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133
police soon arrive. Thorence is pale and unconscious. Fungwe screams in anguish,
‘‘I killed my baby! I killed my baby!’’
Thorence is rushed to the Michigan Children’s Hospital and found to have a
severe case of hyperthermia. The doctors try to resuscitate him but because his jaw
is locked tightly, they have difficulty intubating him. He dies soon after reaching
the hospital.
A Detroit Police Department spokesman later reports that the baby’s body
temperature was at least 108 degrees. The doctors are sure Thorence’s temperature was higher than that, but ‘‘the thermometer would go no higher.’’
1. Relying only on your own intuitions of justice, what liability and punishment, if any, does Thomas Fungwe deserve?
N
0
1
no
liability 1 day
liability but no
punishment
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2 wks
2 mo
6 mo
1 yr
3 yrs
7 yrs
15 yrs
30 yrs
10
11
life
death
imprisonment
2. What liability, if any, under the then-existing statutes?
3. What liability, if any, under the Model Penal Code?
THE LAW
Michigan Statutes Annotated
(1999)
Title 28. Crimes, Part Two. Substantive Criminal Law
Chapter 286a. Penal Code
Chapter XLV. Homicide
Section 28.548. First-Degree Murder; Penalty; Definitions
Sec. 316. (1) A person who commits any of the following is guilty of first
degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life:
(a) Murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or any other
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, or third degree, child
abuse in the first degree, a major controlled substance offense, robbery,
carjacking, breaking and entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the first
or second degree, larceny of any kind, extortion, or kidnapping.
(c) A murder of a peace officer or a corrections officer committed while
the peace officer or corrections officer is lawfully engaged in the performance
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of any of his or her duties as a peace officer or corrections officer, knowing
that the peace officer or corrections officer is a peace officer or corrections
officer engaged in the performance of his or her duty as a peace officer or
corrections officer.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) ‘‘Arson’’ means a felony violation of chapter X.
(b) ‘‘Corrections officer’’ means any of the following:
(i) A prison or jail guard or other prison or jail personnel.
(ii) Any of the personnel of a boot camp, special alternative
incarceration unit, or other minimum security correctional facility.
(iii) A parole or probation officer.
(c) ‘‘Major controlled substance offense’’ means any of the following:
(i) A violation of section 7401(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public
health code, MCL 333.7401.
(ii) A violation of section 7403(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public
health code, MCL 333.7403.
(iii) A conspiracy to commit an offense listed in subparagraph (i)
or (ii).
(d) ‘‘Peace officer’’ means any of the following:
(i) A police or conservation officer of this state or a political
subdivision of this state.
(ii) A police or conservation officer of the United States.
(iii) A police or conservation officer of another state or a political
subdivision of another state.
Section 28.549. Murder; Second Degree
Sec. 317. All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the second [2nd]
degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any
term of years, in the discretion of the court trying the same.
Section 28.553. Manslaughter; Penalties
Sec. 321. Any person who shall commit the crime of manslaughter shall be
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, not more than
fifteen [15] years or by fine of not more than seven thousand five hundred [7,500]
dollars, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Section 28.556. Negligent Homicide; Penalty
Sec. 324. Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway
or upon any other property, public or private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in
a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause
the death of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2 years or by a fine of not more than
$2,000.00, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Section 4
Culpability Requirements
Section 28.557. Negligent Homicide; Inclusion in Manslaughter;
Verdict of Guilty
Sec. 325. The crime of negligent homicide shall be deemed to be included
within every crime of manslaughter charge to have been committed in the operation of any vehicle, and in any case where a defendant is charged with
manslaughter committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the jury shall find
the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of
guilty of negligent homicide.
Section 28.330. Exposing Child with Intent to Injure or Abandon
Sec. 135. Any father or mother of a child under the age of six [6] years, or
any other person who shall expose such child in any street, field, house or other
place, with intent to injure or wholly to abandon it, shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than ten [10] years.
Section 28.331(2). Definitions; Child Abuse
Sec. 136b. (1) As used in this section:
(a) ‘‘Child’’ means a person who is less than 18 years of age and is
not emancipated by operation of law as provided in section 4 of MCL
722.4.
