Preface
In 2004, the Indian Army introduced the military doctrine Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The Cold
Start Doctrine seeks to modify India’s approach to war by ‘leveraging advanced technology to
fight short duration limited conflicts under the nuclear shadow’. According to the Indian strategic
thinkers, the current Indian military doctrine is based on massive militarization. This can prove to a
threat for the region and combined with this CSD can be a strategic destabiliser. The argument is that
the necessity for the CSD arose by the military lessons learnt by the Indian from the Kargil Conflict
and difficulties in India’s war mobilization efforts during the Operation Parakram, following the
attack on India’s Parliament House. The CSD is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike and
calls for rapid deployment of “Integrated Battle Groups” comprising of elements of Indian Army,
Air Force, and if need be, Navy, to conduct high-intensity operations within Pakistani territory.
These battle groups could be used individually for limited operations, or in conjunction for the
operations of a greater scale. India’s Cold Start Doctrine combined with massive militarization
thrust, has the capacity and potential to increase the level of an arms race, consequently raising
the level of minimum deterrence stability for the two protagonists. In this context the workshop was
aimed to explore the ultimate debate surrounding the doctrine and its implications for regional
and international security. Main goal of the workshop was to bring together the think tanks,
experts around the world, as well as governmental officials and specialists from international and
national organizations to work on the evolving discourse of CSD and regional stability. Moreover,
to implement this doctrine India will restructure its army’s offensive power from three strike corps
to eight smaller division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that combine with mechanized
infantry, artillery and armour. Indian Holding Corps or Pivot Corps would undertake limited
offensive operation to give time to IBGs to strike hard on already softened targets by the Pivot
Corps. The IBGs would be self-contained and highly-mobile, adequately backed by air cover and
artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours. Core Objectives of
the Conference report is to describe Indian Cold Start Doctrine. To highlight assumptions of the
doctrine and regional military development as rapid military development. This report will bring to
light the military capabilities of India and its deficiencies in the implementation of CSD. This report
would aim to explore Pakistan’s military capabilities to counter Indian CSD. In addition to that this
report would highlight the nuclear doctrinal challenges and doctrinal implications on Strategic
Stability of the Region. Nonetheless, the future war in South Asia can never remain conventional.
In this regard new theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence would work as Pakistan’s possible
counter measures to Indian CSD. Objective is to ensure that Pakistan no longer fears the threat
of pre-emption. Pakistan had been seeking peaceful resolution to disputes and normalization of
relations with India. Pakistan’s defense and security policy have been entirely focused on deterring
war. Restraint and responsible had been the watchwords of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. It is in pursuit
of this policy that Pakistan has proposed the strategic restraint regime to achieve stability and foster
mutual confidence. As long as destabilizing concepts like Cold Start Doctrine are being projected,
Pakistan has to undertake all measures to safeguard its territorial sovereignty. This workshop
had been attended by officials from military and civil bureaucracy including serving and retired
Military Generals, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Minister of State for Defense Production, Director
General ISPR, Director General Strategic Plans Division, Director General Institute of Strategic
Studies Islamabad, senior faculty members of National Defense University and Quaid-i-Azam
University, Scholars, Senators, more than 44 Diplomats, Politicians, officers from Joint Staff Head
Quarters and Media.
1
THREE-DAY
INTERNATIONAL
WORKSHOP
On
Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine
and its Implications for Strategic
Stability in South Asia
20th-22nd July 2010
4
T
he South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) is an independent research
institute dedicated to promoting peace and stability. The institute aims to make a
leading contribution to regional and international academic and policy-oriented
research discourses about South Asian security. The institute main body of work revolves
around the nuclear questions and debates relating to non-proliferation and disarmament.
The aim is to enhance the capacity building within and outside the region on promoting a
paradigm of strategic stability in South Asia. Our work engages with strategic stability in
region and thus on the emergent nuclear relationship which is at the heart of that stability.
However SASSI’s remit goes beyond nuclear stability to include the wider issues of
chemical and biological weapons, conventional force balance, civil-military relations,
social and political stability and the security issues.
Context:
In 2004, the Indian army introduced the military doctrine Cold Start Doctrine
(CSD). The Cold Start Doctrine seeks to modify India’s approach to war by ‘leveraging
advanced technology to fight short duration limited conflicts under the nuclear shadow’.
According to the Indian strategic thinkers, the current Indian military doctrine is based on
‘massive militarization’. This itself can prove to a threat for the region and combined with
this Cold Start Doctrine can be a strategic destabiliser. The argument is that the necessity
for the Cold Start Doctrine arose by the military lessons learnt by the Indian from the
Kargil Conflict and difficulties in India’s war mobilization efforts during the Operation
Parakram, (following the attack on India’s Parliament House). According to Indians, the
1
Indian Army’s New “Cold Start” war doctrine was strategically stipulated by the need to
operationalise Indian Army’s war fighting in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)
warfare environment. This is a threat to stability incorporating the technological advances
in the fields of Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence and
Information technology (C4I2).
The Cold Start Doctrine is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike and
calls for rapid deployment of “Integrated Battle Groups” comprising of elements of
Indian Army, Air Force, and if need be, Navy, to conduct high-intensity operations
within Pakistani territory. These battle groups could be used individually for limited
operations, or in conjunction for the operations of a greater scale. India’s Cold Start
Doctrine combined with massive militarization thrust, has the capacity and potential to
increase the level of an arms race, consequently raising the level of minimum deterrence
stability for the two protagonists.
These are matters of huge concern for regional stability and require further inquiry
to questions such as: what is the Cold Start Doctrine? Whether the sub-critical warfare can
be linked to the conventional settings. And if so what are the implications for the nuclear
response options for Pakistan? Or what are the possible repercussions for Pakistani, counter
measures, force posture, nuclear doctrine and eventually the state of strategic stability in
the region. The assumptions of the Cold Start Doctrine can be divided into three categories;
Stated, Actual and Perceived assumptions. Few of the stated assumptions are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Pakistan ostensibly has a low nuclear threshold, which is artificial. Thus there is a
space for limited war under the nuclear overhang.
With countering the Pakistan army’s mobilization differential, a strategic surprise
can be achieved against Pakistan by the Indian armed forces.
All terrorist activities inside the Indian Territory are linked to Pakistan. Thus sub
conventional war can lead to a conventional response by Indian.
The Pakistani national response would not be very strong because there is a
difference of opinion in the Pakistani nation and the army vis-à-vis India.
The international response would also not be as hard as during other crises because
of limited time and space of the strikes.
War would end within 72-96 hours
The India’s Perceived Assumptions:
•
•
Indian nuclear doctrine will certainly deter Pakistan from using any nuclear option
a small time frame.
Although, sufficient military objectives will be achieved by the Indian army to
paralyse a cohesive Pakistani response yet, the Pakistani forces would stay confident
of their conventional war fighting capabilities, which would keep them from using
nuclear weapons or lowering the threshold.
However this begs the question of the Actual assumptions of Cold Start Doctrine what
are these. This essentially means that deterrence in South Asia may not be remain static.
2
In this context the workshop will aim to explore whether or not this will impact
on the doctrine, and the Pakistani response options. Therefore, SASSI is aiming to hold a
Three-Day international workshop 20-22 July, 2010 on the issue of the emerging Indian
Military Cold Start Doctrine and its politico-military implications. The ultimate debate
surrounding the doctrine and its implications for regional and international security.
The goal of the workshop is to bring together the think tanks, experts around the
world, as well as governmental officials and specialists from international and national
organizations to work on the evolving discourse of Cold Start Doctrine and regional
stability. The three-day workshop will be a major event organized by SASSI; venue is
Serena Hotel Islamabad, Pakistan.
We would like to cordially invite you to the above mentioned workshop. It
would be a great pleasure for us if you attend this international event, however given the
limitations of the space available, we would appreciate an early response and acceptance
for confirmation.
Please find the attached files and kindly acknowledge the receipt of the documents.
If you have any further inquires feel free to ask.
Workshop Concept:
On April 28th 2004, the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Padmanabhan initiated
the process of formulating a new war doctrine, titled ‘Cold Start’ which revolves around
‘the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.’1
According General Padmanabhan the Indian ‘Cold Start’ will be attempted whenever
possible to achieve surprise and maximise gains. The entire border is likely to be activated
with shallow thrusts, very heavy firepower and short span manoeuvres. Nuclear weapons
may not be used; their use may, however, be threatened. Special Forces and coup-de-main
forces will play a major role. Integrated action by all three services will be crucial for the
enhancement of our combat power vis-à-vis the adversary’s. Levels of technology employed
in the wars will be higher than at present. Wars will end in stalemate, with little or no gain,
and heavy losses to military as well as civilian targets. In the case of Bangladesh, the
threat is of such a low level as to be non-serious. However in the skirmishing, the danger
of casualties to unarmed civilians will be great and will need to be handled with firmness
and imagination.2
The strategy unveiled in 2004 has taken a significant importance with the statement
given by the Indian Chief of the Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor in November 2009
that the possibility of a limited war under a ‘nuclear over hang’ in the region was likely to
exist and reality.3 Stating his reasons he had argued that ‘South Asia along with West Asia
1
2
3
Dr. Subhash Kapila, ‘India’s New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed’, South
Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 991, 04 May 2004, http://www.southasiaanalysis.
org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html.
General S Padmanabhan, Bharat-Rakshak, Wednesday, 21 June 2006 20:01, Indian Army 2010,
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/2006/02/58.html.
“Possibility of Limited War in S Asia: Indian Army Chief”, The News, 24 November 2009.
3
had emerged as “one of the epicenters of conflict and instability” and with absence of a
common consensus to combat this threat the possibility of “territorial disputes, provocation
by proxy wars, religious fundamentalism, radical extremism, ethnic tensions and socioeconomic disparities”4 were to further exacerbate the situation on ground. The Indian
Army chief argued would invariably link ‘sub conventional conflicts to situations leading
to preemptive action/strikes under the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
The Cold Start Doctrine is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike calls for rapid
deployment of “Integrated Battle Groups” comprising of elements of Army, Air Force, and
if need be, Navy, to conduct high-intensity operations.5 These battle groups could be used
individually for limited operations, or in conjunction for operations of greater scale.6
Doctrine and Assumptions:
The aim of the new war fighting doctrine is to increase the Indian military strike
options for possible retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan without invoking
the Pakistani nuclear threshold. The doctrine envisages an increase in the Indian military
options based on a situation where Indian armed forces can have sufficient military success
that can be used to achieve limited political objectives before an international intervention
or the conflict turns nuclear.7
According to the recent statement General Deepak Kapoor (Indian COAS), “The
possibility of limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality in South Asia.”8
The doctrine requires the re-division of the Indian army from the existing three major strike
corps into eight integrated battle groups (IBGs) buffed by the mechanised, artillery and
armoured divisions.9 The aim is to launch multiple strikes within seventy two hours of the
first strike, approximately 50-70 km inside Pakistani territory, with close support of the air
and naval components.
Furthermore, Cold Start Doctrine would entail combined operations between India’s
three services and integrated battle groups for offensive actions against Pakistan without
crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.
To implement this doctrine India will restructure its army’s offensive power from
three strike corps to eight smaller division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that
combine with mechanized infantry, artillery and armour. Indian Holding Corps or Pivot
Corps would undertake limited offensive operation to give time to IBGs to strike hard on
4
5
6
7
8
9
Ibid.
Y. I Patel, ‘Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army’s Doctrine’, BharatRakshak, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/Millenium/324-A-ParadigmShift.html.
Ibid.
Y. I Patel, ‘Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army’s Doctrine’, BharatRakshak, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/Millenium/324-A-ParadigmShift.html.
“Possibility of Limited War in S Asia: Indian Army Chief”, The News, 24 November, 2009.
Walter C. LadwigIII, ‘Cold Start for Hotwars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine’,
International Security, Vol. 32, No.3, (Winter 2007/08) p164.
4
already softened targets by the Pivot Corps. The IBGs would be self-contained and highlymobile, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into
enemy territory within 96 hours.10 Main characteristics of the Cold Start Doctrine will be:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Element of Surprise
Integration among the Armed Forces
Quick, Swift and Day and Night Operations
Combine Mechanised Infantry, Artillery and Armour
Close Air Support/Massive Fire Power
Pivot Corps (Holding Corps) would act offensively
Aims would be limited
72/96 hours for IBGs to enter Pakistani Territory
Robust Command and Control
Strikes below the Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold
Assumptions:
1)
The operational success is based on the assumption that the deployment would
be rapid achieving quick success.
2)
Element of surprise will be achieved.
3)
Pakistani response will be muted.
4)
It will not invoke a Pakistani nuclear response.
5)
Sufficient military objectives will be achieved by the Indian army to paralyse a
cohesive Pakistani response.
6)
The operations would be conducted with rapid mobilization and on multiple
fronts so as to achieve mission objectives before the international pressure can
be crystallised.
Implications & Reponses:
The ‘Cold Start’ doctrine postulates the non use of nuclear weapons in the region
or in the event of an outbreak of war between Indian and Pakistan; based on the notion of
pre-emption and offensive operations.
However, the doctrine received a strong response from Pakistan with the statement
made by the chairman of the civilian-military National Command Authority (NCA)
warning India of any misadventure in Pakistan. The NCA of Pakistan, meeting under Prime
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani on January 13, 2009 stated that it had taken “serious note of
recent Indian statements about conducting conventional military strikes under a nuclear
umbrella” and said “such irresponsible statements reflected a hegemonic mindset, oblivious
of dangerous implications of adventurism in a nuclearized context…Massive inductions of
advanced weapon systems, including installation of ABMs (anti-ballistic missiles), build10
Dr. Subhash Kapila, ‘India’s New Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed’, South
Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 991, 04 May 2004, http://www.southasiaanalysis.
org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html.
5
up of nuclear arsenal and delivery systems through ongoing and new programs, assisted
by some external quarters, offensive doctrines like ‘Cold Start’ and similar accumulations
in the conventional realm, tend to destabilize the regional balance.”11 The Pakistani
response was elucidated further by the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff who clearly hinted
that the consequences of any misadventure in a nuclear overhang can be suicidal for India.
General Kayani stated that “Pakistan would response in full strength while using all types
of resources. We plan on adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions. Yes, we (Pakistan) are
India-centric…We have unresolved issues, a history of conflict and now the Cold Start
doctrine is turning the traditional theory of war on its head.” “The ‘Cold Start’ would
permit the Indian Army to attack before mobilizing, increasing the possibility of a ‘sudden
spiral escalation’” he further elaborated. This statement was supplemented by the Chief of
the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar who said that “Pakistan has put all the required
preparations in place to meet any eventuality. The aggressor could not even think of what
the reply would be from Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has kept its assets for
thwarting conventional threats from the force devoted to deal with the terrorists. Similarly,
the Pakistan Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) Chairman General Tariq Majid stated
that “Leave alone China, General Deepak Kapoor knows very well what the Indian Army
cannot and the Pakistan Army can pull off militarily.”
The difference in the perception of what is a nuclear threshold of a nuclear Pakistan
and the response options clearly cause a challenge to the existing strategic stability in the
region. Strategic stability means the absence of conflict, war, and balance derived from the
broader needs, desires, concerns and national interests. In the search of strategic stability
there are three approaches first to exercise and manipulate threat through deterrence; second
the management of vulnerability through the assurance of safety, security and command
and control; and third the management of threat through arms control and confidencebuilding and threat reduction measures. All these are challenged by the new Indian Cold
Start Doctrine with fundamental implications and repercussions for the region.
India-Pakistan relations had been unstable since their independence. There had
been many instances in history which brought both countries to a crisis situation but due
to nuclear deterrence no escalation had taken place. After the nuclearisation of South Asia
in 1998, nuclear deterrence had been under test by the complex realities of the region. In
addition, India is rapidly accelerating its defense modernization and military responsiveness
by increasing both the offensive and defensive weapons systems. India is on course to
develop capabilities to implement its new war doctrine. It has allocated $31.71 billion for
the defense budget in 2010.12
11
12
“NCA takes serious note of Indian statements”, The News, 14 January 2010.
Anirban Chowdhury, “India to Spend 1.47 Trillion Rupees on Defense” Wall Street Journal, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB126717059610452143.html. According to Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute - (SIPRI) India has become the world’s second largest arms purchaser during
last five years competing with China. India’s imports of arms went as high as seven per cent of
the world’s arms exports. From 2005 to 2009, India’s annual arms imports doubled: $1.04 billion
(2005); $1.25 billion (2006); $2.2 billion (2007); $1.8 billion (2008) and $2.1 billion (2009). It
added that India’s major imports included 82 Sukhoi-30MKI fighters and T-90 tanks from Russia,
and an A-50/Phalcon Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system integrated by Israel. As it has been
described that Cold Start Doctrine would require swift, day and night operations, the offensive strikes
6
The possibility of a growing prospect of an arms race in South Asia further
exacerbated the existing nuclear relationship. This today stands challenged with the
introduction and possible operationalisation of the new Indian war-fighting doctrine of
Cold Start particularly as the Cold Start is a preemptive strategy which supports the idea of
a limited war in a nuclear environment.
The introduction of the doctrine has solicited a Pakistani response and would be
followed by the Pakistani counter measures as it would aim for strategic equivalence
with India. The difference in perceptions, the growing possibility of the introduction of
Cold Start doctrine in the India- Pakistan theater and the culminative effect of the military
modernization and expansion of the Indian army has repercussion for the strategic stability
in the region. Given this context the purpose of this workshop is to elaborate the Cold
Start doctrine; possible Pakistani responses; likely changes in the nuclear doctrine and the
implication on the nuclear doctrine.
Core Objectives of the Conference:
1. Describe Indian Cold Start Doctrine
2. Assumptions of the Doctrine - Regional Military Development as Rapid Military
Development
3. To analyse the Military Capabilities of India and its deficiencies in the implementation
of Cold Start Doctrine.
4. Aim to explore Pakistan’s Military Capabilities to counter Cold Start Doctrine
5. Pakistani Responses and Capability Overhaul
6. Nuclear Doctrinal Challenge
7. Doctrinal implications on Strategic Stability of the Region.
8. To highlight the threats to the Strategic Stability in South Asia by Cold Start
Doctrine
would need active support by advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers
and Intelligence) network and systems. Keeping in mind this notion India is developing its overall
military capabilities. India is going to spend about $ 30 billion on acquisition of military hardware
and software by 2012. “Indian military growth threatens S. Asian stability: Pakistan” Asia One, See
also http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20100226-201022.html).
7
Guest Speakers, Sessions’ Chairs and Director General SASSI with Chief Guest,
Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister along with SASSI Team
Guest Speakers, Sessions’ Chairs and Director General SASSI with Chief Guest, Mr.
Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
8
Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General SASSI presenting SASSI Souvenir to Chief
Guest, Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
Coordinators of Breakout Sessions (War Games) with Director General SASSI
9
WORKSHOP PROGRAMME
SASSI’s International Workshop on “Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its
Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia” was covered in three days from 20th-22nd
July 2010. The detailed programme of three-day workshop is given below.
19th July 2010
Reception / Inaugural Dinner
Key Note Address of
Minister of Defence,Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar
On Monday, 19th July, 2010,
At 18:30hrs – 20:30hrs
SERENA HOTEL
Islamabad (Only Select Invites)
PROGRAMME
DAY I
20th of July, 2010
8:45-9:15
Conference Registration
09:15-10:00
Opening Session
10:00-10:15
•
Recitation from Holy Quran
•
Workshop Outline: Ghazala Nayyar – Research Fellow,
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
•
Welcome Remarks by Director General Maria Sultan South
Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
•
Keynote Address by Chief Guest
Lt.Gen (Retd) Syed Athar Ali HI (M)
Tea/Coffee Break
10
Session I:
10:15-10:50
Session I
Introduction and Theoretical Reference
•
Remarks by Director General Maria Sultan, South
Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
•
Khalid Banuri, Director Arms Control & Disarmament
Affairs (ACDA)
Chair:
Dr. Anwar Hussain Siddique, President International
Islamic University.
10: 50- 11:00
Q & A Session
SESSION II:
SESSION II
Plenary
11:00-11:30
Cold Start Concept and Evaluation
Speakers :
Lt. Gen. Hamid Khan,
Former President National Defence University
(Cold Start Conventional Doctrines and Evaluations (IndiaPakistan)
•
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal,
Advisor on Nuclear Affairs SASSI/Assistant Professor,
International Relations Department of Quaid-i-Azam
University - India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Philosophy and
Dynamics
Chair
Gen. Hamid Nawaz, Former Minister for Interior/
Former Secretary Defence
11:30 -11:45
Q & A Session
11:45- 12:00
Break Out Plenary
Masood-Ur-Rehman - Indian Cold Start Doctrine
Capabilities and limitation
12:00 - 12:30
Breakout Session
Cold Start Doctrine Proactive – Two-Front War
Coordinators: Masood-ur-Rehman, Tahir Nazir, Rida Zeenat
11
Key Elements
•
Limitations of Indian Cold Start Doctrine
• Capabilities of Indian Army to operationalize Cold Start
Doctrine
• India-Pakistan Deterrence Stability
12:30– 12:45
Report back to the Plenary
SESSION III
SESSION III
Plenary
12:45-13:30
Cold Start Assumptions
Speakers:
• Brig. Naeem Salik,
Academic Advisor National Defence University - Cold Start: Its
Assumptions and Implications on Strategic Stability
• Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal,
Advisor on Nuclear Affairs SASSI /Assistant Professor,
International Relations Department of Quaid-i-Azam
University- Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis
• Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani,
Ex-DG Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI) Cold Start: Its
implications on Strategic Stability
Chair:
Dr. Rodney Jones, President Policy Architects International /
Associate Fellow SASSI
13:30 - 13:45
Q & A Session
13:45- 14:00
Break Out Plenary
Ms. Sobia Saeed Paracha, Research Fellow, SASSI - Cold Start:
Structural Context
14:00 - 14:30
Breakout Sessions
Perceived – Actual – Operational
Coordinators: Sobia Saeed, Sannia Abdullah, Haleema Sadia,
Zafar Ali.
Key Elements
• Nuclear Terrorism and Cold Start
12
• Rising on the escalation ladder
• Two-front war for Pakistan and India
14:30 - 14:45
Breakout Report back to the Plenary
14:45 -15:45
Lunch
SESSION IV
SESSION IV
Plenary
15:45-16:15
Military Developments and Implications for Arms Race
Speakers:
• Dr. Rodney Jones,
President Policy Architects International/ Associate Fellow
SASSI - Introduction of Future Technologies (Military
Capabilities) and Its Implications for Strategic Stability
• Brig. Khursheed
Relationship between Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan and
the Cold Start Strategy
Chair:
Lt.Gen. Talat Masood,
Former Federal Secretary
16:15 - 16:30
Q & A Session
16:45 -17:00
Break Out Plenary
Ms. Sajida Mansoor, Research Fellow, SASSI - Cold Start
Doctrine: Implications for Arms Race in South Asia
16:30-17:15
Breakout Session
NMD, Network centric Warfare, Land Warfare
Coordinators: Raja Nusrat Kamal, Sajida Mansoor, Afsah
Qazi, Majid Mehmood, Mohammad Shakar, Mobeen Tariq.
Key Elements
• Network-centric Warfare Capabilities of India and Pakistan
and their Impact on Cold Start Operations
• Role of Armoured (tanks) in India-Pakistan Confrontation
• Role of Air power and National Missile Defence (NMD) in
13
ColdStart Operations
17:15- 17:30
Report back to the Plenary
17:30-17:45
Tea Break
DAY-II
July 21, 2010
09:20-09:30
Recitation from the Holy Quran
09:30-10:30
Conference Registration
10:30-10:45
Tea Break
SESSION V
SESSION V
Plenary
10:45 -12:15
Strategic Stability Implications - Pakistan’s Response
Speakers:
• Dr. Rifaat Hussain,
Chairman Department of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Quaid-i-Azam University-Cold Start and Nuclear Deterrence
South Asia
• Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Professor,
Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) - Cold
Start: Implications for Strategic Stability
• Hamid Hamza Khan,
Regional Director for Central Asia & Afghanistan, SASSIFourth Generation Warfare/Cold Start Doctrine
Chair:
Dr. Tanveer Ahmed,
Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
12:15 – 12:30
Q & A Session
12:30 – 12:45
Break Out Plenary
Mr. Nasir Naveed Dogar, Research Fellow, SASSI - Implications
of Cold Start Doctrine on Strategic Stability in South Asia
12:45-13:20
Breakout Session
Coordinators: Hamid Hamza, Nasrullah Mirza, Jawad Aziz,
Nasir Naveed Dogar, Sitara Noor
14
Key Elements
• Implications of Cold Start for South Asian Stability
• Moral & Psychological Effect of Cold Star Doctrine
• Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
13:20- 13:30
Report back to the Plenary
13:30-15:00
Special Lunch
Key Note Speaker: Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affair
SESSION VI
SESSION VI
Plenary
15:00-16:00
International Response
Speakers:
• Tariq Osman Hyder,
Former Ambassador/Member for Strategic Export Controls,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Pakistan-India Confrontation: Role
of US/UN
• Ali Sarwar Naqvi,
Former Ambassador/Former Advisor to Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission (PAEC) on International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) matters/ Senior Associate Fellow, SASSI-Cold
Start: Response from China and East Asia.
• Brig. Gen Feroz Hassan Khan,
Associate Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI)/ Senior Researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterrey, California, USA-Threat of Two-Front War Under
CSD and Role of EU/NATO
Chair:
Khalid Banuri,
Director Arms Control & Disarmament Affairs (ACDA)
16:00-16:15
16:15-17:00
Q & A Session
Breakout Session
Coordinators: Shumaila Ishaque, Abida Raffique, Adeela
Azam, Abbas Zulqarnain
Key Elements
• International Response and Cold Start Doctrine
15
• Development of Cold Start Doctrine and its impact on War on
Terror: How would the Great Powers Reacts Regional Impact.
• International Organizations.
17: 00 – 17: 15
Report back to the Plenary
17:15-17:30
Tea Break
DAY III
July 22, 2010
08:50-09:00
Recitation from Holy Quran
09:00-10:00
Conference Registration
10:00-10:15
Tea Break
SESSION VII
SESSION VII
Plenary
10:15-11:00
National Response
Speakers:
• Dr. Tanveer Ahmed Khan,
Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
(ISSI)-Pakistan’s response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine
• Dr. Noman Sattar,
Head of Department of Nuclear politics & Strategic Studies,
National Defence University-Cold Start and National Response:
Pakistan Options
• Gen. Hamid Nawaz,
Former Minister for Interior/Former Secretary DefenceNational Context and the Cold Start Doctrinal implications.
Chair:
Akram Zaki, Former Ambassador/Senator.
11:00- 11-15
Report Back to Plenary
11:15-12:00
Breakout Session
Coordinators: Hamid Hamza, Dilshad Bano, Salma Shaheen,
Nimra Safdar
Key Elements
16
• Political Response
• Military Response
• Insurgent Response
• Media Response
12:00-12:15
Report back to the Plenary
Session VIII
Session VIII
Plenary
12:15 – 12:45
Pakistan Counter Measures and Nuclear Doctrine
Speakers:
• Maria Sultan,
Director General SASSI-Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and
implications for Deterrence and strategic Stability: The Theory of
Integrated Strategic Equallance
• Lt. Gen. Tariq Waseem Ghazi,
Former Secretary Defence - To Counter Cold Start Doctrine:
Pakistan’s Possible Response
Chair:
Dr. Pervaz Iqbal Cheema,
Dean Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS) National
Defence University
12:45 – 1300
Report back to Plenary
13:00-13:45
Lunch
Concluding Session
Session IX
Session IX
Plenary
Implications for Strategic Stability
13:45-14:45
All session chairs report back
14:45-15:15
Roundtable
Concluding Remarks by Gen. Ehsan ul Haq NI (M), Former
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan.
17
15:15-16:45
Concluding Session by Lt.Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi, Senator
Chaired by Director General Maria Sultan SASSI
16:45-17:00
Tea Break
Key Note Addresses:
Reception Dinner:
Sardar Salim Haider Khan13
At the reception dinner hosted by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI),
Pakistan’s Minister of State for Defense Production Sardar Salim Haider Khan declared
the workshop open and said, “It is a matter of great honor for me to speak as the inaugural
speaker to the three day workshop on Cold Start Doctrine and its implications for South
Asian Strategic Stability organized by the premier Pakistani institute SASSI.”
He further said that, “I want to congratulate SASSI for organizing the event on a topic
which has great relevance to the future security discourse of India and Pakistan; with
possible repercussions on international security. At almost every crossroads of history the
aspirations in Pakistan have been victim to India’s power aspirations. And it is in this
context that the linkage of the Indian counter terrorism strategy to conventional war under
the military doctrine of Cold Start is seen as a regional destabilize as it has the potential for
becoming a nuclear flashpoint.”
Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General, SASSI, Sardar Salim Haider Khan, Minister of State for Defen
Defense
Production,
n, Syed Samsam Bukhari, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting and other
Di
Distinguished
ti
i h d Guests
G t att the
th Reception
R
ti Dinner
Di
hosted
h t d by
b SASSI
13
Minister of State for Defense Production
18
Syed Samsam Bukhari14
At the reception dinner hosted by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI),
Pakistan’s Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Syed Samsam Bukhari
delivered additional remarks about the workshop that, “I congratulate SASSI for organizing
this workshop.”
PHOTOS of Samsam and Sardar Salim (Side by Side and in Center)
Reception Dinner hosted by SASSI
Reception Dinner hosted by SASSI
14
Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting
19
INAUGURAL SESSION
Welcome Remarks by Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General SASSI
Dr. Maria Sultan,
l
Di
Director G
Generall SASSI iin hher welcome
l
remarks
k said
id that,
h “T
“Today
d we
have gathered here for a cause.” She further emphasized that, “It is of important nature.”
Ms. Ghazala Nayyar, Senior Programme Coordinator, SASSI
20
DAY I:
Syed Athar Ali15
Lt. Gen. (R) Syed Athar Ali HI (M)
Lt. Gen. (R) Syed Athar Ali delivered the keynote speech on first day
of the workshop. While addressing the audience in the inaugural session he
said, “It is a matter of great pleasure for me to speak to you this morning
on a subject that is not only of interest to me personally, but which has
also implications for the defense and security policy of region, particularly
Pakistan. However, before I go into various aspects of this particular
challenge; I would, from the onset like to extend my congratulations to the
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) for arranging this workshop
on the Indian military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its implications for the
security debate in the region.”
He further elaborated that, “The Indian Cold Start Doctrine has been
studied and analyzed repeatedly since its inception in 2004. It has also
been a subject of intense debate at various civil and military forums, and
war games at services level as well as war colleges. The idea of fighting or
creating space for short intense battles under the shadow of a nuclear overhang as described by the Indian strategist is both dangerous and inherently
as self-defeating argument. It underestimates the nuclear reality of South
Asia and Pakistani resolve to deter any future war on Pakistan through all
means available to her.”
15
Lt. Gen. (R), HI (M), Secretary of Defense, Pakistan
21
Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General SASSI presenting SASSI Souvenir to
Lt. Gen. (R) Syed Athar Ali HI (M)
Day II:
H.E. Shah Mehmood Qureshi16
Chief Guest, Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
16
Foreign Minister of Pakistan
22
Chief Guest, Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi,
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
While addressing the distinguished audience he said that, “I am thankful to SASSI
for organizing this event and for providing me an opportunity to speak to such an august
gathering of scholars. The subject chosen by SASSI for this workshop “Indian Military’s
Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia” is both ironic
and provocative.
It is provocative as it reminds us about prevailing realities in South Asia and
transcends from our ideals of peace and amity, preached by sufis/saints in this land, and
ventures into scenarios of war and destruction so often predicted by prophets of doom and
destruction. Pakistan remains firmly committed to the objective of peace and stability in
South Asia.
It goes without saying that neither peace nor stability could be achieved in isolation.
They need strong partnerships, and willingness to build bridges and to walk the talk on
the high road to peace and equal security for all the partners. Naturally, this process of
mutually enriching partnerships begins with your neighbours.”
Guest Speakers, Sessions’ Chairs and Director General SASSI with Chief Guest, Mr. Shah Mehmood
Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
23
Day III:
Dr. Maria Sultan17
Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General SASSI
While describing Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Implications for Deterrence and
Strategic Stability, Dr. Maria Sultan presented a new theory of ‘Integrated Strategic
Equivalence’ in South Asia. She said that, “The future war in South Asia can never remain
conventional. Presenting the new theory of ‘Integrated Strategic Equivalence’ as Pakistan’s
possible counter measures to Cold Start Doctrine, objective is to ensure that Pakistan no
longer fears the threat of pre-emption. The possibility of a growing prospect of an arms
race in South Asia is further exacerbated by the existing nuclear relationship. This today
stands challenged with the introduction and possible operationalisation of the new Indian
war- fighting doctrine of Cold Start particularly as the Cold Start is a pre-emptive strategy
which supports the idea of a limited war in a nuclear environment. Whether Cold Start
Doctrine has the ability to create a gap between conventional and nuclear deterrence is another
question.”
She further explained that, “Currently, the Pakistani deterrence posture is based
on minimum credible deterrence and centralized command and control and strategic value
targeting its need to be consent given the new changing dynamics of threats and the theory, if
strategic equivalence can help to fill up the gap. The introduction of the doctrine has solicited a
Pakistani response and would be followed by the Pakistani counter measures as it would aim
for strategic equivalence with India based on the concept of minimum credible deterrence.”
17
Director General South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
24
Ehsan Ul Haq18
Gen. (R) Ehsan Ul Haq NI (M)
Concluding the conference, Gen (R) Ehsan ul Haq said that, “Pakistan had been
seeking peaceful resolution to disputes and normalization of relations with India. Our
Defense and security policy have been entirely focused on deterring war.” He further said
that, “Restraint and responsible had been the watchwords of our nuclear policy. It is in
pursuit of this policy that Pakistan has proposed the strategic restraint regime to achieve
stability and foster mutual confidence. As long as destabilizing concepts like Cold Start
Doctrine are being projected, Pakistan has to undertake all measures to safeguard its
territorial sovereignty.”
Javed Ashraf Qazi19
Senator Lt. Gen. (R) Javed Ashraf Qazi
18
19
Gen. (R), NI (M), Ex-Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan
Lt. Gen. (R), Senator
25
While addressing the audience he said that, “The gravest danger in our times lies in the
possibilities of war and conflict. This is perpetuated by the military planning divorced of
regional realities and the lack of the ability to control the spiral of violence generated by
the non state actors. This reality becomes all the more relevant when we find ourselves at
the cross roads of extremism; military adventurism and the probability of a nuclear war.
Therefore, I welcome this scholarly and deliberate effort made by the intellectuals/strategic
community through this three day workshop on Cold Start Doctrine and its implications for
the region to come up with policy recommendations and perhaps solutions which may help
to provide insights to ways and measures to bring about strategic stability in the region
and it is in this context that I congratulate the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI) for deliberating on this very important subject and its implications for regional
and global security order. We in the Defence Committee of the Senate will benefit from the
recommendations that will come through this august gathering of scholars, policy makers
and the intelligentsia regarding the doctrinal implications for maintaining and managing
the crisis through effective and reliable crisis and deterrence stability.”
26
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
Day I:
Inaugural Session:
Session Concept:
First session of the Cold Start conference mainly focused on the definition aspect of
the Cold Start Doctrine, strategic stability and Deterrence. First session mainly included a
key note address by the Chief Guest, Lt. Gen. (retd) Syed Athar Ali HI (M). This session
also highlighted the threat of Indian Cold Start doctrine and also tinted implications for the
defence and security policy of region, particularly Pakistan.
Plenary Speakers:
Session II:
Plenary: Cold Start Concept and Evaluation- (Definitions - Cold Start/
Proactive Ops - Conventional Doctrine - Pakistan-India)
Session Concept:
Session-II focused on the Cold Start Concept, how it evolved over the past and how it is
going to impact on the strategic stability of South Asia. In this session major emphasis was on Cold
Start Conventional Doctrine and Evaluations-India-Pakistan. This Session unveiled Indian military’s
weakness in the operationalisation of the Cold Start Doctrine. India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Philosophy
and Dynamics were also discussed in this session, in which the evolution of Indian military posture
from defensive to offensive was highlighted. In Break out session different war games were practiced
in which audience actively played an important role.
Hamid Khan20
(From Left to Right): Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal and Lt. Gen. Hamid Khan
20
Lt. Gen., Former President National Defence University
27
Highlighting Indian Military’s weakness in the operationalisation of the Cold
Start Doctrine, Lt. Gen. Hamid Khan spoke on, “Cold Start Conventional Doctrines
and Evaluations - India-Pakistan.” He said that, “The Indian Military having seen their
weakness of mobilization during the standoff during 2002 decided to have a relook at their
existing doctrine with the aim of offsetting the Pakistan advantage of quicker mobilization.
