The Legacies of History? Colonization and Immigrant Integration in Britain and France
Author(s): Erik Bleich
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 171-195
Published by: Springer
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TheoryandSociety(2005)34: 171-195
2005
@Springer
The legaciesof history?Colonizationand immigrant
integrationin Britainand France
ERIKBLEICH
Middlebury
College
Abstract.Thisarticlescrutinizes
thewidelyheldbeliefthatBritishandFrenchcolostructures.
Itassesses
nialmodelshaveinfluenced
eachcountry's
integration
immigrant
British
and
the coreassumptions
the
that
colonial
integration
underlying argument:
policieshavereliedon indirectruleof groupsdefinedby raceor ethnicity;andthat
ruleandhavebeenhighlyassimFrench
direct
corresponding
policieshaveemphasized
Itdemonstrates
arenotasdifferent
asoftenportrayed.
ilationist.
thatthetwocountries
Italsopinpointsthespecificpathsthroughwhichcoloniallegaciesinfluenced
integrahavebroadlyinformed
tionpolicies,whilerejectingthethesisthatcolonialinstitutions
integration
policiesin Britainor France.The articlethuschallengesa seriesof receivedideas,replacingthemwitha morepreciseassessmentof therelationsbetween
thecolonialpastandtheintegration
present.
a hostof adminDuringthecolonialera,BritainandFranceestablished
istrativeinstitutionsandenacteda wide rangeof policiesto facilitate
rulebeyondtheirborders.Throughtheiractionsoverseas,the British
andFrenchstatesfirstgainedexperiencegoverningethnically,
racially,
andculturallydiversesocieties,makingdecisionsaboutthe statusand
millionsofpeople,
rightsaccordedto differentgroups.Theyinfluenced
theireducation,work,andlaws,andshapingtheiridentities
structuring
andinteractions
witheachotherandwithoutsiders.As decolonization
in
the
proceeded
post-wardecades,thisimperialdiversitywasincreasto Britishand Frenchshores.As immigrantsfrom
ingly transferred
formercoloniesarrivedin significantnumbers,policymakers
in each
faced
choices
about
how
to
administer
ethnic
at
country
diversity home.
Britainand France'smulti-ethnicpasts andpresentsraise questions
aboutthe extentto whichcolonialhistoryhas influencedcontemporarypracticesof managingethnicpluralismin eachcountry.Themost
commonargumentfor a strongconnectionis basedon fourassumptions:thatBritainreliedon indirectrulein its empirewhilecultivating
ethnicand culturaldifferences;thatBritain'sintegrationinstitutions
172
and policieshaverecognizedethnicdifferencesandhave replicated
indirectruleon Britishsoil;thatFranceemployeddirectruleandtried
to assimilatepeoplein its colonies;andthatFrance'spoliciesto inThese
tegratepost-warimmigrantshavebeen highlyassimilationist.
fourassumptions
arewidelyheldby educatednon-specialists
andare
also frequentlyarticulated
by scholarsof immigrantintegrationwho,
althoughtheytypicallyemphasizeotherfactorsin theiranalyses,regularlynodin thedirectionof thesimilaritiesbetweencolonizationand
integrationin BritainandFrance.Earlyin his bookPhilosophiesof
forexample,AdrianFavell(1998:3-4) states:
Integration,
Theresponsesof FranceandBritain[totheissueof immigration],
as befits
theirrespectivecolonialreputations,
appearto be almostreversedmirror
Franceemphasizing
the universalist
ideaof inteimagesof one [an]other:
intofull Frenchcitoyens;andBritain
gration,of transforming
immigrants
as a questionof managingpublicorderandrelationsbeseeingintegration
tweenmajorityandminoritypopulations,
andallowingethnicculturesand
to
the
mediate
practices
process.
Thejuxtapositionof BritishandFrenchapproachesis also common
amongexpertswho specializein one ortheothercountry.In his work
on racerelationsin Britain,IraKatznelson(1976:176-77)arguesthat
"akeyfeatureof classiccolonialpatternsof socialcontrol-indirectrule
- hasbeenreplicatedin themother
througha broker,nativeleadership
Morerecently,ChristianJoppke(1999:224-25) followedin
country."
thisveinby writing:
as ethnicminorities
Britain's
readinessto acknowledge
hasdeep
immigrants
historicalroots.... [T]heempireprovideda pluralisticmodelfor dealing
If imperialFrancehadtriedto assimilate
with post-imperial
immigrants.
her colonies,imperialBritainneverhad suchpretensions.... Whenthe
intothecenterof empire,therewasno
movedfromtheperiphery
"natives"
in anyway.
or"English"
of theirbecoming"British"
presumption
Forits part,theFrenchintegration
as highlyassimmodelis portrayed
ilationist- farmoreso thantheBritish,German,orAmericanmodels,
whicharearguedto embracetheconceptsof multiculturalism
andethnic diversity(Todd1994;Schnapper1992).Egalitarianassimilation
of immigrants
to France'scolois seento beara strikingresemblance
nialcivilizingmission.Mich le Lamont(2000:185)remarksuponthe
differencebetweenBritishand Frenchcolonialmodelsin her work
comparingFranceandtheUnitedStates:
This belief in the superiorityof Frenchculturehas been maintained
throughcolonialism via France'smission civilisatrice- its mission to carry
civilizationto suchless-developed
regionsas NorthAfrica.Frenchculture
was imposedon AsianandAfricanelites at a timewhenFrance'sempire
173
was secondonlyto GreatBritain's.
By contrast,theBritishcolonialproject
of
the
cultural
autonomy its subjects.FortheFrench,barbarians
supported
couldbecomepartof humanity
by assimilating.
betweenBritishandFrenchcolonialstructures,
Beliefinthedifferences
the differencesbetweentheirintegrationstructures,andthe internal
continuitywithineachcountryis, in short,extremelywidespread.It
hoversat theperipheryof manyexpertanalysesas a takenforgranted
proposition.
In spiteof its generallyacceptedstatus,the relationbetweenmanaging ethnicallydiversesocietiesin the coloniesandmanagingthemat
homehasrarelybeencarefullyscrutinized.'Thisarticlethereforeasin Britain
sessesthelegaciesof colonizationon immigrant
integration
in
a
and France orderto confirm,disconfirm,or clarify relationship
widelybelievedto exist.Itexaminesgeneralphilosophies,specificadministrative
andconcretepublicpoliciesthateachcountry
institutions,
createdto ruleits coloniesandto integrateethnicminorityimmigrants
in the post-warera.The firstandsecondsectionsof this articleconsiderBritishandFrenchcolonialandintegration
policiesrespectively
in orderto get a clearerpictureof theirdivergencesbutalso of their
similaritiesandambiguities.Thethirdsectionanalyzesthenatureand
betweencolonialandintegration
significanceof thecausalconnections
policiesin eachcountry.
Twocentralfindingsemerge.First,Britishand Frenchcolonialand
integration
policiesarenot as internallyconsistentor as diametrically
opposedas often portrayed.Thereare significantdifferencesto be
sure,butthereis a muchgreaterdegreeof policysimilarityin bothdomainsthanadmittedin thethumbnail
sketchesofferedin manycurrent
scholarlyworks.Second,althoughthereis evidencethatthe colonial
era influencedelementsof integration
philosophies,institutions,and
in
concrete
is
there
no
broad
connectionbetweenthe
policies
ways,
colonialpastandthe integration
presentimpliedby manyobservers.
