cultures in terms of one's own culture." One ol' the clearest examples
of this tendency can be found in the treatment of Third World conflicts in
Cold War Security Studies. Consider the following. observation on these
conflicts, made not by an IR scholar, but by a trainc:d anthropologist who
certainly has the ability to recognise ethnocentrism when he sees it:
In discussions of collective violence and security in he Third World, the
local-level concerns that motivate less powerful nations and local groups
tend to fall from view. Instead, a privileged position is accorded to the
interests and interpretations of the superpowers, and diplomatic and
military initiatives are treated from the perspeclive of ideological,
political, and economic superpower contests.15
Analysing a well-known Rand Corporation study O F U.S. involvement in
Third World conflicts,16the writer found that American involvement in the
Third World was considered "almost entirely from the perspective of
military concerns." Moreover, the study treated rhe U.S. involvement
"primarily in relation to the Soviet Union, for the rnost part ignoring the
specific interests and concerns of Third World countries and groups." The
writer concludes that this study was characterized by a "preoccupation with
East-West relations, to the exclusion of numerous regional concerns around
the world."'7
Such modes of thinlung and analysis would be forgiven had they been
innocent and inconsequential, and had they not contrj buted to greater levels
of violence in the Third World. The refusal of Vrestern strategists and
policy-makers to recognize regional conflicts in the 'fiird World except as
a 'side-show' to the great game of the superpowers ensured not only grave
distortions in the understanding of the causes artd remedies of these
conflicts, but might also have had the more pemiciclus effect of rendering
these struggles more 'permissible.'l8
15 Robert Rubinstein, "Collective Violence and Common Security," ir Tim Ingold, ed., Companion
Encyclopedia to Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.983-100,3.
16 Stephen Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflicts (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 1985).
17 Rubinstein, op. cit.
18 On the 'permissibility' of Third World conflicts and their role as a way of ',letting off steam" in superpower
tensions, see: Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed.,
Regional Secur~tyin the Third World (London: Croom Helm, 1986).
6
Acharya
Being theoretical in IR not only means to contest and compromise, but also to
condescend. Thus, a t h d form of the ethnocentrism afflicting the field is the
tendency to view the non-West's experiences as 'inferior.' Remember Robert
Gilpin's assertion that free trade is imposed by a "superior society."l9 This
assertion formed a key basis of the hegemonic stability theory according to
which a hegemon - a Western hegemon to be sure - is needed to provide
collective goods for the whole of manlund, including the uncivilized people of
the Third World who may not recognize the benefits of 'free trade' because of
their dependence on Western economies. To be sure, nobody has gone so far
as to label Third World practices as 'barbarian' or 'primitive.' Yet, IR
equivalents of these anthropological categories do exist. The most famous
project to study war, the 'Correlates of War' project at the University of
Michigan, led by Singer and Small, used criteria for defining war which
excluded imperial and colonial wars because of the "inadequate political status
of their participants." As a consequence, while the project's data set for interstate wars from 1816 to the then-present (1972) involving "nation-states" was
definitive, the data for "extra-systemic" wars - i.e., imperial and colonial wars
- remained, as Vasquez observes, "woefully incomplete for non-national
entities...usually the victims in this historical period." Vasquez concludes:
The discrepancy in the quality of these data sets may be seen as part of
the historical legacy of Western imperialism and racism that simply did
not regard non-Western groups as civilized or as human beings equal to
whites. It is not unfair to assume that such attitudes played some role in
accounting for the fact that Western nations did not bother to record in any
systematic way the fatalities sustained by non-national groupings in
imperial wars of conquest or pacification.20
The tendency among deterrence theorists to insist on 'rationality' as a
precondition for the applicability of their theoretical constructs goes with
another crucial assumption: that Third World leaders are unfit to possess
such weapons. This view is held not just by many Western nuclear
strategists, but as Hugh Gusterson's ethnog-aphic study of Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory confirms, by American nuclear scientists and weapon
designers as well." The criteria of rationality also separate the more
contemporary 'rogue states' from those, presumably civilized and trustworthy, owners of the weapons of mass destruction. IR theorists concerned
with rationality deny the possibility that nuclear weapons can be safely
acquired and managed by Third World countries. K. Subhramanyam, an
Lndian strategist, has called this tendency "racist.'c'
19 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
p.129, cited in Isabelle Grunberg, "Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability," International
Organization, 44:4 (Autumn 1990), p.447; For a critique of the ethnocentric bias of the hegemonic
stability theory, see: Grunberg, pp.444-448.