To succeed two essential elements needed to be achieved.
The main points that he chalked out were Indian strategy of denying a quick and total
mobilization to Pakistan, achieving Strategic Surprise over Pakistan, unambiguous nuclear
threshold of Pakistan and Indian incapacity to operationalise the doctrine in near future.”
He further explained that, “All the same if they want to make this doctrine workable they
need to first achieve the preliminary steps of forward garrisoning and forward dumping they
also need to reorganize because offensive formations need a better punch than defensive
formations. Tanks, long range arty and superior mobility are essential. I must emphasis that
presently their offensive and defensive formations are differently organized and equipped.
Also they need to retrain which they are doing but not much success has been reported.”
Distinguished Guests and Attendees at SASSI Workshop
Dr. Zafar Nawaz
waz Jaspal21
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
21
Advisor onn Nuclear Affairs, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)/Assistant Pro
Professor,
International Relations Department of Quaid-i-Azam University
28
He spoke on, “India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Philosophy and Dynamic”. Dr. Jaspal
said that, “Indian posture was defensive before Cold Start Doctrine. After the induction
of nuclear weapons, conventional superiority had been compromised. So India decided to
introduce Cold Start Doctrine to carry out limited war against Pakistan and remain below
the nuclear threshold of Pakistan.” Dr. Jaspal further said that, “India is spending billions
of dollars to overcome their military deficiency which has provoked an arms race in South
Asia. Main focus of Cold Start Doctrine is on Pakistan, but India links it with China.
But in reality latest tanks and other latest equipment cannot be used in Himalaya against
China but they will be used against Pakistan.” Dr. Jaspal advocated Azm-I-Nau exercise to
counter Cold Start Doctrine. In the concluding remarks, Dr. Jaspal said that, “Pakistan is
fully prepared to meet Indian Cold Start Doctrine.”
(From Left to Right): Brig. (R) Naeem Salik, Dr. Rodney Jones, Dr. Zafar Nawaz Ja
Jaspal,
and Lt. General (R) Asad Durrani
Break out Plenary:
Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak22
22
Research
h Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI). His research areas include
nuclear deterrence,
eterrence, nuclear terrorism, Afghanistan and War on Terror.
29
Mr. Khattak spoke on, “Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Myth or Reality.” He said that,
“South Asian security is in peril because of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine.” Further, he cautioned
that, “Cold Start Doctrine has the potential not only to operationalise Indian military doctrine
on the basis of pre-emption but can also trigger a nuclear conflict.” He said that, “Deterrence
in South Asia is delicate because of rapid militarization and operationalisation of Cold Start
Doctrine.” He further said that, “Indian Military carried out 10 major Exercises from 20042010 to operationalise Cold Start Doctrine. In these exercises Indian military exercised LongRange Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS). It has also practiced mechanized
combat vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Air Defence Missile System Electronic
sensors and Surveillance systems. India also practiced Swift and Quick mobilization and
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities. Indian Air Force and Special Forces also took
part in those exercises. Indian Army has also worked on synergy between Indian Air Force
and Army.” In concluding remarks, Mr. Khattak said, “The conception of limited war will
push the region into further instability. The danger of escalation will also increase. Cold Start
Doctrine overlooks the fact that in a crisis the nuclear threshold will be uncertain.”
Breakout Session II: Cold Start Concept and Evaluation
Coordinators: Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak (Research Fellow, SASSI), Rida Zeenat
(Research Fellow, SASSI), Tahir Nazir (Research Fellow, SASSI)
War Game 1: Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak (Research Fellow, SASSI)
Result: India faces defeat in war against Pakistan.
Background- 2015
Security Situation in South Asian is tense and fragile. India Pakistan rivalry and
unresolved issues are still a threat to the peace and stability of the region. Kashmir is
still burning; water issue has seriously hampered relationship between Pakistan and India.
Growing terrorism in India and Pakistan is also a source of concern. Growing insurgencies
in India pose grave danger to its national security. Pakistan is suffering from militancy in
Balochistan and tribal areas. In Pakistan PML-N is holding the driving seat. Blame game
is common in between Indian political elite and Pakistani political leadership. Situation is
getting worse day by day.
2017
26th January 2017
India is celebrating its Republic Day. Main military parade is taking place at the
Rajpath, in the capital New Delhi. President of Russia is the Chief Guest at the occasion.
Many ambassadors, diplomats, senior Indian military officers and political elite of India
are present at the occasion. Just before the flag hoisting ceremony more than 20 people
breach the Indian security at Rajpath and start firing at the gathering. After two hour of
shootout more than 250 people lose their lives and more than 400 are injured. Within 72
hours India launches attack on Pakistan.
30
Breakout Session in Progress
India started its operations with speed and robustness but it was unable to gain
considerable success. It gained some success in the Thar Desert in Pakistan. But it has
failed to gain success in Punjab plains and Jammu-Sialkot sector, because Pakistan had
already strengthened its defenses along the border. Its air defense capabilities armoured
and artillery dispersed Indian attacking forces. Being on defensive Pakistan army had
advantage. Indian military faced huge casualties in the initial onslaught. Their attack failed
miserably. In first two days Indian forces suffered immense losses.
India could not bring reinforcement to build a 3 to 1 ratio against Pakistan army,
which resulted in failure of Cold Start Doctrine. In the meantime, US, Russia, UK and
other important members of the international community pressurized both countries to
ceasefire, because Pakistan’s foreign minister in his speech in parliament declared that
Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if it failed to hold Indian attack conventionally. Such
assertion by Pakistan brought immense pressure on India to go for ceasefire and end the
war. Pakistan gained some 25 km territory in the Punjab sector and India got some 48 km
territory in Thar Desert. Both countries eventually agreed to return the captured territories
and signed a treaty of friendship with the facilitation of UNSC members.
War Game 2: Rida Zeenat (Research Fellow, SASSI)
Result: India Wins.
Result: India-Pakistan War ended in Stalemate.
Scenario:
An unexpected terrorist attack takes place at Bangalore Silicon Valley which is known
as the IT centre of India. 10 terrorists enter the building where influential Indian IT company’s
offices are located. Terrorists kill almost 500 civilian workers. The Indian army commandos
conduct operations against the terrorist kill all terrorists. However terrorists’ identification is
not known. But Indian media starts blaming Pakistan for initiating such attacks. Indian political
leaders vow to give a hard-hitting response to Pakistan for carrying out such attacks.
31
After presenting this scenario, participants divided into four sections.
1.
2.
3.
4.
India
Pakistan
US
China
Breakout Session in Progress
India’s Response:
•
India will not tolerate any terrorist attack and reserve the right to give a punishing
reply to Pakistan for launching such an attack.
•
India is in favour of limited war with Pakistan but they are not sure about the
possible Pakistani response.
•
India wants to exploit Pakistan’s internal unstable security and political situation.
Pakistan’s Response:
•
Any attack on Pakistan will be seen as naked aggression.
•
Pakistan does not believe in limited war.
•
Pakistan will use every means to protect its ideological and territorial integrity.
•
Pakistani nation will fight with India collectively including Baloch and Pushtun
people.
•
Pakistan reserves the right to activate its nuclear arsenal, if it feels threatened.
32
US Response:
•
US has condemned the terrorist attacks and shown sympathy to India.
•
US urged Pakistan to bring those culprits to justice.
•
US also conveyed to India that limited war could be escalated into nuclear war.
•
US urged both India and Pakistan to stop ongoing war.
China Response:
•
China condemned the terrorist attacks on India.
•
China also asked both the parties to be patient and resolve this issue peacefully.
•
China warns that limited war’s consequences would be detrimental for South
Asia.
•
China also conveyed to Pakistani leadership that China will support Pakistan
diplomatically as well as materially.
Conclusion:
•
China and the US enhanced their efforts to stop ongoing war between India and
Pakistan.
•
They convinced both countries that war is not a solution to their problem.
•
They jointly moved a resolution in UNSC 2111. According to this resolution it
is binding upon India and Pakistan to go for ceasefire and back to peace time
positions.
Breakout Session in Progress
33
War Game 3: Tahir Nazir (Research Fellow, SASSI)
Result: India-Pakistan War ended in Stalemate.
Scenario:
It is year 2015. Security situation of South Asia is not stable. India and Pakistan are
still the biggest rivals of each other and the conflicts between them have not been resolved.
Whereas regional security environment is not conducive, U.S. and U.K. forces have withdrawn
from Afghanistan leaving India in the driving seat which is worrisome for Pakistan. On 29th
May 2015, some 7 bomb blast struck Indian metro in New Delhi killing hundreds of people.
Reports by CID, CBI reveal that militants were from Kashmir and Afghanistan. Pakistan
condemned the attack and assured India of full support in countering terrorist activities. But
Indian response was different. National security meeting was called. Prime minister was put
under tremendous pressure to attack Pakistan to execute Cold Start Doctrine.
After the scenario was presented, the participants were divided into three groups.
One was India, second was Pakistan and third was international community. The whole
scenario was presented to them and a healthy debate initiated. The scenario was based on
the concept on India-Pakistan deterrence stability.
Breakout Session in Progress
Indian Response:
Indian group initiated a war by conducting multiple assaults and attacked Sialkot,
Bahawalpur and Lahore, capturing Sialkot and Bahawalpur till 40 km, and Indian forces
are moving to capture Lahore.
Pakistan’s Response:
Pakistan retaliated with aerial strikes and defended on grounds.
When situation got out of hands its nuclear threshold was tipped. Pakistan deployed its
Hatf I & II with nuclear warhead.
34
International Community’s Response:
International community diplomatically intervened and UNSC passed a resolution
to have ceasefire and pressurized Pakistan not to go for a nuclear attack. China stopped its
aid and sanctions were imposed on Pakistan.
Conclusion:
India agreed to have ceasefire on one condition that NATO forces under U.N
flag takeover the captured territory and do not returns it to Pakistan. Secondly, India was
successful in having declared Pakistan a terrorist state. It succeeded in convincing the UN
that Pakistan nuclear program should be taken away from it and gained sympathies from
international community. Pakistan was completely isolated leaving India victorious.
Breakout Session in Progress
Session III:
I
Plenary: Cold Start Assumptions
Session Concept:
Session-III of the conference focused on Cold Start Assumptions and its implications
on strategic stability in South Asia. Major emphasis was to highlight the Indian assumption
of fighting a limited war in a nuclear environment and keep it below the nuclear threshold
and that the Indians can unambiguously identify Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Other major
which was discussed in this session was structural context of the Cold Start Doctrine. In
the critical analysis of Cold Start ended this session. In this part it was emphasised that
Cold Start Doctrine has boosted the strategic optimism of the Indian strategic pundits. The
supporter and propagator of the doctrine have sketched interesting operational advantageous
scenarios. The Revolution in Military Affairs obviously restructures and multiplies Indian
Armed forces striking power. The increasing war-fighting capability of Indian forces has been
boosting Indian ruling elites’ strategic sense of superiority, which could entail devastating
misperception and miscalculation about strategic competitor’s defensive capabilities.
35
Naeem Salik23
Brig. (R) Naeem Salik
He talked about,
b t “C
“Cold
ld St
Start:
t It
Its A
Assumptions
ti
and
d IImplications
li ti
on St
Strategic
Stability.” He highlighted fifteen major Indian assumptions related to the effectiveness
of Cold Start Doctrine. Few of them were: “It is possible to fight a limited conventional
war in a nuclear environment and keep it below the nuclear threshold and that the Indians
can unambiguously identify Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Sources of any terrorist incident
in India would be outside India and ostensibly in Pakistan. Pakistani Military would take
an Indian blow and sit back quietly without retaliating. A so-called ‘punishing blow’ to
Pakistan Army would be so effective and long lasting that the Pakistan Army’s role as
a driver of ‘Pakistan’s aggressive foreign policy’ would be eliminated forever. Pakistan
will perceive attacks by multiple integrated battle groups (IBGs) as less provocative and
threatening than those by one or two strike corps.”
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal24
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
23
24
Brig. (R), Academic Advisor National Defence University
Advisor on Nuclear
N l Aff
Affairs
i S
South
th A
Asian
i St
Strategic
t i St
Stability
bilit IInstitute
tit t (SASSI)/A
(SASSI)/Assistant
i t tP
Professor,
f
International Relations Department of Quaid-i-Azam University
36
He presented a paper on, “Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis.” He declared
that, “The proponents of Cold Start Doctrine are under erroneous impression that Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA) in the Indian Armed Forces automatically converts the structure
of South Asian strategic environment in India’s favour. It would transform the existing
South Asian anarchical system into a hierarchical system, in which India would enjoy
domineering stature. But, in practice, the structure of the regional or international system
is not modified by mere elevating the technical outlook of the armed forces. Kenneth Waltz
pointed out that even major changes in military technology did not change the structure
of the international system unless the new weapons are used to fight wars that change the
number of great powers. The realistic calculations reveal that the regional system would
not become hierarchic.” He concluded that, “The Cold Start Doctrine would give India an
opportunity to keep military operation at the level of limited war. Realistically, the Cold
Start would not give combat edge to the Indian Army over Pakistani defensive forces.”
Asad Durrani25
Lt. Gen. (R) Asad Durrani
Lt. Gen.
n (R) Asad Durrani talked on
on, “Cold Start: Its implications on Str
Strategic
Stability.” He said that, “In the mid 1980s, the Indian Army started mechanizing some
of its infantry formations. The re-organized divisions were given the acronym of RAPID
[which is abbreviation of Re-organized Army Plains Infantry Divisions]. At that time it was
considered merely part of a process all modern armies undergo, to enhance mobility. In all
its conflicts with Pakistan- wars, as well as periods of tension that led to full mobilization
- the Indian military had needed 4-6 weeks to assemble its forces on the borders.”
He further elaborated that, “That gave Pakistani forces sufficient time to carry out
counter measures and make a reasonable assessment of the adversary’s likely war plans. In
this background, the Cold Start Doctrine announced by India in 2004 made sense, but also
25
Lt. Gen. (R), Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
37
raised some questions. Suffice it to say, that if the aim of this concept is to avoid a big war
and use of nuclear weapons, and end the conflict in a stalemate; strategic instability should
be one of our lesser concerns. Our aim would be much better served by limiting the Indian
gains during the first 48 to 96 hours and thus helping them to end the conflict within the
stipulated time frame.”
Distinguished Guests and Attendees at SASSI Workshop
Sobia Saeed Paracha
h 26
Sobia Saeed Paracha
Ms. Paracha
h ttalked
lk d about,
b t “C
“Cold
ld St
Start:
t St
Structural
t l C
Context.”
t t ” Sh
She structured
t
her
presentation on Indian stated and actual assumptions, which were differentiated on the
26
Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI). Her research areas include
strategic export controls of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
38
bases of how they are being stated and how they might actually be operationalized based on
the patterns of Indian preparation and their perceptions about possible Pakistani response.
She discussed that besides the primary assumption of a space available in South Asia for
conducting a limited war, most significant Indian assumption is that they would be able to
cause a psychological paralysis of the Pakistani leadership and nation.
This would break the morale of the forces and disorient the nation, which will break
the Pakistani will and limit its capability to respond to the Indian incursions in Pakistan.
India also talks about marginalizing the command and control of the Pakistani nuclear
weapons which will keep the war from escalating to nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan. Ostensibly the Cold start doctrine is about conducting quick military actions in the
Pakistani territory that help to strategically surprise Pakistan, embarrass the Pakistan army,
and have small territorial gains, that can later on be utilized as a bargaining chip on the
negotiation table, but breaking the backbone of Pakistan army, jamming the command and
control systems of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, acquiring nuclear second strike capability
etc, are Indian goals that clearly are not related to the concepts of limited war.
Breakout Plenary:
Zafar Ali27
Col. Zafar Ali
He spoke on, “C
“Cold
ld St
Startt A
Assumptions”.
ti ” Mr.
M Zafar
Z f started
t t d hi
his presentation
t ti with the
historical background of Cold Start Doctrine. In which he discussed Sunderji’s concept
briefly. Then he explained the concept of Cold Start Doctrine. He said realist would focus
on the military might at economic and social expense of states making out of the box
thinking impossible.
He further said that from the Realists’ perspective, Pakistan should be taking counter
measures to balance against the threat. He further said that while there appears similarities
to the Cold War model there are also stark differences.
27
Col., Senior Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
39
Breakout Session III: Cold Start Assumptions
Coordinators: Sobia Saeed Paracha (Research Fellow, SASSI), Haleema Sadia
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
War Game1: Sobia Saeed Paracha (Research Fellow, SASSI)
The war game was based on the idea of external contingency planning, where US
and India have a strong strategic partnership and desire containment of Chinese influence
in Pakistan. If in this strategic setting where US hold is weakening in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is having a strategic partnership with China a terrorist attack takes place how
would the war evolve? The war doctrine is cold start and Pakistanis were to give responses
according to that and also the over-all strategic scenario. One war game was conducted
under the session related to doctrinal assumptions. The focus was to find out if the Indians
find the environment conducive would and Pakistan is not capable of giving a strong
defense except for using nuclear weapons, would India still keep the war limited.
Scenario:
On 16 March 2017, a series of five terrorist attacks take place in India and
Afghanistan. At 3:00 am the first attacked is the Bagram air base which helps kill 50 US
soldiers. At 4:00 am the other attack took place at the Indian embassy in Kabul, killing 156
people and injuring another 223. Both of these attacks were carried out by hacking the US
drones and diverting their targets.
At 3:00 pm a 9/11 type of attack takes place in Chennai. The terrorists highjack a
plane before it takes off and make it strike inside the general public waiting lounge. The
entire crew, passengers and another 1000 people get killed. The Mumbai police deposed a
car bomb outside a cinema house at 5:00 PM. Another bomb blast took place at the mosque
in Mumbai, killing 50 people. As a result of this a war was initiated by India.
Breakout Session in Progress
40
The participants were divided into following groups: Pakistan, India, China, US,
UNSCR: France Russia, UK, Non-state actors in India, Non-state actors in Pakistan and
Afghan Taliban. Pakistanis during the first day of war did not respond effectively, but they
had mined their borders which made India lose the little surprise that it could cause with
help of IBGs. Indian attacks and Pakistani counter-attacks took place in various sectors yet
the Pakistani nuclear weapons were on a green alert after two days of war. The insurgents in
India were very proactive and they even claimed responsibility for the attacks. Pakistani and
Indian insurgents planned to join hands against the governments and bring about a paradigm
shift, which would take the region completely towards sub-conventional warfare.
When the war game was ended, the Indians had occupied 100 square km of Sindh
and small areas along the international border in Punjab. Whereas, Pakistan had also
occupied 80 km in Rajasthan and 50 km in the Fazilka sector. The nuclear weapons of both
countries were on red alert and the international response was muted, while China declared
not to intervene in any form.
Session IV:
Military Developments and implications for Arms Race
Session Concept:
Session-IV discussed the military development and Implications for Arms Race.
Future Technologies, military capabilities and its implications for strategic stability was also
highlighted. Relationship between Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan and Cold Start
Doctrine was also discussed in this session. Number of rationales for India’s formulation
of its aggressive Cold Start conventional military doctrine were discussed in this session,
Primarily Indian military’s frustration with the failure of its military operation Parakram
in 2002, wherein it mobilized bulk of its armed forces against Pakistan immediately after
an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, provided the apparent rationale for
reformulation of the Indian military doctrine. Evolution and development of the Cold Start
Doctrine was discussed in detail.
Dr. Rodney Jones28
Dr. Rodney Jones
28
President Policy
olicy Architects International/Associate Fellow South Asian Strategic Stab
Stability
Institute (SASSI)
41
He spoke about, “Introduction of Future Technologies (Military Capabilities) and its
Implications for Strategic Stability”. Dr. Rodney Jones in his speech said that in implementing
Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan, India would take advantage of the terrorism that is
prevailing in Pakistan. He said that it is very difficult for Pakistan to cope up with the military
technological advancements to maintain a conventional status quo with India. At the same
time Pakistan needs to have advanced military technology to remain an effective deterrent to
India. Indian implementation of cold start doctrine will adversely affect the strategic stability
of South Asian region and this will lead to a never-ending arms race in this region.
Muhammad Khursheed Khan29
Brig. Khursheed
He highlighted the relationship between nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan
Paki
and cold start doctrine. In his speech he said that, since the creation of India and Pakistan,
both countries have been involved in several conflicts that continue to pose the risk of
inadvertent war. The terrorism phenomenon is an additional factor that has all ingredients
to explode the situation out of proportion thus inviting more troubles in the region.
Unlike in the past, any future war between the two countries, no matter how limited
it might be, will have the potential to escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. Moreover he
said that given the present level of the two armies, India’s Cold Start doctrine is unlikely to
achieve the desired objectives in a given period in the future at any level, from surgical or
punitive strike to a full-scale “Cold Start” operation.
Due to geographical constraints, Pakistan army would definitely respond with
its full might to stall the Indian offensive at all levels. Indian army’s failure to achieve
the desired objectives through a limited war based on the envisaged strategy might force
Indian leadership to push for a full-scale conventional war which may bring catastrophic
end results which both countries as rational actors would like to avert.
29
Brig., National Defence University
42
Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema30
(From
m Left to Right): Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema and Dr. Nasrullah Mirza
The theme off hi
his paper was, “I
“Introduction
t d ti off F
Future
t T
Technologies
h l i (Milit
(Military Capabilities)
and its Implications for Strategic Stability (India).” There are number of rationales for India’s
formulation of its aggressive Cold Start conventional military doctrine. Primarily however,
Indian frustration with the failure of its military operation Parakram in 2002, wherein it
mobilized bulk of its armed forces against Pakistan immediately after an attack on the Indian
Parliament in December 2001, provided the apparent rationale for reformulation of the Indian
military doctrine.
As the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan mutually hold their cities a hostage,
any thought of annihilation of tens of thousands of civilians does amount to ‘unacceptable
damage.’ The excruciating damages of a possible nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan
would be unpalatable for both countries, militarily, politically, socially, and economically. This
is what makes their counter-value deterrence stable. However, Cold Start Doctrine indicates a
disturbing trend toward military adventurism that threatens nuclear stability in South Asia.
Breakout Plenary:
Sajida Mansoor31
30
31
Meritorious Professor and
nd Former Dean of Social Sciences, Quaid-i-Azam University/Senior
Advisor on Arms Control
ol and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI)
Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI). Her research areas include
nuclear energy, nuclear fuel cycle and various multilateral approaches to it.
43
Ms. Mansoor talked about, “Cold Start Doctrine: Implications for Arms Race in
South Asia”. Indian Cold Start Doctrine was made public in year 2004. The main objective
of this Cold Start Doctrine is to launch a massive offensive conventional attack against
Pakistan in multiple sectors that would cause significant damage to the Pakistan armed
forces. Both India and Pakistan have maintained a hostile bilateral relationship as a result of
various ideological, historical and territorial differences since their independence in 1947.
These differences and subsequent disputes have impacted on national security concerns
of both the nations and that have eventually led them to opt for continuous arms race by
acquiring the latest high-technology defence equipment. India continues to buildup arms
at a fast pace in recent years while equipping its armed forces with the latest jet fighters,
warships, radars, tanks, missiles, submarines, weapons systems and platforms. Indian
modern high-technology arms buildup has forced Pakistan to maintain adequately strong
military equipment and weaponry to ensure its national security and sovereignty.
Breakout Session IV: Military Developments and Implications for Arms
Race
Coordinators: Raja Nusrat Kamal (Associate Fellow, SASSI), Sajida Mansoor (Research
Fellow, SASSI), Afsah Qazi (Research Fellow, SASSI), Mohammad Shaker (Research
Fellow, SASSI), Majid Mehmood (Research Fellow, SASSI), Mobeen Tariq (Research
Fellow, SASSI)
War Game 1: Raja Nusrat Kamal (Associate Fellow, SASSI), Sajida
Mansoor (Research Fellow, SASSI), Mohammad Shaker (Research
Fellow, SASSI), Majid Mehmood (Research Fellow, SASSI), Mobeen
Tariq (Research Fellow, SASSI)
Role of Tanks, Air Power, and Network-centric Warfare in Cold Start
Operations
Two war games of session four were based on application or role of high-technology
defence equipment and weaponry in a massive conventional attack launched by India while
executing Cold Start doctrine. One war game scenario was based on the Role of National
Missile Defence in Cold Start Operations whereas other was based on the Role of Tanks,
Air Power, and Network-centric Warfare in Cold Start Operations.
Scenario:
Year 2019:
The overall security environment in South Asia is not conducive to peace due to
prevailing tumultuous relations between India and Pakistan. Kashmir issue is still to be resolved
and now the water dispute between India and Pakistan has further deteriorated the security
calculus of South Asia. In Pakistan, the central government is led by Pakistan Peoples Party in
coalition with Pakistan Muslim League -N. In India, the central government is led by Indian
National Congress whereas the states’ governments are led by various political parties.
44
Multiple terrorists’ attacks have been carried out in India that have led to the execution
of Cold Start Doctrine by Indian armed forces. Surprise attack is going to be launched by
integrated battle groups (IBGs) based on heavy mechanized armoured divisions, with latest
T-90S main battle tanks deep inside Pakistani territory.
After presenting this scenario participants were divided into three groups:
1- India
2- Pakistan
3- International Community (USA, United Nations, Russia, China, Muslim
World)
When divided participants started internal discussions on Indian aggression as
mentioned in war game scenario, their responses were recorded later on.
After getting initial responses, the elements of technology one by one were
introduced with an evolving scenario.
On September 13, at 10:30 AM, two armoured divisions with heavy artillery support
and latest T-90S tanks of Indian Army capable of inflicting heavy damage entered from
Bikaner to Bahawalpur inside Pakistani territory.
On September 15, at 9:30 AM, two squadrons of Indian Air Force with 30 Su30MKI combat aircrafts capable of inflicting heavy damage, were going to head-off from
Chandigarh air base which is part of Western Air Command (that operates sixteen air bases
from Punjab to Uttar Pradesh) to launch deep aerial strikes inside Pakistani territory.
Breakout Session in Progress
Questions:
Following questions were posed to the participants for deliberations with regards to
their responses:
45
1-
Would Pakistan take lightly the initial conventional attack carried out by India?
2-
Whether India would go for a conventional ground attacks?
3-
How would Pakistan Army respond to Indian aggression?
4-
Whether Pakistan would resort to nuclear option in the result of suffering from
heavy casualties and damage of its strategic and air assets?
Response:
Nuclear exchange was averted between India and Pakistan due to immense pressure
from United States of America that had warned both the countries to refrain from a collision
and to ceasefire.
War Game 2: Afsah Qazi (Research Fellow, SASSI)
Role of National Missile Defence in Cold Start Operations
Scenario:
India has revealed its Cold Start Doctrine in 2004 that talks of greater mobility; eight
IBG’s attacking Pakistan at eight different fronts, integrated forces displaying highly Networkcentric Warfare by developing the ISR and C4I2 systems and achieving territorial gains through
surprise attacks. National Missile Defence is not a formal element of Cold Start Doctrine
operations but it needs to be discussed here because of two reasons: India has always been an
admirer of the National Missile Defence and always wanted to achieve it through any means
as disturbing the Indo-Pak deterrence stability has always been India’s foremost priority. If
India gets National Missile Defence the deterrence stability existing between the two will be
undermined and Pakistan will have to engage in an arms race to maintain this stability that
its fragile economy does not allow. Another reason for discussing National Missile Defence
is that the Cold Start Doctrine operations are based on Network-centric Warfare that depends
on systems that work through surveillance radars, reconnaissance aircrafts and airborne early
warning systems. To do NCW first of all the protection of such systems has to be ensured. So
as the Cold Start Doctrine was proposed India stated making more and more efforts to get
National Missile Defence so that during a war situation it can go for air supremacy over Pakistan
without the fear of any counter measures and ensure the protection of its airborne systems from
Pakistani missiles and stop and destroy them midway to make all their targets unreachable and
unachievable and thus ending their capacity to retaliate both conventionally and nuclearly. So
after Cold Start Doctrine was proposed India has started allocating greater amount of economic
resources for National Missile Defence development with US assistance.
On august 11, 2017 a Pakistan navy ship is destroyed by two LRBM’s, later detected
to be fired from Indian bases. India admits it as soon as it becomes public and apologizes by
calling it the accidental use of weapons. Pakistani elite accepts the excuse while behaving
prudently as the strategic dialogue between India and Pakistan is at a critical point about to
provide a viable solution to the Kashmir dispute.
January 2019 the two leaders come up on an understanding to give the right of self
determination to the Kashmiris. Indian PM has said that a formal agreement will be signed
once the insurgent belt in India ranging from West Bengal to Maharashtra, that has become
46
more violent, is settled.
Along with this insurgent belt the Hindu Muslim riots in Gujarat that borders
Maharashtra have also increased greatly as the IT boom has benefited only a minority
Early 2020 the Indian police is deployed in the entire insurgent belt and in greater
numbers in Gujarat in order to save it from becoming a part of the insurgent belt. March 23,
2020 while Pakistan is having resolution day celebrations, four terrorist attacks, including
two suicide blasts occur in Gujarat at places having higher concentration of Muslims. 70
Muslims are killed and entire Gujarat is up in revolt against the Indian govt. within three
days as the terrorists appeared in the uniforms of Indian police. Indian police suddenly
denies its involvement but the revolt has spread from the border between Gujarat and
Maharashtra to the insurgent belt transforming it to a separatist movement.
Breakout Session in Progress
On August 1, 2020 India launches surprise attacks on Pakistan where as per the
Cold Start Doctrine 8 IBGs are formed from the holding cores within the commands in
Punjab, new Delhi and Himachal Pradesh aimed at engaging the Pakistan army at 8 different
fronts while making the best use of its data link systems which helps creating a long
range communication link between ground stations and remote platforms. Actual Indian
assumption is that engaging Pakistani forces at 8 different fronts will lead to psychological
paralysis and state and society will be unable to act as a concentric state.
After losing its major logistical infrastructure as well as 8 MBT’s that are destroyed by
Pakistan’s Baktar Shikan anti tank missile India has become more furious and therefore decides
to go for deep air strikes with SU-30 to have air supremacy. Even after the failure of National
Missile Defence to stop cruise missiles India is very confident about both its airpower and the
National Missile Defence. This confidence in air power lost when the HQ-9 interceptor missile
that Pakistan got from china having the combined features of S-300 and PAC 3 shot down 5
Indian SU30s even after Indian air supremacy. In addition to this Pakistan has used kinetic
warheads that attain a hyper velocity and then collide converting their kinetic energy into shock
waves and heat, to destroy the Indian missiles carried and shot by SU-30.
47
Indians have gained complete air superiority over Pakistan along with the
considerable damage of conventional forces. But even after India has initiated a two front
war it has to face unacceptable damage as the Indian National Missile Defence was once
again proved useless when Pakistani MIRV’s strongly hit the outskirts of Chandigarh and
Bhatinda thus equalizing the collateral damage on both sides making it clear that severe
actions from Indian side might prompt Pakistan to cross the nuclear threshold and go for
an all out nuclear war.
Session V:
Plenary Strategic Stability Implications Pakistan’s Response
Session Concept:
Session-V mainly focused on strategic stability of South Asia and its implications
of Cold Start Doctrine for the regional stability. Strategic stability revolves primarily
around the development of a relation of mutual deterrence among the adversaries. It can be
broadly viewed as a result of effective deterrence. Its remit goes beyond nuclear stability to
include the wider issues of chemical, biological weapons and conventional force balance.
In this session Cold Start and nuclear deterrence in South Asia was also discussed in detail.
Fourth Generation Warfare and Cold Start Doctrine were also discussed briefly. Threat of a
fourth generation warfare and its relevance with Cold Start doctrine was also highlighted.
Further it was highlighted in this session that, this paradigm of warfare revolves around
a symmetrical warfare to get a moral victory with minimum nation state involvement.
Moreover threat of nuclear use has also been highlighted in this session.
Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain32
Dr. Syed Rifaat Hussain
32
Professor andd Chairman Department of Defence and Strategic Studies,
Studies Quaid-i-Azam
Quaid i Azam University/
U
Former Senior Associate Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
48
He spoke on the “Cold Start doctrine and Nuclear Deterrence South Asia”. CS focuses
on what Levy has described as “diagnostic learning”. Unlike causal learning which refers to
changes in beliefs regarding the consequences of actions, DL refers to changes in one’s belief
regarding attributes of the other party such as its capabilities, intentions and resolve.
In order to balance Cold start doctrine he pointed out following options for Pakistan.
External balancing is no longer an effective and credible option for Pakistan in the post
9/11 environment. Internal balancing can only be done at the conventional level. Force
modernization and military preparedness for a “meaner and leaner” force is the only viable
“balancing” strategy.
Distinguished Guests and Attendees at SASSI Workshop
Hamid Hamza Khan33
Hamid Hamza Khan
Mr. Khan highlighted the aspects of Fourth Generation Warfare in cold start doctrine.
In his presentation, Mr. Hamid Hamza said that Cold Start doctrine or 4th generation
33
Regional Director for Central Asia & Afghanistan, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI)
49
warfare, use of 4th generation warfare against Pakistan is a more dangerous and disturbing
angle of Indian doctrine which most defense analysts in Pakistan have overlooked.
This paradigm of warfare revolves around a symmetrical warfare to get a moral
victory with minimum nation state involvement. It is necessary to understand the various
generations of warfare and to figure it out that which one of these Pakistan is facing now.
First generation warfare goes around conscription and firearms. Wars by Napoleon
can be categorized in this generation. Second generation warfare was the involvement of
state armies, alignment of warfare resources and raw firepower. World War I can be said
to as 2nd generation warfare. Third generation warfare was introduced in World War II by
including armored warfare and mechanized troops, and multi state involvement it came to
end after a brutal use of nuclear threshold.
Breakout Plenary:
Nasir Naveed Dogar34
Nasir Naveed Dogar
Mr. Dogar talked about “Implications of Cold Start Doctrine on Strategic Stability
in South Asia”. There are a number of factors that can undermine the strategic stability in
South Asia. Pakistan will come under great pressure to retaliate and there is no way that
the Indians can guarantee that Pakistan will keep the war limited. As there will be no time
for intervention, Pakistan will have to exercise its all available options. With the increasing
disparity between India and Pakistan in conventional capabilities, Pakistan’s dependence
on its nuclear weapons is most likely to increase. The conventional imbalance coupled
with an attack as per the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) will further lower the nuclear threshold
of Pakistan. Why will Pakistan cooperate according to the rules set by India? Although,
Pakistan has not clearly defined its nuclear red-lines.
34
Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI). His research areas include
non-proliferation, global zero, arms control and disarmament.
50
Sannia Abdullah35
Sannia Abdullah
Ms. Abdullah talked about, “Deterrence Vs Compellence Theory and Cold Start:
an Academic Debate.” She said that there lies contradiction in argument that an armed
conflict of any level is conceptually contradictory to the theory of deterrence. History has
witnessed conventional wars and crises as hallmark of nuclearized South Asia. It is difficult
to understand the theoretical divide of deterrence theory into two strands i.e. conventional
deterrence and nuclear deterrence; keeping in view that conventional deterrence is less likely
to practice in the world of today where nuclear deterrence is operative particularly among
two nuclear powers. There have been six nuclear alerts in India-Pakistan relations that
supporters of deterrence regard as functioning of deterrence including the multiple crises
of 1984-85 relating to India’s purported plans to attack Pakistan’s nuclear installations;
the Brasstacks crisis (1986-87); the Kashmir-related Spring crisis (1989-90), the Kargil
conflict (1999), the extended Indo-Pak border confrontation (2001-02) and Mumbai crisis
2008.
Breakout Session V: Strategic Stability Implications: Pakistan’s
Response
Coordinators: Hamid Hamza (Regional Director for Central Asia and Afghanistan,
SASSI), M. Jawad Aziz (Research Fellow, SASSI), Nasir Naveed Dogar (Research Fellow,
SASSI)
War Game 1: Hamid Hamza (Regional Director for Central Asia and
Afghanistan, SASSI), M. Jawad Aziz (Research Fellow, SASSI), Nasir
Naveed Dogar (Research Fellow, SASSI)
35
Research Fellow Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
51
Moral and Psychological effects of Cold Start Doctrine
Situational Context in Pakistan 2012
Pakistan is facing high level of militancy in Balochistan Province.
Situation in Sind province is also getting worse, after government of Sind announced
protests against water dispute with other provinces. Many senior parliamentarians and
government officials have been killed in target killing.
Situational Context in South Asia 2012
India has entered into a treaty with America on Afghanistan. This treaty has
given control of Afghanistan to Indian Forces, after the return of NATO. India is facing
insurgencies in different parts, which become worse than ever in Indian history. Kashmiris
are also protesting to achieve their independence from India.