(b) ‘‘Cruel’’ means brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that which torments.
(c) ‘‘Omission’’ means a willful failure to provide the food, clothing,
or shelter necessary for a child’s welfare or the willful abandonment of a
child.
(d) ‘‘Person’’ means a child’s parent or guardian or any other person
who cares for, has custody of, or has authority over a child regardless of the
length of time that a child is cared for, in the custody of, or subject to the
authority of that person.
(e) ‘‘Physical harm’’ means any injury to a child’s physical condition.
(f) ‘‘Serious physical harm’’ means any physical injury to a child that
seriously impairs the child’s health or physical well-being, including, but not
limited to, brain damage, a skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury, poisoning, burn or scald, or
severe cut.
(g) ‘‘Serious mental harm’’ means an injury to a child’s mental condition or welfare that is not necessarily permanent but results in visibly
demonstrable manifestations of a substantial disorder of thought or mood
which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree if the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.
Child abuse in the first degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 15 years.
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(3) A person is guilty of child abuse in the second degree if any of the
following apply:
(a) The person’s omission causes serious physical harm or serious
mental harm to a child or if the person’s reckless act causes serious physical
harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act likely to
cause serious physical or mental harm to a child regardless of whether harm
results.
(c) The person knowingly or intentionally commits an act that is cruel
to a child regardless of whether harm results.
(4) Child abuse in the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 4 years.
(5) A person is guilty of child abuse in the third degree if the person
knowingly or intentionally causes physical harm to a child. Child abuse in the
third degree is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than
2 years.
(6) A person is guilty of child abuse in the fourth degree if the person’s
omission or reckless act causes physical harm to a child. Child abuse in the
fourth degree is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than
1 year.
(7) This section does not prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person
permitted by law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking steps to
reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable force.
People v. Richardson
293 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. 1980)
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and appealed on the contention that the jury was not instructed on the definition of involuntary
manslaughter, a crime for which his evidence provided support. The court held
the judge’s refusal to instruct on the lesser crimes to be in error, and noted that
Michigan’s ‘‘manslaughter statute does not define that offense [involuntary manslaughter], but instead incorporates the common-law definition.’’
People v. Ryczek
194 N.W. 609 (Mich. 1923)
Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for colliding with a
boy pushing his baby sister in a cart, which resulted in the baby’s death. The court
affirmed his conviction and applied the common law definition that involuntary
manslaughter is ‘‘the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in
doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause
death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by
the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. . . . [Here, the defendant] while
doing a lawful act in driving his automobile, . . . did it in such a negligent manner
Section 4
Culpability Requirements
that it amounted to gross negligence on his part.’’ The court found that if the
‘‘defendant [had] given the most casual glance ahead of him, he would have
observed the children approaching.’’ Consequently, the jury was ‘‘well within
their province in finding that such conduct was gross negligence,’’ deserving of
conviction.
People v. Clark
556 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 1996)
Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the death of her
four-year-old son. She was suspected of child abuse. The court adopted the
common law definition of the crime, and added that ‘‘[t]he kind of negligence
required for manslaughter is . . . often described as . . . ‘gross negligence,’ [for
which] three elements must be satisfied. These elements are embodied in CJI2d
16.18 that expressed the people’s theory of the defendant’s guilt. . . . These
elements are: (1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary
care and diligence to avert injury to another. (2) Ability to avoid the resulting
harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand. (3) The
omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when to the
ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to
another.’’
People v. Clark
431 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. App. 1988)
Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide after he drove his semitrailer
truck through a red light and struck an oncoming car. The court stated that ‘‘the
crime of negligent homicide is the killing of a person through an act of ordinary
negligence, an act which is otherwise noncriminal, which becomes criminal
because the victim dies.’’