Actorsformulatingintegrationpoliciesrarelylookedto the colonies
for inspiration.
Thisarticlethereforeservesto nuancea too-broadargumentby replacingits sweepingversionwithmorepreciseinsights
abouttherelationship
betweenpastandpresent.
BritishandFrenchcolonialpolicies:Consistentandcoherent?
BritainandFranceeachruledmillionsof peoplethroughhundredsof
policiesin dozensof regionsovercenturiesof history.In spiteof the
174
tremendous
variationin eachcountry'sempireoverplaceandtime,it
is commonfor non-specialists
to summarizeBritishcolonialpolicies
as indirectrulethatpreservedculturalandsocial differencesamong
the natives,andto characterize
France'sas basedupondirectruleand
a civilizingmissiondesignedto assimilatecolonialsubjectsthrough
Frenchlanguageandculture.Althoughthepreciseline distinguishing
indirectfromdirectruleis sometimesblurryin practice,Wallerstein
(1961:40-41) has definedthe formeras "leavingin placethe traditionalsystemandoftenthetraditional
ruler,andoperatingas muchas
possiblethroughthatsystem,"andthelatteras "arationalbureaucratic
hierarchywith all officialsoperatingon a statepayrollandwithina
Thefundamental
distinctionon thecontinsinglejudicialframework."
uumfromindirectto directrulerevolvesaroundthe extentto which
thecolonizergovernsthroughpre-existing,
"native"
institutions
versus
fromthehomecountry.
throughmodestransplanted
Britishdecision-makers
didfavorindirectruleinpartsof Africawhere
it "mettheneedto rulebroadareaswithmillionsof subjectsof diverse
racesandlevels of developmentwith the leastpossibleoutlayanda
minimumof Britishpersonnel"(von AlbertiniandWirz 1982:309;
see alsoWallerstein1961:41). It wascarriedoutthroughpoliciesthat
installednon-colonistsattheheadof bodiessuchas theNativeCourts
andCouncils(Asiwaju2001: 119) andthatcreatedNativeAuthority
policeforcesto preserveorderin manyruralareas,notonlyin Africa,
butalso in India(AndersonandKillingray1991:8). Indirectrulealso
meantthatindigenouspeopleretainedthe powerto collect taxes,to
controlbudgetsfor local schools,marketsandroads,andto legislate
on "traditional"
matters(CrowderandIkime1970:xxi-xxii).
Franceadheredto its colonialreputation
moststeadfastlyin thevieilles
colonies (Guyane,Guadeloupe,Martinique,and R6union),in parts
of SenegalandIndia,and in Algeria.The 1848 Revolutionbrought
Frenchcitizenshipfor formerslavesin the Caribbean
andin the four
communesin Senegal,andvotingrightsfor indigenouspeoplein the
five Frenchcitiesof India(Weil2002:235; Perina1997:17).Algeria
was also madean integralpartof Francein 1848 and was divided
into threedepartments.
Reformsbetweenthe 1860s and the 1880s
extendedFrenchadministrative
structures
andpoliciesacrossAlgeria
inthenineteenth
(Lorcin1995:8-9). Advocatesof assimilation
century
presumedthatnativeswouldpass throughan initialstage of being
civilized(France's
missioncivilisatrice)beforebeingeligible
culturally
to becomenaturalized
Frenchmen
(Lorcin1995:7).
175
FurtherdifferencesbetweenBritishandFrenchrulehavebeenthesubstudiesof colonialism.Withrespectto nineject of severalcomparative
teenthandtwentiethcenturySoutheastAsia,forexample,Furnivall
obof [the]DutchandEnglishcontrastseven
servesthat"theindividualism
withthestronglycentralized
moremarkedly
andstillmorepositivegovernmentcongenialto the French"(Furnivall1941:6). In WestAfrica,
whereasthe Britishoften delegatedlocal governmental
functionsto
native
the
French
administrators
chiefs,
legitimate
typicallydeprived
localchiefsof theirroleinadministering
justiceandingoverning,using
themsimplyto carryoutcentrallymandated
tasks(Crowder
andIkime
1970:xvi). The Frenchalso oversaweducationpoliciesmuchmore
thanthe Britishin WestAfrica,takingresponsibility
for the building
andadministration
of schools.Missionschools- the normin British
Africa- werestrictlycontrolledin Frenchcolonies,reflectingthepreFrance(Asiwaju2001:
vailingskepticismof religionin metropolitan
214-18). Even in the interwarMiddleEast(a regionless centralto
eachcountry'scolonialhistory),scholarshavearguedthatFranceassumedits mandateswithaneyetowardmoraldutiesandto themission
civilisatrice,whereastheBritishhadno suchgoals(Sluglett2004).
Thesewidelyacknowledged
distinctionsbetweenBritishandFrench
colonialismaremeaningful,
buttheyshouldnotbeoverstated.
Takentoa
of
selective
that
the
gether,theyrepresent
reading history picks places,
time periods,andpoliciesthathighlightthe greatestdifferencesbetweenBritishandFrenchcolonialpolicies.AsV Dimier(2004)showed,
historiansandpractitioners
of colonialismhavedisagreedaboutdifferencesbetweenthe countries'practices.Britishobserverstendedto
Frenchcounterparts
tendedto see disemphasizenationaldivergence;
tinctionsasjustonesof degree.Withoutsettingthis,onecanidentifyat
leastas manysimilaritiesas differencesin BritishandFrenchcolonial
elementsof directrulein
policies.Forexample,therewereimportant
inIndia,Ceylon,SouthAfrica,partsof
Britishcolonialadministrations
WestAfricaincludingSierraLeoneandGambia,andintheWestIndies
characterizes
Britishrule
(Fieldhouse1981:33).InEastAsia,Furnivall
in Burma,Singapore,andthe MalayStraitsas directrule,despitethe
factthatin theMalayStraits"itseemedunnecessary
to incurthetrouand
of
direct
ble
administration"
(Furnivall1941:15). Even
expense
Indiahas beendubbedthe classicexampleof directrule(Fieldhouse
1981:32).2 In 1858,the Crownofficiallytook overIndianadministrationfromthe BritishEastIndiaCompany.The Secretaryof State
for Indiabecamethe "defactoIndianminister"andwas responsible,
along with the Viceroywho was appointedby Parliament,for the
176
developmentof Indianlaws and legislativepowers(von Albertini
and Wirz 1982: 13). The hierarchyof powerthus flowedfrom the
Secretaryof State,as an extensionof theBritishwill, to theGovernor
General,to the Viceroy,to the districtofficers,who wereresponsible
for the tax collectionandmaintenanceof law,order,schools,roads,
and hospitalswithinthe basic administrative
unit, the district(von
AlbertiniandWirz1982: 14-15). Sucha chainof commandechoes
the philosophyof directrule moretypicallyassociatedwith French
colonization.
Moreover,in manywaysthe Britishsharedthe notionof a civilizing
missionwiththeFrench,lettingthemselvesbe guidedby the ideathat
"lessfavoredracesneededsupervision
byadvancedpeoplesinorderto
(Heussler1971:574).Thiswas
proceedto higherlevelsof civilization"
truein India,as emphasizedby Fischer-Tine
andMann's
particularly
editedvolume(2004).In Mann's(2004:4) analysis:
Theideaof a civilizingmissionresteduponthetwinfundamental
assump-
tionsofthesuperiority
culture
ofFrench
andtheperfectibility
ofhumankind.
to governthemAlso, it impliedthatcolonialsubjectsweretoo backward
selvesandthattheyhadto be "uplifted."