Date: 15-01-2012
9:00 pm: News break out on Indian Media that two explosions took place in Star
Dust Award Ceremony, Mumbai and top Bollywood actors and actresses have been killed
and injured. So far, according to the news, Shah Rukh Khan, Ashwarya Roy Bachan,
Karina Kapoor, Katrina kaif, Karishma Kapoor, Kajul, Prianka Chopra, Madhori dixet,
Preeti Zinta, Asha Takia and many others have been reported dead.
10:00 pm: News says that Aamir khan, Salman khan, Hrithik Roshan and Abhishak
Bachan are also reported dead. Death toll is above hundred and it is suspected to be a Shev
Sena attack.
3:00 am: News from Pakistan media that 11 Indian SU-30 MK 1 aircraft has been
shot down by Pakistani forces. Report says that Indian fighter aircraft attacked Shorekot,
Jacob Abad and Sargodha Air bases but these were successfully defended by recently
bought HongQi 9 (HQ-9) Surface to Air missiles from China. These SAM has maximum
range of 200km and can hit any target up to 30 km altitude. News says that Pakistan bought
these missiles in the response of Indian Cold Start strategy and is also willing to buy the
upgrades too. Emergency has been declared in Pakistan and the Armed Forces are on high
alert to face any attack from India.
5:00 am: Pakistan Air Force carries out big strikes on Pathan Kot, Adampur and
Halwara Air bases of India. The runways at these bases have been rendered unfit for aircraft
operations.
Date: 16-01-2012
6:00 am:
India has launched IBGs in different sectors of Pakistan.
Indian Air Force is facing hard time against Pakistan
HQ9 (SAM)
7:00 am:
Pakistan Nuclear weapons are activated.
52
Indian Response:
•
India said that this kind of attacks cannot be done by any terrorist organization and
involvement of states in these blasts is under consideration.
•
India attacked Pakistan Air Bases.
•
India got surprise about the results of HongQi 9 (HQ9) SAM.
•
India launched Cold Start Doctrine.
•
India gives strong statement to International Community that they will not move
back their IBGs.
•
India has activated its nuclear weapons.
Pakistan’s Response:
•
Pakistan attacked on Indian Air bases.
•
Pakistan has activated its nuclear weapons and announced to go for nuclear
option.
International Response:
•
This war can be escalated into a first ever nuclear war.
•
International community does not have any concerns or interest in issues in between
India and Pakistan; they should solve their own issues by themselves.
•
International Community does not want nuclear war and will apply force and
resources to stop nuclear exchange.
Conclusion
International Response was very weak in early times of crises. Though International
community announced to stop any possible nuclear exchange but no explanation was given
that how they will stop this nuclear war?
Pakistan response was very rational to the situation. In the response of first Air
attack, Pakistan went for Air response besides lowering its nuclear threshold. But, in the
reply of Indian IBGs launch, Pakistan went for nuclear option very quick. The only reason
for this quick nuclear activation was that though, Pakistan responded Air strike of Indian
Air Force but was totally convince to not fight a long or even short conventional war. India
had to decide either to go for a limited or long conventional war in the price of nuclear
exchange or to move back its IBGs.
Indian response was very irrational to the situation. Air strike capability of Indian
Air Force was challenged by Pakistan and there was no surety of any success in Cold Start
launching but, India went to this option. India lost some of its forward Air Bases and Indian
Air force was not able to give proper cover to the Indian ground forces. In this situation,
it was very rational for India to take out its IBGs but beside recalculating the mistakes
53
and reducing the hostility, India went to activate its nuclear weapons in the response of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons activations.
According to the situational context, nuclear war is the ultimate result. Though,
events were not that much hostile that could have escalated to a nuclear exchange but Indian
hostility and desire to punish Pakistan, in the result of moral and psychological effects over
Indian Government from India public, took South Asia towards a nuclear war.
Session VI:
Plenary International Response
Session Concept:
Session-VI mainly highlighted the international response in case of any Cold Start
Doctrine based operations. In this session US role in case of any confrontation between
India and Pakistan has been discussed. Moreover United Nation’s role has also been
discussed in detail in case of any conflict between both nuclear powers of South Asia. In
addition to that role of China (in case of operationalisation of Cold Start Doctrine) has also
been discussed in detail, because it would be a determining factor in the eventual outcome
of the debacle, and immediate because of China’s proximity to both Pakistan and India.
Moreover Threat of two front war under Cold Start Doctrine and role of NATO and EU has
also been discussed in this session.
Tariq Osman Hyder36
Tariq Osman Hyder
Mr. Hyder presented on, “Pakistan-India Confrontation: Role of US/UN”. He
outlined two basic parameters of this entire exercise in which we are engaged in regarding
the Indian Cold Start or as it is also known by them as their Proactive Doctrine. On the one
36
Former Ambassador/Member for Strategic Export Controls, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
54
hand, it is important to draw international attention to an essentially aggressive doctrine
which is at variance by the pronouncement of the Indian political leadership that India
has no aggressive designs against Pakistan and wishes to develop better relations and to
live in peace with Pakistan. He further said that the United States and the Western world
has certainly been much concerned to ensure that South Asia should not again become a
nuclear flashpoint, and have advocated better relations between the two countries, they
could have b done much more to pressure India.
Ali Sarwar Naqvi37
Ali Sarwar Naqvi
Mr. Naqvi spoke on, “Cold Start: Response from China and East Asia”. Ambassador
Naqvi said perhaps the most important, and in all likelihood, the most immediate response
to a Cold Start offensive against Pakistan on the part of India would be that of China.
Important because it would be a determining factor in the eventual outcome of the debacle,
and immediate because of China’s proximity to both Pakistan and India.
While there does not seem to be any official Chinese comment or position on Cold
Start as such, it would be my endeavor to deduce the contours of a likely Chinese response
on the basis of a broad survey of Pakistan-China relations followed by a surmise regarding
the response in the context of the present situation. I will then briefly look at the East Asian
response. In the context of the Chinese response to Cold Start, it would be pertinent to first
speak about the nature of Pakistan-China relations.
The relationship is in many ways unique, as it is wide-ranging, highly substantive
and even intense, and above all consistently on an upward, incremental curve, which has
no parallel in the region or even in other regions of the world.
37
Former Ambassador/Former Advisor to Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) on
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Matters/Senior Associate Fellow, South Asian
Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
55
Feroz Hassan Khan38
Brig. Gen. Feroz Hassan Khan
Mr. Khan spoke about the Threat of Two-front
Two front War under Cold Start
St Doctrine
and Role of EU/NATO. He said that, the security landscape in South Asia has changed
dramatically over the last 12 years, since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be
nuclear weapons powers. In 2001 the Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond
to a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. After nine months of
full mobilization, Indian forces withdrew to the barracks. This outcome of this coercive
force deployment was unsatisfying and triggered debate within the Indian Army to develop
a new doctrine, which would allow it to quickly mobilize in response to a perceived proxy
attack waged by Pakistan.
Dr. Rodney Jones39
Dr. Rodney Jones
38
39
Brig. Gen. (R), Associate Fellow South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)/Senior
Researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, California, USA
President Policy Architects International/Associate Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability
Institute (SASSI)
56
Talking about Cold Start and its Impact on Deterrence and Stability in South Asia,
Dr. Rodney Jones in his speech said that in implementing Cold Start Doctrine against
Pakistan, India would take advantage of the terrorism that is prevailing in Pakistan.
He said that it is very difficult for Pakistan to cope up with the military technological
advancements to maintain a conventional status quo with India. At the same time Pakistan
needs to have advanced military technology to remain an effective deterrent to India. Indian
implementation of cold start doctrine will adversely affect the strategic stability of South
Asian region and this will lead to a never-ending arms race in this region.
Distinguished Guests and Attendees at SASSI Workshop
Breakout Session VI: International Response
Coordinators: Abbas Zulqarnain (Research Fellow, SASSI), Shumaila Ishaque
Chaudhry (Research Fellow, SASSI), Abida Rafique (Research Fellow, SASSI)
War Game: Shumaila Ishaque Chaudhry (Research Fellow, SASSI),
Abida Rafique (Research Fellow, SASSI), Abbas Zulqarnain (Research
Fellow, SASSI)
Scenario:
As a result of large scale terrorist attacks in Mumbai, New Delhi and Chennai, thousands
of citizens have been died including Indian National Security advisor who was on a visit to
Mumbai. Indian government has blamed Lashker-e-Tayyaba (Let) and Jaish-e-Muhammad
(JeM) for the carnage. Indian media and public have upped the ante, and the government has
ordered the military high command to prepare for immediate punitive action against Pakistan.
India has traditional advantage in force ratio, whereas the naval arm has been strengthened
considerably with the acquisition of two aircraft carriers with allied equipments and landing
crafts. It has also nurtured good relations with Afghanistan and a sizeable military contingent is
present inside Afghanistan under the banner of Border Roads Organization (BRO).
57
Breakout Session in Progress
The international forces have already withdrawn under Obama’s Af-Pak Strategy.
China has emerged as a major power. Moreover, Iran after decades of denial mode finally
accepted having nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Afghanistan has intensified its demand
for re-alignment of the Durand Line. Realizing imminence of the war between two nuclear
armed states, international community is mobilized to prevent the outbreak of the war and
force the countries to come to the negotiating table.
Pakistan has strongly denied India’s allegation about involvement of any Pakistani
organization in the attacks and has explicitly conveyed that this is an engineered incident.
Thereafter, getting a blunt response from Pakistan, Indian leadership has decided to take
advantage of the war hysteria created and go for the limited military operation, using the
conventional military forces.
Therefore, Indian military high command has ordered complete mobilization and
offensive corps are in the process of moving to respective battle locations. Indian Navy
is also mobilized and reportedly plans to substantially support the operations through
Blockade of Karachi. And if possible establish beach head in the coastal area for further
operations. RAW and other military elements present in Afghanistan have been ordered to
carry out large scale sabotage activities in FATA and Baluchistan and also carry out raids
against border posts. Thus, India is adamant to launch as Pakistan perceives a two-front
war and the military planners are considering various options to effectively counter Indian
offensives.
Question:
What would be the response of Major Powers of the world and International
organizations?
58
Conclusion:
Pakistan was faced with the two front wars on its borders. On eastern border it
faced Indian troops, after so-called terrorists attack inside India, and on the western side
insurgency through Afghanistan was accelerated by launching regular attacks on its border
posts and playing havoc in its major cities by suicide bombings.
In the said situation, the international community pushed by the fact that nuclear
weapons were present in the region, decided to intervene. United Nations Security
Council meeting was called to ask the countries not to escalate hostilities. Furthermore,
the international body formulated an investigation commission to probe about the culprits
involved in the attacks carried out in Indian cities.
India had created war hysteria among its masses and successfully projected itself
as the victim and warded off international pressure and decided to go for war. On the
other side, Pakistan was fully prepared to take on Indian forces and furthermore, nuclear
thresholds were lowered by Pakistan.
DAY III:
Session-VII- Plenary
National Response
Session Concept:
This session mainly focused on the national response of Pakistan in case of any
Cold Start Doctrine based operations. Furthermore South Asian security environment has
also been discussed in this particular session. Indian army’s Cold Start Doctrine has been
analysed with its previous doctrines. In this session it was discussed that Pakistan’s national
response will be at three levels; Doctrinal, operational and political. Pakistan’s options had
also been discussed. Three options that Pakistan could go for, are; Defuse conflict situation,
engage/embroil and escalate—Fight.
Dr. Tanveer Ahmed Khan40
Dr. Tanveer Ahmed Khan
40
Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI)
59
Speaking about Pakistan’s response to Indian cold start, Dr. Tanveer Ahmed Khan
said that the security landscape in South Asia has changed dramatically over the last 12
years, since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear weapons powers. In 2001
the Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond to a terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament building in New Delhi. After nine months of full mobilization, Indian forces
withdrew to the barracks.
Distinguished Guests and Attendees at SASSI Workshop
This outcome of this coercive force deployment was unsatisfying and triggered
debate within the Indian Army to develop a new doctrine, which would allow it to quickly
mobilize in response to a perceived proxy attack waged by Pakistan. Earlier, what was
referred as Sunderji doctrine envisaged deep strikes into Pakistan thorough three offensive
corps through salami-slicing tactics to destroy Pakistani armored forces in intense
battleground of Indian choosing (desert/semi deserts areas).
Dr. Noman Sattar41
Dr. Noman Sattar
41
Head of Department
partment of Nuclear politics & Strategic Studies
Studies, National Defense Univers
University
60
Dr. Noman Sattar talked about, “Cold Start and National Response”. In his views
on the Cold start doctrine and national response, he mentioned that the Pakistan’s national
response will be at three levels; Doctrinal, operational and political. He stated the three
options that Pakistan could go for. These are; Defuse conflict situation, engage/embroil and
escalate—Fight. In addition, he said that India must take into account Pakistan’s nuclear
threshold and must not ignore the response from China and US.
Akram Zaki42
In his speech related to the national response, Mr. Zaki said that Pakistan has the ability
and credibility to counter any Indian aggression whether conventional or unconventional.
Cold Start Doctrine initiated instability and concerns among regional and international
community that any future war between India and Pakistan would escalate to nuclear war.
Pakistan is peaceful state and wanted to resolve the issues through negotiations and amicably.
There should be mutual balance and harmony in conventional and unconventional weapons
to promote peace and stability in the region. Pakistan and its military have sacrificed a
lot against terrorism and extremism and are more ambitious to eradicate it till the last
terrorist. India should try to look upon its internal terrorist organizations instead of blaming
Pakistan again and again. India should stop interference in Baluchistan, water issue should
be resolved seriously and time has come to solve Kashmir Issue seriously and peacefully.
Distinguished Guests and Attendees at SASSI Workshop
Breakout Session VII: National Response
Coordinators: Nimrah Safdar (Research Fellow, SASSI), Dilshad (Research Fellow,
SASSI), Salma Shaheen (Research Fellow, SASSI)
42
Former Ambassador/Senator
61
War Game: Nimrah Safdar (Research Fellow, SASSI), Dilshad (Research
Fellow, SASSI), Salma Shaheen (Research Fellow, SASSI)
The breakout session for national response was through a war game, which was
based on an assumed scenario, portraying the implication of the Indian cold start doctrine
against Pakistan. The scenario was such that a massive terrorist attack had taken place in
India in the year 2015, and making it as the basis, India has attacked Pakistan at Kasur.
Right in accordance with the doctrine, India also opened a multiple thrust, surprise attack
throughout the Pakistani border. This causes a psychological paralysis for the military,
political leadership, Government and the masses of Pakistan. In addition, it has greatly
affected the decision making body of Pakistan. India also, apprehended that there is a
politico-military discord in Pakistan.
Breakout Session in Progress
The audiences were divided into three groups. These were, the Government and
political leadership of Pakistan, second group was the Pakistan military and third was,
media. The responses that were given by each group as their stance after exercising the war
game were;
Political Response:
The response that was received after the deliberations was unanimous in approach
by the ruling political parties as well as opposition groups. The general conclusions were
that the Indian Cold start doctrine is a destabilizing factor, it could lower the threshold and
possibly lead to the escalation of crisis to a nuclear war.
Military Response:
If India continues to breech the territorial integrity of Pakistan, this may tip Pakistan’s
nuclear threshold and in response to this, Pakistan might not take any time to refrain from
its stance of No NFU.
62
Media Response:
Media is giving full coverage to the real time situation in Pakistan so that international
community can be informed of the stance of Pakistan’s military and political leadership
that Pakistan will not tolerate this unjust act from India.
Session VIII:
Plenary Pakistan Counter Measures and Nuclear Doctrine
Session Concept:
Session-VIII focused on Pakistan counter measures and nuclear doctrine. In this session
Pakistan possible response and capacity has been discussed. Moreover Pakistan’s nuclear
doctrine, nuclear deterrence and, theory of integrated strategic equivalence has been discussed
in details. Main focus in session was on threat of nuclear war between India and Pakistan in
case of any misadventurism by India. Objective of this session was to ensure that Pakistan no
longer feared the threat of pre-emption. Moreover it was reiterated in this session that Cold Start
is an aggressive doctrine aimed at Pakistan, such a doctrine against a nuclear weapon state will
put the region into further quagmire of volatility and dismay. Threat of deterrence failure would
increase if India operationalised her Cold Start Doctrine.
Dr. Maria Sultan43
Dr. Maria Sultan
Dr. Maria
M i S
Sultan
lt ttalked
lk d about,
b t “P
“Pakistan’s
ki t ’ N
Nuclear
l
D
Doctrine
t i and
d IImplications
li ti
for
Deterrence and Strategic Stability.” She said that the future war in South Asia can never
remain conventional. Presenting the new theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence as
Pakistan’s possible counter measures to Cold Start Doctrine, she said, it is to ensure that
Pakistan no longer feared the threat of pre-emption. The main question being; is it better
43
Director General South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
63
to attack or to defend and what are the incentives to absorb the adversary’s blow? This will
impact on the short run stability between actors. For in nuclear weapons the equilibrium or
sense of balance is more a question of capability, perceptions and intent rather than merely
a question of technology or integration. In addition to this deterrence stability is archived
not by the development of triad or a 2nd strike capability of land, air and sea but can also be
achieved as a result of the military posture and the nuclear doctrine.
Tariq Waseem Ghazi44
Lt. Gen. (R) Tariq Waseem Ghazi
Talking about how to counter Cold Start Doctrine and Pakistan’s Possible Response,
Lt. Gen. Tariq Waseem Ghazi said that Cold Start is an aggressive doctrine aimed at Pakistan,
such a doctrine against a nuclear weapon state will put the region into quagmire of volatility
and dismay. Threat of deterrence failure would increase if India operationalised her Cold
Start Doctrine. The analyses of the level of funding allocated for the modernization of
Indian armed forces and its endeavor to overcome its deficiencies, show that India may
operationalise Cold Start Doctrine in next five to ten years.
Pakistan has responded strongly to the Indian Army Chief’s rhetoric of facing
Pakistan and China at the same time. In retort to Indian Army Chief’s statement, Pakistan’s
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) Chairman General Tariq Majid said…”Leave
alone China, General Deepak Kapoor knows very well what the Indian Army cannot and
the Pakistan Army can pull off militarily”…Indian Army Chief “could not be so outlandish
in strategic postulations to fix India on a self-destruct mechanism”. Pakistan’s rejection of
Indian Cold Start Doctrine is based on its military capabilities and its strategy of offensive
defence to counter such an aggressive attack.
Breakout Sessions: Report Back to Plenary
All the breakout sessions were recorded with details of discussions, responses and
outcomes of the war games. On third day, the coordinators of breakout sessions reported
the outcome of their war games back to the plenary.
44
Lt. Gen. (R), Former Secretary Defence
64
MASOOD-UR-REHMAN KHATTAK
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
RIDA ZEENAT (Research Fellow, SASSI)
SOBIA SAEED PARACHA
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
HALEEMA SADIA
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
SAJIDA MANSOOR
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
AFSAH QAZI (Research Fellow, SASSI)
65
NIMRAH SAFDAR (Research Fellow, SASSI)
SALMA SHAHEEN (Research Fellow, SASSI)
HAMID HAMZA KHAN
(Regional Director for Central Asia
& Afghanistan, SASSI)
ABBAS ZULQURNAIN
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
66
Souvenirs Distribution for SASSI Workshop Speakers and Participants
SASSI Souvenirs were distributed by Gen. Ehsan-ul-Haq NI (M), Lt. Gen. (R) Javed Ashraf Qazi
and Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General, SASSI to the speakers and participants of the workshop.
TAHIR NAZIR
MASOOD-UR-REHMAN KHATTAK
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI
RIDA ZEENAT
SOBIA SAEED PARACHA
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
HALEEMA SADIA
COL. ZAFAR ALI
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Senior Research Fellow, SASSI)
67
NUSRAT KAMAL RAJA
SAJIDA MANSOOR
(Associate Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
AFSAH QAZI
MOHAMMAD SHAKER
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
SITARA NOOR
SHUMAILA ISHAQUE
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
68
ABIDA RAFIQUE
ADEELA AZAM
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
ABBAS ZULQARNAIN
DILSHAD BANO
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
SALMA SHAHEEN
NIMRAH SAFDAR
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
69
DR. HANS EBERHART
MOHMMAD MALIK
(Swiss Defence Attaché)
(Editor, The News)
DR. ZAFAR NAWAZ JASPAL
(Advisor, SASSI/Asst.Professor IR Dept., QAU)
KHALID BANURI
(Director General ACDA, SPD)
DR. ANWAR HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI
GEN. HAMID KHAN
(President, IIUI)
(Former President, NDU)
70
LT. GEN. (R) TARIQ WASEEM GHAZI
LT. GEN. (R) ASAD DURRANI
(Former Secretary Defence)
(Former Director General, ISI)
DR. RODNEY JONES
BRIG. (R) NAEEM SALIK
(Associate Fellow, SASSI)
(Academic Advisor, SNS-NDU)
DR. RIFAAT HUSSAIN
BRIG. (R) FEROZ HSSAN KHAN
(Chairman, Professor DSS Dept., QAU)
(Associate Fellow, SASSI)
71
AKRAM ZAKI
AMB. SARWAR ALI NAQVI
(Former Ambassador/Senator)
(Senior Associate Fellow, SASSI)
DR. NOMAN SATTAR
DR. MARIA SULTAN
(Head of Department, SNS-NDU)
(Director General, SASSI)
MAJ. GEN. AZHAR ALI SHAH
AISHA NAVEED
(Director General, ISSRA, NDU)
(HRM/Admin, SASSI)
72
Ali Hamza
(Senior Programme Coordinator, SASSI)
Hamid Hamza
(Regional Director
for Central Asia & Afghanistan, SASSI)
Mrs. Amina Kaira
(Project Director Social Sector, SASSI)
Anum Naveed (Coordinator, SASSI)
Ghazala Nayyar
(Senior Programme Coordinator, SASSI)
M. Jawad Aziz
(Research Fellow, SASSI)
73
DR. MARIA SULTAN, Director General, SASSI
presenting SASSI Souvenirs to
LT. GEN. (R) JAVED ASHRAF QAZI
DR. MARIA SULTAN Director General, SASSI
presenting SASSI Souvenirs to
GEN. AHSAN-UL-HAQ NI (M)
74
(From Left to Right): Nusrat Kamal Raja (Associate Fellow, SASSI), Dr. Maria Sultan (Director
General, SASSI), Akram Zaki (FormerAmbassador/Senator), Sarwar Ali Naqvi (Former
Ambassador/Senior Associate Fellow, SASSI), Gen. Ahsan-ul-Haq NI (M) (Former Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan) and Hamid Hamza (Regional Director for Central Asia &
Afghanistan, SASSI)
75
SESSION CONCEPTS
CONFERENCE SESSIONS’ CONCEPTS
1. Session-I
First session of the Cold Start conference mainly focused on the definition aspect of
the Cold Start Doctrine, strategic stability and Deterrence. First session mainly included a
key note address by the Chief Guest, Lt. Gen. (retd) Syed Athar Ali HI (M). This session
also highlighted the threat of Indian Cold Start doctrine and also tinted implications for the
defence and security policy of region, particularly Pakistan.
2. Session-II-Plenary
Session-II focused on the Cold Start Concept, how it evolved over the past and how
it is going to impact on the strategic stability of South Asia. In this session major emphasis
was on Cold Start Conventional Doctrine and Evaluations-India-Pakistan. This Session
unveiled Indian military’s weakness in the operationalisation of the Cold Start Doctrine.
India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Philosophy and Dynamics were also discussed in this session, in
which the evolution of Indian military posture from defensive to offensive was highlighted.
In Break out session different war games were practiced in which audience actively played
an important role.
3. Session-III
Session-III of the conference focused on Cold Start Assumptions and its implications
on strategic stability in South Asia. Major emphasis was to highlight the Indian assumption of
fighting a limited war in a nuclear environment and keep it below the nuclear threshold and
that the Indians can unambiguously identify Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Other major which
was discussed in this session was structural context of the Cold Start Doctrine. In the critical
analysis of Cold Start ended this session. In this part it was emphasised that Cold Start Doctrine
has boosted the strategic optimism of the Indian strategic pundits. The supporter and propagator
of the doctrine have sketched interesting operational advantageous scenarios. The Revolution
in Military Affairs obviously restructures and multiplies Indian Armed forces striking power.
The increasing war-fighting capability of Indian forces has been boosting Indian ruling elites’
strategic sense of superiority, which could entail devastating misperception and miscalculation
about strategic competitor’s defensive capabilities.
4. Session-IV-Plenary
Session-IV discussed the military development and Implications for Arms Race.
Future Technologies, military capabilities and its implications for strategic stability was also
highlighted. Relationship between Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan and Cold Start
Doctrine was also discussed in this session. Number of rationales for India’s formulation
of its aggressive Cold Start conventional military doctrine were discussed in this session,
Primarily Indian military’s frustration with the failure of its military operation Parakram
in 2002, wherein it mobilized bulk of its armed forces against Pakistan immediately after
an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, provided the apparent rationale for
reformulation of the Indian military doctrine. Evolution and development of the Cold Start
Doctrine was discussed in detail.
76
5. Session-V
Session-V mainly focused on strategic stability of South Asia and its implications
of Cold Start Doctrine for the regional stability. Strategic stability revolves primarily
around the development of a relation of mutual deterrence among the adversaries. It can be
broadly viewed as a result of effective deterrence. Its remit goes beyond nuclear stability to
include the wider issues of chemical, biological weapons and conventional force balance.
In this session Cold Start and nuclear deterrence in South Asia was also discussed in detail.
Fourth Generation Warfare and Cold Start Doctrine were also discussed briefly. Threat of a
fourth generation warfare and its relevance with Cold Start doctrine was also highlighted.
Further it was highlighted in this session that, this paradigm of warfare revolves around
a symmetrical warfare to get a moral victory with minimum nation state involvement.
Moreover threat of nuclear use has also been highlighted in this session.
6. Session-VI
Session-VI mainly highlighted the international response in case of any Cold Start
Doctrine based operations. In this session US role in case of any confrontation between
India and Pakistan has been discussed. Moreover United Nation’s role has also been
discussed in detail in case of any conflict between both nuclear powers of South Asia. In
addition to that role of China (in case of operationalisation of Cold Start Doctrine) has also
been discussed in detail, because it would be a determining factor in the eventual outcome
of the debacle, and immediate because of China’s proximity to both Pakistan and India.
Moreover Threat of two front war under Cold Start Doctrine and role of NATO and EU has
also been discussed in this session.
7. Session-VII-Plenary
This session mainly focused on the national response of Pakistan in case of any
Cold Start Doctrine based operations. Furthermore South Asian security environment has
also been discussed in this particular session. Indian army’s Cold Start Doctrine has been
analysed with its previous doctrines. In this session it was discussed that Pakistan’s national
response will be at three levels; Doctrinal, operational and political. Pakistan’s options had
also been discussed. Three options that Pakistan could go for, are; Defuse conflict situation,
engage/embroil and escalate—Fight.
8. Session-VIII-Plenary
Session-VIII focused on Pakistan counter measures and nuclear doctrine. In this
session Pakistan possible response and capacity has been discussed. Moreover Pakistan’s
nuclear doctrine, nuclear deterrence and, theory of integrated strategic equivalence has
been discussed in details. Main focus in session was on threat of nuclear war between
India and Pakistan in case of any misadventurism by India. Objective of this session was to
ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the threat of pre-emption. Moreover it was reiterated
in this session that Cold Start is an aggressive doctrine aimed at Pakistan, such a doctrine
against a nuclear weapon state will put the region into further quagmire of volatility and
77
dismay. Threat of deterrence failure would increase if India operationalised her Cold Start
Doctrine.
9. Concluding Session-IX-Plenary
In concluding session implications of Cold Start Doctrine for South Asia and
particularly Pakistan had been discussed. It was reiterated in last session that Pakistan
had been seeking peaceful resolution to disputes and normalization of relations with
India, Pakistan’s Defence and security policy have been entirely focused on deterring war.
Moreover it was asserted that restraint and responsible had been the watchwords of our
nuclear policy. Additionally Pakistan’s efforts to counter and maintain balance in the region
had also been discussed in detail. It was emphasized that as long as destabilizing concepts
like Cold Start Doctrine are being projected, Pakistan has to undertake all measures to
safeguard its territorial sovereignty.
Invitees List for the Conference:
The South Asian Strategic Stability Institute organized a Workshop on “Indian Military’s
Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia” from 20-22
July 2010. More than 44 foreign diplomats and more than 200 participants from a number
of local and foreign institutions attended this three-day workshop. People from military and
civil bureaucracy including serving and retired Military Generals, Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
Minister of State for Defense Production, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting,
Director General Inter-Services Public Relations, Director General Strategic Plans Division,
Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, senior faculty members of National
Defence University and Quaid-i-Azam University, scholars, senators, diplomats, politicians,
officers from National Defense University and Joint Staff Head Quarters and media personnel
were present in the international workshop.
In this 3-Days workshop, guests and speakers who participated in the seminar, included
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Gen. Ehsan-ul-Haq NI (M): Former Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan, Lt. Gen. (R) Syed Athar Ali HI (M), Lt. Gen. (R) Asad
Durrani Ex Director General – Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt. General (R) Javed Ashraf Qazi,
Lt. Gen. (R) Tariq Waseem Ghazi, Dr. Parvez Iqbal Cheema - Dean Faculty of Contemporary
Studies National Defence University, Dr. Tanveer Ahmed - Director General Institute of
Strategic Studies Islamabad, Dr. Noman Sattar Head of Department of Nuclear Politics and
Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Air Commodore Khalid Banuri - Director
General ACDA, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema – Former Dean of Social Sciences and Chairman of
Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Dr. Anwar Hussain
Siddique President International Islamic University Islamabad, Brig. (R) Naeem Salik, Tariq
Osman Hyder, Former Ambassador, Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal,
Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, Sharon McDonald Political Secretary of British High Commission
Islamabad, Ruslan Tsekov Secretary Embassy of Ukraine, Brig. Patel Indian Defense Attaché,
Brig. Muhammad Khursheed Khan, National Defence University, Col. Zafar Ali Strategic Plans
Division, and officers from National Defence University, Joint Staff Head Quarters, Strategic
Plans Division and Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority.
78
Key Note Speeches (Full Presentations/Transcripts):
Key Note Addresses:
Reception/Inaugural Dinner:
SARDAR SALIM HAIDER KHAN45
It is a matter of great honor for me to speak as the inaugural speaker to the three day
workshop on Cold Start Doctrine and its implications for South Asian Strategic Stability
organized by the premier Pakistani institute SASSI. I want to congratulate SASSI for
organizing the event on a topic which has great relevance to the future security discourse
of India and Pakistan; with possible repercussions on international security. At the centre
of the global strategic corridors Pakistan is n a unique position of historic, regional and
global power struggles. This special geo-strategic significance confers an extraordinary
role and importance to Pakistan as not only a key player at the regional level but also at the
international level.
The significance at this moment draws strength both from the positive and the
negative developments in the regional security milieu; here my reference is to the global
war against terror and the resultant consequences which has made region alive to threat of
terrorism with trans-nationalism being a central component. Positives are the determined
efforts by Pakistan to curb this menace inside Pakistan and the high success rate that has
been reached in achieving the goal of stability and security. The security challenges are
however compounded by the permanent security context faced by Pakistan especially the
threat from the eastern borders and the climate of animosity; this needs to be addressed in a
positive and constructive manner in which this relationship of conflict can be changed into
a relationship of peace and security.
Since our independence we have found ourselves a difficult relationship with our
eastern neighbor and despite our utmost attempts at developing a positive relationship
with India the prospects have been challenging. At almost every crossroads of history the
aspirations in Pakistan have been victim to India’s power aspirations. And it is in this
context that the linkage of the Indian counter terrorism strategy to conventional war under
the military doctrine of cold start is seen as a regional destabilize as it has the potential for
becoming a nuclear flashpoint.
Pakistan has always maintained that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are for defensive
purposes and will be considered as weapons of the last resort; nonetheless given the large
asymmetric conventional imbalance Pakistan has to rely on the policy of no no first use.
Furthermore, the fundamentals of the Cold Start Doctrine is based on the flawed assumptions
that any future war in South Asia can remain limited and does not have the potential to go
nuclear.
In the end I would like to state that Pakistan is a strong believer in the policy of
minimum credible deterrence. However the nature of deterrence is dynamic and has to
45
Minister of State for Defense Production
79
consider all possible force multipliers linked to any military operational doctrine that is
being used to develop a policy of compliance or is an extension of coercive diplomacy.
History and facts on ground at least in South Asia clearly indicate that though
Pakistan is a peace loving country and does not want any aggression or conflict. Having said
that doesn’t mean that we are not fully committed to the defense of Pakistan. The territorial
and ideological defense of Pakistan’s sovereignty will remain the primary objective of all
governments of Pakistan ad let me assure you this is one issue where there is no difference
of opinion. We are committed to the defense of Pakistan based on the concept strategic
equivalence and minimum credible deterrence.
Coming back to the topic, this three day workshop ion cold start and it implications
strategic stability in the region. I would like to compliment SASSI for organizing this
event and working towards a deeper understanding of this doctrine and its possible
repercussions for the security of the region. I sincerely hope that the three day deliberations
would help pave the way for understand that sub conventional warfare cannot be linked to
conventional warfare without underwriting the new security context and without the risk
of an uncontrollable spiral of escalation.
I once again thank you all for your attention and wish you success for the upcoming
workshop.
Day 1:
Session-I:
Key note Address by Chief Guest- LT. GEN. (R) SYED ATHAR ALI HI (M)
It is a matter of great pleasure for me to speak to you this morning on a subject that
is not only of interest to me personally, but which has also implications for the defence and
security policy of region, particularly Pakistan. However, before I go into various aspects
of this particular challenge; I would, from the onset like to extend my congratulations to the
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) for arranging this workshop on the Indian
military’s Cold Start Doctrine; and its implications for the security debate in the region.
I sincerely hope; looking at the very distinguished list of speakers in this workshop
that this event will allow for ground breaking work on this very important subject, leading to
a further deepening of the discourse and understanding of the security dilemma’s associated
with it. The definition of security has undergone a radical transformation in the 21st century
including the expansion in the concept of linking non-traditional threats to security with
that of traditional threats to security. Nowhere, has this transformation been more real
than in the context of South Asia. This has also brought about a fundamental change in the
character and nature of conflicts, warfare and response options available to state actors.
In the case of South Asia, the spectrum of threats has expanded to include the
asymmetric threat posed by non-state actors both of national and trans-national nature.
The response, like the threat, also requires a concentrated national and regional counter
80
terrorism strategy by the state actors. This includes the process of negotiations, economic
and political dispensation drawing its strength from the nuanced approach.
This said the strength of a country’s defence derives from the domestic sources of national
power like the people, government and the economy; this is further realized by the interplay
of internal external relations; and foreign and military policies of the states. These provide
the structure in which states see themselves and shape their futures as either aggressors or
peace loving states. These require huge resource and time investment as they determine the
short and long term objectives of a state and its security policy. Any mistake or shortcoming
in the formulation or implementation of defence policies can go undetected or unattended,
but they never go un-punished in a war. This is especially true if the policy is based on
an unrealistic or potentially dangerous doctrine such as the Indian military’s Cold Start
Doctrine.
The idea of fighting or creating space for short intense battles under the shadow of a
nuclear over-hang as described by the Indian strategist is both dangerous and inherently as
self-defeating argument. It underestimates the nuclear reality of South Asia and Pakistani
resolve to deter any future war on Pakistan through all means available to her.
Ladies and Gentlemen!
The Indian Cold Start Doctrine has been studied and analyzed repeatedly since its inception
in 2004. It has also been a subject of intense debate at various civil and military forums,
and war games at services level as well as war colleges.
Ladies and Gentlemen! Let me introduce some of the conceptual features of Indian Cold
Start Strategy Doctrine, which may serve as basis for subsequent discussions:
1- Conceptual Facets
a. Overt nuclearisation of Sub-Continent has brought a paradigm shift within its
security calculus, affecting regional strategic balance.
b. Experiences of recent escalations have lead Indian military planners to believe that
long mobilization period provides space for intervention to the major international
players inhibiting India from realizing her politico-military aim through application
of military instrument.
c. Therefore, Indians have resorted to notion of limited conflict with curtailed
application of military instrument and objectives. This shift in Indian thinking
manifests her intentions to fight a short notice, short duration war through its
highly propagated Cold Start Doctrine. The concept, while attempting to gain edge
over Pakistani mobilization differential, aims to exploit initial Pakistani defence
vulnerabilities through Hit and Mobilize Concept.
d. Edifice of the doctrine highlights a shift in Indian Armed Forces in general and
Army in particular from a defence reactive strategic thinking to a more proactive
approach by seizing early initiative in any confrontation.