20 John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.27.
21 Hugh Gusterson, "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination," Cultural Anthropology,
14:1, pp.lll-143.
22 K. Subhramanyam, "Export Controls and the North-South Controversy," Washington Quarterly (Spring
1393).
Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory
7
Explaining Ethnocentrism: The Foundational Myths, the
'Columbus Syndrome,' and the Production of Knowledge
The very idea of theory in IR contributes to ethnocentrism. Theory after all
is a search for coherence; a narrower ontology obviously serves the ends of
theory. The search for theoretical coherence often outweighs the quest for
emancipation and cosmopolitanism. And the two may be antithetical. "If
coherence within international relations is finally a product of AngloAmerican nurturing, disciplinary and cosmopolitan ideals may never be
reali~ed."'~
Beyond this, there are other factors, having to do with power, the
'Columbus Syndrome,' foundational myths, and the process of going
theoretical for the non-Westerner.
Tlze Distl-ibutiolz of Power. and tlze PI-oductioi?of Knowledge
Writing a review of the development of the field since it was "founded" by
David Davies, "a wealthy Liberal MP in Wales," Ken Booth wondered:
"what ...would the subject look like today...if the subject's origins had
derived from the life and work of an admirable black, feminist, medic, shechief of the Z U ~ U S The
. " ~ very
~ fact that Booth is one of the very few among
IR's leading lights to even contemplate this question is in itself an
indication of the extent of the problem. The questions he raises are
interesting, but the conclusion he reaches is disheartening. The fact that the
field of IR was founded by David Davies rather than the Zulu chief is, going
by Booth's perspective, no accident, because it reflected, and continues to
reflect, the correlation between the distribution of power and production of
knowledge in the contemporary world order. In this world, it is the
materially powerful that dictate the terms of theory-building.
I have a slight disagreement with Booth. The issue is not that there has been
no IR theory which is'derived from the experience of admirable or not so
admirable natives of the non-West. The fact is that there have always been
places in the world where what may be considered 'international relations,'
or the 'affairs of the world at large' have always been seen and conceived
in terms markedly different from those underlying Western scholarship.
The apparently inscrutable Brahmins, and the profoundly self-centric
Chinese. can claim as interesting and, from their own vantage-points,
'accurate' theories of world affairs as can Morgenthau, Waltz, and the other
Western gurus of IR theory.' But the problem is that only the latter are so
recognized. And this may have something to do with the 'Columbus
Syndrome. '
23 William Olson and Nicholas Onuf, "The Growth of a Discipline," in Steve Smith, ed., International
Relations: British and American Perspectives (New York: Blackwell, 1985), p.18.
24 Ken Booth, "75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past - Reinventing its Future," in Steve Smith, Ken
Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International Theory: Postivism and Beyond (Cambridge:
Camb~.idyeUi~ive~siiy
Fress, i3363, p.330.
8
Acharya
The 'Colunzbus Sylzdronze'
A startling anthropological discovery in a place called Clovis in New
Mexico, USA, provides an appropriate backdrop for reflection on the
origins of International Relations theory. At Clovis, researchers looking for
evidence of the first humans in the New World discovered artifacts that date
back 11,000 years. The real significance of this discovery was not the
rekindling of the debate about who the first Americans really were. Rather,
it was the inception of the "Clovis police," described by the Ecorzonzist as
"those who attempt to stamp out the heretical idea that mankind is long
established in the Americas," well before "fourteen hundred and ninety two,
[when] Columbus sailed the ocean blue."'5
For an IR scholar fed up with the refusal of the discipline to acknowledge
the ideas and contributions of non-Western sources of international thought,
the debate about the identity of the first Americans is akin to the question
'who were the first theorists?' I am not indicting Western scholars of
International Relations, especially those who call themselves theorists, as
variants of the Clovis police, out to trample on any notion that International
Relations theory might have originated outside of the Anglo-Saxon world.
Yet, there is a discomforting similarity between the Clovis police and the
community of IR scholars who rule the discipline through their ideas and
instruments (such as journals, editorship of prestigious monograph series,
and positions which enable them to recruit students and provide grants).