People v. Traughber
439 N.W.2d 231 (Mich. 1989)
Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide for causing a fatal crash
when he swerved into another lane of traffic. On appeal, the defendant challenged
the jury instructions as prejudicial by requiring more than a reasonable standard of
care. The court held the trial judge’s instructions were correct, and stated that
‘‘[t]here is no question that the applicable standard of care in negligent homicide
cases is that of a reasonable person. CJI 16:5:02(1) states: ‘For negligent homicide
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty of ordinary negligence.’ This instruction goes on to explain that ‘[o]rdinary
negligence is defined as want of reasonable care; that is, failing to do what an
ordinarily sensible person would have done under the conditions and circumstances then existing. . . . ’ CJI 16:5:02(4).’’ However, the court reversed the
137
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Offense Requirements
conviction because the defendant had reacted to an emergency situation in a
manner that was not contrary to that of a reasonably prudent man under similar
circumstances.
THE CASE OF RAYMOND LENNARD
GARNETT
Raymond Lennard Garnett is a twenty-year old man living in Silver Spring,
Maryland, a Washington, D.C., suburb. Garnett is average height (50 800 )
and weight, but is legally mentally retarded, with an I.Q. of 52. (The Supreme
Court recently held that an I.Q. of 70 or lower qualifies as mentally retarded.)
Garnett reads at about a third-grade level and his math skills put him on a fifthgrade level. He attended special education classes, but recently left school for a
short time when the other students teased him so mercilessly that he became too
scared to return to class. He was home-schooled for a time but eventually returned
to public school. He cannot complete many of the required tasks, because he
does not understand the vocational assignments. He is often confused and sometimes gets lost. He does not pass any of the state’s graduation tests and so receives
only a certificate of attendance rather than a diploma. He presently interacts with
others and processes things much as an eleven- or twelve-year old would.
In November of 1990, Garnett’s friend introduces him to Erica Frazier.
They both tell Garnett that Erica is sixteen years old, a fact later confirmed by her
friends. In reality, Erica is only thirteen. Garnett is surprised that she is interested
in talking to him. He likes her and enjoys talking with someone who does not
make fun of him. Erica and Garnett talk on the phone off and on over the next
several months.
On the evening of February 28, 1991, Garnett is stranded. He needs a ride
home and notices that Erica’s house is nearby. He approaches her house on
Liberty Heights Lane at
about 9 p.m. Erica opens
her bedroom window and
invites him in. She tells
him to get a ladder and to
climb up to her window so
as not to disturb her parents. He enters her room
and the two sit and talk
for a while. One thing
leads to another and they
eventually end up having
consensual sex. Afterwards,
Garnett and Erica lie
for hours talking. Finally,
at 4:30 a.m., Garnett
Figure 16 Frazier’s house (with tree)
leaves.
(Catherine McAlpine)
Section 4
Culpability Requirements
139
Eight and a half months after their encounter, on November 19, 1991, Erica
gives birth to a baby girl at Shady Grove Adventist Hospital. Her mother, Brenda
Freeman, had not been aware of the pregnancy. Erica explains that Garnett had
visited once and that it was her only sexual experience. The next day, Ms. Freeman
contacts the Youth Division of the police to report the rape of her daughter.
Garnett is subsequently arrested for statutory rape after being determined to be
the biological father.
1. Relying only on your own intuitions of justice, what liability and punishment, if any, does Raymond Lennard Garnett deserve?
N
0
1
no
liability 1 day
liability but no
punishment
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2 wks
2 mo
6 mo
1 yr
3 yrs
7 yrs
15 yrs
30 yrs
10
11
life
death
imprisonment
2. What liability, if any, under the then-existing statutes?
3. What liability, if any, under the Model Penal Code?
THE LAW
Annotated Code of Maryland
(1990)
Article 27. Crimes and Punishments
I. Sexual Offenses
Section 461. Definitions
(a) In general. — In this subheading, the following words have the meanings
indicated.
(b) Mentally defective. — ‘‘Mentally defective’’ means (1) a victim who
suffers from mental retardation, or (2) a victim who suffers from a mental disorder,
either of which temporarily or permanently renders the victim substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or resisting the act of vaginal
intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual contact, or of communicating unwillingness to
submit to the act of vaginal intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual contact.