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e. Major focus of Indian military thinking is on simultaneous integrated operations
to unhinge the enemy (Pakistan), break its organic cohesion and paralyze its
military leadership.
2- The Concept
Indian Cold Start Doctrine envisages applying linear ground forces for multiple
thrusts, backed by massive firepower well before Pakistan completes its mobilization and
international community can intervene. Salient concept contours are:
a. Indian military leadership has reckoned that a decisive victory against Pakistan is
not possible especially under the nuclear environment.
b. Therefore, new doctrine reflects a shift to conventional war with limited objectives.
However, partial destruction of Pakistan’s military potential, perceived as strategic
Centre of Gravity (COG), is considered important to humble Pakistan.
c. The doctrine emphasizes to strike offensively but without giving battle indicators
of mobilization to maintain changes of strategic surprise while remaining below
nuclear threshold.
d. In nutshell, the doctrine aims at destruction of industrial complexes, communication
infrastructure and military forces.
e. Entire concept aims at preventing Pakistan Army from shaping its defensive
battle.
f. Its aims at shaping the Battlefield through Network Centric Warfare, incorporating
all available technology driven assets and firepower platforms like Indian Air Force,
Indian Navy, Artillery and Surface to Surface Missiles etc. which would remain the
hallmark of Indian offensive.
g. Cold Start Doctrine warrants overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air
support.
Ladies and Gentlemen! I would like to share some serious security implications that the
region faces:
a. Indian Cold Start Doctrine is offensive in nature and carries inherent strategic
instability, induces arms race and had potential for sudden spiral escalation.
b. Indian growing military capabilities and aggressive designs are implied with war
provoking intent by practical manifestation of Cold Start Doctrine.
c. Hit and Mobilize concept would further squeeze space for diplomatic maneuver
to thwart conflict, this inducing great instability.
d. In practical terms, the strategy has increased threat in an unpredictable manner
at various rungs of the escalation ladder.
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e. e. it is inherently flawed to further engage nuclear south Asia in an arms race rather
than diverting the efforts and resources to alleviate the social needs of the poor
segments in the societies.
f. f. Strategic equilibrium presently prevalent in the Sub-Continent would thus be
impacted with negative repercussions.
A FEW WORDS ON RESPONSE
For the Indians, it would be naïve to assume that no response has been prepared
by Pak Armed Forces. Moreover, at all strategic forums the aspects of deterrence, nuclear
stability and thresholds are discussed threadbare.
Latest PAF Ex High Mark-10 and Pak Army’s War Games and exercises were
rehearsal of its response of PAF and Pak Army. Indeed, the introduction of Doctrine has
enabled three Services to refine their responses and they are well rehearsed. In the overall
context it is only natural that Pakistan strives for strategic equivalence with India.
Ladies and Gentlemen! Pakistan has always maintained a firm approach towards
restraint and responsibility in both regional and international security relations. The
commitment is also true when it comes to maintaining minimum credible deterrence needs
and those presented to her as a result of her commitment to the non-proliferation regime.
However, with the growing tendency of certain actors to link sub-conventional warfare
with conventional warfare; the upward spiral to super critical level of warfare that is nuclear
cannot be set aside; for the simple reason that any future war in South Asia between India and
Pakistan cannot remain indefinitely limited in scope, time, space or result.
Ladies and Gentlemen! Here let me assure that Pakistan does not support a policy
of belligerence or aggression but only aims to drive home the message that Pakistan’s
security is aimed at thwarting the full spectrum of threats and at maintaining Sovereign
Equality and Strategic Equivalence.
This is enshrined in Pakistan’s desire to maintain peaceful and friendly relations
with all its neighbouring countries including India. Since 1998 the region has moved away
from a conventional to non-conventional reality. And all future wars will hold this as a
universal regional truth.
In addition to the traditional source of threat and insecurity today the region suffers
from an entire range of threats amongst which the threat from non-traditional actors with
trans-border connections and reach is the most critical. Given the nature and the potential
of these actors to challenge state structures as well as regional security architecture; there
is need for all stake holders to work together in combating this challenge and developing
mechanisms of peace and collective response; I hope that we can all work towards this
regional challenge.
Coming to the end of my address I would once again thank you all for your
participation and the South Asian Strategic Stability (SASSI) for providing an independent
83
and neutral platform to understand develop policy relevant ideas to promote peace and
stability. I declare the workshop open and wish you all your deliberations.
Day-II:
Key note Address by Chief Guest:
Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi46
Mr. Shah Mehmood Qureshi
Ms. Maria Sultan,
S lt
Director General, SASSI
Excellencies, Distinguished guests,
Ladies & Gentlemen,
Assalam-o-Alaikum!
I am thankful to SASSI for organizing this event and for providing me an opportunity
to speak to such an august gathering of scholars. In a democratic polity like ours, foreign
policy reflects hopes and aspirations of the people of the country. Think tanks like SASSI,
intellectuals and civil society organizations have an important role to play in informing,
shaping and articulating public opinion on important foreign policy and security issues.
The subject chosen by SASSI for this workshop “Indian Military’s Cold Start
Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia” is both ironic and
provocative. It is ironic as only last week I hosted His Excellency S.M. Krishna, Foreign
Minister of India in Islamabad as part of our efforts to recommence stalled dialogue in
pursuit of our endeavors for durable peace in the region, albeit without a corresponding
positive response.
46
Foreign Minister of Pakistan
84
It is provocative as it reminds us about prevailing realities in South Asia and
transcends from our ideals of peace and amity, preached by sufis/saints in this land, and
ventures into scenarios of war and destruction so often predicted by prophets of doom and
destruction.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Pakistan remains firmly committed to the objective of peace and stability in
South Asia. Our strong commitment to peace and security stems from our conviction
that a peaceful and secure environment, regionally as well as globally, is imperative for
eradicating poverty; and to ensure sustained economic growth, prosperity and welfare of
our people as well as other countries in the region.
It goes without saying that neither peace nor stability could be achieved in isolation.
They need strong partnerships, and willingness to build bridges and to walk the talk on the
high road to peace and equal security for all the partners. Naturally, this process of mutually
enriching partnerships begins with your neighbours.
Fully cognizant of this reality, Pakistan has been pursuing a three pronged approach
with India, to achieve durable peace and strategic stability in South Asia. This includes:
(a) peaceful resolution of all outstanding disputes, including the core issue of Jammu and
Kashmir; (b) strategic restraint and conventional balance; and (c) close cooperation for the
socio-economic development and welfare of our peoples. As you are, well aware, between
1974 and 1998, Pakistan made several proposals to keep our region free from nuclear
weapons. We regularly co-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution to declare South
Asia as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. This could not be achieved due to non-cooperation
on the part of our neighbour. As a consequence, we were forced to respond to Indian nuclear
tests; which were followed by highly provocative statements by senior political leaders in
May 1998.
Our response was not motivated by any ambition for regional dominance or great
power status. It was aimed at restoring strategic balance and to deter aggression against our
political independence and territorial integrity.
We believe that growing conventional asymmetry between Pakistan and India would
seriously undermine the objective of strategic stability in the region. Pakistan, therefore,
would continue to pursue various initiatives with India to: (a) strengthen strategic stability,
(b) avoid arms race, and (c) prevent conflict in South Asia.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
As recognized in the Joint Statement issued after the first Pakistan-India Expert Level
talks on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures in New Delhi on 20 June 2004, the nuclear
capabilities of the two countries constitute a factor of stability in the region. As mature and
responsible nuclear powers, both countries now need to develop a better appreciation of
each others threat perceptions and military doctrines. It would help in developing doctrines
and strategies that are defensive, rather than aggressive in nature. It is particularly desirable
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as any sort of military adventurism in South Asia, is neither prudent nor responsible. It has
the potential to plunge the whole region into disastrous consequences of immeasurable
proportions.
In this back-drop, floating of concepts like Cold Start doctrine betray strong
streak of recklessness. It is hard to imagine that any rational mind could come up with
such dangerous ideas. The deterrence theory has with-stood intense rivalry between two
super-powers throughout the cold war period. One wonders if anyone was now willing to
undertake an adventure beyond deterrence.
As the world moves from cold war bitterness to cooperation in diverse fields, do
we want South Asia to descend into a new destructive madness? We are not interested in
any such venture. I strongly feel that in the interest of regional and indeed global peace,
no one should be allowed to pursue such irrational adventurism. Let me also make it
absolutely clear, while Pakistan stands for peace in the region and beyond, we cannot
remain oblivious to threats to our national security. Pakistan has the capability and the
determination to counter any military adventurism thrust upon us. Our response would
be swift and effective. No one should nurture any doubt on this score. However, I am
confident that the Indian political leadership, civil society activists and intellectual elite
would discourage any moves or doctrines which have the potential to endanger peace and
stability of the entire South Asian region.
In the past Pakistan and India have agreed on several nuclear and conventional
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). These measures were in the nature of risk reduction
measures. We believe that the two sides should now go beyond risk reduction measures and
work towards measures aimed at restraint and avoidance of an arms race in the region. The
Lahore agreement of 1999 provides the suitable framework to pursue broader CBMs in
nuclear and conventional fields, as well as to engage in bilateral consultations on security
concepts.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Pakistan is a peace loving country. We wish to develop friendly and cooperative
relations with all the neighbouring countries including India. I conveyed this message to
my Indian counterpart during his visit to Islamabad last week. I assured him that Pakistan
was willing to walk the proverbial extra-mile with India in pursuit of peace, welfare and
prosperity of our two peoples. For this, the two countries need to return to the negotiating
table with the political will to resolve all our outstanding disputes, including the core issue
of Jammu and Kashmir peacefully and in accordance with international law and morality.
The Indian side was more focused on Mumbai blasts. I emphasized that terrorism
was a common threat. Pakistani nation has been living through many Mumbai’s every
day. More than 10,000 innocent civilians have fallen victim to terrorism over the past
few years. Our material losses exceed US$ 40 billion. Despite all odds, we remain
determined to bring to justice anyone and every one involved in heinous terrorist
incidents any where in the world.
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Pakistan has been in the forefront of struggle against terrorism. The recent successes
achieved by our security forces against terrorists in Swat and other areas of Pakhtoonkhwa
and FATA have been lauded by the international community. These successes have come
at a heavy cost. More than 2500 personnel of the security forces have offered the ultimate
sacrifice. We have offered more sacrifices than any other country in the world. Our actions
against terrorists speak louder than words.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
South Asia has seen plenty of conflict, warfare and bloodshed in the past 60
years. The 21st century has brought new challenges for the entire human race. Climate
change is increasingly being compared with Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs)
for its destructive potential. It poses particularly serious challenge to South Asia. We all
depend on Himalayan glaciers for our fresh water supplies. An increase of more than two
degree centigrade in global temperature may cause sudden melting of all glaciers leading
to floods followed by droughts. Climate change and other issues like poverty eradication,
malnutrition and high infant mortality call for closer cooperation among regional counties
to evolve joint responses to common challenges. The welfare and prosperity of our people
will depend upon how well we can cope with emerging new challenges.
In conclusion let me reiterate that Pakistan and India should work together to institute
a sustained dialogue for peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia. We should not remain
hostage to our troubled past. We must rise to the occasion and take bold decisions to lead
our people to a more hopeful and promising future.
Thank you.
Session-VIII-Plenary:
Pakistan Counter Measures and Nuclear Doctrine:
Maria Sultan47
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Implications for Deterrence and Strategic
Stability: The Theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence
The future war in South Asia can never remain conventional. Presenting the new
theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence as Pakistan’s possible counter measures to Cold
Start Doctrine, objective was to ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the threat of preemption.
War and the threat of war is a serious business which can neither be left to conjecture,
wishful thinking or mere imagination. Every move made by the adversary requires inquiry
and a thorough investigation; for any miscalculation in the intent or response can be disastrous
in the event of the outbreak of war, especially in the nuclearised context. India and Pakistan
47
Director General South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
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have remained in a state of rivalry for almost 60 years; more than the historic rivalry that
existed between the United States and the USSR. Furthermore, the transformation in their
respective war doctrines have also remained locked in the historic tradition of British war
fighting, battle plans and strategic out comes. The force differentional between the states
being in the case of the army almost 3:1, 1:5 mechanised forces and 4 to 1 in artillery
strength. The total number equaling to almost 1.3 million troops.
However, since the 1980s there has been deliberate effort by India to capitalize
and modernize its military thought process; the first visible attempt for transformation was
undertake by General Sunderji, who introduced the concept of blitz Krieg, deep operations
and simultaneous offensives in the war plans.
This transformation reduced the threshold of war between the two protagonists it
increased the level of the threat of loss and suffered from a serious flaw of quick and swift
mobilization from the four Indian strike corps, (Ambala, Mathura and Bhopal) located
almost 200 to 600 kms of the Pakistani border.
Exhibited in 2001-2002 Operation Parakram, despite the Indian political decision to go
to war, the Indian Army was not in a position to launch a major offensive against Pakistan till
almost 3 weeks into the crisis; giving Pakistan sufficient time to activate its layered defense.
The challenge was caused as a result of the huge mobilization time lines of India
vis-à-vis Pakistan. In the Cold Start Doctrine, India has worked towards removing these
conceptual as well practical difficulties. The effort is consistent, concentrated and concentric
aimed at an up gradation, mobilization differential; battlefield visibility (surveillance and
night warfare capability) - real time intelligence - network centric ability - multiple assaults,
integration of in aviation attack/transport helicopters (supported by the Indian Air Force)
and delegation of force initiation to the theatre level.
In terms of force posture, the defence transformation is aimed at the primary goals:
Battle readiness; stand alone capacity or the delegation of initiative at the theatre command
level, small heavily mechanized units capable of carrying out independent action as well a
collective strike operations and war objective; intense fire power and enhanced mobility.
It drives from the larger military policy of a limited war and the pre-eminence of
Pre-emption. This caused a change in the military concept of deep operations that had
required an engagement with the defensive forces and a sequential engagement with the
reserves through deep manoeuvre and vertical envelopment and lastly the engagement of
the full enemy defences through air attacks.
The Cold Start Doctrine is geared to create 8 IBGs with an armoured division size or
mechanized infantry division size force, an armoured and two infantry brigades. Depending
upon the war objectives, the ability of the Defense corps to carry out both defensive and
offensive operations.
The widespread battle integration and increased capacity to carry out independent or joint
operation in stand alone mode or in sync with air and aviation underline the following trends.
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Indian military forces are actually under a transformation to carry out operations
under a nuclear environment; aim is to deny Pakistan conventional deterrence space and
counter force target for offensive nuclear strikes (tactical or strategic - the seamless web
of mobilization); making Pakistani nuclear posture (strategic value targeting irrelevant) to
actual conduct of war and ensuring space for swift and intense battlefield operations. The
addition, of the airlift component to the IBGs would allow India also the ability to carry
our elite – swat kind of operation with minimum human force and maximum technological
punch; thereby creating a situation of targets having greater spatial access and lesser
response options.
Furthermore, as the Cold Start Doctrine would operationalise the size of forces
would decrease with larger offensive punch and ability to carry out more than anticipated
strikes and operations against Pakistan; resulting in the biggest challenge to the linear
defence of Pakistan’s eastern border and in future with the ability to move to the western
front as well; hence the crystallization or the real possibility of two front war based swift
action and deep penetration; a supposition different than projected. This may not be the
aim in the initial operationalisation phase but can be anticipated in future.
The assumptions for this is based on the strategic calculation that the threat of
terrorism faced by Pakistan will continue and will in future become the primary threat to
Pakistan; challenging both the internal polity of Pakistan and the external manifestation
of the state of Pakistan; therefore rendering the state structure weak or insufficient to
deal with the threat as it develops. There is would in turn when confronted by an Indian
offensive would draw out or stretch out Pakistani conventional military response to
multiple theatres and denying the Pakistani strategic offensive counter forces targets in
the process of war.
Given the small target space for nuclear weapons and forcing Pakistan to use
nuclear weapons in only as strategic value targeting; the deterrence gap is created as a
result of the doctrine of mobility. This is further supplemented by the fact the Pakistani
nuclear weapons are under centralized command and control and in non deployed status;
initially designed to give inter war crisis stability and more time to the decision makers. In
the Cold Start environment the assumption is that Pakistani defences would be stretched
and in the absence of viable counter force targets; the differential for use of strategic value
targets to Pakistan under the nuclear environment would be denied. Thereby creating a
deterrence gap and space for a limited war ultimately leading to a situation where India’s
technological and economic differential would aid to determine the outcome of the war.
To date the Pakistani conventional response to the rapid deployment and quick
mobilization strategy of India has been factored under principle that the multiple thrusts or divisionary tactics of the Indian assault will include Pakistani Army as force multipliers
through the reduction of the fog of war from the own troops, obviating enemy surprise and
through a reduction of the fog of war. Hence, the thrust aims to in validate the element of
surprise. Conventionally the Pakistani response would remain effective so long Indian Air
Force is not used to go for deep targets.
89
DETERRENCE CHALLENGE
The war is no longer an issue of capability or technology but about the critical will
and brinkmanship of war. ‘Small wars embody the threat of long war; they are not just
military engagements but crisis diplomacy’. Military strategy can no longer be seen as
the victory of military technology or scientific development, it is the ‘art of coercion, of
intimidation and deterrence’. The classic security dilemma states that security of one state
leads to the insecurity of the other particularly if they are caught up in a pattern of crisis
or rivalry. ‘When commitments, strategy or technology indicate an expansion to attain
security; it is considered as the most vicious.’
The main question being is it better to attack or to defend and what are the incentives
to absorb the adversary’s blow? This will impact on the short run stability between actors
for in nuclear weapons the equilibrium or sense of balance is more a question of capability,
perceptions and intent rather than merely a question of technology or integration. In addition
to this deterrence stability is archived not by the development of triad or a second strike
capability of land, air and sea but can also be achieved as a result of the military posture
and the nuclear doctrine
This creates a new level of deterrence where the balance between the offense and
defence is not only essential for declaration of war but also the maintenance of peace.
The theory of offense and defence suggests that whenever defence has an advantage than
peace shall an advantage whenever offense has an advantage the propensity of states to go
to war is higher; it further states that understanding of defence or offense basis itself on
three major components; technology and its invulnerability to the adversary’s technology
or weapons (the lesser the quality of the weapon the higher the possibility of their preemptive use); the objective of war to protect territory or attack; mobility and the time span
in which the military targets can be achieved.
If the rate of mobilization is slow the planners would favour a defensive posture
rather than an offensive posture for in this case the rate of attrition is higher; and last but
not least the technological superiority. All these however require a military policy which
aims at victory and offense for this to translate into an offensive policy’ interestingly the
theory and offense – defence in the case of nuclear weapons is opposite as the offensive
weapons are those that provide defence for example when the nuclear weapons are used
to launch an attack on strategic value targets in order to deter a counter value attack
on one’s population centres than though the offense is central in identifying the threat
and the choice of retaliation; it support defence; furthermore nuclear weapons cannot take
or hold territory that requires a conventional force thereby favouring defence. Hence, it
is not always the nuclear weapons that change the policy towards the offense rather the
conventional understanding of acceptable damage and the desire to have military victory;
nevertheless these become irrelevant in the face a nuclear deterrence that is operationalised
and carries the threat of retaliation as well as pre-emption.
In the case of south Asia since the overt nuclearisation of Indian and Pakistan
the nature of deterrence was considered as stable and central to maintaining peace. The
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consensus was that India-Pakistan war was not an option for either India or Pakistan;
however this was challenged by the first indication of change in the Indian military war
fighting doctrine. Although based on conventional war fighting operational strategy the
doctrine draws strength from the Indian military policy that space could be created for a
limited war with Pakistan.
The policy enunciated in April 2004 as ‘Cold Start’ by the Indian Army Chief
General Padmanabhan; it calls for swift military operations through the employment of
integrated battle groups. These according to the doctrine may be employed against Pakistan
and may be limited in time and objectives but which can have the potential to impact on the
political - military decisions of Pakistan.
The Cold Start Doctrine is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike and it calls
for rapid deployment of “Integrated Battle Groups” comprising of major elements of Army
with the close support of the Air Force, and if the need arises fronts may be opened and
expanded to include Naval operations: the primary thrust of the operations aimed at creating
conditions for limited war.
These battle groups could be used individually for limited operations, or in
conjunction for operations of a greater scale based on the concept of blitzkrieg. According
to General Padmanabhan, the Indian ‘Cold Start’ will be attempted whenever possible
to achieve surprise and maximize gains. The entire border is likely to be activated with
shallow thrusts, very heavy firepower and short span manoeuvres. Nuclear weapons may
not be used; their use may, however, be threatened. Special Forces and coup-de-main
forces will play a major role. Integrated action by all three services will be crucial for
the enhancement of our combat power vis-à-vis the adversary’s. Levels of technology
employed in the wars will be higher than at present. Wars will end in stalemate, with little
or no gain, and heavy losses to military as well as civilian targets. Stating his reasons he
had argued that ‘South Asia along with West Asia has emerged as “one of the epicentres of
conflict and instability,” and with absence of a common consensus to combat this threat the
possibility of “territorial disputes, provocation by proxy wars, religious fundamentalism,
radical extremism, ethnic tensions and socio-economic disparities,” All these items were
to further exacerbate the situation on ground. This the Indian Army chief argued would
invariably link ‘sub conventional conflicts to situations leading to pre-emptive action/
strikes under the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
The strategy unveiled in 2004 has taken a significant importance with the statement
given by the Indian Chief of the Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor in November 2009
that the possibility of a limited war under a ‘nuclear over hang’ in the region was likely to
exist and reality. This statement was all accompanied by series of military exercises carried
out by India since 2004 to date.
DOCTRINE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The aim of the new war fighting doctrine is to increase the Indian military strike
options for possibly retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan without invoking
the Pakistani nuclear threshold in short aiming to create conditions of a limited war. The
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military policy of fighting a war with Pakistan as a Limited War (LW) envisages Cold
Start Doctrine as a war fighting Doctrine for achieving the core objectives. The success
envisages an increase in the Indian military options based on a contingency situation where
Indian armed forces can have sufficient military success that can be used achieve limited
political objectives before an international intervention or the conflict turns nuclear.
According to the recent statement General Deepak Kapoor (Indian COAS),
“The possibility of limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality in South Asia.”
Consequently the doctrine requires the re-division of the Indian army from the existing
three major strike corps into eight integrated battle groups (IGB) buffed by the mechanised,
artillery and armoured divisions. The aim is to launch multiple strikes within seventy two
hours of the first strike, approximately 50-70 km inside Pakistani territory, with close
support of the air and naval components if need may be .
Furthermore, Cold Start Doctrine would entail combined operations between
India’s three services and integrated battle groups for offensive actions against Pakistan
without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Indian Holding Corps or Pivot Corps are
to undertake limited offensive operation to give time to IBGs to strike hard on already
softened targets by the Pivot Corps. The IBGs would be self-contained and highly-mobile,
adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy
territory with the major offensive in the first 96 hours. The main characteristics of the Cold
Start Doctrine are:
1.
Element of Surprise
2.
Integration among the Armed forces
3.
Quick, Swift and Day and Night Operations
4.
Combine Mechanised Infantry, Artillery and Armour
5.
Close air support/massive fire power
6.
Pivot corps (Holding Corps) would act offensively
7.
Aims would be Limited
8.
Major offensive to be launched in the first 72/96 hours for IBGs to enter
Pakistani territory and achieve primary objectives.
9.
Robust Command and Control
10.
Strikes below the Pakistan’s nuclear threshold
11.
To have a politico-military superiority in the interest of India.
ASSUMPTIONS:
1)
The operational success is based on the assumption that the deployment would be
rapid achieving quick success; 2) element of surprise will be achieved ;3) Pakistani
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response will be muted;4) it will not invoke a Pakistani nuclear response;5)sufficient
military objectives will be achieved by the Indian army to paralyze a cohesive
Pakistani response; 6) the operations would be conducted with rapid mobilization
and on multiple fronts so as to achieve mission objectives before the international
pressure can be crystallized.
IMPLICATIONS & REPONSES
The ‘Cold Start’ doctrine postulates the non use of nuclear weapons in the region
or in the event of an out break of war between Indian and Pakistan; based on the notion of
pre-emption and offensive operations.
However, the doctrine received a strong response from Pakistan with the statement
made by the chairman of the civilian-military National Command Authority (NCA) warning
India of any misadventure in Pakistan.
The difference in the perception of what is a nuclear threshold of a nuclear Pakistan
and the response options clearly cause a challenge to the existing strategic stability in the
region which requires further inquiry.
Strategic stability means the absence of conflict, war, and balance derives from the
broader needs, desires, concerns and national interests of state parties vis-à-vis their military
objectives. In the search of strategic stability there are three approaches first to exercise and
manipulate threat through deterrence; second the management of vulnerability through the
assurance of safety, security and command and control; and third the management of threat
through arms control and confidence-building and threat reduction measures. All these are
challenged by the new Indian cold start doctrine. The Cold Start Doctrine has large scale
repercussions for the regional and international security.
The possibility of a growing prospect of an arms race in South Asia is further
exacerbated by the existing nuclear relationship.
This today stands challenged with the introduction and possible operationalisation
of the new Indian war- fighting doctrine of cold start particularly as the Cold Start is a preemptive strategy which supports the idea of a limited war in a nuclear environment.
The introduction of the doctrine has solicited a Pakistani response and would be
followed by the Pakistani counter measures as it would aim for strategic equivalence with
India based on the concept of minimum credible deterrence.
Although the current Pakistani response and conventional reconfiguration under
Azm-e–Nau is solid nonetheless given the fact that the military budget of the two countries
is 35 billion vs 4 billion and is like to have 80 percent operationalisation by year 2010;
it is clear that the conventional response by Islamabad can challenge the Indian offensive
capability expressed through the pivot corps can provide robust base for the defence to the
Indian military doctrine; there is need to draw further into what are response options
available to Pakistani the realm of the nuclear deterrence theory and whether the Cold
Start Doctrine has the ability to create a gap between conventional and nuclear deterrence.
93
The battle effectiveness of the Pakistani capability. The contention is that it will erode
nuclear deterrence as may make the use of strategic nuclear weapons irremediable during
conflict therefore there is need to reconsider Pakistan’s deterrence posture.
To date the Pakistani deterrence posture is based on minimum credible deterrence and
centralised command and control and strategy value targeting. With the shift in the conventional
military doctrine to smaller offensive units the problem is four fold; and requires a revisit on all
issues regarding deterrence stability through Credibility, communicability and capability.
National resolve plays a critical in the final outcome of any war however the
nuclear capability affords that the next wars may not be fought on the rational of the fourth
generation warfare. As this is neither 65 nor 71 where the cessation of war would lead to
cessation of hostility at all levels. The end of war may see the beginning of war.
THEORY OF INTEGRATED STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE
The theory of minimum credible deterrence is to be strengthened by adding credibility
to the second strike capability and through a change military posture. The propped theory is
called integrated strategic Equillance as the basic assumption is to ensure that the element of
surprise and technological advantage or battlefield integration of systems does not shift the
balance towards the offensive or war. Partial decentralization of the tactical range nuclear
capable weapons (100-300km) and sub critical tactical weapons with reduced radiation
levels and enhanced EMP fall outs - use force as force multipliers.
Nuclear integration at force level that means the delegations of powers to the
command level for deployment and employment. Mobility and counter measure to support
partial deployment of assets at the command level. Maintaining centralized control of
strategic nuclear weapons (300-3500km) 1000 kg payload.
Create Reverse Threshold through selective target engagement on the Indian side
initiated by the activation of cold start with first ring of targeting to be geared against
the extended line of communication links of India (aim is to contain the offensive and
break the linkage between the IBGs and the strike corps of India and paralyze the network
centric ability. Create second ring of escalation through reverse targeting and use of tactical
nuclear weapons against the offensive corps/command control centres (target lock on) and
third ring of escalation through target selection of contour value targets.
This will require force management and mechanization at the command levels in
Pakistan as their creation can provide a basis for second level of delegation. This will free
the policy makers to have initiative dominance of the battle field while maintaining control
and decision at the strategic level.
This would enable the command to deal with threat from one level at the strategic/
national level; decisions relating to the redirection of evolving threat; support a policy
of India/threat determined rather than India focused. The ultimate aim of this remaining
refined deterrence posture against all future threats based on the de- critical the use of
strategic nuclear weapons for all future wars.
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This is supported by Electronic Warfare component; which would target the network
centric capability being developed, possessed and evolved by future threats to Pakistan.
This will allow Pakistan to reduce the element of surprise
To create, develop and deployment of fourth generation nuclear (sub-critical) nuclear
weapons for indication of intent; resolve and credibility of nuclear use and deterrence.
These will act as force multipliers and operational and strategic equitant. This will create
the element of surprise.
PAKISTANI RESPONSE:
EQUIVALENCE
THEORY
OF
INTEGRATED
STRATEGIC
This theory will a supplement to the internal threshold debate for Pakistani nuclear
employment holding central the ideas of conventional deterrence and minimum credible
deterrence while increasing the space of operations for Pakistani decision makers and
denying the space of operations for the adversary based on conventional technological
superiority.
This would require a shift of the nuclear threshold from internal to an external
threshold essentially requiring a shift from the policy of offensive defence to offense
offense. This will give more time to the decision makers to handle the on coming decisions
at the national level and would require only partial up gradation (technological) at the
conventional level
No future war in South Asia can remain conventional as the rings of escalation can
easily be extended. The objective of this offense-offense strategy is to ensure that Pakistan
no longer fears the threat of pre-emption or remains under the threat of a conventional
threat of coercion/war and retains the initiative of the use of sub-critical or fourth generation
nuclear weapons through the central components of deterrence that is communication of
threat and use of force during operations.
The war between two nuclear powers cannot be either linked to the sub-conventional
level of warfare without the risk of the re initiation of war after the cessation of conventional
offensive as it easily lead to the fourth generation of war as the current Indian doctrine does
not appreciates the linkage of the sub conventional to conventional and the change regional
security environment; where the national critical will not be deterrence the conventional
offensive; hence no war in the region can be transformed from the sub-conventional to
conventional without the possibility of supra critical level of conflict and nuclear war.
The use of Sub-Critical or Fourth Generation nuclear weapons, as a measure for creating
intra-war deterrence is required, especially after the initiation of Cold Start Doctrine. This is
based on the central idea of deterrence that is communication of threat and the credibility of
threat combined with the intention to use force during operations. She said there was a need to
study the possible response options available to Pakistan in the realm of the nuclear deterrence
theory. Whether Cold Start Doctrine has the ability to create a gap between conventional and
nuclear deterrence is another question. Currently, the Pakistani deterrence posture is based on
minimum credible deterrence and centralized command and control and strategic value targeting
95
its need to be consent given the new changing dynamics of threats and the theory, if strategic
equivalence can help to fill up the gap.
Session-VIII-Plenary:
Pakistan Counter Measures and Nuclear Doctrine:
LT. GEN. (R) TARIQ WASEEM GHAZI48
To Counter Cold Start Doctrine: Pakistan’s Possible Response
Cold Start is an aggressive doctrine aimed at Pakistan, such a doctrine against a
nuclear weapon state will put the region into quagmire of volatility and dismay. Threat
of deterrence failure would increase if India operationalised her Cold Start Doctrine. The
analyses of the level of funding allocated for the modernization of Indian armed forces and
its endeavor to overcome its deficiencies, show that India may operationalise Cold Start
Doctrine in next five to ten years.
Pakistan has responded strongly to the Indian Army Chief’s rhetoric of facing
Pakistan and China at the same time. In retort to Indian Army Chief’s statement, Pakistan’s
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) Chairman General Tariq Majid said…”Leave
alone China, General Deepak Kapoor knows very well what the Indian Army cannot and
the Pakistan Army can pull off militarily”…Indian Army Chief “could not be so outlandish
in strategic postulations to fix India on a self-destruct mechanism.” Pakistan’s rejection of
Indian Cold Start Doctrine is based on its military capabilities and its strategy of offensive
defence to counter such an aggressive attack.
Pakistan armed forces are the seventh largest in the world. Pakistan’s military
strategy is based on the geographical compulsions. Due to the lack of strategic depth
Pakistan military planners have to compete with this dilemma. Most of the population and
industrial centers are close to the border with India. Lahore, the most important city and
Karachi the port city and financial hub are at the distance of approximately 20 km and 160
km respectively from the Indian border, making them vulnerable to Indian penetration.
Concluding Session-IX-Plenary:
Implications for Strategic Stability:
Concluding Remarks by GEN. EHSAN UL HAQ NI (M)49
Pakistan had been seeking peaceful resolution to disputes and normalization
of relations with India. Our defence and security policy have been entirely focused on
deterring war, restraint and responsible had been the watchwords of our nuclear policy.
It is in pursuit of this policy that Pakistan has proposed the strategic restraint regime to
achieve stability and foster mutual confidence. As long as destabilizing concepts like Cold
Start Doctrine are being projected, Pakistan has to undertake all measures to safeguard its
territorial sovereignty.
48
49
Former Secretary Defence
Former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan
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Concluding Session-IX-Plenary:
Implications for Strategic Stability:
LT. GEN. (R) JAVED ASHRAF QAZI50
Excellencies, scholars, ladies and gentlemen,
The gravest danger in our times lies in the possibilities of war and conflict. This is
perpetuated by the military planning divorced of regional realities and the lack of the ability
to control the spiral of violence generated by the non state actors. This reality becomes
all the more relevant when we find ourselves at the cross roads of extremism; military
adventurism and the probability of a nuclear war.
Today, the unresolved conflicts around the world have unfortunately made all of us
a future witness to the probability of wars becoming a reality; a reality which may become
history of this region if the roots of misadventurism are not seriously reconsidered by the
politico- military elite of our neighbouring country India. For the implications can be far
reaching and offsetting for regional peace; if not re-calibrated in the interest of peace.
Therefore, I welcome this scholarly and deliberate effort made by the intellectuals/
strategic community through this three day workshop on Cold Start and its implications for
the region to come up with policy recommendations and perhaps solutions which may help
to provide insights to ways and measures to bring about strategic stability in the region.
And it is in this context that I congratulate the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI) for deliberating on this very important subject and its implications for regional
and global security order. We in the Defence Committee of the Senate will benefit from the
recommendations that will come through this august gathering of scholars, policy makers
and the intelligencia regarding the doctrinal implications for maintaining and managing the
crisis through effective and reliable crisis and deterrence stability.
Ladies and Gentlemen!
For any democratically elected government the primary responsibility remains the
upholding of the territorial integrity through defence of borders and security of the state
and the people as they pass through turbulent and trying times. In these times, however,
sovereignty remains the key dominator for all self respecting states and peoples.
Pakistan is no different as a state when it comes to identifying the threat and the threat
matrix to its existence. There is no doubt that Pakistan is challenged by the array of threats faced
by its polity both internally and externally by the interface that exists between the internal and
the regional strategic milieu. Nonetheless, in the order of threats, there is no greater threat than
that presented by the misperception of strategic planners to believe that future war; including
what are controlled conflicts between India and Pakistan that they can remain local or short of
a total war; without encompassing all elements of national power and military strength.
The nature of threat requires Pakistan - to emphasize deterrence to adversary’s use
50
Senator
97
of force, producing a picture of minimum credible deterrence. And if the vary basis of this
is to be challenged because of the spiral of technological up gradation, and perationalization
of a military doctrine which has the potential to cause regional instability; than it is also the
right of any self respecting state to ensure that it responds with all of its disposal the full
spectrum of threat it faces.
Pakistan’s commitment to the global war against terror is a testament to our ability
and determination to meet any challenge faced by Pakistan with an Iran clad will and the
perseverance of a nation which will stand against any adversity. This only goes on to prove
that the nation and its leaders stand united and firm against any security challenge that it
may face.
Pakistan, with its demonstrable keenness for peace, has always remained a key
advocate for maintaining peace and strategic restraint in the region. Peace and pursuing
peace for us is not a slogan for politics or a figure of speech. It is not a contemporary global
trend but for us it is an idea which is enshrined as an article of faith - literally speaking
given to us fourteen hundred years ago by our faith.
This however requires an equal determination on all parties concerned to work on
peace through a prism of sovereign equality.
Unfortunately in this regards, since our inception as an independent state in 1947
we have been subjected to, an unfair treatment, dual standards and a hostile security
environment perpetuated, (despite our efforts) to normalize by our continuously turbulent
relations with our neighbour India. The festering dispute of Kashmir, three wars and the
series of crisis both in 1998, 2001-2002 and 2007-2008 have been part of this long saga.