While International Relations may no longer be regarded as an 'American
social science' (though it very much remains a 'Western social science'),
the theoretical literature provides scant recognition and regard for theorists
and theoretical insights from non-Western backgrounds. While the
introduc~oryhistorical chapters of many textbooks on IR, dealing with the
evolution of the international system, may these days include a section on
China or India, and a few quotes from Kautilya or Confucius or Sun Tzu,
this recognition of non-Western contributions stops as one moves to the
discussion of more contemporary issues such as power, interdependence,
and hegemony. Here, the overwhelming majority of theorists are Western,
mostly American. It is as if, when it comes to International Relations,
nothing of substance or significance has ever been said by anyone who
grew up in Calcutta or Ulan Bator, Jakarta or Nairobi. There are exceptions
to be sure, and references to Gandhi in sections dealing with peace studies,
or to Fanon in discourses on dependency may be found. But, the implicit
message seems to be that without Western theorists and the Western
experience, we would not have a discipline of International Relations.
25 'The First Americans," The Economist, 21 February 1998, p.79.
Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory
9
Fo~lrzdatioizalMytlzs
This is by no means a novel complaint. International theorists sometimes
do recognize problems of ethnocentrism and occasionally lament it, but
seldom do they try to overcome it in their own writings. Banal and
objectionable as these examples may be, ethnocentrism in IR is hardly
surprising. We have a discipline whose foundational myth dates the origins
of the 'modem international system,' hence the source of much theorizing
about international relations, to the magical year of 1648, the Peace of
Westphalia. We are constantly reminded that the modem international
system is the European states-system writ large, that the world we live in
today consists of nothing other than the expansion and universalization of
European international society. Yet, can 1648 mark the beginning of
international relations any more than 1492 represents the 'discovery' of
America by Christopher Columbus? For someone who grew up in the
villages and towns of India, Indonesia, or China, the predominance of
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Morgenthau, Kant, Gramsci, and Foucault in the
writings of a field whose scope is supposed to encompass herlhis own
native land must be profoundly alienating.
Moreover, as Morgenthau and Thomson put it in 1954, "the subject matter
of international politics is struggle for power among sovereign nations."'6
If this be so, then those countries which are yet to be sovereign, or are
barely sovereign, or have had too little power to matter in the "struggle for
power among sovereign nations" are naturally to be regarded as the objects,
rather than the subject-matter of IR. Their struggles are often left for the
students of Comparative Politics to analyze and study - while IR focuses on
the more profound and consequential matters involving the West.
Similarly, the supposedly foundational concepts of IR, such as anarchy and
sovereignty, deny the possibility that political communities might have
existed in the past, and may continue to exist in parts of the world, that do
not resemble the Westphalian state.
Goiizg Theol-etical:A Treaclzei-ous Jourizey
Theo~yin International Relations serves many ends. For rationalists, it is
about explaining and predicting state behaviour and international events.
For critical theorists, the purpose of theory is to uncover domination. For
anti-positivists, theory is about searching for 'thinking space.' But theory
can also be about discovery of self. The project of going theoretical is about
a journey in self-discovery.
A student of International Relations in Ravenshaw College, Orissa is likely
to know very little about the inter-paradigm debate. He or she is even less
likely to have heard about French post-structuralism or Western post-
26 Cited in Olson and Onuf, op. cit., p.5.
10
Acharya
modernism. He or she is more likely to have read the worldviews of
Gandhi or Nehru than Foucault. Yet International Relations theory claims
to represent us all.
In elaboration, I return to, and repeat, my initial focus on alienation.
Alienation occurs when one stands outside of the lore of the discipline,
unable to comprehend or even relate to its foundational myths. Alienation
sets in when one's own conceptions of how the world is conceived,
organized, and managed finds no place in the prevailing orthodoxy of IR o r
among those who seek to challenge it. Alienation occurs when one is asked
to view the world through a Waltzian, Gramscian, or Foucaldian prism
instead of a Gandhian or Fanonian one.
When alienation grows, disorientation sets in. Facing alienation, one
course of action is to turn oneself into an intellectual anarchist, rejecting
everything, as long as this turn does not compromise one's grades. This is
a short step to embracing area studies, studying events and trends about
one's country or region of origin. Another way is to jump wholeheartedly
into the source of alienation and take in the ancient wisdom of alien lands
as quickly and in as short a time as possible, for theory is not just a
requirement for survival, it is also a source of status. Without theory, one
is likely to be ridiculed and isolated in one's own academic environment.