(c) Mentally incapacitated. — ‘‘Mentally incapacitated’’ means a victim who,
due to the influence of a drug, narcotic or intoxicating substance, or due to any act
committed upon the victim without the victim’s consent or awareness, is rendered
substantially incapable of either appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or
resisting the act of vaginal intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual contact.
(d) Physically helpless. — ‘‘Physically helpless’’ means (1) a victim who is
unconscious; or (2) a victim who does not consent to an act of vaginal intercourse,
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Offense Requirements
a sexual act, or sexual contact, and is physically unable to resist an act
of vaginal intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual contact or communicate unwillingness to submit to an act of vaginal intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual
contact.
(e) Sexual act. — ‘‘Sexual act’’ means cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal
intercourse, but does not include vaginal intercourse. Emission of semen is not
required. Penetration, however slight, is evidence of anal intercourse. Sexual act
also means the penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or anal
opening of another person’s body if the penetration can be reasonably construed
as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either
party and if the penetration is not for accepted medical purposes.
(f) Sexual contact. — ‘‘Sexual contact,’’ as used in §§464B and 464C, means
the intentional touching of any part of the victim’s or actor’s anal or genital areas
or other intimate parts for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for
abuse of either party and includes the penetration, however slight, by any part of a
person’s body, other than the penis, mouth, or tongue, into the genital or anal
opening of another person’s body if that penetration can be reasonably construed
as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either
party. It does not include acts commonly expressive of familial or friendly affection, or acts for accepted medical purposes.
(g) Vaginal intercourse. — ‘‘Vaginal intercourse’’ has its ordinary meaning of
genital copulation. Penetration, however slight, is evidence of vaginal intercourse.
Emission of semen is not required.
Section 461A. Admissibility of Evidence in Rape Cases
(a) Evidence relating to victim’s chastity. — Evidence relating to a victim’s
reputation for chastity and opinion evidence relating to a victim’s chastity are not
admissible in any prosecution for commission of a rape or sexual offense in the first
or second degree. Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct may be admitted only if the judge finds the evidence is relevant and is
material to a fact in issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature
does not outweigh its probative value, and if the evidence is:
(1) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant; or
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source
or origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or trauma; or
(3) Evidence which supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior
motive in accusing the defendant of the crime; or
(4) Evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment when the prosecutor puts the victim’s prior sexual conduct in issue.
(b) In camera hearing. — Any evidence described in subsection (a) of this
section may not be referred to in any statements to a jury nor introduced at trial
without the court holding a prior in camera hearing to determine the admissibility
of the evidence. If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that
may make the evidence described in subsection (a) admissible, the court may order
an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence
under subsection (a).
Section 4
Culpability Requirements
Section 461B. Instructions
In any criminal prosecution for rape, attempted rape, assault with intent to
commit a rape, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, or any other sexual
offense, the jury may not be instructed:
(1) To examine with caution the testimony of the prosecuting witness,
solely because of the nature of the charge;
(2) That the charge is easily made or difficult to disprove, solely because
of the nature of the charge; or
(3) As to any other similar instruction, solely because of the nature of
the charge.
Section 462. First Degree Rape
(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force or threat of
force against the will and without the consent of the other person and:
(1) Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article
which the other person reasonably concludes is a dangerous or deadly
weapon; or
(2) Inflicts suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, or serious physical injury upon the other person or upon anyone else in the course of
committing the offense; or
(3) Threatens or places the victim in fear that the victim or any person
known to the victim will be imminently subjected to death, suffocation,
strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or kidnaping; or
(4) The person commits the offense aided and abetted by one or more
other persons; or
(5) The person commits the offense in connection with the breaking
and entering of a dwelling house.
(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for no more than the
period of his natural life.
Section 463. Second Degree Rape
(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
(1) By force or threat of force against the will and without the consent
of the other person; or
(2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably
know the other person is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless; or
141
142
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Offense Requirements
(3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at
least four years older than the victim.
(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more
than 20 years.