Maj. Gen. Azhar Ali Shah (Director General, ISSRA, NDU)
98
This relationship of hostility despite our repeated efforts has not moved away
from a balance of terror to a balance of peace ; or a historic reduction of nuclear
arsenals on both sides; or towards a sustainable cooperation in the areas such as counter
terrorism or towards bilateral arms control agreements let alone a collective effort
by the two nuclear states towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
The 1971 war and the subsequent Indian nuclear tests of 1974 had left Pakistan
with little or no choice to pursue a nuclear weapons programme to protect the future
generations from the perils of instability which are to be faced by a state when it is
confronted by any major adversary possessing disproportionate economic and military
might and harboring super power ambitions.
Unquestionably, we are averse to aggression or war but our nuclear doctrine must make
it clear to all that this aversion is not misunderstood as being an impeding reluctance to employ
our critical assets in the defence of our country. We have always maintained that we will not
engage in an arms race however when it comes to our race for the defence of our country let
there be no doubt that, we have no plans to come second or be subjugating by any one.
The threat determines the response and a mere status quo cannot be maintained
in the face of constant threats and in the absence of a significant progress made towards
an abiding peace; the existence of the large number of stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction by the superpowers and the unfair allowances made by the proponents of the
non proliferation regime to accommodate India in the nuclear arena without a criterion
based approach will and has exacerbated the security concerns of Pakistan; as it favours
India and free’s Indian nuclear facilities to produce large stocks of nuclear weapons; all to
the detriment of the existing deterrent relationship between to the two states.
This oversight by the international community would have been acceptable had
not the pursuits of hegemony being made by the military elite of India and to link subconventional warfare with conventional warfare. This can easily plunge the region into
a nuclear war; a reality which I believe the Indian leadership should be wise enough and
rational enough not to pursue.
It is sincerely hoped that these concentric efforts and trends towards operationalization
of the doctrine are arrested well in time. For the escalation dominance so desired by the
Indian military planners may not and cannot be achieved in the current security and military
environment; where the cross over from sub-conventional to conventional supra-critical
levels of conflict are so inter linked and so undesired.
There is a need to act responsibly and as mature nuclear weapons states, by both
parties if we are to keep this region and deterrence stability on the basis of non deployment
of such aggressive doctrines as Cold Start.
While mankind places its hope into a world free of nuclear weapons the south Asian
region despite efforts lags behind as we deal with the terrifying reality of the prospects
of a nuclear war and an uncontrolled military frenzy against the rationally controlled, busy
in fighting insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan.
99
The world is going through a period of an upheaval without precedent. It would be a
delusion of the worst kind to believe that the world, as it is today; however pleasant it
may seem to some, can be maintained on the basis of desires of dominance; hegemony or
desire to be a superpower.
Around the world there are problems that must be solved: racial inequality; religious
discrimination; economic inequalities; technological divides; terrorism; extremism;
resource wars; regional conflicts and nuclear non proliferation. Where in a world thus
divided and compounded by the realities of our times shall we draw our fault lines and
cease fire lines and move towards peace and equalities.
I sincerely, hope that these are done through the collective and not through the
individual and unilateral actions of the states. Moreover, for South Asia I believe it is time
for this change where we can use the nuclear stalemate to start the process of negotiating a
peace regime on the basis of sovereign equality and an arms control process. This regime
would allow us to deal with the bigger problems of population increase, resource limitations
and terrorism in the region like the civilized traditions of peace negotiations and bilateralism
rather than the un-welcome practice of aggression and war; an outcome desired by none.
I leave you all with the solemn commitment by Pakistan and by the people of
Pakistan that we are committed to peace and we shall remain open to all such efforts which
allow the region to come close in dealing with common challenges; albeit in the manner
and mechanisms through which sustainable peace is attained by self respecting sovereign
equals. For in the absence of which the most immediate problems could be over taken
with a misplaced belief that disputes can be frozen for ever and refusal to make concrete
efforts to resolve them in accordance with universally accepted principles continued lack
of progress can only lead to a state of affairs in which disputes not only remain unresolved
and as in South Asia’s case but can become a nuclear flash point.
I sincerely hope that we are moving away from this ethos and discourse and as
democratically elected governments of two great peoples and nations are ready to establish
peace and stability in line with the traditions of the great nations of the world.
I thank you all for your attention and patience.
I once again thank the SASSI as an Institute and leading think tank for making
this effort towards understanding the security strategic dilemmas faced by this region and
coming up with some solutions which may lead to a more welcomed future.
100
Day 1:
Session-II-Plenary:
Cold Start Concept and Evaluation
LT. GEN HAMID KHAN51
Cold Start Conventional Doctrines and Evaluations-India-Pakistan
The Indian Military having seen their weakness of mobilization during the standoff during
2002 decided to have a relook at their existing doctrine with the aim of offsetting the
Pakistan advantage of quicker mobilization. To succeed two essential elements needed to
be achieved.
a) Strategic Surprise
b) Denying A Quick and Total Mobilization to Pakistan
To implement this doctrine the first thing they decided was to reverse the roles of
their various field formations so that they didn’t have to wait for the offensive formations
for two reasons, firstly they took more time because of the distance and bulk and secondly
it gave away their intentions prematurely. Here let me debate why the Indian strategists
think that despite the nuclear overhang they still had the space for a conventional conflict
which is limited in nature? Probably they thought it to be possible because:
a)
If they curtailed their war aims to only the psychological spectrum i.e. to embarrass
and humiliate the Pakistani forces and government and not to go for spatial gains.
b)
The international community will allow such an adventure in the garb of a counter
terrorism strike.
c)
Also more importantly maybe that our nuclear threshold is not ambiguous
anymore.
All the same if they want to make this doctrine workable they need to first achieve
the preliminary steps of forward garrisoning and forward dumping they also need to
reorganize because offensive formations need a better punch than defensive formations.
Tanks, long range arty and superior mobility are essential. I must emphasis that presently
their offensive and defensive formations are differently organized and equipped. Also they
need to retrain which they are doing but not much success has been reported.
I must also highlight the inbuilt risks in this doctrine
(a)
What if they fail to achieve the strategic surprise because of a number of reasons,
preparations for war are difficult to hide.
(b)
What if international community does not approve-and immediately on mobilization
51
Former President National Defence University
101
they intervene.
(c)
What if the time and space bondage between various echelons is not achieved i.e.
the independent battle groups arrive while the theatre force reserves who have to
exploit the gains are delayed.
(d)
Pakistan despite all difficulties succeeds in mobilizing its defensive formations in
time, which would mean that the chances of its IBGs success will be affected.
(e)
Remember this Doctrine is based on minimum Defensive Safeguards with no mine
fields or ditches charged.
Here I think it is time to also analyze if the pre requisites of this doctrine are a
possibility, firstly, is strategic surprise achievable.
(a)
Any such adventure has to follow some immediate incident, which will alert the
Pakistani forces and they might start deploying in anticipation.
(b)
Will our well equipped intelligence agencies fail to pick up signals, as preparations
for war do send out signals. Also the latest induction of Surv means by the army and
air force should make it difficult.
(c)
What about preparations like ammo and other logistic buildup, especially when the
attacks would be spread over eight or ten places as compared to the three to four
places in the past.
(d)
When will the soldiers be told, because you cannot take people to war without
psychologically preparing them. If not prepared their morale and fighting abilities
will be badly affected.
(e)
Would they have achieved the much needed marrying up of various echelons,
training standards aside, various actions are essential to marry up forces before
going into action.
(f)
To convince the international community for a limited war will also be visible and
may take some time.
Having said all this it is still doable if they start with air strikes which achieves
both strategic surprise and degradation of Pakistan’s military in its garrisons and airbases.
However to achieve this they require 60 to 70 squadrons. At present they have only 37
squadrons which they are likely to increase to 47 by 2012 and 50 by 2015.here I would like
to add that like the land forces it difficult for the naval forces to hide its intentions because
of the deployment time needed by both its submarines and surface fleet, although their
missile boats may b e in a position for quick ground attacks.
The net centric warfare advantage also gives them an edge in this doctrine.
Now, I would like to take up the second pre-requisite i.e. denying or delaying
Pakistan force mobilization
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(a)
Pakistan has a superior strategic orientation as far as mobilization goes. This is due
to the depth of Pakistan and positioning of our forces.
(b)
Pakistan’s defensive formations can be in its defenses within 24 to 36 hours that is
before the Indians can assemble for an offensive. Some defensive formations can be in
their positions in 12 hours. Some of our offensive formations are well located.
(c)
However the Indians can offset this differential by:
1.
Massive air strikes against ground forces and the air force causing degradation and
also causing delay
2.
Secondly and more importantly, embroil Pakistani forces on the internal front as
a pre-requisite for this doctrine. This will have to be done years before a war, like
presently so many of our formations are in FATA. Probably this is why we refused
to pull out more forces from the Eastern borders when we were being asked to do
so. In the backdrop of what i have talked so far lets see how this doctrine a short
notice-short duration war is likely to unfold in the tactical domain. These operations
are also referred to as pro-active operations (PAOs).
(a)
On receiving orders the forces will start mobilizing on m-day they would
take three days to be in their battle locations. Navy will also mobilize
simultaneously.
(b)
On m+1 they will start the offensive with massive air strikes to cause
degradation on our ground and air forces also thereby delaying our
mobilization this will also be taken as D-day
(c)
On D+2 they will employ their integrated battle groups (IBGs) in our
northern command area. Just to amplify these are division size forces made
up from their pivot corps, as I mentioned in the beginning there will be eight
to ten of them. Reportedly three IBGs will be used.
(d)
The next day i.e. D+3 they will launch the second set of IBGs in our southern
commands area. Upto five IBGs will be used.
(e)
On the fifth day of mobilization i.e. D+4 the second tier of offensive forces
known as theatre force reserves (TFR) gets launched in the north which
comprises of 2 Indian corps along with elements of 4 Corps which are likely
to be airlifted from Eastern Command. This will be launched to exploit one
or two out of the three penetration made by the IBGs.
(f)
On D+5 and D+6 two more TFRS will get launched in the South, these
maneuvers are somewhat the same as in their conventional doctrine. Except
that they operate for curtailed objectives.
(g)
Forces from their eastern command are likely to arrive by D+9 or the tenth
day of mobilization to act as balance forces.
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(h)
While this is going on the international borders they operate with 5 to 6
brigades in Kashmir.
The basic assumption of the doctrine being that the Indian Air Force having depleted
the Pakistan Air Force and degraded the mechanized forces would achieve air superiority
over the battlefield and therefore ground forces can take risks in their maneuvers. You can
notice that a serious imbalance exists throughout the maneuver which is exploitable.
(a)
No mines or defensive preparations, which can be exploited by our strategic reserves
with ease as no complexed operation of a bridge-head will be needed.
(b)
No strategic reserves-TFRs arrive two to three days after the employment of the
IBGs, while the balance forces arrive six days after the employment of TFRs.
Thereby giving sufficient time to the Pakistani reserves in piecemeal elimination of
Indian forces. To implement this doctrine they need some time and the earliest they
might be able to make it operational will not be before 2015 when they have their
air force reorganized and forward cantonments built. The doctrine further validated
and practiced also to reorganize and re-equip their ground forces. This doctrine
being all related to the availability of space, I will leave you with a few questions;
firstly does this space exist despite our conventional ratios. If we conclude in the
positive than secondly do we need to modify our nuclear doctrine to deny this space
by making our nuclear threshold more ambiguous if not lowered. I must also add
that the Pakistan’s military is aware of the threat and has worked on its own war
fighting concept to defeat Cold Start Doctrine through war games also an Army/Air
Force joint exercise has been conducted.
They also need to reorganize because offensive formations need a better punch
than defensive formations. Tanks, long range artillery and superior mobility are essential.
However, he emphasized that if India may start operations with air strikes which achieves
both strategic surprise and degradation of Pakistan’s military in its garrisons and airbases.
However to achieve this they require 60 to 70 squadrons. At present they have only 37
squadrons which they are likely to increase to 47 by 2012 and 50 by 2015. Lt. Gen. Hamid
Khan also highlighted Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth as an opportunity. In the end Lt.
Gen. Hamid Khan said that to implement this doctrine Indian armed forces need some time
and the earliest they might be able to make it operational will not be before 2015 when they
have their air force reorganized and forward cantonments built.
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Lt. Gen. (R) Asad Durrani, Former Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence
Session-II-Plenary:
Cold Start Concept and Evaluation
DR. ZAFAR NAWAZ JASPAL52
India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Philosophy and Dynamics
Indian posture was defensive before Cold Start Doctrine. After the induction of
nuclear weapons conventional superiority had been compromised. So India decided to
introduce Cold Start Doctrine to carry out limited war against Pakistan and remain below
the nuclear threshold of Pakistan.
Purpose of the Cold Start Doctrine is to give a punishing reply to Pakistan in case
of any terrorist attack in India by Pakistan based militants organizations. Further he said
that India reformed its strike forces into eight Integrated Battle Groups to cut short its
mobilization time and carry out quick and swift attacks against Pakistan. Moreover India
is spending billions of dollars to overcome their military deficiency which has provoked
an arms race in South Asia. Main focus of Cold Start Doctrine is on Pakistan, but India
links it with China. But in reality latest tanks and other latest equipment cannot be used in
Himalaya against China but they will be used against Pakistan. Pakistan is fully prepared
to meet Indian Cold Start Doctrine.
52
Advisor on Nuclear Affairs, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)/Assistant Professor,
International Relations Department of Quaid-i-Azam University
105
Session-III:
Cold Start Assumptions
BRIG. (R) NAEEM SALIK53
Cold Start: Its Assumptions and Implications on Strategic Stability
Assumption-1:
It is possible to fight a limited conventional war in a nuclear environment and keep
it below the nuclear threshold and that the Indians can unambiguously identify
Pakistan’s nuclear red lines.
Assumption-2:
Sources of any terrorist incident in India would be outside India and ostensibly in
Pakistan.
Assumption-3:
Pakistani Military would take an Indian blow and sit back quietly without
retaliating.
Assumption-4:
A so called ‘punishing blow’ to Pakistan army would be so effective and long lasting
that the Pakistan Army’s role as a driver of ‘Pakistan’s aggressive foreign policy’
would be eliminated for ever.
Assumption-5:
Pakistan will perceive attacks by multiple IBGs as less provocative and threatening
than those by one or two strike corps.
Assumption–6:
While India brings about doctrinal and organizational changes and relocates its
offensive forces, Pakistan will watch passively and would not take appropriate
counter measures.
Assumption-7:
Pakistan will be willing to play the game by the rules set by India and would not expand
the conflict by taking counter offensive actions at the place of its own choosing.
Assumption-8:
That the IAF efforts to neutralize PAF and suppress Pakistani air defenses would
not stumble into hitting Pakistan’s strategic assets.
53
Academic Advisor, National Defence University
106
Assumption-9:
Pakistan would be amenable to India’s definition of ‘shallow’ and ‘limited’
objectives.
Assumption-10:
Pakistan totally depends on outside powers to bail it out of a difficult situation and
does not have the ability to defend itself against even the limited incursions by
India.
Assumption-11:
India’s political leadership would be as prone to taking the risk of a nuclear escalation
as the Indian military and would be willing to loosen its grip over the military and
that India’s political decision makers/civilian bureaucracy will somehow become
as nimble in their decision making as the IBG commanders.
Assumption-12:
India would be able to acquire enough modern tanks/IFVs to not only replace the
obsolete equipment of its strike formations but also provide additional resources to
the ‘Pivot Corps’ to enhance their offensive capability.
Assumption-13:
Pakistani intelligence would be less capable of monitoring the movement of IBGs
than that of the strike corps.
Assumption-14:
Lowering of Pakistan’s confidence in its ability to defend itself conventionally would
not force it to lower its nuclear threshold and that Pakistan would act rationally in
an emotionally charged crisis situation and would not take the extreme decision
even when forced into an embarrassing or humiliating situation by India.
Assumption-15:
A military bred on orthodox pattern of thinking and operating would suddenly
transform and start producing Guderians and Pattons.Session-III:
Cold Start Assumptions
SOBIA SAEED PARACHA54
Basic Assumptions of the Indian Cold Start Doctrine
Cold Start is an offensive Indian military doctrine that seeks to achieve tangible
military and political targets inside the Pakistani territory without tipping the Pakistani
54
Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
107
nuclear threshold. Although, it is a conventional military doctrine as contemplated by many
strategic analysts; nonetheless, its operationalisation may have repercussions eventually
destabilizing the already fragile nuclear stability of the region. The Indian military action,
according to this doctrine will achieve its purpose and end, before international intervention.
It would be limited in its time and scope. The aim of this paper is to outline the apparent
Indian assumptions and to analyse in the light of the Indian stated assumptions whether
future wars in South Asia can be limited or not.
Ostensibly this doctrine is about conducting quick military actions in the Pakistani
territory that help to strategically surprise Pakistan, embarrass the Pakistan army, and have
shallow territorial gains, that can later on be utilized as a bargaining chip on the negotiation
table. Following are the broad contours of cold start doctrine:
•
Joint military operations through IBGs (Integrated Battle Groups) with IAF (Indian
Air Force) and Navy
•
Operations through special forces and fourth generation warfare implementation
•
Utilisation of Special Forces
•
Emphasise on network centric and electronic warfare
•
Robust command and control
•
Attaining strategic surprise and mobilization differential over Pakistan
•
Limited time, scope and aims of the operations
On the bases of the acquisition of all these capabilities, India would be able to
attain its politico-military targets in a future conflict with Pakistan. This led to the search
for underlining factors that the Indians assume would assist them in their future endeavours
vis-à-vis Pakistan.
For analytical convenience the Indian assumptions for successful operations under
old start doctrine have been divided in to two main categories; stated and actual. The stated
assumptions are those which were highlighted in the open sources of information like
official statements, military research papers, books, articles and analyses etc given by the
prominent Indian strategists. And actual assumptions are those which have been deduced
after analysing the stated and perceived assumptions and compared with historical evidence,
the actual military capabilities, evolving technologies, force postures and other facts on the
ground.
Following are the Indian stated assumptions that show how the Indians are
observing the current strategic scenario of South Asia, Pakistani capabilities and how can
India exploit it for its interests. The strategy of cold start doctrine is certainly based on
Indian assumptions regarding Pakistan. The stated assumptions would be followed by the
actual assumptions.
108
STATED ASSUMPTIONS:
1. The deployment of IBGS close to the international borders and their small size
would help to mobilize them faster and attain a strategic surprise over Pakistani
forces.
2. The initial thrust of operations of 72-96 hours by the IBGs would help to achieve
Substantial military targets.
3. There is a perception gap between the Pakistani nation and the Pakistan military
forces vis-à-vis India. This time Pakistani forces will not receive due support
from the nation regarding its war against India. This India might capitalize so
that the nuclear threshold is not activated.
4. The small crisp operations would be aimed at disrupting the command and
control of Pakistani forces. Ensuing shock would keep them from responding
timely and sufficiently.
5. One of the critical features, on which the success of cold start doctrine relies is
the psychological paralyses of the Pakistani nation and their will to fight against
India. This would be achieved through launching multiple attacks along the
length of the Pakistani border, while keeping the thrust and scale of operations
limited. The operations would be kept limited which would keep the Pakistani
forces confident of their war fighting capabilities on conventional grounds, while
the multiple thrusts along the complete border would cause a leadership crisis
and diminishing morale. This eventually would cause psychological paralyses
6. Few of the Indian analysts believe that the when this doctrine is operationalized
the Indian electronic warfare capabilities should be sufficient enough to jam the
command and control system of the Pakistani nuclear weapons.
7. The war would not lead to a nuclear exchange between the two countries because
of the scale, size and thrust of the operations.
8. Indian problems related to sub conventional warfare are linked directly with
Pakistan.
9. Major intelligence gaps would exist in that would make it difficult for Pakistani
intelligence to pinpoint Indian army’s concentration areas and calculate which
Indian IBGs would be reinforced during battle leading to seamless Indian
operations.
10. India might be fighting a war in the NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical)
environment, for which India is also acquiring capabilities. India has also
conducted the military exercise, “Ashwamedh and Shatrunash” in 2007 to test
its war fighting capabilities in NBC environment.
11. Small military or territorial gains in the Indo-Pak scenario have great political
109
connotations which might help create a leadership crisis in Pakistan. And if this
happens the Pakistani political and diplomatic response will be insufficient in
order to galvanize the international response.
12. The Indian nuclear doctrine of responding with nuclear weapons if its forces
are attacked with WMDs will deter Pakistan from using any nuclear option in
a short time frame.
13. India believes that China will play a role in Cold Start Doctrine although the
role has not been specified.
14. If the military operations are successful Indian ascendancy over political
objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan will be achieved such as Kashmir, Siachen, water
and terrorism.
ACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS:
1. Military targets would be achievable because Pakistan would not come up with any
conventional or nuclear response that matches the Indian offensive.
2. The war objective is not to take out terrorist groups but destruction/degradation of
Pakistan army.
3. The war would be limited in time and space and military targets in the Pakistani
territory would be achieved within 72-96 hours.
4. But after the initial 72-96 hours the war might be prolonged to achieve the war
objectives. This also means that the war may not be limited in any aspect except
that it would depend completely on the Indian military gains and Pakistani counterresponses. Thus the initial thrust of the operations would be 72-96 hours, but the
war will continue till India achieves its objectives.
5. If Pakistan wants to use nuclear weapons, IBGs would present a smaller target
than the corps. This underlines the assumption that Pakistan would not use nuclear
weapons against Indian corps inside the Indian territory, because they believe the
Pakistani nuclear doctrine is based on counter value targeting and the Pakistani
missiles have got higher CEP (circular error of probability) differential.
6. Although China is indicated as a target yet the attack will be focused on Pakistan.
7. The internal instability in Pakistan vis-à-vis global war on terror and insurgencies
will act as a force multiplier for the Indian offensive.
8. Presence of NATO/Allied Forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s commitment to
Global War on Terror would limit the Pakistan’s capability to fight a two front war.
Thus, they will accept Indian activities in Baluchistan and NWFP, which can be
activated in Cold Start Doctrine as a response to Kashmir.
9. The regional nuclear deterrence relationship would remain static, which means that
110
the Indian nuclear doctrine will help India to deter any future nuclear threats from
Pakistan and Pakistan will not change its deterrence strategy. The Indian nuclear
doctrine says that any nuclear, chemical or biological attack against the Indian
forces in India or elsewhere would call upon the use of Indian nuclear weapons.
10. The concept of escalation control is actually based on the assumption that the small
incursions with full force on the Pakistani territory will disorient the Pakistani
leadership and the current doctrine of centralized command and control would keep
them from undergoing a coherent process of decision-making for the use of nuclear
weapons. Thus the Pakistani nuclear response may also be rendered ineffective.
And after the end of the war, Pakistan would lose any justification to use its
nuclear weapons.
Through research it was found that the Indian stated assumptions are in many cases
different than their actual assumptions. Few assumptions are implicit while others might be
regarded as incorrect, exaggerated or mere misperceptions. The level of training, weapons
and technology acquisition and the strategy shows that India is preparing for a war that
prolongs for more than a week, like breaking the backbone of Pakistan army is too higher
a goal to be achieved in three days and it will also invoke the use of nuclear weapons
by Pakistan. Thus when India talks about such diverse aims as having territorial gains
in Pakistan, breaking the Pakistan army, jamming the command and control systems of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, acquiring nuclear second strike capability etc. it is not talking
about a limited war but it is based on the concept of total war. Consequently the debate on
cold start doctrine was misrepresented as related to conventional military strategy only,
as it has a nuclear dimension from the very early stages. India’s massive conventional
military capabilities and the principal of limited goals for any future wars with Pakistan
has led India to assume that it will enjoy escalation control. It is also believed in India that
they will enjoy escalation control, because Pakistan has tried to project a nuclear threshold
artificially low.
Finally, the Indians have developed this doctrine for two levels of escalation. The
first level would be to have an attack with the help of IBGs; if the required results are
achieved and the bilateral issues in South Asia are resolved on the Indian terms, the region
moves towards strategic stability. If this does not happen and the Pakistani response is
different than what India expected, then it will still have escalation control. India will break
the backbone of the Pak-Army and nuclear high command through its military might, which
will keep the war from further escalation.
CONCLUSION:
It is believed by the Indian strategists that the shift of the Indian military from
defensive to offensive posture will help them breach the Pakistani defences successfully.
The doctrine was formulated in order to counter the Pakistani mobilization differential and
have short crisp military actions that break the Pakistan army with incurring negligible
collateral damage at the tactical level. However, strategically it unites India’s problems
related to sub conventional warfare with the conventional responses. Yet paradoxically,
111
it connects Pakistani conventional military strategy with the acquisition of nuclear war
fighting capabilities leading to doctrinal shifts. This makes Indian cold doctrine strategically
impossible.
Session-III:
Cold Start Assumptions
DR ZAFAR NAWAZ JASPAL55
Cold Start Assumptions: Critical Analysis
FIRST DRAFT
Three-Day Workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for
Strategic Stability in South Asia. July 20-22, 2010, Islamabad
Note: No citation without the prior permission of Author
The Cold Start Doctrine has boosted the strategic optimism of the Indian strategic
pundits. The supporter and propagator of the doctrine have sketched interesting operational
advantageous scenarios. The Revolution in Military Affairs obviously restructures and
multiplies Indian Armed forces striking power. The increasing war-fighting capability of
Indian forces has been boosting Indian ruling elites’ strategic sense of superiority, which
could entail devastating misperception and miscalculation about strategic competitor’s
defensive capabilities. This state of mind has been augmenting destabilizing hypothetical
advantageous assumptions in New Delhi. Consequently, the Indians style of diplomacy is
increasingly becoming dogmatic and coercive in South Asia.
The Indians are hypersensitive, or, even paranoid about Pakistan’s strategic
potential. They believe that Cold Start Doctrine would provide their Army ‘Preemptive
Military Intervention’ potential vis-à-vis its belligerent neighbor Pakistan. According to
Ashley Tellis that: “Pakistan’s window of opportunity is closing as India’s power continues
to rise. India’s growing economic clout, international prestige, and conventional military
superiority, all contribute to limit Pakistan’s options.”56
Pakistan is also vigilant to the Cold Start Doctrine. On January 13, 2010, the
National Command Authority (NCA) of Pakistan declared that it had taken “serious
note of recent Indian statements about conducting conventional military strikes under
a nuclear umbrella.” It added that “such irresponsible statements reflected a hegemonic
mindset, oblivious of dangerous implications of adventurism in a nuclearised context …57
General Parvez Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan categorically stated that the
55
56
57
Advisor on Nuclear Affairs, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)/Assistant Professor,
International Relations Department of Quaid-i-Azam University
Quoted in in Arzan Tarapore, Report of the seminar presenting key findings of the USIP report
held on January 19, 2005 at the IPCS conference room, Military – Articles, No. 1623, Institute
of Peace & Conflict Studies, January 29, 2005. http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/limited-warunder-the-nuclear-shadow-in-south-asia-1623.html.
Ibid.
112
consequences of any misadventure in a “nuclear overhang” can be suicidal for India. He
added that Pakistan would response in full strength while using all types of resources.
This statement was supplemented by the Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Rao
Qamar who said that “Pakistan has put all the required preparations in place to meet any
eventuality. The aggressor could not even think of what the reply would be from Pakistan.
These statements manifests Pakistan’s resolute to respond Cold Start Doctrine militarily.
The counterstrategy of Islamabad obviously defies the wishful and misleading conclusions
about the likely outcome of Cold Start Doctrine.
The proponents of Cold Start Doctrine are under erroneous impression that
Revolution in Military Affairs in the Indian Armed Forces automatically converts the
structure of South Asian strategic environment in India’s favor. It would transform the
existing South Asian anarchical system into a hierarchical system, in which India would
enjoy domineering stature. But, in practice, the structure of the regional or international
system is not modified by mere elevating the technical outlook of the armed forces.
Kenneth Waltz pointed out that even major changes in military technology did not change
the structure of the international system unless the new weapons are used to fight wars that
change the number of great powers.58 The realistic calculations reveal that the regional
system would not become hierarchic.
Ironically, the Indian strategic community has been debating the advantages of
Cold Start Doctrine, rather than the specific conditions that produce the destabilizing
characteristics of Cold Start operational plan — the need for prompt mobilization, the
immediate attack on Pakistan and the plan to knock Pakistani nuclear capable armed forces
out of the war before International community mobilize and intervene in the crisis. These
destabilizing features not only unleash deadly arms race, but intensify security dilemma
between the nuclear capable belligerent neighbors. Is New Delhi risk her economic
resurgence by being over-assertive with Islamabad and thus risk nuclear war?
INDIA’S ASSUMPTION
The Indian forces will employ “blitzkrieg” or NATO’s integrated group offensive
type strategy that involved Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy. All the three
armed forces have to synergize operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army. The
Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed by eight integrated armoured
division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour,
artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. The distinction between “strike
corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished. The
primary focus would be on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine.
During the operation the IAF would achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyze
the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the
area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”. The Indian Navy would
concurrently launch amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is
forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.59
58
59
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (1979), pp. 180-181
Dr Subhash Kapila, “India’s new Cold Start” war doctrine strategically reviewed,” South Asia Analysis
Group, paper no. 991, May 4, 2004. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/paper991.html
113
The Cold Start Doctrine would give India an opportunity to keep military operation
at the level of limited war. The limited war can be evaluated by four parameters: time,
geography, weaponry used, and objectives sought. P. R. Chari pointed out: “The Cold Start
strategy, which seeks to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff with limited offensives, provides
all corps with offensive capability and upgrades the role of Special Forces. The tactical
objectives may include a rapid shallow invasion, destroying terrorist infrastructure or
Pakistani military assets, or hot pursuit of militants - all limited objectives. The strategic
objective would be to get India out of its post-1998 ‘strategic box’ of being deterred by
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from acting against Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir.”60
The Cold Start Doctrine necessitates the integrated groups’ deployment and
mobilization into ‘highly mobile formations on hair-trigger alert for launching limited
war. It is because the speed and efficiency of a military force’s Observation-OrientationDecision-Action (OODA) loop would disrupt the Pakistan’s decision cycle, allows Indian
Army to change the ground reality fast enough to leave Pakistan Army constantly reacting
to an inadequate understanding of the situation. The key is maintaining the initiative,
continually disorienting the enemy through rapid and unpredictable change in tactics. The
ultimate result should be strategic paralysis of the enemy, so that it is blind, disoriented,
confused, and incapacitated, thereby offering a faster and more efficient way of fighting and
winning conventional war.61 If the Cold Start Doctrine operational plans are materialized in
the future, it could pose following strategic challenges to Pakistan:
1. India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle
group would be launched. Indians believe that the element of surprise would be
achieved.
2. Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in
numbers and quality of numerical strength. Pakistan air force would be knocked out.
3. Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence. Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise
missile strikes would be defied.
4. Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations
which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.
5. Having eight IBG (rather than three) units capable of offensive action significantly
increases the challenge for Pakistani intelligence’s limited reconnaissance assets to
monitor the status of all the IBGs, improving the chance of achieving surprise.
The preceding assumptions raise a few questions when and how does Pakistan’s
60
61
Prof PR Chari, “Limited War under the Nuclear Shadow in South Asia,” in Arzan Tarapore,
Report of the seminar presenting key findings of the USIP report held on January 19, 2005 at
the IPCS conference room, Military – Articles, No. 1623, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies,
January 29, 2005.
http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/limited-war-under-the-nuclear-shadow-in-south-asia-1623.
html, accessed on July 17, 2010.
Arzan Tarapore, “The New Army Doctrine in Limited War,” Nuclear – Articles, No. 1588,
Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, December 2004. http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/thenew-army-doctrine-in-limited-war-1588.html, accessed on July 18, 2010.
114
nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play? How to offset India’s
overwhelming long range artillery fire support? How to counter India’s force projection
capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear? The aforementioned perceived and real threats
necessitate Pakistan to take the following countermeasures. They are:
•
Pakistan retains a robust nuclear arsenal to provide deterrence against nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons. Its’ nuclear weapons also guards, its national
interest from the conventional superiority of the adversary. It could develop
in the future low-yield-battle field nuclear weapons to solidify its defensive
fence.
•
The quantitative and qualitative gradual upgrading in both conventional and
nuclear weapons remains the priority of its armed forces. During the improvement
of armed forces arsenals, the policy-makers ought to remain vigilant about the
repercussions of defense industry on the socio-economic development. That is
very important because Indians believe that they would win against Pakistan
by using ‘arms-race’ as a weapon of war. This hidden component of Indian
Cold Start doctrine, i.e. strategy of economic exhaustion/collapse ought to be
carefully considered. The perfect balance between both the sectors ensures the
sustainable increment in the armed forces power.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
POLITICAL CULTURE
Political culture of a state decisively influences the decision-making process in the
state. Despite India’s rapid GDP growth (7%), its political culture is gradually deteriorating.
The former Indian Chief of Army Staff General Padmanabhan lamented that: “The political
culture in the country has deteriorated over the years. Communalism, sectarianism, regional
parochialism, and sub-nationalism are on the rise. There is growing criminalization of
politics and a culture of ‘vote banks’ has taken root. Politicization of the bureaucracy and
the police, are well-established.”62 The political culture effects Cold Start Doctrine, because
it is an offensive doctrine and domestic in origin, rooted in bureaucratic, sociopolitical, and
psychological causes.
COMBAT EDGE
Realistically, the Cold Start would not give combat edge to the Indian Army over
Pakistani defensive forces. The calculation of force ratios between the adversaries is
hitherto done on a service to service basis – Army, Navy, Air force versus the opponent’s
Army, Navy and Air Force. Or the three services integrated into one strong unified force
with – unity of command and control, total synergy in operations, and much superior and
economical employment of the resources available to the armed forces versus opponents’
unified force.
62
General S. Padmanabhan (Retd), “The Indian Army in 2020,” Security Research Review, The
Journal of Bharat-Rakshak.com, June 21, 2006. http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/SRR/2006/02/58.
html, accessed on July 13, 2010.
115
The Indian Army presently lacks significant material shortfalls. The army’s tank
corps suffers from a low operational readiness rate because much of its equipments are at
the end of their service life. The integrated battle groups also require organic self-propelled
artillery to have the mobility and firepower necessary to accomplish their mission. According
to declassified estimate, the army possesses only 10% of the self-propelled guns it needs.
Agreed India purchased several hundred T-90 tanks from Russia Federation to replace its
ageing tanks force. In addition, Indian air force also lacks decisive superiority. According
to Dr Subhash Kapila the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons to meet demands of the
new offensive doctrine. 63 It calls into question Indian Army’s ability to execute Cold Start
doctrine operational plans.
The conventional military asymmetry does not give India Conventionally strong
adversaries-Pakistan and China. Whatever, India achieved against Pakistan; it was not
through military muscle. For instance; in 1971, it exploited the internal political crisis of
Pakistan. Its compellence strategy gave it dividends in Kargil 1999, military deployments
in 2001-2001 and Mumbai 2008 only after the benign involvement of United States. In this
context, credit goes to India’s diplomatic strategy rather than military doctrines. Bharat
Karnad pointed out: “ The record of Indi-Pakistan wars in the pre-nuclear era, in fact,
suggests that even when the disparity in conventional forces favored India, its military
forces did not or could not cut through the built-up Pakistani antitank defenses in the heavily
defended and valuable Punjab sector, nor advance very deep in the open dessert terrain
into Pakistan.”64 While commenting on the current military asymmetry he concluded:
“Today with the gap in deployable troops and armor narrowed, Indian forces are even less
able, realistically speaking, to affect ‘large’ breakthroughs in terms of capturing Pakistani
territory or destroying Pakistani forces and therefore to start a nuclear.”65
Apart from the doubtfulness any military gain of the Cold Start, such a military
adventurism might lead to a campaign of mutual destruction. In view of the high density of
India’s own cities and the impossibility of affording an adequate defense against enemy’s
missile strikes, it would be seen a great mistake for India to initiate such a campaign of
mutual destruction, and probably even a mistake to retaliate in kind even if so attacked.
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF PAKISTAN
Pakistan is a declared nuclear weapon state (NWS) since May 1998. Importantly,
after some hiccups, the world has accepted this reality. Its nuclear doctrine clearly states
that it would maintain a “Credible Minimum Deterrent” based on a triad of weapon delivery
systems. It has also declared “First Use Option”. In a crisis, which could instigate the Cold
Start Doctrine, the Indian political ruling elite should not rule out completely Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons potential. Importantly, the nuclear weapons represent a qualitative change
not only in the destructiveness of war but also in the predictable consequences of war. War
has always entailed considerable costs and risks and has often resulted in a loss of absolute
63
64
65
Dr Subhash Kapila, “India’s new Cold Start” war doctrine strategically reviewed,” South
Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 991, May 4, 2004. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/
paper991.html
Bharat Karnat, India’s Nuclear Policy (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 110.
Ibid.