Unfamiliarity with Waltz, Keohane, or Foucault is a deadly sin which will
not only spoil social evenings at graduate parties, but sink career hopes, as
well.
But deciding to be theoretical is not enough. One has to be 'correct' in
one's theoretical predisposition. Going theoretical is an act of political
choice. One may hope that there is something natural about why one
chooses a particular theory. But in reality, this is rarely the case, I suspect.
Theory, like fashion, is generation- and time-specific. It is also spacebound. Theory is chosen not because it appeals to one's natural instincts,
but because it best fits one's social and material circumstances.
Going theoretical is by itself hardly an act of emancipation. One must be
aware of two countervailing tendencies: devotion and aversion. Devotion
applies both to the 'gatekeepers' and the 'gatecrashers' (to be discussed
below). Despite all this lip-service to methodological pluralism, the
'gatecrashers' of the discipline remain as much devoted to their respective
and peculiar epistemological, methodological, and linguistic pastures as the
so-called 'gatekeepers.' A second and related tendency is aversion. The
target of aversion is not only the atheoretical - or anti-theoretical - type but
also the theory-minded from a rival school. The so-called honest
intellectual debate between 'gatekeepers' and 'gatecrashers' is more often
likely to be a fatal shootout aimed at destroying peace of mind and
sometimes careers. IR theorists are among the worst hypocrites when it
Ethnocentrism and Ernancipatory IR Theory
11
comes to honouring the self-professed commitment to keep intellectual
animosities separate from personal ones. The two are closely linked.
'Gatekeepers' and 'Gatecrasher-s'
If the high priests of Realism and liberalism are to be called the
'doorkeepers' or 'gatekeepers' of the discipline, then those who question
their authority and orthodoxy may be called 'gatecrashers.' The
'gatecrashers' are a diverse lot, but share one thing in common: resistance
to exclusion and a commitment to emancipation. But the metatheoretical
debates and preoccupations of IR scholars devote so much time and energy
to fighting exclusion that they have tended to neglect the issue of
emancipation.
For example, the concept of national security has been attacked mercilessly
for its exclusionary bias; yet few pause to ask whether broadening the scope
of security discourse to cover environment, migration, and drugs is an
emancipatory act in itself. Security and emancipation do not mix well.
Securitizing non-military, non-war phenomena is merely a way of
restricting discourse and finding new ways of domination.
By emancipatory theory, I mean theories that not only seek to expand the
horizons of IR, and resist exclusion of certain social groups (e.g., women)
and issues (e.g., the environment), but also those which resist all forms of
centrism, including ethnocentrism. Moreover, the aversion of the
'gatecrashers' to anything remotely resembling policy has the unfortunate
consequence of engendering a lack of interest in advancing the cause of
emancipation. An emancipatory theory of IR, in my view, must go beyond
a critique of epistemological and methodological assumptions of
conventional IR theory and establish its claim to praxis. The real debates
about IR theory should not just, or primarily, be about 'thinking space,' but
about strategies and agendas that promote a transformation of world order.
What is the record of the 'gatecrashers' with respect to ethnocentrism? Let
us look at four major bodies of work, recognizing, however, an element of
overlap between these categories.
1. The Third World PI-edicai7zerzt. One category of work seeks to establish
how IR concepts, for example those involving security or foreign policy,
derived largely from the West do not fit the non-West. Such work is not
necessarily based on assertions about cultural uniqueness of the Third
World. Rather, this body of literature, with major contributions from
Mohammed Ayoob and Barry Buzan, identifies a specific Third World
'predicament,' in which the security concerns of states and regimes focus
not so much on protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity from
external threats, but on the preservation of regime security and political
stability from internal threats. Another aspect of this category of work has
12
Acharya
been the attempt to build models of foreign policy and security that fit the
conditions of the Third World.