Section 464. First Degree Sexual Offense
(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the first
degree if the person engages in a sexual act:
(1) With another person by force or threat of force against the will and
without the consent of the other person, and:
(i) Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article
which the other person reasonably concludes is a dangerous or deadly
weapon; or
(ii) Inflicts suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, or serious
physical injury upon the other person or upon anyone else in the course
of committing the offense; or
(iii) Threatens or places the victim in fear that the victim or any
person known to the victim will be imminently subjected to death,
suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or
kidnaping; or
(iv) The person commits the offense aided and abetted by one or
more other persons; or
(v) The person commits the offense in connection with the breaking and entering of a dwelling house.
(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for no more than the
period of his natural life.
Section 464A. Second Degree Sexual Offense
(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second
degree if the person engages in a sexual act with another person:
(1) By force or threat of force against the will and without the consent
of the other person; or
(2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably
know the other person is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless; or
(3) Under 14 years of age and the person performing the sexual act is
four or more years older than the victim.
(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more
than 20 years.
Section 4
Culpability Requirements
Section 464B. Third Degree Sexual Offense
(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the third
degree if the person engages in sexual contact:
(1) With another person against the will and without the consent of the
other person, and:
(i) Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article
which the other person reasonably concludes is a dangerous or deadly
weapon; or
(ii) Inflicts suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement or serious
physical injury upon the other person or upon anyone else in the course
of committing that offense; or
(iii) Threatens or places the victim in fear that the victim or any
person known to the victim will be imminently subjected to death,
suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or
kidnaping; or
(iv) Commits the offense aided and abetted by one or more other
persons; or
(2) With another person who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person knows or should reasonably
know the other person is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless; or
(3) With another person who is under 14 years of age and the person
performing the sexual contact is four or more years older than the victim.
(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more
than 10 years.
Section 464C. Fourth Degree Sexual Offense
(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the fourth
degree if the person engages:
(1) In sexual contact with another person against the will and without
the consent of the other person; or
(2) In a sexual act with another person who is 14 or 15 years of age and
the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the
other person; or
(3) In vaginal intercourse with another person who is 14 or 15 years of
age and the person performing the act is four or more years older than the
other person.
(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not
more than one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both fine and
imprisonment.
143
144
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Offense Requirements
Eggleston v. State
241 A.2d 433, 434 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968)
Defendant was charged with statutory rape. On appeal, he argued that the
statute’s language describing the crime as ‘‘feloniously’’ committed meant that a
specific intent was required. However, the court rejected his argument, and held that
the state’s statutory rape provision did not permit a mens rea requirement and the
term ‘‘feloniously’’ was merely a description used to classify the offense. The court
applied the ‘‘generally accepted state of the law as set out in Wharton’s Criminal Law,
[which] fail[ed] to vindicate appellant’s proposition: ‘It is no defense that the
defendant did not know that the female was under the statutory age of consent. It
is immaterial that the defendant in good faith believed that the female was above
the prohibited age; that his belief, though erroneous, was reasonable; or that the
defendant had been misled by the appearance or statements of the female. The
defendant acts at his peril that the female may in fact be under the age of consent.
The fact that the defendant cannot assert as a defense his bona fide belief in the
victim’s age does not make unconstitutional the statutes under consideration.’ ’’
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County
450 U.S. 464, 465 (1981)
The defendant was convicted of statutory rape under the California Penal
Code §261.5. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by defining unlawful
sexual intercourse as ‘‘an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not
the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years.’’ Thus,
the statute made men alone criminally liable. However, the Court overturned the
California Supreme Court’s ruling and upheld the statute as not being invidious,
and instead found it ‘‘realistically reflect[ed] the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.’’ The Court recognized the state’s interest in
making the crime of statutory rape a strict liability offense, and held that California’s
interest of preventing teenage pregnancy to be a valid interest.
Model Penal Code
(Official Draft 1962)
Section 1.13. General Definitions
In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required: . . .
(9) ‘‘element of an offense’’ means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii) such a result of conduct as
(a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the
definition of the offense; or
(b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or
(c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or
(d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or
(e) establishes jurisdiction or venue;