... Thesamewastrue,of course,
forBritishattitudestowardstheirIndianempireandthenon-whitecolonies.
Thisperspectiveis supported
notonlyby Kipling'snotionof thewhite
desiretocreateaclassof Indians"English
man'sburdenandMacaulay's
in taste,in opinion,in moralsandintellect"(citedin Mann2004:20),
butalsobytheextensionof theruleof lawthroughtheCivilandCriminalProcedure
Codesenactedin Indiain the 1860s(Mann2004:9-10).
Frenchcolonialpolicy,conversely,saw a movein the latenineteenth
andearlytwentiethcenturiesawayfromassimilationanddirectrule.
By 1892,colonialpolicyobjectivesin Algeriathatweregearedtoward
to Parisianministrieswere "abanthe administration
subordinating
and
of parliamentary
donedin favourof a combination
representation
was
Albertini
1982:
Even
more
dramatic
localautonomy"
(von
286).
the growingpopularityamongFrenchgovernorsandcolonialofficers
of the idea that"Frenchrule couldbe establishedmoresmoothlyif
builton existing
one triedto win the co-operationof the inhabitants,
institutionsand appliedcivilizingpressuresslowlyand 'indirectly"'
(von Albertini1982:286). Thesechangeswerejustifiedby the doctrineof "association,"
whichhadcompetedwiththatof assimilation
muchof the 1800s(Amselle1996:93-4; Deschamps1971:
throughout
545-6; Lorcin 1995: 7). Accordingto proponentsof association,it was
moreproductiveto workwith colonizedpeoples'institutionsandto
177
respectculturaldifferencesthanto overridethem(Lorcin1995:7). By
the post-WorldWarOne era,the trendtowardassociationhadtaken
a firmholdin Frenchcolonialpolicies,evenin formerassimilationist
suchas WestAfrica(Conklin1997).
strongholds
Inpractice,theFrenchpolicyof assimilation,
signifiedby thegranting
of Frenchcitizenshipto some inhabitantsin Senegal,Algeria,and
the vieilles colonies, was not employedoutside of those regions.
Underthe directionof the ColonialMinistrythatwas establishedin
in FrenchWestAfrica,FrenchEquatorial
1894,naturalization
Africa,
andIndochinawasnot easilyobtained.3
Assimilationas
Madagascar,
a policy of convertingnativesinto full-fledgedFrenchcitizenswas
rarein mostFrenchcoloniesas demonstrated
by the factthatin 1936
therewere fewerthan2,500 nativecitizensamongthe 15,000,000
inhabitants
of FrenchWestAfricaoutsideof Senegal(von Albertini
1982: 289). In Algeria,local administrators
responsiblefor vetting
Muslimswho wantedto becomeFrenchexhibited"exceptionalbad
asmanyaspossiblefromjumpingthehighhurdles
faith,"discouraging
to citizenship(Weil 2002: 236-7). The predictableresultwas that
naturalization
was all butimpossiblefor AlgerianMuslims.Between
1865 and 1930 only approximately
4,400 out of over 3.5 million
Muslimsbecamefull citizens(Weil2002:237, 240).
Thedoctrineof assimilation
haditslimitsin otherspherestoo.France's
colonialeducationpolicies, for example,were rarelyas uniformas
GiffordandWeiskel(1971)
commonlybelieved.In theirscholarship,
seekto overturnthe imageof FrenchWestAfricanschoolsas carbon
copiesof thosein themetropole.TheyarguethatwhileFranceset educationpolicy,coursecontentwasadaptedto thelocalconditions.The
wasFrenchforpragmaticreasonsof fostering
languageof instruction
communication
amongdiverselanguagegroups.Buttheycite a 1906
of Education
in Senegalto illustrate
thetruetone
reportbytheInspector
of Frencheducational
in
Africa:
of
the
beliefs,the
policy
"Respectful
the
habits
and
the
traditions
of
the
African
customs,
peoplessubmitted
to this authority,
the Governor-General
wantsin no wayto assimilate
the indigenouspeoplesnor to orientin this directionthe education
givento them"(GiffordandWeiskel1971:677). Otherevidenceof
France'sapproachto educationcomesfromIndochina,whereduring
the interwarperiod,FrenchGovernor-General
AlbertSarrautdecreed
thatinstruction
wasto be exclusivelyin Vietnamese,a decisionclearly
not in keepingwith a policyof assimilation(von AlbertiniandWirz
1982: 212).4
178
to the coloniesdifferedgreatlyby time,place,andpolicy
Approaches
areainbothBritainandFrance.Eachcountrypracticedbothdirectand
indirectrule.Eachbelievedit hada civilizingmission.Eachviewedits
subjectsas inferiorpeoples.Layingoutthesefactsdoesnotimplythat
the two countries'colonialpolicieswerepreciselythe same.It does
demonstrate,
however,thatBritishandFrenchcolonialpolicieswere
neitheras internallyconsistentnor as differentfromone anotheras
oftenthought.
Integrationpolicies:Britain,France,andpost-colonialimmigrants
Sincethe endof the SecondWorldWar,millionsof immigrants
have
arrivedin BritainandFrance,manyfromtheformercolonies.Thetwo
countriesnowhavedecadesof experiencetryingto integratemigrants
and minoritiesinto theirsocieties.As with colonialpolicies, it has
becomecommonto characterize
Britishand Frenchpolicies as sigis
different.
Britain
as favoringa decentralized
nificantly
represented
whereas
(indirect)policyapproachthatencouragesmulticulturalism,
Franceis deemedthe home of state-centric(direct)assimilationof
(Favell1998;Schnapper1992;Soysal1994;Todd1994).
immigrants
Thereis, of course,evidenceto supporteachof theseviews.Theearly
post-warhistoryof Britishimmigrationwas markedby local rather
thancentralizedinitiativesto integratenewcomers(Rose 1969:380nationallevel integration
bureaucracies
suchas
2). Thegovernment's
the CIACandtheNCCI5wererelativelyshortlived(theydidnot surto assistlocaljurisdictions
vivethe 1960s)andweredesignedprimarily
in formulating
As of the late
responsesto problemsof immigration.
sincethen,theBritishstateturned
1960s,andwithincreasingamplitude
toward"community
relations"and"racerelations"lawsandadministrativebodiesthathaveanexplicitremitto promoteharmonious
group
Inaddition,Britishpolicymakers
interactions.
eventuallyacceptedthe
countingandcategorizingof citizensby raceandethnicity,codifying
theirdecisioninthe 1991census(ColemanandSalt1996;Peach1996).
Foritspart,theFrenchstatehasneverrecognizedindividuals
according
to racialcriteria,andhas studiouslyavoidedintegrationpoliciesthat
channelmoneyorsupportto ethnicgroups(Bleich2000;Soysal1994).
Until 1981,Franceevenrestrictedthe rightsof migrantsto organize
collectively,hinderingethnicidentitiesandaction.The government's
recentbanningof Islamicheadscarvesin publicschools appearsto
be furtherevidenceof a widespreadpreferencefor assimilationover
179
multicultural
recognitionof ethnicdifferences.Moreover,forthe mainstitution,the
jorityof thepost-warera,France'sprimaryintegration
thatleft litSocialActionFund(FAS),6wasa centralized
organization
to crafttheirownintegration
tle leewayto localgovernments
policies
(Silver1993).