116
capabilities for the victor as well as the vanquished. But in the pre-nuclear weapons era,
decision makers could and often did make the calculation that large-scale military operations
against rivals would enhance their state’s relative standing. If they were wrong, the costs
of defeat were unlikely to be extirpation.66 The nuclear weapons effect these calculations in
a fundamental way. India does not possess means to protect its population, industrial base
and above all its armed forces from the catastrophic losses in the wake of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons retaliatory strikes. Thus, India’s use of tri-service integrated war-fighting doctrine
against nuclear-armed Pakistan would absolutely ensure a destruction that is unfavourable
and unacceptable to New Delhi.
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: LOSS OF FREEDOM
The Cold Start Doctrine would entail Indian political decision-makers into a
brinksmanship crisis, resulting in a war that everyone was willing to risk but that no one
truly wanted it due to the possibility of limited war escalating into total war. Walter C.
Ladwig III opined that “Limited war on the subcontinent poses a serious risk of escalation
based on a number of factors that are not necessarily under the control of the policymakers
or military leaders who would initiate the conflict. A history of misperception, poor
intelligence, and India’s awkward national security decision-making system suggests that
Cold Start could be a risky undertaking that may increase instability in South Asia.”67
The most important negative political consequence of the doctrine would be during
the crisis, the pressure on the political leadership to begin mobilization and launch offensives
promptly, according to the military timetables, multiplied. Which, would contribute greatly
to the dynamic of escalation and the political leaderships’ loss of freedom of action
ECONOMIC:
Foreign Direct investment in India would severely be damaged.
OFFENSE/DEFENSE BALANCE
Since Clausewitz, it has been generally recognized that defense is almost always
easier in land warfare because of advantages of cover and the capability to choose and
prepare terrain and fortify positions. This is why military analysts usually think in terms of
the force ratios-the required superiority of the offensive forces (2:1, 3:1, etc.) in order to
achieve victory.68
MISPERCEPTION ABOUT ESCALATION CONTROL
The Indians believe that they would determine the nature of the future war and thereby
they would not allow the situation to cross the nuclear threshold during the operationalization
of Cold Start Doctrine. This perception reflects that neither they are aware of strategic thought,
66
67
68
Steve Weber, “Realism, détente, and nuclear weapons,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1
(Winter, 1990), p. 63.
Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, p. 158.
Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security, Vol. 11,
No. 2, Fall 1986, p. 161.
117
and nor able to calculate the likely domino effect of the crisis once it entered into a hot-war
sphere. It seems that they have been rejecting the centuries old military axiom, i.e. “just as
water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.” Carl von
Clausewitz cautioned that war is a reciprocal engagement: “In war, the will is directed at an
animate object that reacts.”69 Second, both India and Pakistan has deployed nuclear-capable,
short-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional payloads as part of their conventional
war plans. These missiles are likely to be used early in a crisis against a variety of targets. The
general perception is that Pakistan would be more pressed in a conflict to use these missiles
before India due to India’s air superiority and up-gradation of its air-defense system in the
recent years with the generous assistance Israel. Importantly, the Indian strategic analysts
also believe that India would use missiles in crisis. Dr Subhash Kapila opined that India
would have to use conventional short range battle field missiles (SRBM) and cruise missiles.
He concluded that: “The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly
rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to
include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.70
The use of ballistic and cruise missiles in conflict might be easily be misinterpreted
as a nuclear strike. Zachery Davis pointed out: “There is, however, a growing recognition
that the use of these missiles in a conflict could easily be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack. A
non-nuclear missile strike on an opponent’s nuclear forces, or a nuclear facility despite their
agreement to refrain from such attacks, or even an accident involving nuclear assets could
escalate quickly and even provoke nuclear retaliation.”71 It seems that due to its misperception
and miscalculation about escalation control India in with Cold Start doctrine would be flirting
with nuclear escalation, which is perilous business and thereby should be avoided.
HITTING POLITICAL WILL
The Indian air force considers Gulf Wars as the precedent for its new responsibility
under the Cold Start doctrine. By launching preemptive sorties, the Indian air force render
Pakistan armed forces defenseless by first knocking out its air force and then destroying
its forces, infrastructure and value targets piecemeal.72 The strategy has dual purposes, i.e.
knocking out enemy defenses and simultaneously hitting political will of the adversary.
Hitting political involves targeting decision makers, infrastructure destruction and forcing
the enemy armed forces into giving battle. One fails to understand, how the war would be
remained limited when Indian air force will be targeting both force and value targets.
69
Quoted in Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited
War Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/08, p. 171.
70
Dr Subhash Kapila, “India’s new Cold Start” war doctrine strategically reviewed,” South
Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 991, May 4, 2004. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/
paper991.html
71
Existing crisis-management measures, such as the underutilized hotline between New Delhi and
Islamabad and the agreements to give advanced notice of nuclear accidents and missile tests, are
insufficient. Zachary Davis, “Stepping Back from the Brink: Avoiding a Nuclear March of Folly in
South Asia,” Arms Control Today, January/February, 2009.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/stepping_back_from_the_brink. accessed on July 16, 2010.
72
Firdaus Ahmed, “The Day After ‘Cold Start’,” Military – Articles, No. 2424, Institute of Peace &
Conflict Studies, November 23, 2007. http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/the-day-after-cold-start2424.html, accessed on July 16, 2010.
118
The Indian military has been so committed in sub-conventional operations over the
past two decades that the engagement has possibly impacted its conventional preparedness.
Equipment shortfalls have found mention, but of greater importance is the operational
orientation.
HAIR-TRIGGER DEPLOYMENT
The Cold Start doctrine operational plan entails hair-trigger deployment on IndiaPakistan border. Islamabad would not allow India to take the advantage of surprise. If
Pakistan’s countermeasures undermine the element of surprise, which is the primary
component of Cold Start doctrine, India would be in disadvantage. Moreover, this kind of
the deployments continuously haunts the regional peace.
REALISTIC OUTCOME
If Pakistan act vigilantly and upgrade its nuclear weapons capability from forceinto-being to operational mode by ignoring nuclear pessimists’ sermon; the likely outcome
of Cold Start would be:
Military Futility: A war-fighting strategy that called for rapid response in the form
of armored thrusts to punish Pakistan before the international community intervenes would
be proven inappropriate policy to pursue limited aims. It is because Pakistani armed force
are alert and operationally prepared to thwart Indian surprise attacks.
Enduring External Intervention: The execution of Cold Start and Pakistan’s
response would permanently internationalize India and Pakistan hostility. The international
stakeholders would lack the luxury to relax and wait for mobilization order and the actual
deployment of either sides strike corps. They would be forced to be permanently on guard
and watchful of India Pakistan strategic environment.
Political Restraint: India’s rational political leadership would not even think about
its gigantic military machine’s application to accomplish its minor political objectives. It is
because even an immaterial conventional military adventurous tactic would be a trumpet
of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.
CONCLUSION
Theoretically and practically, the brinkmanship, coercive diplomacy and compellence
strategy may achieve positive results, if conducted carefully. But in a nuclearized strategic
environment these strategies are very risky. The Indians have been failing to realize that
Cold Start would engage both sides into dangerous brinkmanship. They seemed under the
impression that nuclear weapons have a political utility rather than acknowledging them
as military tools and their likely repercussions in a war. The lack of substantive progress
on confidence-building measures and nuclear risk reduction measures further complicate
the situation. More precisely, the Cold Start doctrine would have disastrous political and
military consequences for India in particular and South Asia in general.
119
Session-III:
Cold Start Assumptions
LT. GEN. (R) ASAD DURRANI73
Cold Start: Its Implications on Strategic Stability
In the mid 1980s, the Indian Army started mechanising some of its infantry formations.
The reorganised divisions were given the acronym of RAPID. At that time it was considered
merely part of a process all modern armies undergo, to enhance mobility. In due course,
the concept for their employment also started becoming a little clear. In all its conflicts
with Pakistan- wars, as well as periods of tension that led to full mobilisation- the Indian
military had needed 4-6 weeks to assemble its forces on the borders. That gave Pakistani
forces sufficient time to carry out counter measures and make a reasonable assessment of
the adversary’s likely war plans. Considering, that there are means available to make up
for this unavoidable lag and achieve strategic/battlefield deception, in a conventional war
scenario, this was for India not a decisive disadvantage.
In this background, the Cold Start Doctrine announced by India in 2004 made
sense, but also raised some questions. In the initial stages, since a major portion of the
Indian Army would not yet be effective in the war zone, there was bound to be imbalance
in the Indian system of forces.
Even when the balance was restored, the spread between various efforts made a
strategic breakthrough difficult to achieve. Some of these questions were answered and
some other pieces fell in place when General Deepak Kapoor, the incumbent Indian Army
Chief, earlier this year went public with the proposed concept of “limited war”.
The limited war option, certainly possible in a nuclear overhang as argued earlier, to
carry out a few military strikes in the Pakistani territory before any outside intervention or
the fears of escalation took control, provides India with a reasonably effective and convincing
choice.
The concerns that this policy statement caused, especially in Pakistan, are
understandable, but some of the arguments are self-serving. Before we go overboard
with “any conflict can spin out of control”, “between two nuclear armed countries, such
brinkmanship was irresponsible” and that “the concepts like Cold Start Doctrine & limited
war would lower our nuclear threshold”, we are well advised to revisit our nuclear doctrines,
both declared and what may make more sense.
Some of the relevant parts are as under. In concluding remarks he said that this
paper cannot deal with the whole range of strategic stability, which being dynamic in nature
is essentially the ability to restore stability whenever it is disturbed. Suffice it to say, that
if the aim of this concept is to avoid a big war and use of nuclear weapons, and end the
conflict in a stalemate; strategic instability should be one of our lesser concerns. Our aim
would be much better served by limiting the Indian gains during the first 48 to 96 hours and
thus helping them to end the conflict within the stipulated time frame.
73
Ex-Director General ISI
120
Session IV: Military Developments and Implications for Arms Race
DR ZAFAR IQBAL CHEEMA74 (Discussant to Rodney Jones’ Paper)
Introduction of Future Technologies (Military Capabilities) and its
Implications for Strategic Stability (India)
There are number of rationales for India’s formulation of its aggressive Cold Start
conventional military doctrine. Primarily however, Indian frustration with the failure of
its military operation Parakram in 2002, wherein it mobilized bulk of its armed forces
against Pakistan immediately after an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001,
provided the apparent rationale for reformulation of the Indian military doctrine. Cold Start
Doctrine focuses on the prior assembling and immediate employment of Indian integrated
battle groups (IBGs) supported by Indian Navy and Air Force as thrust formations that will
undertake deep hard strikes against Pakistani military, but remaining below the Pakistani
nuclear threshold.75 Cold Start Doctrine visualizes eight such integrated battle groups (IBGs)
consisting of armoured and mechanized military formations along with heavy artillery and
conventional ballistic Pakistan-specific missiles supported by concurrent air and naval
strikes will ensure lethal destruction of main Pakistani armed forces in surprise attacks
before Pakistan could retaliate with conventional or nuclear weapons, and the international
community could have time to intervene. Another premise of the Cold Start Doctrine is
that precision and swift hard-hitting impact would ensure destruction of the main Pakistani
military forces, because holding or capturing territory like previously is not the intended
objective.76
The background to the Cold Start Doctrine as a blitzkrieg style limited military
operation originated from the Kargil conflict in spring 1999. Indian strategists, including
the military, contended that if Pakistan could undertake limited military operations at
Kargil despite the existence of nuclear weapons capabilities tested in 1998 by both India
and Pakistan, why India could not undertake such operations, which seems a dangerous
lesson to draw under vengeful mindset. Taking Kargil as a limited military conflict, Indians
seem to be exploring strategic space for a punitive military action against Pakistani armed
forces to dissuade its arch adversary from undertaking Kargil style operations. The urge
was intensified after the failure of operation Parakram, although some Indians claim that
their country partly achieved its objectives associated with that massive mobilization.
A public debate initiated in India after the Kargil conflict to develop limited war
contingencies against Pakistan. On 5th January 2000, the Indian Defence Minister, George
Fernandes spoke on “the Challenges of Limited War” at a seminar organized by the
leading Indian think tank, IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and analyses), and stated
that Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons does not rule out the possibility of a limited
74
75
76
Former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences and Chairman, Department of Defence and Strategic
Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University.
Shishir Gupta, “No eyeball to eyeball any more in new war doctrine,” The Indian Express, March
06, 2004, p. 1 Internet Edition: http://www.indianexpress.com/print.php?contect
Ibid, p.2.
121
conventional war.77 He said that Pakistan did hold out a nuclear threat during the Kargil
war, but it had not absorbed the real meaning of nuclearisation, that it can deter only the
use of nuclear weapons, not all and any war.78 He continued that the issue was not that war
has become obsolete by the development of nuclear weapons, and that covert war (proxy
war) is the only option, but that conventional war remains feasible, though within definite
limitations.79 The Indian Chief of Army Staff General V.P. Malik who declared that India
would not hesitate to fight a limited war with Pakistan, regardless of its nuclear weapons
capability, endorsed Fernandes’ statement.80 General Malik warned that if Pakistan persisted
with its proxy war or trans-border terrorism policy, an Indo-Pakistani war is a possibility.
Such statements emanating from New Delhi generate uncertainties about peace
and stability in the South Asian region, one implication of which is that if their nuclear
deterrents cannot prevent a limited conventional war between India and Pakistan, how
can its escalation and spillover be controlled? In their anti-Pakistan frame of mind, Indian
strategists have not carefully examined the possibilities of limited use of conventional forces,
which cannot terminate military action unilaterally for a number of cogent reasons. First, it
would involve the consent of the adversary under attack, unless totally debilitated. Given
the size of the Pakistani armed forces, especially army, and their diversified deployment,
a total debilitation is out of question. Pakistan has corps size armed forces deployed in the
western and southern regions of the country as strategic reserves, which will be outside
the operation of the Indian integrated battle groups and Indian Navy, if not the Air Force.
Assuming that the Indian Air Force will successfully render most Pakistani air bases out of
use, it still cannot wipe out corps size strategic reserves.
Second, the most elementary lesson lost on the Indian military planners of the
strategy of Cold Start is that starting a war is one’s own choice, but its termination cannot
come without an adversary’s agreement. It is almost three hundred years old Clausewitzian
dictum that the ‘friction’ and ‘fog of war,’ decides its momentum and finale.81 It is absolutely
insipid to fathom that the Pakistani military will passively watch the transformation of
Indian elite corps into Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) as ready-to-attack strike formations
and wait to react until they attack. Pakistan’s current conventional strategy since exercise
Zarb-i-Momin in 1989 is based on a doctrine of ‘offensive defence’ with a forward defensive
posture due to compulsions of geography, and aims to fight next battles on the enemy
territory.
Third, Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state who possesses around 70 such
weapons as internationally estimated. It is sure India understands it well that not all the
weapons are stored at one place so that they cannot be destroyed. It is widely believed
that Pakistan has not even fully assembled all its nuclear weapons, and war-heads are
kept separately from delivery aircraft and ballistic missiles. The unavoidable military
77
78
79
80
81
C Raja Mohan, “Fernandes Unveils ‘Limited War’ Doctrine,” The Hindu (Chennai), January 25,
2000.
Ibid.
Ibid. .
Ibid.
Naeem Salik, “Perils of Limited War in a Nuclear Environment,” Strategic Studies, winter 2004.
122
logic is that a fully diversified, concealed and camouflaged nuclear force cannot be
totally destroyed. Even if a few nuclear weapons remain safe from pre-emptive air
strikes, there are maximum chances of Pakistani retaliation with nuclear weapons. The
strategists and nuclear historians have a consensus that pre-emptive strikes did not
take place in the entire nuclear history of the Cold War since 1945 because of the fear
of retaliation with leftover nuclear weapons. The United States seriously considered
carrying out pre-emptive air strikes against Soviet nuclear assets many times in the
early Cold War, but dropped each time because of the fear of unacceptable retaliation.
The only two cases of preventive, not pre-emptive, nuclear strikes are: one against
Iraq by Israel in 1980-2 and the other against Syria again by Israel in 2007. In both the
cases, preventive air strikes were taken against non-nuclear weapon states by opaque
nuclear weapon state, which possesses more than 200 nuclear weapons.
Fourth, escalation is inherent in any military confrontation: conventional or nuclear.
The only exception as demonstrated during the Cold War was sub-conventional use of
violence below the threshold of a full-fledged conventional war and nuclear threshold,
which has best been described as stability – instability paradox.
Is there a strategic space for the use of conventional forces to forestall subconventional violence or carry out hot pursuit operations beyond the LoC on the Pakistani
side of Kashmir that would not lead to escalation? What if an Indian air strike against a
regional military headquarters in Kashmir, or an operation by an Indian brigade crossing
the LoC and undertaking limited operations in the area, and then withdrawing? The
answer relates to the complexity of the three levels of likely conflict in South Asia: the
sub-conventional, limited and full-fledged conventional war, which would invariably
escalate. Another Indian rationale for Cold Start Doctrine is mounting political and military
problems in IHK (Indian Held Kashmir) for which it blame Pakistan. Cold Start Doctrine
is a threatening military posture against Pakistan to desist from its alleged support to the
low-intensity conflict in Kashmir.
One of the fundamental assumptions of the Cold Start is that outside diplomatic
intervention does not let the Indian armed forces to accomplish their so-called military
mission of destroying the best of Pakistani armed forces in the timeframe they require in
their present dispensation. It is in fact an admission of guilt of their inability to achieve the
objectives. The type of inordinate delays in mobilization in 2002-2003, the lack of initiative
and other organizational flaws of the Indian Army have been a source of bitter criticism
by the Indian professionals themselves. One of the objectives of Pakistan’s decision to
develop nuclear weapons was the outcome of 1970-71 war and diminishes reliance upon
outside powers. The planners of Cold Start ignore the most basic premises of the Pakistani
posture of credible minimum deterrence is that it aims to deter a conventional war with
nuclear weapons. The greater the threat of such a use of large-scale conventional force, the
lower the threshold to employ nuclear deterrence by Pakistan.
The focal point which the Indian strategists, whether civilian or military, seem
to be ignoring is that containing the scope of military action, may it be limited war, pre123
emptive air strikes or ‘Cold Start’ strategy can hardly be one side’s choice and might
precipitate unintended, larger and uncontrollable conflict prone to further escalation,
conventional or nuclear. The Cold Start is a modification of the pre-emptive air strikes
against Pakistan air force, its ballistic missiles force and nuclear facilities, which
surfaced repeatedly in the past, but dropped each time due to its virtual impossibility
of succeeding. Any Indian limited military operations on Pakistan’s territory, whether
punitive, or pre-emptive conventional air strikes or Cold Start targeting Pakistan’s
conventional armed forces, nuclear forces and strategic facilities, would trigger an
assured Pakistani retaliation. These dilemmas would exacerbate if any side places its
SRBMs equipped with nuclear weapons near to the border, let us say Prithvi-I & II or
Haft-II & III, and if those weapons faced being overrun by an opposing army, there
would be a classic ‘use them or lose them’ problem. The key concern is to understand
the scope of a limited conventional conflict or Cold Start. Should a war break out, and
the Indian army gains a major advantage, there must be a compulsion for Pakistan to
signal nuclear deterrence.
The threats like the possibility of a limited war or Cold Start, which India
thinks it can win, are ideational tools to achieve the objective coupled with structural
instruments. India has failed to contain the Kashmiri freedom struggle/low–intensity
conflict in the part of Kashmir under its control. It perceives military and strategic
disadvantages in fighting an unending low-intensity conflict in Kashmir and has
thereby threatened to escalate the level to a limited conventional war or implicitly
threatens the application of Cold Start strategy against Pakistan. It has therefore,
raised the spectrum of a limited conventional war with Pakistan to dissuade her from
supporting the Kashmiris. Pakistan feels inherent asymmetries in a limited or full-scale
conventional war with India disadvantageous to her and therefore, invokes its nuclear
weapons capability for a strategic equilibrium and to avert an all out war with India.
The India – Pakistan nuclear deterrence cannot prevent low-level sub-conventional
war in a nuclearized environment, which also never happened in the Cold War. India’s
perception of alleged Pakistani support for sub-conventional violence in Kashmir
under the umbrella of nuclear weapons is one of the greatest unresolved dilemmas
of the South Asian nuclear age. Support of sub-conventional warfare by either of the
two nuclear weapon states can be so graduated that does not provoke escalation as
happened during the Cold War. Without endorsing the limited nuclear options and the
other forms of nuclear escalation that drove the U.S. and Soviet Union to raise their
nuclear arsenals to their climax aiming at MAD, New Delhi is struggling to find a
viable method to counter its perceived Pakistani support for sub-conventional warfare
in Kashmir. The modus operandi being currently explored in the form of limited war
or Cold Start after the failure of Parakram, when it kept battle-ready forces in the
field for ten months, does not lend itself to repetition and is within the framework of
a conventional war with all its attendant escalatory risks. If the full mobilization of
India’s entire armed forces in that crisis could not produce a credible outcome, how can
the threat of limited war or Cold Start alter an adversary’s behavior?
124
STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA:
The concept of Strategic Stability
Stability in the strategic context means maintaining the status quo: no disruptive
development disturbs the existing strategic equilibrium. In the nuclear context, it means
that none of the parties undertake any action which is detrimental to the maintenance of
nuclear deterrence between the concerned parties, called deterrence stability. Deterrence
stability has three essential requisites. 82
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Each of the parties must have a deliverable first strike capability and an ability
to absorb adversary’s first strike and undertake a successful retaliatory strike,
called second-strike capability. In other words, it the possession of assured,
survivable and credible second-strike capability. Credibility means that the
adversary recognizes the opponents’ deterrence capability and will to use
it if its interests are hurt, and therefore refrains from any prejudicial action
based on a cost – benefit calculus and prospects of suffering unacceptable
damage.
None of the parties should undertake pre-emptive strike. Pre-emption strike
refers to a military action to neutralize opponents existing capabilities before
that is perceived to undertake first strike.
Nuclear weapons capabilities of the concerned parties must be secure
against accidental or unauthorized use, which includes safety and security
of the nuclear arsenals. It presumes that nuclear weapons are not used unless
intended by the legitimate and designated authorities and are well protected
against sabotage and illicit takeover.
A fourth element that must essentially be added this general list is that none of the
parties willfully disturbs the deterrence equilibrium. These theoretical pre-requisites of
strategic stability would help in evaluation of state of strategic stability in South Asia, and
how far it fulfills the requisite criteria.
Survivability and Credibility:
The short history of India-Pakistan crises since Brasstacks 1986-87 suggests that
both countries demonstrated their statesmanship by, perhaps employing, but not using
nuclear weapons. It was based upon each party’s assessment that the other has not only
a survivable and credible first strike capability but a retaliatory capability as well. This
became more pronounced after the 1998 nuclear tests by both states. Both have tested
nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems: nuclear capable air craft and ballistic
missiles. Their weapons are well dispersed and ballistic missiles are to be based on mobile
launchers to assure that their first strike capabilities are both, functional and operational.83
82
83
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1995), p.51.
R. Lavoy, ‘Managing South Asia’s Nuclear Rivalry: New Policy Challenges for the United States,’
paper presented at an international conference on Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in
South Asia, Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, June 7-9,2004, p.8-9.
125
Will and Communication:
Will, determination and resolve to use nuclear weapons if each of the two South
Asian antagonists undermines the other’s interests have often been communicated less
directly but more indirectly between India and Pakistan. Communicating resolve to use
nuclear weapons is at times referred as nuclear signaling. For deterrence to function, a
capability to inflict unacceptable damage must be recognized by the adversary. Direct
communication of will and resolve to employ nuclear weapons can be signaled through
an official statement, policy declaration, doctrine and press briefing. India announced a
formal nuclear doctrine on 17 August 1999 which has been partially implemented including
command and control. Pakistan has however made piecemeal statements which put together
constitute an informal nuclear doctrine. It also announced a Nuclear Command Authority
including a more elaborate and formal command and control in February 2000, which is
fully operative now. Indirect signaling can be communicated through third parties, which
may be involved in negotiating to end the crisis, kind of a role the United States played in
most of the India – Pakistan crises.
Pre-emption:
Successful nuclear deterrence necessitates total absence of pre-emptive strikes,
which at least is the lesson of Cold War. The United States planned many times to undertake
pre-emptive air strikes against the former Soviet Union before the state of nuclear parity
was achieved between the two superpowers, but dropped it each time due to fear of
retaliation: conventional or nuclear. There have been no pre-emptive strikes undertaken in
South Asia, although there have been instances of official planning for such measures. In
1982 and 1984, there were reports of India looking into the likely success of such military
undertakings. The government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi asked the Indian Air Force to study
the prospects of success of a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan’s uranium enrichment
plant in Kahuta.84 Reportedly, the Indian Air Force ruled against the advisability of such a
measure due to fear of Pakistan’s Air force retaliation against Indian nuclear installation at
Bombay. In May 1998, Pakistani Foreign Minister stated that there were ‘credible reports’
of an Indian plan to attack Kahuta immediately after India conducted its nuclear tests to
forestall Pakistani prospects of going nuclear. However, the reports were not substantiated
by the independent and international media.
Safety and Security:
Accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons has been the principal concern
of the Cold War strategists. The dilemma of the Cold War nuclear planners was devising a
“fail-safe” command and control system under which nuclear weapons could be used only
the officially designated head of state/government authorized and could not be used without
legitimate authority. This debate revolved around arguments for developing a centralized
versus delegative command and control system. Another major concern was the accidental
84
P.R. Chari, Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia, The Henry L.
Stimson Center, August 2003, pp. 13–14.
126
use of nuclear weapons in which some mishap like crash of an aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons or missiles tipped with nuclear warheads could lead to unintended detonation.
There had been many reported cases of nuclear accidents incidents during the Cold
War, especially in the United States, while it could not be known how many took place in
the Soviet Union as it was a closed society. Theft of fissile material is also a worry of the
contemporary experts. Some Western media, especially the U.S., raises unlikely possibilities
of Pakistani nuclear weapons being taken over by the Taliban terrorists. The possibilities of
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in South Asia are less likely negligible, but nothing
can be ruled out with guarantee. There have been nuclear accidents in the region: more
in India and less in Pakistan. There had been a nuclear accident described as ‘the worst
accident in radiation exposure in the history of India in its Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant
(KARP).’85
It is important to note that the concept of strategic stability in South Asia is
multifarious, complicated and controversial. It includes a number of core ideational views,
e.g. deterrence stability, escalation control stability, and crisis stability. Deterrence stability
is often used synonymously with strategic stability and is concerned with the equitable level
of strategic [nuclear] security equilibrium [of capabilities]. It is an equilibrium in which
each side is credibly deterred [in relation to threats to core norms, values, and interests]
by the other. There is no ambiguity in the minds of parties about the “pillars” of nuclear
weapons capability upon which the deterrence rests.86 Escalation control stability is the
notion that status quo at the nuclear level [due to the achievement of nuclear or deterrence
stability] does not create space or incentives for the use of conventional force [military
adventurism, coercion, pre-emption and punitive options, etc], which might then escalate
to the nuclear level.87 Crisis stability implies that stability remains robust during crises, i.e.
during periods in which unanticipated threats to core norms, values and interests emerge
on the surface in a form closest to eruption of violence.
India has built one of the largest conventional military infrastructures in world.
This process of rapid expansion of the Indian armed forces has been unprecedented in
many ways. It has maintained the world’s third largest army, fourth largest air force and fifth
largest navy, while the sum-total of its conventional armed forces ranked as the fourth largest
military power after the United States, the former Soviet Union and China.88 South Asia has
passed through a series of wars, crises and conflicts before, during and after the period of
their incipient nuclear weapons capabilities. Since independence, both the countries have
tried best to maintain military forces beyond what their levels of economic development
would permit by inducting most modern conventional weapon systems supplemented by
the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
85
86
87
88
Danger of Nuclear Accidents in S. Asia,’ editorial in Daily Times, July 22, 2003, <http://www.
dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_22-7-2003_pg3_1>.
Michal Ryan King, “The Political and Strategic Imperatives of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,”
Indian Defence Review, Vol. 2, no.1, January 2003, p.3.
Ibid.
This conclusion is based on a comparative assessment from various volumes of Military Balance
1989-1990 to Military Balance 2006-2007 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 19902007).
127
India’s latest arms acquisitions both conventional and strategic are poised for
maintaining much higher levels of conventional and strategic asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan.
However, the pursuit of these twin Indian objectives generate compulsions for Pakistan:
first to keep the gap in conventional military asymmetry as less widening as possible to meet
the requirements of conventional military contingencies, and second to maintain credible
minimum deterrence. These complimentary objectives and related strategic developments
propel an expensive arms race and generate instability in the maintenance and operation
of conventional military and strategic equilibrium in the South Asian region. The process
of arms race, both conventional and nuclear, between India and Pakistan is one of the
rapid in the world today compared with many regions, which have more resources than
South Asia. Pakistan deters India’s highly asymmetric conventional military capability, its
expanding nuclear weapons capability, BDM system and unaffordable arms race with its
posture minimum credible deterrence by adjusting the threshold in proportion to the level
of threats it perceives.
Strategic Stability and Stability – Instability Paradox:
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union resisted to directly
engage in nuclear and conventional conflicts, while exploiting sub-conventional military
opportunities that existed in their rival strategic alliances: NATO and WARSAW Pact.
It happened in large number of forms and manifestations usually termed as proxy wars.
Strategic experts and deterrence theorists aptly describe this tense standoff as the stabilityinstability paradox.89
The stability-instability paradox postulates that nuclear-armed adversaries like
the United States and the former Soviet Union sought to avoid crossing of the nuclear
threshold and maintained a safe distance from nuclear catastrophe. At the same time, both
the Cold War competitors viewed this fearsome threshold as an opportunity as well as an
insurance against escalation. An adversary’s reluctance to cross this threshold provided
opportunities of sub-conventional conflict below the threshold. There was no guarantee
however that sub-conventional warfare would not spillover across the nuclear threshold,
whether by design, accident, miscalculation, inadvertence, or a breakdown of command
and control. One of the soundest versions of that stability – instability paradox as it applied
in the superpowers Cold war model is postulated as follows:90
The essence of this paradox was that nuclear weapons were supposed to stabilize relations
between adversaries, and to foreclose a major war between them. At the same time, offsetting
nuclear capabilities might well prompt provocations, instability, and even conflict at lower levels
– precisely because nuclear weapons would presumably provide protection against escalation.
The focal point of the stability – instability paradox is that offsetting nuclear
weapons capabilities will maintain peace at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, while
89
90
Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and
Brinkmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38 (Washington D.C.: The Henry Stimson Centre, June
2001), Also see Krepon, “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control
in South Asia,” Stimson Centre, December 2004, http://www.rcmi.org
Ibid.
128
it entails possibilities of increasing tension at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
A serious competition between states that possess nuclear weapons reinforces the
caution of national leaders to avoid full-scale conventional or nuclear war, while increasing
the instances of risk-taking at sub-conventional level, i.e. much below that threshold.
Military balance is stable at the level of all-out conventional/nuclear war; it is instable
at the lower levels of violence. Another important principle of the stability-instability
paradox is that despite increased tensions and severe crises, nuclear-armed adversaries
will avoid a major conflict or a nuclear exchange. The stability-instability paradox is by
no means a sure thing. Like other outcomes of deterrence theory, the stability-instability
paradox continues to work with possibilities of likely failure. Both appear to reinforce
the same bottom line: serious competitions between states that possess nuclear weapons
reinvigorate the caution of national leaders to avoid a full-scale conventional or a nuclear
war, while increasing the instances of risk-taking below these thresholds. This has happened
many times between India and Pakistan, before and after the 1998 nuclear tests: 1990. 1999
and 2002 crises.
There are certain preconditions of stable nuclear deterrence and strategic requirements
of nuclear stability.91 Rajesh Basrur points out that there are three main schools of thoughts
on this subject in U.S; two of them, the punitive retaliation school and the denial school
believed that assured destruction capability is a prerequisite for deterrence stability, but
the third, the damage limitation school, insists on nuclear superiority.92 South Asia is the
considered as the most important and most interesting test case of western deterrence
theory.93
Krepon and Gagne’s version of stability – instability paradox leads to a selfcontradictory and dichotomous summing up. It is partly derived from conventional wisdom
that nuclear weapons were supposed to stabilize relations between India and Pakistan
because it so happened between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the
Cold war and partly it originates from the recognition that ground realities in South Asia
are different and perceived instable as compared with their stipulated postulation based
upon Cold War model.94
For the stability-instability paradox to be operative and prevent unintended
escalation, lines of communication between adversaries need to be reliably working and
91
92
93
94
Desmond Ball, Hans Bethe, Bruce Blair and others compiled a shorter list of key measures:
do not use deadly force against an adversary; do not force an adversary to choose between
humiliation and escalation; do not use military forces to undermine an adversary in geographic
areas he deems vital; do not use force against an adversary’s ally; do not use force to dramatically
alter the status quo in a sensitive region; and do not initiate horizontal escalation, in Crisis Stability
and Nuclear War (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1987), p. 62.
Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security, (California, Stanford
University Press, 2006), pp. 26-31.
Krepon, the Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia.
Krepon, ‘Introduction’ in Krepon and Cagne, The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons
and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38.
129
the messages conveyed over these channels need to be trustworthy. As noted above, the
United States and the former Soviet Union began to address this requirement immediately
after the Cuban missile crisis. In contrast, after the Kargil crisis, communication between
India and Pakistan worsened, and then ceased altogether during the 2002 confrontation.95
Escalation control requires as careful and accurate assessment of one’s adversary as
possible, in which reliable information plays a very important part. Regrettably, problems
of misperception on the subcontinent appeared growing as the wall of separation between
India and Pakistan became higher and thicker in 1999 and 2002 crises. Credibility of
deterrent forces, survivability and reliability of communications, and cost-benefit analysis
are essential conditions for a stable nuclear deterrence,96 which the adversaries are to keep
in mind while evaluating the behaviour and responses of each other. Despite that deterrence
is not a mechanical formula that can apply in crisis and conflict-situations for unilaterally
or bilaterally desirable result. It is fundamentally a psychological relationship based upon
the above criteria. Krepon and Gagne suggested that ten key commandments of reducing
dangers to strategic stability evolved over time had helped keep the Cold war from spillingover into a violent global conventional military war,97 and that may help in maintaining
peace in South Asia.
The evidence since the gradual nuclearisation of South Asia suggests regional
confirmation of the stability-instability paradox. During the Cold war, Moscow enjoyed
clear conventional military superiority, while Washington enjoyed nuclear superiority, at
least in the earliest decades of the contest. The conventional military and nuclear equilibrium
on which the stability-instability paradox rests in South Asia is mostly different from that
of the United States and the Soviet Union. While Indian conventional military advantages
over Pakistan are indisputable, there is an equitable nuclear equilibrium at this stage of the
competition between India and Pakistan.
There are in fact reports of Pakistan’s definite advantages in certain areas. Tactical
nuclear weapons played an important role in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. In India and Pakistan
case, there is no public evidence that they are interested in tactical nuclear weapons,
although there were unconfirmed reports that General Sunderji had been toying with the
idea in the 1980s. Moreover, during the Cold war, the instability half of the paradox took
the form of proxy wars far distant from the most sensitive areas of the two superpowers.
In contrast, the geographical proximity of India and Pakistan rules out the safety of a longdistance competition.
Elementary nuclear risk-reduction measures have been undertaken such as improved
communication links and a ballistic missile flight test pre-notification agreement, which has
improved the nuclear environment. The focal point of the stability – instability paradox that
offsetting nuclear weapons capabilities will maintain peace at the higher end of the conflict
spectrum, while tension persist at the lower end, has already been fairly demonstrated in
95
96
97
Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia.
Arpit Rajain, “ Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia”, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp.
27-29
See Krepon and Gagne, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox, pp. 1–14.
130
South Asia, although there have been crises, e.g. Kargil conflict and 2002-2003 military
mobilization in which war was averted only from the brink. This happened during the Cold
war as well. The second important element of the stability-instability paradox that despite
increased tensions and severe crises, nuclear-armed adversaries will avoid a major conflict
or a nuclear exchange is so far well established in South Asia and it might hold true in the
future.
From an Indian perspective, Kargil conflict is a classic example of “securityinsecurity” paradox.98 An Indian perception that the military regimes in Pakistan traditionally
have a propensity for acting irrationally is controversial. The often quoted examples are
1965, 1971 and in 1999 during the Kargil conflict are one-sided interpretations.