As the Cold War drew to a close, this body of literature did make a
significant contribution in addressing the ethnocentrism of Security
Studies, especially in the sense of the neglect of the non-West and
developing conceptual tools for security analysis from the experience of the
non-West, instead of simply using standard Western categories. On the
other hand, such writings do tend toward over-generalization, given the
problematic nature of the very notion of a 'Third World' even before the end
of the Cold War. Not only are the various constituents of the Third World,
or South, too diverse to permit definitive generalizations about a common
security predicament, but the distinction between the First World and the
Third World can be rather arbitrary, since social and political conditions that
constitute the more recent notion of 'human security' exist everywhere,
even in the West. Neither is the specification of a Third World security
predicament necessarily emancipatory. 'Subaltern Realism,' a-term coined
by Mohammed Ayoob, is a relevant example here.27 Subaltern Realism in
Security Studies seeks to incorporate the security concerns of "the weak
and of inferior rank." But its emancipatory claims may be limited by its
focus on the security of the Westphalian state.28
2. U~ziver.salIrztel-natio~~al
S o c i e ~ This
.
body of literature revolves around
the important claim that many of the so-called 'modem' and supposedly
Western concepts of IR, such as the state, balance of power, hegemony,
anarchy, and so on, predate Westphalia and transcend Europe. It assumes
of
the universality of international society. Adam Watson's The El~olutior~
I~ztel-rzatio~zal
Society best exemplifies this type of work.29 There is an
element of irony here, since Watson belongs to a theoretical tradition
labeled as the 'English School,' one of whose key figures, the late Hedley
Bull, did more than most to popularize the apparently uncomplicated view
that it was the European state-system that enlarged itself into a "universal
international society" in the process of colonialism and decolonization.30
He did so by looking into the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and
territorial integrity, with little attention to the pre-colonial political concepts
that might have persisted and worked to severely distort the Westphalian
overlay so as to deny the possibility of a universal international system.
27 Mohamed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Keith Krause and Michael
Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997), pp.121-146.
28 Tyler Attwood, "Security Studies and the Third World," unpublished paper, York University, Department
of Political Science, Fall 1997, pp.3-5; Massoud Moin, "Redefining Security and the Inter-Paradigm
Debate," unpublished paper, York University, Department of Political Science, Fall 1997, p.2.
29 Adam Watson, The Evolution of lnternational Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London:
Routledge, 1992).
30 See Bull's contributions in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Societv
(Oxtord: Clarendon Press, 1985).
Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory
13
Nonetheless, what emerges from this literature is significant. If modem
international relations was shaped by a struggle between the principles of
empire and anarchy in which the latter prevailed, then its roots must be seen
to lie not just in the Westphalian settlement, but in the struggles of ancient
China (The Warring States) and India (the Maurya era). The Asian
experience could thus be seen as throwing up a number of supposedly
'modern' ideas about IR (such as balance of power, sovereignty, and
collective security) long before they were evident in the European context.
If one goes by this logic, then IR theorists seeking to find alternative
political forms to the Westphalian state should consider the period in India
under the Mauryas. Those looking for the foundations of the secular
conceptions of the state might consider Mauryan Prime Minister Kautilya's
argument that the true aim of power is not to please the gods, but to attain
the happiness of the state (including its people). Similarly, one of the
foundational debates in IR theory, the so-called Realist-liberal debate,
ought to begin not from the Wilsonian critique of the European balance of
power system, but from the contestation of ideas during the Warring States
Period in China which featured a much more powerful and pluralistic
debate (both in the intellectual arena and in the battlefield) involving the
Dao (anarchic pacifism), Confucian (pro-hegemony based on the concept
of the mandate of heaven, but with moral restraints on the ruler's domestic
and foreign policy), Mo-zi (anarchic but not pacifist like Dao, pioneered the
doctrine of defensive war to counter offensive hegemonism and the concept
of armed neutrality), and the Legalists (pro-hegemony with a strong
advocacy of offensive military power without the Confucian moral
restraint).
But a key problem with this work is its underlying assumption that the
historical heritage of the non-West can be searched and studied in terms of
categories that are derived from the West itself. More often than not, the
search for a universal international society degenerates into a search for
categories from the abundance of non-Western experience that either
parallel or 'pre-replicate' the ideal-types of Western statecraft. As such it
offers only a limited challenge to the problem of ethnocentrism in IR
theory. Moreover, such work has its own problem of 'centrism'; it is often
Indo-, Sino-, or Egypto-centric. The historical experience of Africa and
South America has merited little attention. Part of the reason for this may
have to do with the focus of such work on instruments of 'statecraft'
associated with large and powerful empires. Ironically enough, political
and social systems that fell short of enlpirehood do not figure in the search
for the historical antecedents of a 'universal international society.'