Thesefactsdemonstrate
thattherearerealdifferencesbetweenBritish
andFrenchintegration
policies.However,as AdrianFavellhas forceit
is
not
fully argued,
possibleto summarizea country'sintegration
strategyin termsof a coherent,discretemodelbecauseit consistsof
a "disparate
rangeof statepolicies,laws,localinitiatives,andsocietal
by manyagenciesatmany
dispositions- whichcouldbe implemented
levels"(Favell2001:351).Lookingacrosstimeat a varietyof spheres,
it becomesclearthateachcountryhas- at varioustimesandin various ways- employeda widerangeof integration
policies.Britishand
Frenchofficialshaveusedbothdirectandindirectmethods,andhave
bothpromotedassimilationandrecognizedculturaldifferences.
The workof GaryFreeman(1979) revealsthat Britishand French
in thepost-World
WarTwodecadesbelievedtheycould
policymakers
assimilatearrivingimmigrants.
HomeSecretary
RoyJenkins'1966invocationthatintegration
shouldbe defined"notas a flatteningprocess
of assimilation
butasequalopportunity,
byculturaldiveraccompanied
in
in
an
of
tolerance"
(cited Joppke1999:225),
sity,
atmosphere mutual
is oftenusedas evidenceof Britain'spreferenceformulticulturalism.
Buthis statementwasmemorable
principallybecauseit markeda significantchangefromthe attitudesthatdominatedintegrationdebates
untilthattime.Merelya yearbeforeJenkins'speech,a Labourparty
mostlikelyto be
spokesman
publiclysuggestedthat"'onlyimmigrants
assimilatedintonationallife' shouldbe permittedto stayin Britain"
(citedin Tomlinson1983:12).
In termsof concretepolicyareas,government-sponsored
groupssuch
as the CIACwereconcernedwith "therole of the educationsystem
in bringingaboutthe culturalassimilationof immigrantchildreninto
'Britishlife"'(Tomlinson1983:16;see alsoPatterson1969:108-14),
anduntilat least 1971,policieswerein placeto disperseimmigrant
schoolchildrento avoidheavyconcentrations
in anyoneschooldistrict
resurfaced
under
(Freeman1979:151).Similarthemesof assimilation
the leadershipof Margaret
Thatcherandthe Tories,especiallyduring
the overhaulof Britisheducationpolicy in the late 1980s and early
1990sthatincludedthe developmentof a new NationalCurriculum.
180
At the time,politicalleaderswereissuingordersto excisereferences
to multicultural
education- referencesthathadbeena prominentpart
of Britisheducational
philosophysincethe late 1970s- andwererein the history
assuringthe publicthatpupilswouldbe well-grounded
of "Britishheritage"(TomlinsonandCraft1995:2-5). Morerecently,
LabourPartyleadershaveechoedtheinterestin commonnationalvaluesbyproposing"Britishness
tests"forwould-becitizensandby instioaths
of
Even
ceremonies.7
tuting
citizenshipduringnewnaturalization
thechairman
of theCommissionforRacialEquality(CRE)announced
in early2004 thathe was skepticalof theterm"multiculturalism"
and
sawtheneedto "asserta coreof Britishness."8
TheBritishsystemalsocontainsseveralimportant
nationalpolicytools
forpromotingintegration.Since 1976,for example,the Commission
forRacialEqualityhasbeenableto undertake
racerelationsauditsof
or
local
(McCrudden
companies,industries,ministries,
governments
1987;Bleich2003: 100-1). TheCREhas usedthis authorityto open
intogroupsas diverseas theHandsworth
Hortiformalinvestigations
culturalInstitute,theAbbeyNationalBuildingSociety,theMinistryof
Defense(HouseholdCavalry),the Birmingham
LocalEducationAuthority,andmostrecentlythe police serviceof EnglandandWales.9
If thereis evidenceof systematicracism,the CREis empoweredto
non-discrimination
noticerequiringcompliance
issue a court-backed
with the Race RelationsActs (GreatBritain:HomeOfficeundated:
has also strengthened
11.3-.20).Since2000, the Labourgovernment
nationalprovisionsfor integrating
refugeesby institutinga varietyof
Englishlanguagetrainingprogramsacrossthecountry(GreatBritain:
HomeOffice2004:24-30).
JustasBritainhasnotalwayspursueda unifiedmulticultural
line,so has
for
Francewaveredfromits assimilationist
path.Compare, example,
withtheFrenchHighCouncilonIntegration's
Jenkins'abovestatement
descriptionof thebasicFrenchphilosophy:
It is a questionof evokingthe activeparticipation
of differentandvarious
elementsin thenationalsociety,whileatthesametimeacceptingthemaintenanceof cultural,socialandmoralspecificitiesandtakingforgrantedthat
thewholeis enrichedby thisvariety,thiscomplexity.Withoutdenyingdifferences,knowinghowto takethemintoaccountwithoutexaltingthem,a
accentssimilaritiesandconvergence.
[HautConseilA
policyof integration
1991:18]
l'Int~gration
of integration
Thesetwoseminalstatements
strategiesaresurprisingly
similar.TheFrenchstatementstrikesa balancebetweenfosteringcommongroundandvaluingdiversity,twogoalsthathavebeenpresentto
181
France'spost-warhistory.Any desireto
varyingdegreesthroughout
simplyassimilatedifferencewasshort-livedandfadedawaylongago.
By the 1970s,for example,Freeman(1979:309) notedthat"having
begunwith a grandercommitmentto assimilationthanthe British,
the Frenchwerequickerto admitthe impossibilityof absorbinglarge
elementsof non-Europeans
andsimplygaveup."Throughout
the 1970s
andearly1980s,moreover,theprevailingpolicyphilosophyin France
was "insertion,"
whichreliedto someextenton "culturalgroupsand
of
to help with integration(Favell
representatives the immigrants"
1998:47).
Frenchpolicymakers
haveleanedawayfromassimilationism
on conwell
creteas
as on theoreticallevels. In the 1970s,the Frenchstate
activelysupportedreligiouspluralismthroughincreasedtoleranceof
Islamicpracticesin factoriesandlocalpublichousing(includingfinancial supportfor religiousbooksandevenfor imams'salaries),andit
classesfor
promotedculturalpluralismby sponsoringmother-tongue
schoolchildren
and
cultural
on
immigrant
by developing
programming
television,suchasa one-hourSundaynightshowcalled"Mosaic"
(Weil
1991:245-9). Beginningin the 1980sandcontinuingthroughtoday,
to reppoliticalleadershavesoughtto cultivateMusliminterlocutors
resentthecommunity's
interestsvis-a-visthegovernment
(Roy1994).
In 2003, the Frenchstatetook the controversial
of
step establishing
anelectedFrenchCouncilof theMuslimReligion(Laurence2003).0
This policy directlycontradictsassimilationism
by institutionalizing
based
on
an
representation
ethno-religious
identity.It is muchcloserto
domesticindirectrulethananythingattempted
in Britain."1
Moreover,
while the 2004 banningof religioussymbolsin schoolsappearedto
be a blow struckfor assimilation,this is not necessarilythe case. Its
of preventing
originalimpetuscamefrompublicorderconsiderations
verbalandphysicalassaultson youngMuslimwomenwhorefusedto
weartheheadscarf(Weil2004).