It is argued that the stability/instability paradox will hold for the near future because
“neither side has the requisite capability to pursue a decapitating first strike against the
other.”99 The proponents of South Asian deterrence stability suggest that their arguments
are upheld by empirical evidence. Nuclear weapons helped to maintain peace and prevented
military adventures in the past during the Cold War, and there is no reason to believe that
they will not do so in the future. However, the state of strategic stability between India and
Pakistan from 1999 to 2003 is a precarious one, which needed a more constant monitoring
and vigil than the former Cold war models. The historical legacy of conflict and warfare
between India and Pakistan, and the unresolved Kashmir dispute compounds the problems
of nuclear arms competition, missiles proliferation and adds to divergent perceptions
about strategic stability and regional security in South Asia. The weaponization policies
proclaimed to be followed after India - Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1999 and attendant
doctrinal/posture developments raised strategic stability to a higher level of threshold,
and could be maintained provided other essential pre-requisites of nuclear deterrence are
fulfilled. These may include early warning systems, C3I networks, survivable weapons
capabilities and second-strike capabilities.
Deterrent optimists suggest that nuclear weapons “make the cost of war seem
frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the
use of such weapons.”100 As the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan mutually hold their
cities a hostage, any thought of annihilation of tens of thousands of civilians does amount to
‘unacceptable damage.’ The excruciating damages of a possible nuclear exchange between
India and Pakistan would be unpalatable for both countries, militarily, politically, socially,
and economically. This is what makes their counter-value deterrence stable. However,
Cold Start Doctrine indicates a disturbing trend toward military adventurism that threatens
nuclear stability in South Asia.
98
99
100
See Chari above.
Summit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001), p. 108.
Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 26.
131
Session IV:
Military Developments and Implications for Arms Race
SAJIDA MANSOOR101
Cold Start Doctrine: Implications for Arms Race in South Asia
1- Introduction
Indian Cold Start Doctrine was made public in year 2004. The main objective
of this Cold Start Doctrine is to launch a massive offensive conventional attack against
Pakistan in multiple sectors that would cause significant damage to the Pakistan armed
forces. This is to be conducted before the international community could intervene, while
achieving shallow territorial gains to deny Pakistan a justification to escalate the clash to
the nuclear level. The success of Indian Cold Start Doctrine largely depends upon modern
high technological advancement in military equipment and conventional weaponry.
Pakistan would have to build up advance weaponry systems to match Indian capabilities
to counter the challenges posed by the Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). This trend would
lead this South Asian region to face never-ending arms race which is surely destructive for
the regional peace and stability. India and Pakistan, the world’s poorest countries dedicate
a substantial portion of their resources in competition against each other while neglecting
the basic needs of their people and fueling the arms race in the region. This brief paper aims
to highlight some of the current trends in military procurement on part of India inline with
its Cold Start Doctrine prerequisites. It further discusses how Indian military acquisition
has been contributing to the regional arms race while compelling Pakistan to allocate its
already meager resources to defend itself against Indian aggressive ambitions particularly
to counter the threats posed by Indian Cold Start Doctrine.
2- Definition of Arms Race
The term ‘arms race’ is simply defined as a competition in which nations compete
with each other to attain the most powerful armaments.102 Both competitors seek to produce
larger military equipments including various weapons and war machines such as armour,
machine guns, helicopters and other high-technology defence armaments.
3- Arms Race in South Asia
Both India and Pakistan have maintained a hostile bilateral relationship as a result
of various ideological, historical and territorial differences since their independence
in 1947. These differences and subsequent disputes have impacted on national security
concerns of both the nations and that have eventually led them to opt for continuous arms
race by acquiring the latest high-technology defence equipment. India continues to buildup
101
102
Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI).
“Definition of Arms Race”, WordNet, Princeton University, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/
webwn?s=arms+race&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o7=&o5=&o1=1&o6=&o4=&o3=&h
=0, (accessed on July 17, 2010).
132
arms at a fast pace in recent years while equipping its armed forces with the latest jet
fighters, warships, radars, tanks, missiles, submarines, weapons systems and platforms.
Indian modern high-technology arms buildup has forced Pakistan to maintain adequately
strong military equipment and weaponry to ensure its national security and sovereignty.
This competition of both the countries has contributed to everlasting arms race in South
Asia which has resulted in incessant miseries and socio-economic deprivation of their poor
population.
4- Indian Military Acquisition: Current Trends
India’s defence budget of approximately $32 billion for fiscal year 2010-11 has
increased up to 8.13% over year. As this trend is likely to continue, therefore, Indian defence
budget is expected to reach about $42 billion by 2014-15. It is estimated that India is going
to spend more than $80 billion for defense procurement over the next five years.103
According to SIPRI Fact Sheet of March 2010, India is the second largest arms
importer of the world after China. The SIPRI report also stated that from 2005 to 2009,
India’s annual arms imports have been doubled as $1.04 billion (2005); $1.25 billion
(2006); $2.2 billion (2007); $1.8 billion (2008) and $2.1 billion (2009) while importing 7
per cent of the world’s total arms imports. India’s recent major imports include 82 Sukhoi30MKI combat aircrafts and T-90S tanks from Russia and Phalcon Airborne Early Warning
(AEW) system from Israel. It also received its first A-50 airborne early warning (AEW)
aircraft from Israel in 2009 which is considered as an important force-multiplier. Major
arms suppliers to India include Russia, UK, Israel, USA, France and Germany.104
India’s Defense Acquisitions Council has recently approved to allocate over $11
billion for the construction of six new-generation diesel-electric submarines in a huge arms
deal. According to the source, three of the six submarines will be constructed at Mazagon
Docks in Mumbai and one at Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. in Visakhapatnam with the assistance
of a foreign contractor. The other two submarines will either be imported or constructed
at a private shipyard in India. The programme is called Project-75 India (P-75I). All the
six new submarines will be equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems to
enhance their operational capabilities apart from stealth, land-attack capability and the
ability to incorporate advanced technologies. The conventional diesel-electric submarines
have to surface every few days to get oxygen to recharge their batteries. However, with AIP
systems, they can stay underwater for much longer time.105
The submarine construction deal under the Project-75 India (P-75I) will match the
Indian purchase of 126 multi-role fighters worth of $12 billion. The six global aerospace
companies which are bidding for the deal include Lockheed Martin, Boeing (USA),
103
104
105
“Lockheed Martin Lands in India”, Yahoo! Finance, July 8, 2010, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
Lockheed-Martin-Lands-in-zacks-3562376803.html?x=0&.v=1, (accessed on July 17, 2010).
Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman And Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in
International Arms Transfer, 2009”, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
Fact Sheet, March 2010, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1003.pdf, (accessed on July 17,
2010).
“India allocates $11 bln to build six new submarines – paper”, RIA Novosti, July 11, 2010, http://
en.rian.ru/world/20100711/159760904.html, (accessed on July 17, 2010).
133
Dassault’s Rafale (France), Gripen (Sweden), MiG (Russia) and Eurofighter Typhoon that
is a group of British, German, Italian and Spanish companies.106
India concluded major arms deals with USA that include 6 C-130J Super Hercules
aircraft for almost $1 billion and 8 Boeing P-8I planes for over $2 billion in 2007 and
2009 respectively. India has also purchased Airborne Early Warning Air Craft, Hawkeye
E-2D, developed by U.S. firm Northrop Grumman. Indian arms deals with Israel include
3 Phalcon AWACS for over $1 billion in 2004 and a $2.5 billion project to jointly develop
medium-range surface-to-air missile systems in 2009. Both have also concluded deals for
the Barak-8 Naval air-defense system and the Spyder surface-to-air missile system.
In 2005, India inked an agreement with France to supply and build 6 Scorpene
submarines that is a $4.5 billion project. Russian role in strengthening India’s defense
continues to be huge with the $1.5 billion aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov and MiG
fighter deal and 230 Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets for $8.5 billion and T-90S tanks. The United
Kingdom has been involved in the 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer $2 billion project since
2004.107
5- Indian Military Acquisition: Analysis
India has been modernizing its defence equipment while replacing outdated
weaponry and aircrafts with most modern technology. India aims to buildup arms in threetier trend to dominate the seas, the land and the air. Further, it aims to control the next frontier
of space as well. India has been acquiring not only the sophisticated conventional arms
such as multi-role combat aircraft, guided-missile armed ‘stealth’ frigates and destroyers,
modern submarines, and cruise missiles but also investing in crucial ‘force-multipliers’
such as in-flight refueling and airborne early warning aircraft and in space. This trend
compels Pakistan to compete with India with military acquisitions that will definitely lead
this region to face arms race and this trend is likely to continue. This will be suicidal for the
region.
As per SIPRI report, Pakistan received 2 Jiangwei (or F-22P) frigates which has
been Pakistan’s first new major surface warship for many years, and the first of up to
300 JF-17 combat aircraft from China. It also received its first AEW aircraft, the Saab2000AEW from Sweden.108
For the successful execution of the Cold Start Doctrine, Indian armed forces
have started to modify their organizational, logistical and training arrangements. There
has been much emphasize on the acquisition of new command, control, communications,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, for taking benefit of the prospects
106
107
108
“Acquisition of 126 fighter jets on track: IAF Chief”, The Economic Times, May 4, 2010, http://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5889075.cms, (accessed on July 17, 2010).
Siddharth Srivastava, “Subcontinent: Another Arms Race? India’s Defense Buying Spree”,
Siliconeer, April 2010, http://www.siliconeer.com/past_issues/2010/april-2010/apr10subcontinent-Another-Arms-Race.html, (accessed on July 17, 2010).
Paul Holtom et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2009”, The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2010, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/
SIPRIFS1003.pdf, (accessed on July 17, 2010).
134
that modern technology offers for the development of highly-mobile, powerful ‘networked’
forces. The incorporation of distant operation, new surveillance techniques through latest
satellite and linked systems, high-tech information technology (IT), enhanced precisionguided munitions, and lasers have further contributed to the ongoing arms race trend. Cold
Start Doctrine has affected bilateral security relations of India and Pakistan. This will
have serious consequences for regional and international/global security calculus while
disturbing the peace and stability.
6- Conclusion
Contributing further to the arms race in South Asia, the rise in defence expenditure
is likely to continue in the same manner since India intends modernizing its forces for the
implementation of its Cold Start Doctrine. In the existence of constant Indian aggressive
posture, Pakistan’s security imperatives will remain threatened. Therefore, for Pakistan,
maintenance of a deterrent capability will continue to be the basic consideration for
survivability. India and Pakistan have been allocating scanty resources towards socioeconomic development sector as compared to their huge defence expenditures. Both
countries need lasting peace, economic and political stability and long-term progress. Arms
race trends in South Asia need to be contained for progress and better future of the people
of the region. Both countries need to address the real issues like poverty and unemployment
and unresolved disputes like Kashmir, water distribution and terrorism between the two
also need to be sorted out.
Day 2:
Session-V:
Strategic Stability - Implications
DR RIFAAT HUSSAIN109
Cold Start and Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
Cold Start a form of learning
•
CS focuses on what Levy has described as “diagnostic learning”. Unlike causal
learning which refers to changes in beliefs regarding the consequences of actions,
DL refers to changes in one’s belief regarding attributes of the other party such as
its capabilities, intentions and resolve.
Assumptive framework of Cold Start Doctrine
109
•
Mobility is the key to achieving military success
•
Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir can only be countered through application of
force.
Chairman, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University.
135
•
Faced with the risk of larger conventional conflict with nuclear overtones,
Pakistan will not escalate and ultimately “chicken out” due to asymmetric costs of
escalation.
•
Limited war is feasible between nuclear armed adversaries.
•
Nuclear weapons have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance between
India and Pakistan.
•
Third party intervention will either favor India or it can be effectively neutralized
through battlefield victories against Pakistan
•
Pakistani “red lines” for vertical escalation are well-known to India and New Delhi
can fight a limited war well below these triggers.
•
Irreversible diplomatic gains will follow the Indian punitive military strike
•
Cold Start Doctrine is essentially a punitive strategy involving the concentrated,
calibrated and coordinated use of conventional force against a vulnerable enemy.
ASYMMETRIC ESCALATION LADDER
RUNGS
INDIA
PAKISTAN
Nuclear
Nuclear
Nuclear
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional plus Nuclear –
tactical, Strategic
Sub-Conventional (Special
Force Operations) Cold Start
Sub-Conventional/
Limited War/Conventional/
Cold Start
Nuclear
Asymmetric: Cross-Border
Terrorism, Proxy War
Limited War/Conventional/
Limited War
Nuclear
Escalatory Dynamic
•
As observed by Varun Sahni, “the moment India decides to respond to Pakistan
by moving up a level of violence, i.e. by sub-conventional (Special Force)
operations, that become an offensive action at the sub-conventional level that not
only invited a Pakistani defensive response at that level but also sets in motion an
escalatory dynamic. Thus, the fact of mutual deterrence, far from freeing India’s
136
hand at lower levels of violence, in fact severely constrains India’s options and
maneuverability.”
Why should Pakistan be concerned about Cold Start Doctrine
•
Analytical reasons:
•
Prospect Theory Insight: individuals accept greater risks to avoid losses than to
achieve gains.
•
Offense-Defense Theory insights – shifts in the offense-defense balance cause large
shifts in the occurrence of war.
•
Salient war-causing effects of Offense-Defense theory include the following:
•
(i) States more often pursue opportunistic expansion, because expansion attempts
are more often successful and pay greater rewards.
Balancing Cold Start Doctrine
•
Should Pakistan take Cold Start Doctrine seriously?
•
Pakistan should as it is a Pakistan specific war-fighting doctrine.
•
It aggravates Pakistan’s security dilemma as India is both a superior conventional
and nuclear force.
•
It poses twin dilemmas of “interpretation” and “response”
•
External balancing is no longer an effective and credible option for Pakistan in the
post 9/11 environment.
•
Internal balancing can only be done at the conventional level.
•
Force modernization and military preparedness for a “meaner and leaner” force is
the only viable “balancing” strategy.
•
Specific Areas of concern:
•
1. Improve intelligence gathering capabilities to lengthen the warning time of
impending attack.
•
2. Restructure forces to deny significant battlefield victories and territorial gains to
the Indian forces.
•
3. Plug existing “capability” gaps in likely theatres of military operations.
•
Improve logistical capability for easy and enhanced mobility and deployment of
Pakistani forces in likely theatres of war.
•
Improve Pakistani Air Force war-fighting capabilities with key focus on early
137
warning and air-defense systems
•
Keep the option of developing tactical nukes open
•
Stabilize Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
•
Reduce Pakistan Army’s involvement in counter-insurgency operations in FATA.
•
If required, have Special Forces conduct these operations.
•
Avoid the nightmare of a two-front war along the Eastern and Western borders of
Pakistan.
•
Push the military back to the barracks and avoid internal overstretch by strengthening
law enforcement and crime-fighting capabilities of the state.
•
Undertake simulation exercises to explore weaknesses, snags and potential pitfall
of a Pakistani response to Cold Start Doctrine military operations.
What would future look like?
•
Three predictions stem from the offense-dominant posture:
•
1. War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy, or is believed easy,
than in other periods.
•
2. States that have, or believe they have, large offensive opportunities or defensive
vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states.
•
3. A given state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or believes
it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive vulnerabilities
Anticipatory Self-Defense Anticipatory Self-Defense
•
Cold Start Doctrine sets a dangerous precedent and may be countered by the logic
of anticipatory self -defense reinforced by the changing nature of modern warfare.
Defining the “Nuclear Threshold”
•
Traditional meaning: The actual use of nuclear weapons in the course of a process
of escalation. (Herman Khan)
•
Increasingly common usage: the decision to acquire, or actually acquiring nuclear
weapons to use as a tool of coercion and intimidation, or the decision to test nuclear
devices.
“Lowering” and “Raising” the Nuclear Threshold
•
Lowering the nuclear threshold:
Anything that increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in a given
138
conflict; that diminishes the obstacles to a decision to use nuclear weapons, or lowers the
military, political, or diplomatic cost of their use.
•
Raising the threshold:
Anything that decreases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used; or that
makes a decision to use them more difficult, or that raises the military, political, and
diplomatic cost of employing nuclear weapons in a conflict.
Examples of Things that May “Lower” the Nuclear Threshold
•
Fielding nuclear weapons that minimize collateral consequences (e.g., earth
penetrating, small yield, radiation-enhanced).
•
An operational doctrine that emphasizes or integrates tactical nuclear weapons.
•
Availability or presence of troops trained, equipped, and prepared to use nuclear
weapons, or platforms with nuclear delivery capability.
•
Nuclear weapons with improved operational flexibility (e.g., variable yields,
delivered by dual-use platforms).
•
Proliferation of delivery vehicles with nuclear delivery capability.
•
Less survivable weapons (“use ‘em or lose ‘em”) or basing modes.
•
Predelegation of nuclear use.
•
Use of WMD by another state or terrorist group.
•
Restricting or eliminating tactical or operational nuclear options (fewer weapons,
less flexible targeting options, fewer delivery vehicles, higher yields, less training
or planning).
•
Complicated nuclear release procedures or consultations requirements.
•
Availability of conventional precision-guided weapons that could replace nuclear
options.
•
Highly survivable basing modes.
•
Missile defenses (accused of both lowering and raising)
•
Policies, procedures, arms control regimes, and other international obligations that
constrain, limit, deligitimize, or marginalize nuclear weapons use.
Raising the Nuclear Threshold
•
Pros:
– May defuse tensions, by relaxing first-strike threats.
139
– Could improve stability by allowing more time/space for diplomatic
solutions, or for military options short of nuclear war.
•
Cons:
– Narrows scope of deterrence.
– Could invite conventional escalation.
– May undermine credibility of deterrent threat.
Lowering the Nuclear Threshold
•
Pros:
– May strengthen deterrence if it convinces the other side that you are more
likely to use nuclear weapons, by making it easier to decide to use nuclear
weapons, or showing greater willingness to use them.
– May provide more options in a crisis by bringing in to play a greater range
of nuclear capabilities.
– Could promote crisis management by enhancing the credibility of a deterrent
threat.
•
Cons:
– May increase incentives for preemptive counter-attack.
– May narrow or lessen the margin of error in a crisis, and increase the chances
for a mistake or accident.
Incentives for crossing the Nuclear Threshold
Reasons why a state may decide to cross the nuclear threshold:
•
To warn, demonstrate resolve, preclude, or dissuade U.S./allied intervention.
•
To rally potential allies through a demonstration of strength, resolve, capability.
•
To deny access to ports, facilities, supply routes, or natural resources.
•
To forestall military or political defeat.
•
To precipitate the intervention of an otherwise neutral state, alter the dynamics of
an opposing coalition.
•
To validate nuclear capability, equipment, and/or procedures.
•
To establish nuclear power/great power status.
•
Retaliate for a conventional/chem/or bio attack.
140
•
To shift international approbation to another state or group (by making it appear
they were responsible for the detonation).
Internal reasons:
•
To demonstrate to a leader’s own party or followers his resolve to stand up to the
U.S. and/or its allies, or to other regional adversaries or competitors.
•
To impose loyalty on restive or rebellious factions.
•
To legitimize investment of resources in nuclear weapons R&D and acquisition.
•
To save or restore face after a perceived slight, insult, or defeat.
Session-V:
Strategic Stability - Implications
HAMID HAMZA KHAN110
Fourth Generation Warfare and Cold Start Doctrine
In the name of Allah, the most merciful, the most magnificent
Salaam to Everyone,
I am honored by the chair to give me the opportunity to have the floor, Thank you
sir.
“AND WE ORDAINED, THEIR IN FOR THEM LIFE FOR LIFE, EYE FOR EYE,
NOSE FOR NOSE, EAR FOR EAR, TOOTH FOR TOOTH AND WOUNDS EQUAL
FOR EQUAL.”
SURAH ALMAIDA VERSE 45- AL QURAN
This is the doctrine we already have and to be followed to counter cold start which
is merely man made script. I would like to draw your kind attention to that “when we have
feet why to be lame and having hands why to hide fingers”.
The pundits of Cold Start tried to give the feeling of entrapment. As stated by
some Indian think-tanks that they will bring an eleven to one ratio against Pakistan. But
remember deficient can be efficient. We have full confidence in our brass commanders
having precision, engineered minds and PASSION.
Cold Start Doctrine is in fact based and formulated on fourth generation warfare
school of thought. The most dangerous and disturbing aspect and angle of Indian design.
In this paradigm of warfare is to get a moral victory on enemy by using media individuals/
groups of ad-hoc warriors and sub conventional fighters from the targeted enemy’s territory
who know the geography, terrain, culture and language entangles the state armies. And by
110
Regional Director for Central Asia and Afghanistan, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI)
141
conducting surprise attack with precision are to be carried out. Though gorilla war is very
old when former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This guerrilla warfare gave birth to
fourth generation warfare. To understand the various generations of warfare and to figure
it out that which one of these is Pakistan is facing now. First generation warfare revolves
around recruitment and use of fire arms. Second generation of warfare was based on big
armies’ placement of warfare resources and use of raw fire power like World War 1.Third
generation of warfare was introduced in World War 2 by use of armored and mechanized
troops and involvement of multi-state armies which came to an end after a brutal use of
nuclear weapon.
When we take a careful look on the prevailing situation of Pakistan, it is very clear
that Pakistan is facing a 4th generation warfare through Indian media’s cultural invasion of
our minds, and if we look further the situation in tribal areas and FATA, makes it obvious
that Pakistan army is dealing with first step of Indian doctrine against Pakistan, it can not be
a co-incident that Pakistan army is facing an enemy who have sub conventional fighters ad
hoc warriors. How these poor tribesmen gathered these assets in that short span of time and
mastered the skills to engage and to use them against one of the largest military machine.
This is indeed an earth work being done by India to exercise Cold Start Doctrine.
When we see all this in a sharper deeper perspective we come to this conclusion
that all the efforts are on the go to destabilize Pakistan. Fuel is being constantly sprinkled
in Balochistan, FATA and Swat to inflame, Southern Punjab and Karachi are planned to
be torched as last and final phase to create anarchy in Pakistan so as to make pathway for
disarmament of nuclear weapons and to make easy for India to test its cold start doctrine.It
is now understood that all these chain of events leads to a ground leveling for Indian cold
start doctrine. Will it work? Let’s go through what is it all about and what measures can be
taken and what this region is going to face if it comes on ground? We want stability not war
but if forced we are not to shy away. Life can be understood backwards but it must be lived
forward.
Indian Cold Start doctrine describes formation of battle groups supported by
dedicated artillery, combat air support and tactical nuclear weapons. It perceives launching
limited attacks with battle groups of mechanized and armoured regiments or vice versa.
Each battle group is mandated to capture and objective of tactical importance and to exploit
success as far as possible but remaining well away from core areas so as to restrain Pakistan
from using its nuclear response. Indian military relying on air superiority in main area to be
targeted.
India by considering overall geo-political environment favorable and having this
understanding that this time Pakistan army has got deeply engaged in many internal troubled
spots and is not in a position to act or respond in a short given time and hoping that Pathan
and Balochis would be giving a tough time to Pakistan Army in case of war with India.
Use of 4th generation warfare against Pakistan is a more dangerous and disturbing
angle of Indian doctrine which most defense analysts in Pakistan have overlooked. This
paradigm of warfare revolves around a symmetrical warfare to get a moral victory with
142
minimum nation state involvement. It is necessary to understand the various generations of
warfare and to figure it out that which one of these Pakistan is facing now. First generation
warfare goes around conscription and firearms. Wars by napoleon can be categorized in
this generation. Second generation warfare was the involvement of state armies, alignment
of warfare resources and raw firepower. World War 1 can be said to as 2nd generation
warfare. Third generation warfare was introduced in world war 2 by including armored
warfare and mechanized troops, and multi state involvement it came to end after a brutal
use of nuclear threshold.
COLD START STRATEGY HAS FLAWS:
1:
The Pakistan missile Deployment is underestimated. It could, make the advancing
Indian army to a halt having the capability to take on with hundreds of short range
missiles and long range missiles can now attack every Indian city.
2:
It will be very sad if the war goes to Kolkota, Chenai, Mumbai and Delhi it would
make India to re-think.
3:
Another point of Cold Start Strategy banks on an element of surprise, pin-pointprecision, technological and optimal efficiency—Nothing can be left to a chance.
But the element of surprise is minimized by Pakistan new series of UAVs Burraq
and Pakistan has develop a robust command and control mechanism which includes
Computerized, Control, Command, Communication , Information, Intelligence and
Surveillance system (CCCCIIS or C4I2S). These systems are synchronized with
satellite based systems, which are more flexible reliable and diverse. Having this
surveillance mechanism, and if there are no surprises, there are no cold starts.
4:
Then there are tactical nuclear weapons. India can never be sure that Pakistan will
not use low intensity tactical nuclear weapons which would target the Indian Air
Force bases and the Indian Command and Control Centers.
5:
Finally, the Indian Army does not know what the “Nuclear Threshold” is. It cannot
count on sanity and logical thinking –especially in the heat of the battle. Pakistan
may go for the nuclear option at an early stage and burn all South Asia. The think
tanks of the US and the west conducted hundreds of different scenarios of limited
war between India and Pakistan. All permutations and combinations ended in fullfledged hostilities and total nuclear war.
China is also having a hawk’s eye on this doctrine. The mentioning of China in
Indian chief statement is a mere indication to West and US that now India is ready to take
a role of regional power and a counter weight of communist China.
COLD START AND POSSIBLE PAKISTANI RESPONSE
India would have to have a solid reason to launch any attack no matter how limited it is.
1)
As indicated in its response Pakistani military leadership has made it clear that any
misadventure by India can result in unavoidable consequences.
143
Pakistan is fully prepared to counter Cold Start successfully. Indian Navy would
not be able to go for a naval blockade of Karachi as Pakistan navy has two more
naval bases in Ormara and Gawadar. Likewise, if Indian air force deploys its front
line jet fighter and bombers Pakistani Hattaf Series missile system can come into
equation much earlier.
2)
Ongoing freedom struggle in Kashmir matters a lot. And in case of any war between
Pakistan and India, Indian military would be in no position to control Kashmiris
and fight Pakistan army at the same time.
Last but not the least; India is relying on its ever increasing air power. PAF had
been reshaped to take on the challenges. PAF has already established parity after inducting
SAAB, state of the art F/16, Block 52 fighters and JF/17 Thunder to counter. Over and
above Hattaf is there. And on ground Al-Khalid is to take care. Though Indian air force
currently is enjoying numerical superiority but India can’t put all its war assets against
Pakistan in a war keeping in view the size of India.
Another problem which India is going to face during any execution of Cold Start
is the gauge of nuclear threshold of Pakistan, a point where Pakistan would decide to
go for unconventional warfare as stated by Pakistani army chief that Consequences of
any misadventure in a nuclear overhang can be suicidal for India. According to Pakistan’s
Nuclear Doctrine defending smaller strategic depth in front of larger conventional power
can easily provoke Pakistan’s leadership to utilize its nuclear options at initial stage.
Operational mode of cold start will surely lead Pakistan to lower its nuclear red line. If
Pakistan puts its nuclear arsenals into higher state of readiness and deploy its tactical
nuclear weapons then Cold Start Doctrine can immediately fail.
CONCLUSION
In the recent visit to Pakistan by the Indian foreign minister, he tried to compel
Pakistan to hand over the alleged culprits of Mumbai carnage to India, forced Pakistan to fight
terrorism as directed by India, forced Pakistan to accept India’s leading role in Afghanistan
and in the region and to allow its trade with Afghanistan through Wagah, solve Kashmir
dispute by accepting LOC as permanent border. In case Pakistan refuses to oblige, it might
initiate the Cold Start Doctrine but it will be subject to the full assurance by the US that it
would prevent Pakistan from assembling and deploying its tactical nuclear weapons.
Media management of Pakistan has always been a weak link. In Pakistan, unlike
India, media is not always behind government and army. Weak media policy by government
needs an urgent attention.
Cold start is the war lingo from Indians that is “JUNG KI BHASHA” and in response
we say “AMAN KI ASHA” “KIA YE KHULA TAZAD NAHI?”
So, brothers and sisters, I apology for the comment but it is in the air. It is needed
to find the resolve in a more cognitive manner need of more abstract thinking and making
strategy before they switch from Cold to freezing doctrine.
144
Wars can only be won by consensus, ideology, involvement of national trust,. It’s
the spirit and dedication, ideological character which matters.
I would like to thank this enlightened and esteemed gathering with brilliant thinking
capabilities and would like to quote the statesman of all times and the founder of Pakistan
Quaid-e-Azam who said United we stand, divided we fall,
I thank you so very much.
Day 2:
Session-V:
NASIR NAVEED DOGAR111
Implications of Cold Start Doctrine on Strategic Stability in South Asia
Definition of Strategic Stability
Strategic stability revolves primarily around the development of a relation of
mutual deterrence among the adversaries. It can be broadly viewed as a result of effective
deterrence. Its remit goes beyond nuclear stability to include the wider issues of chemical,
biological weapons and conventional force balance.
What is Deterrence?
It can be described as dissuasion of a potential adversary from initiating an attack
or conflict by the threat of retaliation. The term is also used more usually to suspect a
party in any field of potential conflict of being prepared to inflict unacceptable damage on
an aggressor and making sure the potential aggressor is aware of the risk so that he may
refrain from aggression.
Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) will have significant implications on strategic
stability in South Asia. After the execution of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) strategic stability
would be disturbed because Pakistan will have to respond to it to defend its sovereignty
and integrity. It would be almost impossible to make the war limited because limited war
between the nuclear adversaries will be impossible. Pakistan will not be in a position to
wage a conventional war with a conventionally superior enemy. A conventional response
may be initiated by Pakistan however it cannot remain indefinitely conventional.
There are a number of factors that can undermine the strategic stability in South
Asia. Pakistan will come under great pressure to retaliate and there is no way that the
Indians can guarantee that Pakistan will keep the war limited. As there will be no time for
intervention, Pakistan will have to exercise its all available options. With the increasing
disparity between India and Pakistan in conventional capabilities, Pakistan’s dependence
111
Research Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI).
145
on its nuclear weapons is most likely to increase. The conventional imbalance coupled with
an attack as per the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) will further lower the nuclear threshold of
Pakistan. Why will Pakistan cooperate according to the rules set by India?
Although, Pakistan has not clearly defined its nuclear red-lines, however, Lt.
General (R) Khalid Kidwai in a widely quoted interview has given certain pointers to
situation under which Pakistan might consider using its nuclear weapons. According to him
Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons if: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part
of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air force; India blockades
Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically. Pakistan obviously cannot ignore the Cold
Start Doctrine (CSD) and will have to develop contingencies of its own. Pakistan will
under no circumstances, let the Indians attempt to capture its territory without fighting with
all possible means. This might also be a point where Pakistan might think of tactical use of
nuclear weapons.
The point which the Indian military establishment is missing is that there is no
guarantee that a limited war will remain limited. Whichever side will be losing will try
to save itself by using any mean at its disposal. There are chances that a limited war will
expand to a total war. There are chances that a limited war expands to a total war. Two
things are very significant here, what objectives will be achieved by fighting a limited war?
And what measures by the Indian military will be taken to ensure that a limited war will
remain limited?
Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) is challenging nuclear deterrence in the region as it
is not taking into account the nuclear reality. It will have negative impact on deterrence
in the region as Indian ambitions to challenge nuclear threshold of Pakistan at the time
of conflict will bring higher level of instability in the region. Cold Start has a potential
to upset the crisis stability in nuclear South Asia. Whatever course Cold Start Doctrine
(CSD) and related debate will take in India and elsewhere is yet to be seen but what is clear
is that it will have unfavorable effects on strategic stability in South Asia. Finally, Cold
Start Doctrine (CSD) will trigger an arms race in the region which would lead to further
instability and turmoil.
Strategic Stability - Implications
SANNIA ABDULLAH112
Deterrence Vs Compellence Theory and Cold Start: an Academic Debate
The major deterrent [to war] is in a man’s mind. The major deterrent in the future is
going to be not only what we have, but what we do, what we are willing to do, what they think
we will do. Stamina, guts, and standing up for the things we say - those are deterrents.
Admiral Arleigh Burke113 [3rd Oct 1960]
112
113
Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
Charles W. Durr Jr, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Third Millennium”, 9 April 2002, available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nuclear/Durr_C_W_02.pdf, accessed on 12th July 2010.
146
The above citation represents deterrence in actual practice in today’s times. The case
of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states, represent a different relationship altogether
in terms of ‘deterrence’. Deterrence is ineffective in asymmetric balance of power - a very
logical argument that best explains the less productive outcome of US policies in fighting
the war on terror. Thinking of Deterrence in terms of conventional imbalance between
states can trigger responses that can be counter productive. The doctrines like Cold Start
Doctrine can be provocative if not by design then by default believing that fewer chances
of survivability and sustaining the conventional war can lead to unwanted escalation.
There lies contradiction in argument that an armed conflict of any level is
conceptually contradictory to the theory of deterrence. History has witnessed conventional
wars and crises as hallmark of nuclearized South Asia. It is difficult to understand the
theoretical divide of deterrence theory into two strands i.e. conventional deterrence and
nuclear deterrence; keeping in view that conventional deterrence is less likely to practice
in the world of today where nuclear deterrence is operative particularly among two nuclear
powers.
There have been six nuclear alerts in India-Pakistan relations that supporters of
deterrence regard as functioning of deterrence including the multiple crises of 1984-85
relating to India’s purported plans to attack Pakistan’s nuclear installations; the Brasstacks
crisis (1986-87); the Kashmir-related Spring crisis (1989-90), the Kargil conflict (1999),
the extended Indo-Pak border confrontation (2001-02) 114and Mumbai crisis 2008.
Strategists believe that it was nuclear deterrence that has averted six nuclear crises
between India and Pakistan but the parallel argument is if nuclear deterrence is operative
then eruption of six nuclear alerts must not have taken place one after another. The notion
is not to deny the theory of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia but to mark the shifting trends
in traditional terms in their bilateral relations that are unable to distinguish deterrence from
compellence in practice.
Defining Deterrence and Compellence Theories
Deterrence is defined as a state of being characterized by the absence of war between
two opponents and an effort to persuade the opponent not to take an action contrary to the
interests of the other by convincing that doing so would maximize the losses and not gains.
115
Two important components of deterrence are:
•
Physical
•
Psychological.
Physical in terms of military capabilities and psychological that adversary must be
convinced to not even think of attacking. In this regard the basic condition of deterrence to
114
115
P.R. Chari, “Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia”, Working Paper in
Stimson Centre, August 2003, available at www. stimson.org, accessed on 10th July 2010.
Agha Farooq, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: a Strategic Failure or Beginning of Regional
Stability”, 19 March 2004, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc
=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424089, accessed on 20th July 2010.
147
succeed in practice requires the deterring nation to use the political will of making use of
weapons. The deterrence would be credible provided the deterring nation is able to convey
the message to the deterree that it is both capable and willing to materialize the threat in
case of danger/imminent attack.116
It is important to understand that in practice when Deterrence works its “effects
are almost invisible.” Invisible means that it is assumed to be successful when it prevents
actions by adversaries. The Cold War era represents the classical example in which nuclear
weapons created a ‘security environment’ making state actors unconsciously cautious to
avoid war in lieu of unimaginable consequences.117
The concept of deterrence and compellence are distinct from each other although
they are at times used virtually interchangeably. The inability to distinguish between the
two is hardly deliberate because on ground they are indistinguishable. There are certain
similarities between the two concepts like deterrence, compellence is an endeavor to
manipulate the adversary and get the maximum gain by driving its behavior in a certain
intended direction. Unlike deterrence the mere use of threat is not there rather it requires
action to change/persuasion to change adversaries’ action.
Difference between Deterrence and Compellence Theories
Feroz Hassan Khan differentiates deterrence from compellence as: “deterrence is
don’t do this or else and compellence is do this or else.” Other theoreticians also define
their margin as deterrence works when the one party to the conflict gets successful in
persuading its adversary from taking any action whereas compellence succeeds when one
party to the conflict disturbs the status quo course of its adversary and persuades it to
change its existing plan to action.
Compellence usually occurs in the wake of failed deterrence. Unlike deterrence,
compellence requires the opponent to make concessions or suffer the consequences. All
wars are about compellence: each side is trying to persuade the other that surrendering is
better than continuing to fight. That is, the wartime status quo is worse for the other side
than capitulating.118
Deterrence is different from compellance, since it involves threats to prevent the
war by raising the costs of the outcome of war than its gains, whereas compellance “also
involves military action and often the unwanted military behavior to be stopped and steps
to be taken involve the use of force. The distinction between the two is quite abstract; in
confrontations they are often present together and virtually indistinguishable.”
In India-Pakistan case the use of deterrence was less operative than compellence
theory. The involvement of external actors (mostly US) in averting the crises and the
116
117
118
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security (Oxford University Press, 1982).
Charles W. Durr Jr, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Third Millennium”, 9 April 2002, available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nuclear/Durr_C_W_02.pdf, accessed on 12th July 2010.