3. Cr-itical IR Theory. Almost by definition, this is a very broad canvas,
which contributes to the vagueness and mystique surrounding the label
itself. Critical IR theory includes such diverse threads as Marxism, neoMarxism, Gramscian approaches (Robert Cox is a major figure in these
14
Acharya
approaches), feminism (Cynthia Enloe, Christine Sylvester, V. Spike
Peterson), and post-modemism (Jim George, Michael Shapiro, R.B.J.
Walker, Richard Ashley, James Der Derian). If there is one thing that binds
these together, it would be a collective challenge to the dominance of
Realist and liberal perspectives on international relations. Take for
example, the approaches of critical IR theories to security. Underlying
most is a shared view that the state, instead of being a provider of security,
can be a threat to people's security. Critical IR theories profess a normative
concern with global security as opposed to the security of the nation-state
or the inter-state system. They challenge the narrow focus of mainstream
Security Studies on issues of war and military force, and resist the exclusion
of issues of race, gender, ethnicity, and other forms of identity in the
discourse of Security Studies. Post-modern and post-structural theories
resort to deconstruction and discourse analysis in order to expose the
deliberate construction of national security threats by the ruling elite to
maintain regime security and justify military budgets. Critical IR theories
take a broad view of security, including the fate of the biosphere and
population movements linked to globalization. Multilateralism is a
preferred approach to managing insecurity, but this is not the
multilateralism among states, but a broader and more inclusive notion of
multilateralism involving social movements and civil society.
Feminist scholarship has done much to address the problem of
ethnocentrism in IR. Not oilly are many of its leading lights and most
original thinkers working on the non-West, they are actually from the nonWest. Moreover, feminist perspectives have made important contributions
in not only exposing the exclusionary nature of IR theorizing, but also in
offering pathways in respect of how this can be overcome. But one should
not assume a convergence of views between Western and Third World
feminist scholars; the disagreements and conflicts which exist between
them in praxis are also reflected in theory. Feminist thinlung and praxis in
Botswana do not necessarily fit into the categories and constructs of
Western feminist appr0aches.3~
If feminism has done most to address the ethnocentrism of IR theory, postmodernism has probably done the least. To be sure, the very idea of
modernity which it contests is profoundly anti-emancipatory to the nonWest. The very fact that the dividing line between modernity and its 'post
condition is traced to the Enlightenment is significant here. The
achievements of post-modernity are being claimed on the basis of an
historically-specific development that is essentially European. Moreover,
post-modemist and post-structuralist approaches to IR might have liberated
us from the excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment, but they have never
7
31 Alex Mogwe, "Human Rights in Botswana: Feminism, Oppression, and 'Integration'," Alternatives, 19
(1994), pp.189-193.
Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory
15
come to terms with the fact that many areas of the non-West have been so
marginalized in the historical processes of colonialism and neo-colonialism
(itself a product of Enlightenment) that for some non-Western states and
societies at least, what passes for 'modernity,' including a commitment to
illtellectual and policy rationalism, is a legitimate but still-elusive
aspiration.
Moreover, an argument can be made that in IR theory, the post-modern
challenge to ethnocentrism is set by the need to counter the Anglo and
Anglo-American with the help of the Franco. Missing from this is the nonWest, the non-Anglo-American and the non-Francophile. When Der Derian
uses the term Anglocentrism to characterize Jeremy Bentham's context
when he became the first to use the term 'international,' or the "AngloAmerican discipline of international relations," he is concerned with the
goal of countering it with "continental philosophical incursions," especially
those plotted by neologistic Francofiles.3'
But ironically enough, a few of the critics of the post-modern project
themselves have fallen into the same trap. Of particular relevance here is
postcolonial theory, which seeks to dismantle all binary distinctions
between West and the rest, such as that between First World-Third World,
North-South, and centre and periphery to "reveal societies globally in the
complex heterogeneity and contingency."33 Gayatri Spivak began by
challenging Foucault for treating "Europe as a self-enclosed and selfgenerating entity, by neglecting the central role of imperialism in the very
making of Europe."34 Edward Said has made similar criticisms, accusing
Foucault of neglecting not only European imperialism, but also resistance
to imperialism outside of Europe. But postcolonialism cannot be regarded
as an authentic attempt to counter ethnocentrism, because postcolonial
discourses, as Arif Dirlik points out, are intended "to achieve an authentic
globalisation of cultural discourses by the extension globally of the
intellectual concerns and orientations originating at the central sites of
Euro-American cultural criticism."35 Thus, postcolonialism seeks "not to
produce fresh knowledges about what was until recently called the Third
World but to re-structure existing bodies of knowledge into the
poststructuralist paradigms and to occupy sites of cultural production
outside the Euro-American zones by globalising concerns and orientations
originating at the central sites of Euro-American cultural production."36
32 James Der Derian, "The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations," in James Der
Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., International/lntertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World
Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp.7-9.