In dealingwithintegration,
the Frenchstatehasalso notbeenas uniformlycentralizedas its reputation
suggests.Whenthe Socialistgovernmentcameto powerin theearly1980s,it institutedthreeprincipal
reformsof the FAS, its main immigrant-integration
it
bureaucracy:
made it moreindependentfromministerialcontrol;it includedimin the institution's
migrantrepresentatives
governingbody;andit createdRegionalCommissions
fortheInsertionof Immigrant
Populations
(CRIPI)designedto "selectandsubsidizesocial,cultural,andeducation programsoutside of the Parisianregion"(Silver 1993:499). Since
182
1999,as integrationpolicy has evolvedtowardthe fightagainstdissuccessors
crimination,SocialistPartyleadersandtheircenter-right
Commissionson Accessto Citizenshir
havedevelopedDepartmental
structure
forhandlingcomplaintsof racisrr
(CODAC),a decentralized
it
is
too
2000).
earlyto tell howmuchindepen(Hargreaves
Although
denceorimpacttheywillhave,theyhavebeenencouraged
byMinisters
to seekoutfundingfortheirinitiativesfrombothnationalandEuropear
sources,suggestingsomeleewayforlocalleadership.12
Thereare also similaritiesbetweenBritishand Frenchintegratior
andmulbetweenassimilationism
thatriseabovedistinctions
strategies
andbetweendirect,centralizedactionsandindirect,deticulturalism
centralizedpolicymaking.Britishand Frenchdecision-makers
have
thatdo notrequirc
eachreliedheavilyon attemptsto fosterintegration
themto takean explicitpositionin these debates.Manyof the ma.
jor problemsof immigrantintegrationhavebeen addressedthrougi
educational,urban,andhousingpoliciesthatapplyto areasdefinec
ratherthanby th(
principallyby geographyand social deprivation,
presenceof immigrantsor minorities.In the 1960s,for example,th(
majorBritishgovernment
programsput in place- Section11 of th(
Act of 1966 and the 1968 UrbanProgramme
Local Government
wereofficiallytargetedat areas,ratherthanat groups(Young1983
288). Althoughtheyweredesignedto dealwithproblemsassociatec
with immigrants,these initiativeswerenot labeledas such, andthc
fundingwas opento a rangeof depressedareasin Britain.Similarly
in France,majorintegration
programshavebeencouchedin "genera
terms
thataddressgroupsand
legal"(droitcommun)
neighborhood,
1993:160socialconditions"(Lapeyronnie
afflictedby "unfavorable
PriorityZone,
1). Thiswas trueof programssuchas the Educational
andurbar
(ZEP)andpolicy initiativesagainstyouthunemployment
1993:
169in
1980s
the
(Lapeyronnie
early
especially
degradation,
76). Naturally,the effecton immigrantandminorityintegrationwa,
partof policymakers'calculuswhencraftingthesepolicies.Yetthe
or mi.
policiesthemselveswereneverexplicitlyaimedat immigrants
anddecentralizec
norities.Inpractice,theycontainedbothcentralized
to
with
were
neutral
and
elements,
respect promotingmulticulturalisn
versusassimilation.In this highlysignificantway,therefore,Britist
andFrenchpoliciescloselyresembleone another.
In summary,integrationpolicies have takena varietyof forms it
bothBritainandFrance.Theyeachcontainelementsof activist,cen
initiativesand morelaissez-fairelocal policies
tralgovernment-led
183
Eachcountryhas at timesdemandedassimilation,andeach country
has toleratedandeven cultivatedculturalpluralism.Theyhaveboth
usedtargetedandgeneralpoliciesto promoteintegration.
Althoughin
it
is
not
each
accurateto
fulfills
country
expectations,
significantways
viewBritainas a bastionof local,minoritycommunity-led
integration,
orFranceasthehomeof centralized
Thenotionof unified
assimilation.
BritishandFrenchapproaches,
witheachcountryat the oppositeend
of an integration
policyspectrumis simplynot sustainable.
Thelegaciesof history?
Sofar,thisarticlehasdemonstrated
thatBritishandFrenchcolonialand
modelsareneitheras distinctnoras divergentas commonly
integration
assumed.Knowingthisclearsthewayfora preciseassessmentof the
true legaciesof colonialism,but in itself it says nothingaboutthe
causalconnectionbetweenthe two policyareaswithineachcountry.
Howaccurateis theprevailing
beliefthatBritishandFrenchintegration
structures
arelegaciesof theirrespectivecolonialpasts?
Ina numberof concreteways,integration
policiesin eachcountrywere
of policiesdevelopedforthe BritishandFrench
directcontinuations
is
This
empires.
especiallytruein the realmsof citizenshipandimmigrationpolicy,at least in the earlypost-wardecades.As Randall
Hansen(2002) has arguedwith respectto Britain,post-warcitizenpolicieswereinitiallycreatedto encourageclose
shipandimmigration
ties betweenthe homecountryandits overseasrelations.Until 1962,
membersof Commonwealth
countrieshadunfettered
accessto British
soil.13Oncein theUnitedKingdom,theseWestIndian,SouthAsianor
otherCommonwealth
hadalltherightsandresponsibilities
immigrants
of Britishcitizens,includingtherightto work,therightto voteandthe
rightto accessto thewelfarestate.
In France,all Algerians(includingMuslims)hadfull Frenchcitizenshipwithina few yearsof theendof WorldWarTwo(Weil1991:64).
Thiswasthemuchdelayedbutlogicaloutcomeof thestate'sclaimthat
Algeriawasanintegralpartof thenation.Afterthe 1962EvianAccords
confirmedAlgeria'sindependence,
accessto Frenchcitizenshipcontinuedfor individualsbornin Algeriapriorto independence
because
of thepre-existingcolonialcitizenshippolicies.Evenif theseindividualselectedto becomecitizensof Algeria,theirchildren- if bornon
Frenchsoil (andhundredsof thousandswere)- were automatically
grantedFrenchcitizenshipanddidnothaveto go throughthenormal
184
Theywereconsideredt(
processesforsecond-generation
immigrants.
be childrenbornto parentsbornon Frenchsoil, andtherebyqualifiec
for the samerulesof automaticcitizenshipat birthas normallyap.
1992:139-42;Hanser
(Brubaker
pliedto third-generation
immigrants
thus
an
France's
colonial-era
had
effecton citizenshil
2002).
policies
that
lasted
across
generations.
rights
On the whole,however,it was not the case thatagenciesor policiet
establishedto managecivil, social,political,or culturalaffairsin th(
colonieswereadaptedto deal with the integrationof immigrantsit
BritainandFrance.It is plausible,for example,thatthe ColonialOf
int(
fice or the Ministryof the Coloniescouldhavebeentransformed
immigrantintegrationinstitutionsas eachcountrydecolonized.Thi:
did happenbrieflyin Britainduringandjust afterWorldWarTwo
witl
whenthe ColonialOfficedevelopeda smallwelfaredepartment
from
the
colonie:
for
the
faced
by
immigrants
problems
responsibility
(Rich1986;Patterson1969:114).It organizedfacilitiesforblackstu
dentsandseamenarrivinginBritain,andduringthewarit alsooversav
welfareprovisionsforblackvoluntaryworkers(Rich 1986:48). Thi:
patterndid not becomethe normfor managingintegrationconcerns
however,andthe officewas closedin 1951(Patterson1969:114).
or
Instead,inthe1950sand1960s,eachcountryestablished
integration
de novo,suchas theCommonwealth
Immigrants
Advisor
ganizations
Committee(CIAC)andthe NationalCommitteefor Commonwealti
(NCCI)in BritainandtheSocialActionFund(FAS)14anm
Immigrants
in France(see Freeman1979;Patterson1969;Silve
SONACOTRA
1993;Weil 1991;Lapeyronnie1993).Althoughthese organization
were initiallyset up to deal with problemsassociatedwith colonia
theyhadne
(as opposedto othersortsof immigration),
immigration
historicalbasisin the coloniesthemselves.Colonialofficesandcolo
nial institutionson the whole failedto expandinto the areaof inte
Ii
of decolonization.
gration,andultimatelywitheredin theaftermath
healthcare,ani
mostotherdomains,suchas education,employment,
not
transferred
to the hom
the
colonies
were
from
housing,policies
institutiona
in
domestic
a
arrived
well-developed
country.Immigrants
andwereexpectedto adaptto it. Whatpolicycontinuit
environment
butrathe
therefore,wasnota legacyof colonialstructures
transpired,
a resultof domesticstability.
whereinitiallyther
Evenin areassuchas citizenshipandimmigration
th
and
was strongcontinuitybetweencolonial integration
structures,
185
consequencesof such policies led both Britainand Franceto shift
theirpositionssignificantly.
The mainresultof opencitizenshipand
was
influxof hundredsof thousandsof iman
immigration
policies
from
the
Britain's
restrictive1962Commonwealth
migrants
empire.15
Actwasenactedby theConservative
in large
Government
Immigrants
measureas a backlashagainstthe recentarrivals(see Hansen2000;
1992).Yetin reactionto thatmove,the 1964 Labour
Layton-Henry
Government
passeda liberalRace RelationsAct in 1965 as partof
whatHomeSecretaryFrankSoskicereferredto as a "packagedeal"
to "integrate
colouredimmigrants."16
Memberof Parliament
RoyHattersleysummeduptheconnectionbetweenthetwodecisionswiththe
limitationis inexcusable;
withoutlimaphorism"Without
integration,
is
in
Rose
1969:
itation,integration impossible"(quoted
229). This
to largeinfluxesof colonialmiprogressionfromopenimmigration,
to
restrictive
grants,
immigration
policies,to liberalintegration
policies
is certainlya legacyof colonization.Buttheultimateoutcomes- limiting movementwithinthe empireandproactivelypromotingracial
equality- arequitedifferentfromthe originalcolonialpolicies.
In a parallelfashion,France'sopen-doorpolicy towardresidentsof
newlyindependent
Algeriain the 1960sresultedin hundredsof thousandsof migrantswithina few years.In responseto this situation,
Francepressured
ontrans-Mediterranean
Algeriato acceptrestrictions
migration,limitingtheannualnumberof workersto 35,000in 1968and
cappingit at25,000in 1971(see Weil1991).France'scitizenshiprules
forAlgeriansalsoprovokedintegration
policydebatesandactions.As
(1992:chapter7) hasshown,theautomaticgranting
RogersBrubaker
of citizenshipto childrenbornin Francewhoseparentswerebornin
in thelate 1970sandearly
Algeriapriorto 1962sparkeda controversy
1980s.Manyof thesesecond-generation
immigrants(notto mention
the Algerianstate)did not wantFrenchcitizenshipascribedto them.
Yetsincetheylivedin France,the statewasunwillingto releasethem
fromcitizenshipandrequiredthemto performdutiessuchas military
service.In 1984, FranceandAlgeriasignedan agreementallowing
dualnationalsto performtheirmilitaryservicein only one country.
Thesepolicydiscussions,thoughnarrowon theirface,helpedspawna
discussionaboutcitizenshipandintegration
thathit crescendosin the
late 1980sandthe 1990swhencitizenshipruleswerehotlydebated
(Brubaker1992;Feldblum1999).Inthiscase,citizenshippoliciesthat
appliedto colonialsgeneratedananomalouslegalstatus,whichin turn
prompteda changein citizenshiprules,withtheentireprocessframed
as a discussionaboutintegrationandnationalcohesion.Onceagain,
186
however,therehas been no direct,continuousline fromcolonialtc
integration
policiesin thesecases.
Forthosewhoperceivethesimilarities
betweena country's
colonialpasi
areas
andintegration
present,assessingindividualpolicy
mayseemtc
miss the forestfor the trees. Scholarssuch as FrankDobbin(1994:
andYaseminSoysal(1994)havearguedthatinstitutionscantaketheii
institutions
shapebecausetheyaremodeledonthelogicof pre-existing
in otherdomains.Soysal,forexample,attributes
variationin incorporationregimesacrossEuropeto "theconceptualand organizational
of thepoliticalorderwithinwhichstatesframetheiracconfiguration
tion"(1994: 35). This type of logic may applyto the cases at
hando
andis particularly
consistentwith Joppke's(1999:224) views of the
Britishmodel'shistoricalrootsandwithFavell's(1998:3) discussion
of thetwocountries'colonialreputations.
Inthe Britishcase,the strongestadvocateof thisperspectivehasbeen
Katznelson,who sees "indirectrule througha broker,nativeleadership"(1976: 176)appliedalmostunwittinglyin the 1960s.'7 Freeman
(1979:40) andRich(1986: 168)concurthattherehavebeenelements
of thiscolonialphilosophyapparentin post-warintegration
practices.
ForFrance,Jean-Loup
Amselle(1996)has madethe mostsystematic
argumentfor the continuitybetweenthe colonialand contemporary
he calls"assimilationist
eraof anapproach
whichis the
regeneration,"
with
assimilation
the
of
of
the
longstandconcept
marriage
Republican
of Franceas a countryof Gaulsand
historiography
ing differentialist
Francs- in otherwords,of multipleethnicgroups.
As notedearlier,therehavebeen some aspectsof Britishintegration
the decentralization
policiesthatresembleindirectrule- particularly
inthefirstfewdecadesafter1945.Overall,
of integration
policymaking
however,the argumentrestson weakfoundations.Sinceindirectrule
was so widelyhailedamongcolonialthinkersin the interwaryears,it
is likelythatif it wereseen as relevant,it wouldbe openlyadvocated
at home.However,thereis no evidencethatpolicymakers,
politicians,
or otherpublicfiguresusedthetermin publicor in privatewhendiscussingimmigrantsin Britain.Thismayhavebeenbecausegranting
ethnicleadersreal governingpowerwas an integralpartof indirect
rule. Thoughpolicymakerssoughtinputfromimmigrantleadersin
the Britishstatedid not considerturningover
some circumstances,
to
themselves,evenalongthelines
power minoritygroupsto represent
the Frenchstatehas takenwiththe Councilof FrenchMuslims.It is
truethatthereweresomeimmigrantleaderson theNCCIin theearly
187
1960s,butthis groupwas notmeantto representethnicminorityimmigrantsandwasneververypowerful.TheNCCIwas chairedby the
conditional
(who madehis chairmanship
Archbishopof Canterbury
on the NCCI'sincludingimmigrantmembers),its role was merely
advisory,and it was disbandedaftera few shortyears.'8Moreover,
withthe
managingminoritiesthroughindirectrulewas incompatible
Britishstate'soft-repeated
the
decades:
assimiearlypost-war
goalof
latingnewimmigrants.
withrespectto Franceis slightlydifferent.Rather
Amselle'sargument
thaninsistingsimplythatassimilationhas alwaysbeenthe dominant
nationalframeworkfor dealingwith ethnicdiversity,he arguesthat
Frenchleadersandthinkershavehistoricallybeentornbetweenviewing humanityin the singularandin theplural.In his ownwords,"the
Republicanlogic whichrests,as we've seen, on the principleof the
fusionof the races,in factpresupposes
the existenceof a pluralityof
groups"(Amselle 1996: 106). He cites evidencefromcolonialconFrance
questsin Egypt,Algeria,andSenegal,andfromcontemporary
to illustratehis argument
aboutthisparticularly
Frenchmodelof multiculturalism.