33 Arif Dirlik, 'The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," Critical Inquiry
(Winter 1994), p.329.
34 Aijaz Ahmad, "Postcolonial Theory and the 'Post'-Condition," in Leo Panitch, ed., Ruthless Criticism of
all that Exists, The Socialist Register 1997 (London: Merlin Press, 1997), p.374.
35 Dirlik, op. cit., p.329.
36 Ahmad. op. cit.. p.368.
16
Acharya
Gramscian approaches, especially the work of Robert Cox, have made a far
more sincere attempt to go beyond their European heritage. Cox's early
work on IR theory and his more recent work on civilizations stand out in
their attempts to consciously (self-consciously?) draw upon and incorporate
the thinking of Ibn Khadun.37 His critique of globalization focuses on the
marginalization of labour and destruction of the environment in both the
West and the non-West.38 Yet, the Gramscian notion of hegemony as a
single overarching framework for analyzing and explaining world events is
problematic because of its potential to ignore or marginalize social,
cultural, and economic structures and agencies which are locally produced
and may not relate well to an historical-materialist explanation based on the
dominance of global production processes. For example, one may well
explain economic liberalization in India or human rights abuses in China in
terms of globally dominant ideas and material structures; but the influence
of important local historical and inter-subjective factors could be lost in the
process. How much of the latter should inform the former?
Within Gramscian perspectives, the non-West exists only as the object,
rather than subject, of a hegemonic world order. The thoughts and
approaches of the non-West 'local' are conditioned primarily by the ideas
and material instruments of the Western and hegemonic 'global.' This runs
the risk not only of re-legitimizing the oppressive ethnocentrism of IR
theory, but also of marginalizing the emancipatory strategies of the
multitude of non-Western voices. The normatively appealing visions of a
'global civil society' promoted by critical theorists, including neoGramscians, which link together social movements around the globe, are a
case in point as they blur crucial material and inter-subjective distinctions
between the West and the non-West.39
4. Retzir-12of Cz~ltzir-e
and Iderztity. The 'return of culture and identity' to IR
theory has been the subject of much joy and celebration. It is hardly
necessary to revisit the debate regarding the necessity of considering
culture and identity questions in IR theory. However, it must be kept in
mind that this exclusion had always been more true of Western scholarship
than of non-recognized IR scholars in the non-West. A scholar from the
non-West was always more llkely to accept culture and identity as the basis
of IR discourse, rather than the models and abstractions of problem-solving
and critical Western theory.
37 Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
38 Robert Cox, "Production and Security," in David Dewitt, David Haglund and John Kirton, eds., Building
a New Global Order Emerging Trends in International Security (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1993).
39 An interesting example could be found in the Asia Pacific human rights NGO gathering in Bangkok prior
to the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. There, the NGO community produced two
drafts of a final declaration. The initial draft, containing the'views of Western NGOs, was contested by
Chandra Muzzafar, a leading Malaysian human rights scholar and activist, who felt compelled to
rlic?r;re.. ?!it!? !!?o Wes!e::
?!GC?pe:spec:i~;a on whai sP,oulu" be h i i e .
Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory
17
Thus, to say that culture matters in explaining international relations adds
to our perspective only if one compares it with the unbelievable lightness
of rationalist Western IR theory. Against this backdrop, the return of culture
and identity should be happy news to those fighting ethnocentrism in IR.
After all, questions about culture necessarily call for a recognition of a
diversity of experiences and encounters in the world in which we live.
Getting one's identity recognized could mean breaking out of the margins.