Amselle'sthesisis appealingbecauseit suggeststhatthe
tensionsbetweenassimilation
andassociation- betweentryingto "civilize"peopleandtryingto preservetheircultures- canbe unifiedin
onephilosophical
perspectivethathasenduredforcenturies.It argues
fora stronglegacyof colonialismonintegration
butnotnecstrategies,
essarilythe legacythatmostpeoplesee. Andit appearsto fit the facts
thatassimilation(in the sense of the stateactivelytryingto promote
hasbeenvariouslyappliedandignoredovertime.
"Frenchness")
HoweverconvincingAmselle's evidence that some thinkershave
meldedthetwo strandsof thinkingintoone philosophy,whenFrench
politicians,activists,andcitizensdebatesymbolsof integration,
they
often land on one or anotherside of a significantdivide.Ongoing
discussionsaboutthe Islamicheadscarf,for example,reflectserious
withinFrenchsociety.Therearethosewho- in an asdisagreements
similationistvein - believethatheadscarvesareun-French(perhaps
evenuncivilized)and shouldbe bannedwherepossibleanddiscourrhetoricto argue
aged everywhereelse. Othersdeploymulticultural
thatpeoplemustbe allowedto drawon theiridentitiesandleadtheir
liveswithouthavingto assimilateintoa supposedlyunifiedFrenchculture.Thesedisagreements
suggestthattherearedifferentviewsabout
how to manageethnicdifferenceratherthanone unifiedperspective
thathascarriedforwardfromthe colonialerato today.
188
BritishandFrenchcolonialandintegration
policiesareclearlyneither
internallyconsistentnordiametrically
opposed.Nevertheless,French
withsomehave
stressed
assimilation
andcentralization
policymakers
whohavetypiwhatgreaterfrequencythantheirBritishcounterparts,
ethnicdistinctionsanddecentralcallyprovenmoreopento embracing
ized policymaking.Althoughthis apparentcontinuityovertime may
reveala legacyof the past- albeitone toned-downin intensityand
fortheparconsistency- in fact,therearethreepossibleexplanations
indeed
allelswithineachcountry.Integration
owetheir
policiesmight
to
structures.
it
be
that
both
sets
colonial
of instiHowever, may
origins
between
tutionswerecausedby a thirdfactor,makingtherelationship
the two spurious.Or,it is conceivablethatthe originsof bothsets of
in whichcasetheparallels
policieswithineachcountryareunrelated,
wouldbe merelycoincidental.
In the Frenchcase, it is possibleto sortthroughthesehypothesesby
examiningthe statementsof integrationpolicymakers.Did they extheirdecisions,
plicitlydrawon colonialprincipleswhenformulating
did they referto othersourcesfor theiractions,or did they establish integration
structures
withoutregardto historicalmodels?French
authoritiesspecializingin integrationaffairshavejustifiedtheirperspectivesandactionswithreferencesto thepast.However,politicians
andpolicymakers
havetendedto speakof the FrenchRevolutionary
theirrationalesfor immiandRepublicantraditionwhenarticulating
and
theories
practices,especiallywhendebatesabout
grantintegration
moved
center
Rogers
stagein the 1980s.Inhis scholarship,
citizenship
Brubaker(1992) drawsthe linesbetweenthe Revolution,the Repubthe
lic, andpost-colonialintegration
policiesmostclearly,highlighting
elementsin all threeeras.He is not alonein viewing
assimilationist
the
this historyas an importantinspirationfor futurepolicymaking:
(HautConseila l'Int6gration1991:19)
HighCouncilon Integration
spelledout the Frenchintegrationlogic by insistingthat"theidentitarianandegalitarianprinciplesthatstretchbackto the Revolution
andto the Declarationof the Rightsof Manandof the Citizenimpregnateourconception,foundedthuson the equalityof individuals
beforethe law,whatevertheirorigins,theirrace,theirreligion... to
theexclusionof aninstitutional
References
recognitionof minorities."
to the anti-modelof Vichyalso serveto bolsterthe positiveview of
the Frenchmodelof integration.Whendiscussingthe prosandcons
of collectingracialor ethnicdataon citizens,a high-placedFrench
officialinsistedthatit couldnot be donebecauseit would
integration
of JewsduringtheVichyregime,anobviously
recallthecategorization
189
intolerableoutcome.19 As numerousscholarshave demonstrated
(Bleich 2003; Feldblum1999;Favell1998),lessons fromthe Revolution,Republican,andVichyeras haveplayeda prominentrole in
debatessurrounding
whereasreferencesto
integration
policymaking,
colonialexperienceshavebeenexceptionally
rare.
It is moredifficultto pinpointthesourcesof Britain'spost-warintegration strategies.It seemsplausiblethatrecognitionof racialandethnic
of suchrecognitionin British
difference(andthe institutionalization
libpost-warcensusesandlaws)washandeddownfromcenturies-old
or thatit was a logieralandpluralistmodelsof socialorganization,
cal extensionof theUnitedKingdom'smulti-national
structure.
Gilles
Kepel(1997:86, 98, 145),forone,viewsBritishcolonialpolicies,internaldecentralization,
andpost-warethnicpoliciesas derivedfromthe
samephilosophicalorigins.However,duringthe earlystagesof colonial immigration
intoBritain,officialpolicywas race-blindandeven
assimilationist.Embracingmulticulturalism
was a decades-longand
sometimespainfulprocessduringwhichmanymorereferenceswere
madeto concurrent
in NorthAmericathanto Britain's
developments
colonialhistory.Whenpassingracerelationslegislation,in particular,
Britishpolicyexpertsandpoliticalleadersturnedrepeatedlyto North
Americanlawsandpoliciesfor inspiration,
usingthemas guideposts
fordevelopingtheirinstitutions
and
Bindman
1972;Rose1969;
(Lester
Bleich2003).As an indicatorof the impactof theAmericanmodel,it
is interestingto notethatthelandmark1969BritishstudyColourand
Citizenshipwas explicitlyinspiredby GunnarMyrdal'sAnAmerican
Dilemma,and that its goal was to help staveoff the type of racial
disintegration
prevalentin the UnitedStates(Rose 1969:xix). The
substantialattentionto the NorthAmericansituationandthe paucity
of referencesto thecoloniessuggestthatintheBritishcase,integration
structures
werelargelyindependent
of coloniallegacies.
On the whole, therefore,it is difficultto sustainan argumentthat
colonialinstitutionsaffectedcurrentintegrationpolicies in an overarchingmanner.Colonialstructuresin both countrieswere quite
varied. Policymakerscannot, therefore,cast an eye back to the
colonies and come away with simple lessons. Integrationpolicies
have also embodiedmanycurrentsthat run againsteach country's
supposedlydominantapproach,furthercomplicatingthe picture.
Even if one accepts that there have been tendenciestowardindirect rule and multiculturalism
in Britainand towardassimilationismacrosstime in France,the preponderance
of the evidence
190
suggeststhatpresent-day
integration
policiesdonotflowfromcolonial
history.
Conclusions
This articlefindsthatBritainandFrancedid not formulatetheirintegrationpolicieswithcolonialtraditionsweighingon thebrain.This
contradicts
theplausibleandcommonlyheldview thateachcountry's
integrationinstitutionsreflectits colonialpast.The historicalrecord
showsthatthe assumptionscentralto this argument- thatFrance's
colonialpoliciesandintegrationstructureshavebeen assimilationist
anddirect,andthatBritain'shavebeendifferentialist
andindirect- are
notas trueas theyatfirstappear.Eachcountryhasexhibitedaspectsof
bothstrategiesin itscolonialandintegration
Onbalance,the
structures.
two countriesarecloserto themiddleof the spectrumthanthe edges,
evenif Francehasemployedstate-centric
assimilationwithrespectto
its coloniesandits integration
more
policies
explicitlyandmoderately
moreoftenthanhasBritain.
Policymakersalso madefew referencesto colonialtemplateswhen
and
formulatingimmigrantintegrationstrategies.The Revolutionary
Republicantraditions(forFrance)andthe UnitedStates(forBritain)
were more common orientationpoints than colonial precedents.
NeitherFrenchnor Britishpolicymakersreliedexclusivelyon those
referentswhen devisingtheirstrategies;but to the extentthatthey
moldedtheir integrationstructuresbased on examplesfrom other
arenas,they lookedto non-colonialsourcesmore than to colonial
ones.
Althoughthe broadversionof the coloniallegaciesargumentdoes
nothold,narrower
versionsdo. Aspectsof eachcountry'spost-World
WarTwointegration
wereindeedlinkedto previouscoloapproaches
nial policies.This is especiallytrue in the domainsof immigration
and citizenship,where inclusiverules set up for colonial subjects
weremaintained
evenafterdecolonization
tookplace.Colonialstructuresandtheireffects- particularly
on migrationfromcolonialholdings- alsoeventuallyprovokeda numberof additionalconsequences.
Thearrivalof largenumbersof ethnicminorityimmigrantsfromthe
coloniesgeneratedspecializedadministrative
agenciesto deal with
problemsof housing,schooling,andracism,suchas France'sFASand
and Britain'sCIAC,NCCIand eventuallythe CRE.
SONACOTRA
191
Of course,some of these agenciesand otherpolicies were subsequentlyeliminatedoraltered,andmostof themwerereactionsagainst
the statusquo ratherthana continuationof it. Nonetheless,signifiinstitutionscannotbe uncantelementsof eachcountry'sintegration
derstoodwithoutreferenceto specificcolonialstructuresand their
effects.
Legaciesof colonialismon officialintegrationinstitutionsare thus
narrower
andmorelimitedthanfrequentlysupposed.It is worthhighlighting,however,that coloniallegacies may remainsignificantin
otherways. For example,racistbeliefs that expandedand became
deeplyrootedduringthe colonialera continueto exist to this day.
The legacy of racismhas been importantin Britishand Frenchsoactionin the form of ancieties, in partby spurringgovernmental
tiracistlaws and policies. Focusingthis study on official institutions has calledinto questionone type of legacy,but it has not exeffectsof colonial
haustedall pathsfor exploringthe contemporary
history..
Britishand Frenchcolonialand integrationapproachesare not dialegaciesbetweenthe
metricallyopposed,noraretherebroadstructural
colonialand integrationeras in eithercountry.This articlereplaces
with a morerealisticassessmentof the complex
thesepresumptions
natureof BritishandFrenchpolicies in bothtime periods,andwith
a sense of the specificways in whicheach country'scolonialmanminoritiesafter
agementspilledoverintoits dealingswithimmigrant
decolonization.BritainandFrancemayhavefirstgainedexperience
governingdiversityin theircolonies,butthe way eachcountrymanages its multiethnicsocietytodayhas less to do withits colonialpast
beenpresumed.
thanhasfrequently
Acknowledgments
Forhelpfulcommentsas this articledeveloped,I thankIan Barrow,
AdrianFavell,VeroniqueDimier,PeterHall, RandallHansen,John
Rex, PatrickWeil,the membersof the MiddleburyCollegePolitical
ScienceDepartment
FacultyResearchGroup,andthe reviewersand
Editorsof TheoryandSociety.JillParsonsprovidedexcellentresearch
assistance.Forfinancialsupportfor a conferenceseriesin whichthis
paperwas firstpresented,I amgratefulto the GermanMarshallFund
of theUnitedStates.
192
Notes
1. Freeman
(1979:28-42) andLapeyronnie
(1993:129-33)areexceptionsto thisrule.Hownottoreadcontemporary
ever,theirinjunctions
policiesasdirectlegaciesof colonialhistory
havehadlittleimpactonpopularassumptions
abouttheconnections
betweenthetwoeras.
2. Thoughnotallof Indiawasunderdirectruleatalltimes.I thankIanBarrowforhighlighting
thispoint.
3. Naturalization
was "theoretically
opento everynative,but it hadto be requestedfrom
the administration
andwas subjectto a numberof conditions:knowledgeof the French
of the
language,conclusionof militaryservice,etc.andaboveall it meanttherenunciation
to Frenchlaw"(vonAlbertini1982:279).
applicant's
personalstatusandhis subordination
4. AnneRaffin's(2002)reviewof Frenchcolonialpolicyin Indochina
duringWorldWarTwo
showselementsof assimilation
temperedheavilyby a laudingof culturalpluralismand
strictlimitson accessto citizenship.
5. The Commonwealth
Immigrants
AdvisoryCommitteeandthe NationalCommitteefor
Commonwealth
Immigrants.
6. Fondsd'ActionSociale.
7. See The Observer,7 September2003; TheEvening Standard,26 February2004.
8. The Times,3 April 2004.
9. A full list of reportson formalinvestigationsis availableon the CRE web site at
http://www.cre.gov.uk/publs/cat-fi.html.
10. ConseilFranqais
duCulteMusulman.
11. As such,it is in keepingwithJean-Loup
Amselle'sconclusionthatFranceoperates"a
veritableindirectadministration
of entiresectorsof thepopulation"
(Amselle1996:164).
12. See theFrenchgovernment's
circularNOR/INT/K/04/00019/C
of 5 February
2004.These
and with regionalparticipants,
are
commissions,althoughwith regionalresponsibility
chairedby thedepartmental
of thecentralstate.
representative
13. Veryfew colonialsubjectsimmigrated
priorto 1948,whenthe BritishNationalityAct
formallyinstituted
equalcitizenshipfortheUnitedKingdomandthecolonies.
14. Themandateof theorganization
wheninitiallyformedin 1958wasto constructhousing
for"Muslimworkersin themetropole
andtheirfamilies"(Silver1993:493).
15. Empirehererefersto currentor formercoloniesas well as possessionssuchas Algeria
deemedat thetimeto be partof thestate.Fordataon migrationflowssee Hansen(2000)
andtheannexesin Weil(1995).
16. PROHO376/68.See alsoHansen(2000),andBleich(2003).
17. He writesthat"mostof theliterature
on Britishracepoliticsmissesthesignificance
of the
criticalstructural
decisionto linktheThirdWorldpopulation
to thepolitythroughbuffer
colonialrelationships"
1976:
institutions,
replicating
keyfeaturesof traditional
(Katznelson
178).
of theNCCI.
18. I thankJohnRexforanexchangethathelpedclarifytheroleandcomposition
19. Confidential
interview,
Paris,30 June1997.
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