Yet, such celebrations may lead us in directions that may result in
oppression and further marginalization. The emancipatory claims of
culture and identity approaches deserve closer scrutiny.
Theories that accept culture and identity as legitimate points of discourse
are of a broad variety: state-centric, society-centric, and post-structuralist.
Not all culture-based explanations of IR look to society for their
explanatory power. Wendt, a constructivist, and Katzenstein, a cultural
institutionalist, remain wedded to a state-centric project. For them,
bringing in issues of culture and identity has meant exploring the identity
of the state. The emancipatory potential of culturelidentity discourses lies
in the recognition of the margin, the representation of the object, and the
empowerment of the weak. But here post-structuralist perspectives on
culture and identity do not entirely overcome the problem of ethnocentrism.
David Campbell's influential and popular work explains the foreign policy
of the U.S. as an identity-inscribing process, but as Rodney Loeppky points
out, it is "ill-equipped to ascertain certain unique aspects of identityformation in states subjected to the foreign policy of an outside power such
as the United States."40 The dynamic of identity formation among Western
actors is different from that among non-Western actors because in the case
of the latter, the identity of states - in everything from its citizens to its
political structure - may be partly an effect of outside penetration. "Under
such a process, the identity of the 'other' is formulated in a manner which
reaffirms, and often strictly reinforces, the dominant selflother environment
within which it operates."41 While Campbell assumes that the American
state can have an unlimited capacity to enact politically "useful" policies in
its identity-generating historical processes, it is hard to accept that this sort
of capacity could exist in the Third World. Ironically, therefore, Campbell's
work can do with a little dose of Ayoob-like effort to differentiate between
the West and non-West, including the differences in state capacity and the
very specific socio-political cohesion of the latter.
40 Rodney Loeppky, "Identity Analysis and Non-Western Foreign Policies," unpublished paper, York
University, Department of Political Science, Fall 1997, p.1.
41 /bid.. p.6.
18
Acharya
There can be no safe assumption that a cultural approach is emancipatory,
or that to ask questions about identity involves more than fighting the
narrow positivist bias of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Culture and
identity are not categories that always lend themselves to emancipatory
projects. Culture is inherently boundary-minded, and identity easily fits
into a project of exclusion. This happens not only in the hands of states, but
also in those of social movements and of various other representatives of
the margins. One example of the negation of universality by arguments
from a cultural standpoint is easily found in the universalist-relativist clash
over human rights. Governments in Asia today question the universality of
human rights and consider the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as
an instrument created by the West reflecting its own particular values and
identity. But this may be a call by authoritarian rulers invoking culture to
survive in office. Moreover, one should be mindful of the use of culture and
identity by Western governments and analysts in dealing with the so-called
'ethnic conflicts' in the Third World. Here, culture provides a ready-made
and relatively unproblematic framework for analyzing violence in the Third
World, as something of an ahistoric and 'inevitable' phenomenon.
Focusing on culture and identity means shifting attention away from other,
possibly more salient causes of ethnic warfare, including issues of socioeconomic development, marginalization, and North-South inequities for
which blame must be shared by both the West and the non-West.4'
Conclusion
In their well-known, if dated, survey of the field, William Olson and
Nicholas Onuf hoped to see "the ideal of a cosmopolitan discipline in which
adepts from many cultures enrich the discourse of International Relations
with all the world's ways of seeing and knowing." But they also warned
that globalization of IR may well indicate "the successful diffusion of the
Anglo-American cognitive style and professional stance rather than the
absorption of alien modes of thought."43
This is exactly what has happened and continues to be the problem. The
belated and ongoing efforts by the community of IR scholars to 'globalize'
their discipline have merely entailed the drafting of more Third World
scholars into the field that continues to be defined and dominated by
Western categories and concepts. This chapter has sought to highlight the
need for some urgency in addressing the problem and to render the
discipline truly universal by recognizing and incorporating the ideas and the
experiences of the non-West. Ethnocentrism is one of the most pernicious
forms of exclusion in IR theory. It is also one of the foremost challenges
for the emancipatory project, with which the field has yet to fully come to
terms.
42 Matina Karvellas, "International Relations and Inter-Discipline: Redefinition without Recourse"
unpublished paper, York University, Department of Political Science, Fall 1997, pp.7-8.
4 1 Olson and Onuf, op. cit., p.18.