Slantchev, “Deterrence and Compellence”, 12 February 2003, available at http://slantchev.ucsd.
edu/courses/ir/lectures/notes-10.pdf, accessed on 17 July 2010.
148
persuasion by each party from pursuing the existing course are manifestations of compellence
theory. In case of India and Pakistan, India tends to exercise compellence under the garb of
deterrence.
For instance:
•
1987-88 Brasstacks
•
1999 Kargil conflict
•
2001-02 standoff
Deterrence Vs Compellence and Cold Start Doctrine
If deterrence exists in South Asia then why Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) is drafted by
India? Is India operating compellence theory to achieve its politico-military aims through
Cold Start Doctrine? Through Cold Start Doctrine India is thinking of launching blitzkrieg
like offense with conventional forces vis-à-vis its nuclear adversary which is irrational.
According to the theoretical debate Deterrence is a mean to achieve goal of peace (either
negative peace or positive peace) between the nuclear weapons states.
…Strategy is the relationship of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources).
[Of late, we are]… confusing a strategic concept (deterrence) with the means (nuclear
weapons). We deter an actor from undertaking a specific action in order to achieve a
specific objective (non-use of nuclear weapons, preservation of peace, avoidance of war,
etc.). Deterrence is not an objective …, although it was spoken as such during the Cold
War… Rather, deterrence is one way of achieving the objective. Viewed in this way, there
must be different means we can use in different ways (including in combination) against
different actors to deter different actions.119
India and Pakistan have yet to decide the ‘ways’ for themselves to make Deterrence
truly operative. Up till now both states have not decided to pursue the mode of deterrence
according to the above stated argument, its either MAD, flexible response or massive
retaliation or whatever. This grey area is undermining the concept of deterrence preventing
its transformation from theory to practice leading to continuous turbulence in their bilateral
relations with continuous hiccups of crises.
Moreover the two states after acquiring nuclear capability have not decided the
level of deterrence for them. Is the deterrence is to avoid war (conventional deterrence), or
the non use of nuclear weapons (nuclear deterrence) or maintenance of negative peace by
avoiding wars (the deterrence in actual terms) between them. There is no clarity because of
which deterrence is limited more to rhetoric and less operational in practice.
For deterrence to work, it’s significant that adversary (if assuming its India) wants to
be deterred. Since Deterrence is more psychological in its connotations therefore perception
of threat by an adversary - the outcome of which is deterrence - has to be significant. It
119
Robert H. Dorff and Joseph R. Cerami, “Deterrence and Competitive Strategies,” Deterrence in
the 21st Century, ed. Max G. Manwaring, (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 2001), 116117.
149
further requires key instruments:
•
Capabilities of deterrer towards deterree.
•
Intentions of deterrer – ‘will’ to materialize the threat that is being conveyed.
•
Assuming that adversary knows some of your weak points or ‘centre of gravity’ so
do not underestimate adversary in war scenario.
•
Last but not least Communication of threat to make it more credible.
Cold Start: a Beginning of Cold War in South Asia
Cold Start is a doctrine for hot war pursuit through preemptive measure by launching
land offense with the support of air surveillance and helicopters for heavy uplift along
with naval maneuvers thereby opening up different fronts of attack for Pakistan making it
difficult to secure defense simultaneously. 120But this is the theoretical grounds of chalking
out war, in actual this seems impossible to maneuver. Getting offensive at all of its corps
India may lose its defense as no defensive corps will be left behind and cannot prevent the
divisions of Pakistan Army getting into it and can create havoc. Engaging in many fronts
requires strong coherence among all three tactical, operational and strategic levels. Any
discontinuity can turn the tables and bring war a great losing game for India. On practical
grounds it seems that Cold Start doctrine will sow the seeds for Cold War between India
and Pakistan, if the salient features of Cold War era (US vs. USSR) were:
•
Precarious peace
•
Arms race
•
Strangulated bilateral relations
•
Transformation of crises into all-out-war
Therefore the Indian politico-military objective for preponderance in the region will
open the era of cold war defining the level of deterrence as the outbreak of war excluding
the notion of ‘limited warfare under nuclear umbrella’.
Conclusion
Nationalism at times makes human mind hard nut. Therefore one may be harsh in
imagination but one fact is clear that nuclear weapons keep caution on our thinking to make
it rational. The failure of deterrence among nuclear weapons states is disaster and a loselose game for each party to the conflict.
Since 2004 India on one hand showed willingness for Composite Dialogue while
at the same time formulated this doctrine. The double standards need to be sort out by
India herself first to differentiate the concept of deterrence from compellence vis-à-vis
120
Subhash Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed”, South Asia
Analysis Group, Paper No. 991, 4 May, 2004, available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/
papers10/paper991.html, accessed on 19th July 2010.
150
Pakistan. India’s Cold Start Doctrine may be tactically convincing to few strategic thinkers
but strategically it’s flawed. What lessons India got from past mistakes of India-Pakistan
wars if the new design Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) is in its hand and the lip singing is for
‘AMAN KI ASHA’.
Although the Nuclear war is impossible between two nuclear neighbors but the
misadventures of conventional/limited wars cannot rule out the escalation factor by default
if not by design. The assumption to keep war limited among nuclear power states is
theoretically a perfect idea and practically absurd. Who guarantees to prevent the escalation
of war in the battlefield where state sovereignty and territorial integrity is at stake - it’s
difficult to imagine and answer.
The military capabilities of both states as a result of the massive arms race were to
maintain deterrence at minimum credible level. The Cold Start shows that India is denying
factual grounds and does not believe in deterrence in practice and is pursuing compellence
theory by opening ways for limited warfare.
Session-VI-Plenary:
International Response
TARIQ OSMAN HAIDER121
Pakistan-India Confrontation: Role of US/UN
Two basic parameters of this entire exercise in which we are engaged in regarding
the Indian Cold Start or as it is also known by them as their Proactive Doctrine. On the one
hand, it is important to draw international attention to an essentially aggressive doctrine
which is at variance by the pronouncement of the Indian political leadership that India has
no aggressive designs against Pakistan and wishes to develop better relations and to live in
peace with Pakistan.
The United States and the Western world has certainly been much concerned to
ensure that South Asia should not again become a nuclear flashpoint, and have advocated
better relations between the two countries, they could have b done much more to pressure
India .
Session-VI-Plenary:
International Response
ALI SARWAR NAQVI122
Cold Start: Response from China and East Asia
Perhaps the most important, and in all likelihood, the most immediate response to a
Cold Start offensive against Pakistan on the part of India would be that of China. Important
121
122
Former Ambassador
Senior Associate Fellow, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
151
because it would be a determining factor in the eventual outcome of the debacle, and
immediate because of China’s proximity to both Pakistan and India. While there does not
seem to be any official Chinese comment or position on Cold Start as such, it would be my
endeavor to deduce the contours of a likely Chinese response on the basis of a broad survey
of Pakistan-China relations followed by a surmise regarding the response in the context of
the present situation. I will then briefly look at the East Asian response.
In the context of the Chinese response to Cold Start, it would be pertinent to first
speak about the nature of Pakistan-China relations. The relationship is in many ways unique,
as it is wide-ranging, highly substantive and even intense, and above all consistently on an
upward, incremental curve, which has no parallel in the region or even in other regions of the
world.
The relationship encompasses cooperation in many areas, particularly political,
economic and military. Going back to 1950, when Pakistan recognized the People’s
Republic of China as one of the first countries to do so, the relationship has grown and
burgeoned over the years, becoming a pillar of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Chinese President Hu Jintao described the relationship as “higher than the mountains
and deeper than the oceans. In his concluding remarks he said Cold Start doctrine and any
offensive launched under it would not elicit a substantive or clear ASEAN reaction.
Session-VI- Plenary
International Response
BRIG. FEROZ HASSAN KHAN123
Threat of Two Front War under Cold Start Doctrine and Role of NATO/
EU
The security landscape in South Asia has changed dramatically over the last 12
years, since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear weapons powers. In 2001
the Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond to a terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament building in New Delhi. After nine months of full mobilization, Indian forces
withdrew to the barracks.
This outcome of this coercive force deployment was unsatisfying and triggered
debate within the Indian Army to develop a new doctrine, which would allow it to quickly
mobilize in response to a perceived proxy attack waged by Pakistan.
123
Associate Fellow South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
152
DAY-III:
Session-VII-Plenary
National Response
DR TANVEER AHMED KHAN124
Pakistan’s Response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine
The security landscape in South Asia has changed dramatically over the last 12
years, since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear weapons powers. In 2001
the Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond to a terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament building in New Delhi.
After nine months of full mobilization, Indian forces withdrew to the barracks. This
outcome of this coercive force deployment was unsatisfying and triggered debate within
the Indian Army to develop a new doctrine, which would allow it to quickly mobilize
in response to a perceived proxy attack waged by Pakistan. Earlier, what was referred
as Sunderji doctrine envisaged deep strikes into Pakistan thorough three offensive corps
through salami-slicing tactics to destroy Pakistani armored forces in intense battleground
of Indian choosing (desert/semi deserts areas).
DAY-III:
Session-VII-Plenary
National Response
DR. NOMAN SATTAR,
Cold Start Doctrine and National Response
The Pakistan’s national response will be at three levels; Doctrinal, operational and
political. There are three options that Pakistan could go for. These are; Defuse conflict
situation, engage/embroil and escalate—Fight. India must take into account Pakistan’s
nuclear threshold and must not ignore the response from China and US.
India’s Cold Start doctrine is not very new but has suddenly caused uproar in
academic circles. This probably was the result of a statement made by the Chief of Indian
Army in December 2009 about India being able to fight a “two-front war”—with Pakistan
and China. Anything coming from across the border has an ominous ring in Pakistan. The
much discussed Cold Start doctrine is no exception. Of course, it is Indian, and a war
doctrine, and if it causes concern it is understandable.
I would like to argue that just as the doctrine is hyped, so is the response, at the level
124
Director General Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
153
of academic debate. Of course, Pakistan needs to have a calibrated response for any Indian
doctrine or move. But such a response calls for a real understanding of the issue, and a need
to get into the heart of the matter. This calls for putting the matter in context. The tendency
is to see the issue in a narrow military context.
This calls for clarifying some of the key assumptions of the doctrine, Eg, ‘the
doctrine does not aim at capturing Pakistan’s territory, but destruction of Pakistan’s armed
forces, and defense infrastructure.” In one viewpoint, “Islamphobe and thinktanker Cohen
pushed India to this doctrine, along with Israel.” Such views have not really clarified the
issues surrounding the doctrine. The doctrine has also been linked to the Israeli strategy
which it tried to implement in Lebanon. This has resulted in more hype than scholarly
debate.
Thus, in order to overcome such confusion, it is important to understand both
the context and rationale of Cold Start. The doctrine could be said to have two major
antecedents, the Kargil war of 1999, and the military standoff of 2001-02. The insurgency
that started in Kashmir in the early 90s and has continued to this day focuses attention on
an issue that India has been unable to resolve militarily or address politically adds another
template.
In the context of Kashmir problem and the Kargil conflict, it is pertinent to quote
Gen. Malik here: “Space exists between proxy war/low intensity conflict and nuclear
umbrella within which limited conventional war is a distinct possibility.” Thus the doctrine
could be seen as responding to threat of proxy war by Pakistan.
Pakistan and India have a history of wars and limited conflict. The essence is to
avoid a major war that supposedly could escalate to the nuclear level. It could be read
as having two major objectives, achieve limited aims, or exert pressure on Pakistan on a
critical issue, say Kashmir or terrorism
The paper aims at examining Cold Start in a theoretical and strategic perspective;
putting the threat and the response in context. It aims to answer questions pertaining to its
doctrinal and operational viability, as well as Pakistan’s response.
The Context
It is important to put the doctrine in context. This calls for putting it in the politicohistorical context. India’s rise as a major power has not been sudden or abrupt. Historically
it can be dated to the cataclysmic events of 1971, civil war in eastern Pakistan, Indian
intervention, Pakistan’s surrender. It was as a result of this that the US accorded India the
status of a preeminent power.
Within three years, India shocked the world by conducting its first nuclear tests. That
could be seen as a major breach in the non-proliferation regime. This also pushed Pakistan’s
nuclear program into high gear, putting south Asia onto the nuclear path. It is worth noting
that even after Indian nuclear test, world attention remained focused on Pakistan, with
sensational stories emerging in the western press on how the program was progressing.
154
The interim decade was a time of turmoil in the region, jihad in Afghanistan against
the soviets, and the rise of Kashmiri independence movement. The end of the cold war, and
bipolarity led India to rethink its new role. Its superpower patron was no more, and gone
was its antagonism with Washington. The government of PM Narasimha Rao put the final
touches by opening up the Indian economy. The ensuing years saw incredible growth of
Indian economy, as well as IT industry. India became a major player on the world scene,
competing with China, recording an impressive growth rate. This was duly recognized in
academic circles in the west.
T V Paul relates India’s rise to systemic compulsions. “Among the developing states,
India seems to be the key state in line for achieving major power status in the twenty-first
century….” (SarDesai-Thomas 2002: 88) India’s economic and technological advancement
became a popular theme in academia and politics, reflected in “India-centric” literature.
Its strategic environment is also unique, in that it borders another major, nuclear
power, China that developed close relations with its arch rival since the 60s. The 1962
border war with China kept India uneasy for a very long time; compounded by the SinoPakistan equation. India could be said to have an enduring rivalry with both. The nuclear
tests of
1998 gave this rivalry a nuclear dimension. But this development also pushed India
closer to major power status, though officially still outside the nuclear club.
Even this hitch was removed when, in 2006, India-US civilian nuclear deal was
signed. That was a crowning achievement, and a quasi acceptance of its nuclear status. The
deal clearly challenges the global non-proliferation regime.
Even before this, 9/11 attacks came as a blessing for India. On the one hand, it
offered New Delhi an opportunity to squeeze Pakistan on withdrawing support from
extremist/militant groups operating in Kashmir, in contributing to US-led WOT. It was also
able to forge a close relationship with Washington, again, to fight terrorism, and relieve
pressure on Kashmir, and use US leverage on Pakistan to contain ‘cross border terrorism.’
The above narration gives a short but good picture of India’s new role and status,
and how it sees itself in that role.
The Doctrine
The Indian army chief’s statement on the doctrine came in a seminar at a military
academy in Shimla. This was based on five year review of its military doctrine and
operational preparedness. In politico-military terms, the doctrine could be summarized in
the following points:
1.
India is in position to mobilize its forces so that they can move into enemy territory
within 72-96 hours to execute its Cold Start military doctrine.
2.
India is now ready to take on Pakistan and China both in a “two front war” in a
nuclear over hang.
155
3.
India is going to enhance its “strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities” to protect
its interests from Malacca strait to Persian Gulf.
4.
To achieve above mentioned goals India would attain “operational synergy” between
the three services.
5.
Countering “both military and non-military facets of asymmetric and subconventional threats.”
In operational terms, the strategy implies the following:
Specially trained Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), combining mechanized infantry,
artillery and armor, would launch preemptive strikes against Pakistani territory.
Up to 8 of these forward-deployed, division sized units would be mobilized,
deployed quickly, at short notice.
Besides attacking counterforce targets, these would focus on gaining territorial
control in vital areas.
The ground assault would be supported by massive fire power of the air force.
Cold Start can be seen as a break from India’s defensive orientation since 1947. Former
Defense Minister George Fernandes defined India’s military posture as “non-aggressive, nonexpansive defense, based on policy of defensive-defense”; this is reflected in the training and
organization of its armed forces. The limits of such policy were exposed during Operation
Parakram which took three weeks of mobilization time. This episode brought to light other
problems with India’s war fighting strategy and capability, mobilization problem with the
big size of three strike corps, lack of strategic surprise, and lack of offensive power. Thus
the reorganization of three strike corps into 8 division sized IBGs.
In operational terms, the essence is in surprise, speed and mobility. The doctrine
could be seen as a strategy of prevention and punishment. It is meant to inflict significant
damage on Pakistan army before the international community intervenes on Pakistan’s
behalf—as it has done in the past crises. The essence is in avoiding a major war that could
escalate to the nuclear level. It could be read as having two major objectives, achieve
limited war aims, and exert pressure on Pakistan on a critical issue, Kashmir or terrorism.
AS Zachary Davis observes: “Under Cold Start, India would conduct quick,
punishing strikes into Pakistan, hopefully without crossing Pakistan’s fuzzy redlines for a
nuclear response. The vague redlines include cutting off a major supply route, seizing key
territory, defeating a major Pakistani military group, or blockading Karachi with Indian
naval forces….” (2009)
The Response
Given the past history of wars and conflict, as well as mutual suspicion, Pakistan cannot
ignore any new Indian doctrine. Though Pakistan did not respond to the Indian nuclear doctrine,
a response did emerge. Pakistan’s response to Cold start could be viewed in three levels:
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1. Doctrinal.
2. Operational.
3. Political.
At the Doctrinal level, Pakistan could take sustenance from its nuclear capability,
and its nuclear posture, based on no no-first use. As explained by Gen Khalid Kidwai of
SPD,
Pakistan will use atomic weapons only if the existence of Pakistan as a state will be
at stake, deterrence will fail, India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory,
India destroys a large part of either of Pakistan’s land or air forces, India proceeds to the
economic strangling of Pakistan, and if India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization
or creates a large scale internal subversion.
The above scenarios establish some thresholds or redline, but operationalizing them
becomes problemsome. For instance, India conquering a large part of Pakistani territory.
How large? Or destroying Pakistan’s land or air forces also seems rather far-fetched if one
tries to see it in numbers. Similarly, “economic strangulation,” “political destabilization”
and “internal subversion” cannot really establish redlines, but serve to send a message. In
recent times, media has played up the specter of India trying to “strangulate” Pakistan by
building dams on rivers flowing into Pakistan, but at the official level this ‘threat: has not
been picked up. No wonder, Zachary Davis calls Pakistan’s redlines for a nuclear response
“fuzzy.”
The above gives the scenarios that would prompt a nuclear response from Pakistan.
Such scenario building is important for the purpose of deterrence. But while this points
to a threshold, it begs many questions. Nevertheless, as observed by Sumit Ganguly and
others, “nuclear deterrence is robust in south Asia.” Analyzing the crisis following the
attack on the Indian Parliament, and apparent Indian unwillingness to take military action
against Pakistan, he observes, Pakistan’s possession of a limited nuclear arsenal acted as a
sufficient deterrent to Indian action.” (2008: 60).
Paul Kapur, on the other hand, argues that nuclear capability encourages aggressive
behavior. He builds a case around Pakistan’s somewhat reckless ‘behavior” after the
acquisition of nuclear capability. (2008: 72). While most Pakistanis would not buy his
line of argument and would present the nuclear capability as an insurance against India’s
aggressive behavior (to some, expansionist tendencies), the nuclear linkage remains
alarming.
It has been observed that ‘an operational cold start capability could lead Pakistan to
lower its nuclear red line, put its nuclear weapons on a higher state of readiness, develop
tactical nuclear weapons, or undertake some equally destabilizing course of action (Ladwig
2oo7-08: 169) In an alarmist viewpoint, Shireen Mazari opines that Pakistan’s nuclear
escalatory ladder has only “one rung.” (2002: 1-8) This would seem to be true in terms of
political rhetoric, but would not be plausible in strategic terms.
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Pakistan has not ruled out employing nuclear weapons to respond to conventional
attack. Cold start would put Pakistan under pressure to rely more on them in self-defense,
if not offense. Pakistan’s doctrine of “offensive –defense” to respond to any Indian attack
by launching aggressive counter attacks on Indian territory reflects Pakistan’s response to
the Indian war doctrine.
At the Operational level, Pakistan’s military doctrine is built around two realities,
India’s overwhelming conventional superiority of 3:1, and its limited strategic depth.
Technological advances in the 80s and 90s, force restructuring and innovations at level of
strategic and battlefield planning have enhanced Pakistan’s capability to check aggression.
Pakistan has deployed a centralized corps of reserves in critical areas in southern Punjab
and eastern Sind.
Its reserve formations are closer to the border and with smaller lines of communication
take less time to be mobilized than the Indian. Of course, all this is buttressed by Pakistan’s
advanced ballistic missile capability, built around IRBM Shaheen II (Hatf IV), and Ghauri
I and II (Hatf V) MRBMs.
The Indian military has become more capable in use of advanced information
technology and communication system on the battlefield to enable “network-centric
warfare,” both indigenous and acquired from Russia and Israel. It has integrated advanced
sensor system in its warfare capability. Its clear edge in IT gives this capability a clear
boost.
The Political dimension of Pakistan’s response cannot be ignored. Being a smaller
and weaker state, Pakistan has consistently sought foreign, mostly western support in
dealing with security related issues. In the past, both the US and UK have played a role
in resolving India Pakistan crises. In the post-Independence era, UN was also active in
addressing regional conflict. While diplomacy may not be working in Pakistan’s favor (as
witnessed during the Kargil crisis), the role of external powers and their desire to prevent
conflict in the region are premised to check conflict from escalation. Almost all of south
Asian conflicts have been resolved from outside, particularly through US intervention. The
doctrine is meant to inflict significant damage on Pakistan army before the international
community intervenes on Pakistan’s behalf.
When faced with imminent conflict, Pakistan could be said to have the following options:
1. Defuse conflict situation.
2. Engage/embroil.
3. Escalate—fight.
Analyzing the crises of the 90s, and post 9/11 situation, one could conclude that a
characteristic pattern has been to go from 2 to 1, than toward 3, after a crisis has reached
the red line (or before), (as illustrated by Kargil and 2001-02 standoff). The referred crises
have shown that India-Pakistan conflicts are built around brinkmanship; both sides allow
the conflict to reach a certain level before they try to resolve it.
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Needless to say, Pakistani forces are ready to face any external threat, as reiterated
by the civilian and military leadership. The recent military exercises, Azm e Nau 3, the
biggest in the last 2o years, came as both a signal of battle readiness, and a message to India.
Focused on conventional war, the exercises, in the words of Director General Training,
‘were aimed at validating and refining newly evolved doctrines,” in tactics and operations.
These incorporated – new technology for better intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
and communication, aimed at reducing reaction time, in what could be seen as a response
to Cold Start.
In one viewpoint, Pakistan needs more armor dominated brigade size reserves to
meet the challenge of Cold start. Pakistan could also preempt Cold start by early or timely
deployments in expected war or conflict zones.
Indian army chief’s statements met with prompt reply from Pakistani military top
brass. “Proponents of conventional application of military forces, in a nuclear overhang,
are charting an adventurous and dangerous path, the consequences of which could be both
unintended and uncontrollable,” said General Kayani, COAS Pakistan army.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Tariq Majeed responded to two-front war
doctrine in these words, “Leave alone China, General Deepak Kapoor knows very well
what the Indian Army cannot and the Pakistan Army can pull off militarily”. He said the
Indian Army chief “could not be so outlandish in strategic postulations to fix India on a
self-destruct mechanism.”
Both the above statements are self explanatory, and reflect Pakistan military’s
thinking and response in very clear terms.
(Ir) Relevance of Cold Start?
The hype about Cold Start is understandable. Most of it originates from the
Internet, and from lack of accurate information. Most people refer to statements/accounts
from Internet, or comment without having sound background of the issue, and often out of
context. Often the information given or recorded is inaccurate and misleading, like Pakistan
having 250 nuclear weapons. Even armed forces personnel have not addressed the issue
seriously in journals or public forums. The SASSI conference was perhaps the first public
discussion on the critical issue, and thus generated a lot of interest.
Pakistanis sensitivity and (over)reaction is understandable. We are in an adversarial
relationship; we have not been able to develop mutual trust; hawks mostly dominate the
doves; Kashmir remains unresolved; the breach caused by terrorism has not been overcome.
The peace process (Composite Dialogue) remains stalled over the issue of terrorism.
To this can be added India’s new stature duly accepted by the world community, the
west, NSG, the Islamic world. While India is still not part of the big league, it craves that
role, and is assiduously following a path that leads there.
In the regional context, Pakistan remains an irritant; the terrorism connection has
compromised the peace process. Pakistan surprised them in Kargil, 2001-02 standoff did
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not pay off, besides checking terrorism; it still pleads Pakistan’s role and culpability in
Mumbai attacks. In this background, does Cold start come as a big surprise? A simple
answer is no.
While nuclear deterrence is working, since before 1998, this did not prevent Kargil
and Mumbai. India was not willing to escalate Kargil conflict, and apparently was not in a
position to take on Pakistan in 2001-02. Cold Start is meant to address both situations. It is
meant to deter not just Kargil but also Mumbai. India was not ready for Kargil, but now it
is, and this would deter Pakistan.
While nuclear war is to be avoided at all costs, conventional war has a bigger price
tag, rather puts India in double jeopardy, as it can be fought. Apart from the huge cost of
the war—and the fear of escalation—it is going to flounder India’s economic agenda and
whatever its economic edifice. “Limited war” is a form of war India can afford to fight.
Cold Start gives it doctrinal expression. If at all this takes place, this would not be a LIC,
but a High Intensity Limited Conflict (HILC).
Cold Start may sound good to the Indians as a doctrine, but how does it look in
operational terms? How realistic does it seem as a war doctrine, given the peculiar nature
of India Pakistan rivalry and the geographic context? Would India be able to meet the level
of forces and armaments to make this a reality? Is it ready to squander the resources to
make Cold Start operationally viable? Most people, including the Indians, would say no.
The essence of the doctrine is to convey the message that Cold Start is an option with India.
It may not be able to carry it out any time soon, but it is working on that.
While it lacks on many counts, the doctrine does not take into account Pakistan’s
response/s, as well as advantages (in terms of quicker mobilization). Cold Start carries
the risk of escalation, and India should not underestimate Pakistan’s resolve to strike back;
Pakistan’s nuclear posture is a poignant reminder of that.
The doctrine ignores the China factor. While China would not have taken the
Indian General Kapoor’s statement about a “two-front war” kindly, India would rather not
compromise Chinas position by launching preempting strikes against Pakistan, an act that
would certainly destabilize the region, as well as threaten Chinese interests.
The doctrine also ignores the US factor. At this time both Pakistan and India are
US allies in WoT. Since WoT began, Washington has been intent on pushing India and
Pakistan closer so as to avoid conflict in the region. Cold Start strategy in operation would
certainly hurt US interests in the region and its relations with New Delhi. A crippling strike
against Pakistan would certainly not go well with current US interests in Pakistan (as well
as the “investment” it has made in the last decade).
One scholar who has studied the doctrine in great detail observes that the doctrine is
in experimental stage. In his view: “Regardless of the training and discipline of the Indian
army,” four factors—goal setting, misperception, agency and geography—”contribute to
make the notion of a limited war in south Asia a risky undertaking.” (Ladwig 2o07-08:
175)
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One could conclude the discussion in the following points:
Cold Start is a doctrine of prevention and punishment.
It is a strategy for a High Intensity Limited Conflict.
The doctrine is meant to avert the risk of a nuclear confrontation or escalation.
The doctrine comes at the right time in the regional context, but at the wrong time
in the international context.
As nuclear neighbors, it behooves India and Pakistan to act responsibly and
rationally, while Pakistan keeps the “first use option” open, and India mulls its
Cold Start doctrine.
If the Pakistan army is prepared the fight a conventional war with India, it is ready
to face Cold Start.
Day 3:
Concluding Session–Session IX–Plenary
COLONEL GS HANS EBERHART125
Contribution to “International Response”
Madam Chairperson Director General Maria Sultan and General Ehsan ul Haq,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen
1.)
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
I am honored and grateful for having been invited to constructively contributing to
this workshop. I approach the topic “International response” from a different perspective
and hope to add to its better understanding in the framework of this workshop.
My role here is an ad hoc one. I also speak on my personal capacity and do no present any
element of the position of the Swiss government.
2.)
CONCLUSIONS WITH CONCRETE TERMS
Firstly, in my view, as the workshop has shown, the component “International
response” needs further elaborations within the work to formulate an overall, coherent
and consistent response to the “Cold Start War Doctrine (CSWD)”. Let me concretize this,
namely with regard: To the aspect “International”. We must differentiate. Do we expect
responses/actions/support/disagreement
a.)
at multilateral level, in/through international and/or regional organizations, etc.
b.)
at unilateral level, from national actors? To the aspect: “response”. We must clarify.
125
PhD, Defence Attaché of Switzerland
161
To what/which substance is the response related:
a.)
to the doctrine itself,
b.)
to the cause of triggering it and giving reason for a possible military escalation,
c.)
to/in the phase of an armed struggle,
d.)
in its aftermath (ceasefire, peace negotiations)?.. to the aspect: “International
response” and its connection with the workshop title “and its Implications for
Strategic Stability in South Asia”. What can we assume as interest(s) of (the)
external actors/third parties for strategic stability in South Asia.
ASIA IN A CRISIS/CONFLICT CYCLE:
a.)
to resist changes or to change the current status quo of the region preventive action/
role/policy of external actors,
b.)
to perform a stabilizing role during an armed conflict = crisis management
contribution from external actors,
c.)
to bring the region back to its status quo or to progressively alternate it = peace
building contribution from external actors?
- Secondly, the workshop has shown that there is also a need for more in-depth
analysis. I discern three areas and assume a comprehensive and inclusive process, that
means an India including politico-military process: I depart from possible objectives/
common ground being the precondition for this, namely:
a.)
common interests between the two parties. That are, among else: a good and
friendly neighbourhood, maintaining peace and security, promoting social progress
(contain/avoid another arms race), armed forces not being used save for national
defence and/or in the common interest, removal of threats to peace (comprehensive,
but including the military aspect),
b.)
further fact-finding and enquiry in order to avoid/eliminate wrong or misperceptions
and undesirable developments... And, now to the three areas:
a.)
The politico-diplomatic one: Analyse further the pros/cons of a risk reduction
approach, with the objective of clarification of facts, dispelling concerns
regarding developments/military activities, space for further mechanism for
consultations and co-operation. Explore the possibility to bring the issue
“CSWD” up bilaterally first (e.g., invite for an official bilateral high-ranking
military seminar either in New Delhi or in Islamabad) and/or discuss the
doctrine in international fora. Present facts from Pakistan as a constructive
actor underlining its credible implementation of a policy of disbandment/
denial of irregular/non-state actors being the key cause for the “CSWD”.
b.)
The structural one: I refer to Professor Rifaat Hussain’s contribution 21
162
July): Explore the pros/cons of a regional co-operative politico-military
framework – à la longue of OSCE (information exchange, notifications and
constraints regarding certain military activities).
c.)
3.
The military one: Write a “strategic defence guideline” being passed by
the Parliament which would give the Pakistani politico-military stance to
“CSWD” its legitimacy and anchorage in the nation.
SUMMARY/FOLLOW-UP
Particularly with regard to the topic “International response” is valid: Politics/
diplomacy should come first, the military’s response when needed and called by the
government. But, both angles should be embedded into an agreed national security
policy/”CSWD”-answer. Apart from further work, as highlighted above, a systematic
analysis of the UN Charter could serve. This in order to formulate a consistent, well
comprehensible plan of action for Pakistan in its action-taking in the international arena.
Thank you very much for your kind attention.
Chair Speakers
Session-III:
Cold Start Assumptions
DR RODNEY JONES126
In implementing Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan, India would take advantage
of the terrorism that is prevailing in Pakistan. it is very difficult for Pakistan to cope up
with the military technological advancements to maintain a conventional status quo with
India. At the same time Pakistan needs to have advanced military technology to remain
an effective deterrent to India. Indian implementation of cold start doctrine will adversely
affect the strategic stability of South Asian region and this will lead to a never-ending arms
race in this region.
Session-VI-Plenary
International Response
AIR COMMODORE KHALID BANURI127
India’s new military doctrine—which envisions conducting a limited war under
the nuclear umbrella—is intriguing to policymakers and scholars of international security
alike. Thus international community is not expected to comprehend Pakistani explanation
of capacity when perceptions are of state complicity in export of terror. Indeed the
international community has indicted Pakistan before the crime is committed.
126
127
Associate Fellow South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
Director General ACDA
163
Air Commodore Khalid Banuri
Session-VIII-Plenary:
Pakistan Counter measures and nuclear doctrine
DR. PARVEZ IQBAL CHEEMA128
India and Pakistan have fought many wars since independence, including the
1999 Kargil conflict. Though relations at the strategic level continue to be reasonably
stable, instability persists in South Asia. The Cold Start doctrine is a work-in-being. Its
implementation would have major ramifications for strategic stability in South Asia.
No Pakistani could ever allow Indian troops to enter Pakistan and occupy a strategic
area in a so called limited war. The Cold Start Strategy is a variation of India’s plan
to take over Lahore in 1965. It did not work then, and it will not work with a nuclear
armed Pakistan.
Conference Report:
Cold Start Doctrine: Implications for the Strategic Stability in South Asia
The South Asian Strategic Stability Institute organised a Three-Day International
Workshop on “Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic
Stability in South Asia” from 20-22 July 2010. At dinner hosted by SASSI Samsaam
Bukhari on behalf of Sardar Salim Haider Khan, Minister of State for Defense Production
said it is a matter of great honor for me to speak as the inaugural speaker to the three day
workshop on Cold Start Doctrine and its implications for South Asian Strategic Stability
organized by the premier Pakistani institute SASSI.
128
Dean Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University
164
He further said that, “I want to congratulate SASSI for organizing the event on
a topic which has great relevance to the future security discourse of India and Pakistan;
with possible repercussions on international security. At the centre of the global strategic
corridors Pakistan is n a unique position of historic, regional and global power struggles.
This special geo-strategic significance confers an extraordinary role and importance to
Pakistan as not only a key player at the regional level but also at the international level.
Additionally he said the significance at this moment draws strength both from the
positive and the negative developments in the regional security milieu; here my reference is
to the global war against terror and the resultant consequences which has made region alive
to threat of terrorism with trans-nationalism being a central component. Moreover he was
of the view that positives are the determined efforts by Pakistan to curb this menace inside
Pakistan and the high success rate that has been reached in achieving the goal of stability
and security. The security challenges are however compounded by the permanent security
context faced by Pakistan especially the threat from the eastern borders and the climate of
animosity; this needs to be addressed in a positive and constructive manner in which this
relationship of conflict can be changed into a relationship of peace and security.
Director General South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) Maria Sultan
highlighted the aims and objectives of the workshop. She said that the goal of the workshop
is to bring together think tanks and experts from around the world, as well as government
officials and specialists from international and national organizations to work on the
evolving discourse of Cold Start Doctrine and regional stability.
Director General of SASSI Maria Sultan said that the goal of this workshop was
to bring together the thinking elite, experts and specialists from international and national
organizations to work on the evolving discussion of Cold Start Doctrine and regional
stability. She proposed a new theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence as Pakistan’s
possible counter measures to Cold Start Doctrine. She said its objective was to ensure that
Pakistan no longer feared the threat of pre-emption. She added that the use of sub-critical
or fourth generation nuclear weapons as a measure for creating intra-war deterrence is
required, especially after the initiation of Cold Start Doctrine.
Khalid Banuri in his comments appreciated efforts made by SASSI. He further said
that he would be keen to look at what this workshop would offer as its assessment through
this academic discourse on India’s cold start and its implications for strategic regional
stability. He further said that geographically Pakistan is in a difficult and dangerous
neighbourhood. He further said that such discussions often begin with the theoretical
determination of intentions versus capabilities. Mr Banuri said India should thin its force
along the border with Pakistan if international community expects Pakistan to cut down its
deployment from eastern border to focus on FATA.
Lt. Gen. (R) Hamid Khan highlighted Indian military’s weakness in the
operationalisation of the Cold Start Doctrine. The Indian Military having seen their weakness
of mobilization during the standoff during 2002 decided to have a relook at their existing
doctrine with the aim of offsetting the Pakistan advantage of quicker mobilization. They
also need to reorganize because offensive formations need a better punch than defensive
formations. Tanks, long range artillery and superior mobility are essential. However he
emphasised that if India may start operations with air strikes which achieves both strategic
surprise and degradation of Pakistan’s military in its garrisons and airbases. However to
165
achieve this they require 60 to 70 squadrons. At present they have only 37 squadrons which
they are likely to increase to 47 by 2012 and 50 by 2015. Lt. Gen. Hamid Khan also
highlighted Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth as an opportunity. In the end Lt. Gen. Hamid
Khan said that to implement this doctrine Indian armed forces need some time and the
earliest they might be able to make it operational will not be before 2015 when they have
their air force reorganized and forward cantonments built.
Dr. Jaspal said Indian posture was defensive before Cold Start Doctrine. After the
induction of nuclear weapons conventional superiority had been compromised. So India
decided to introduce Cold Start Doctrine to carry out limited war against Pakistan and
remain below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. Further he said that India reformed its
strike forces into eight Integrated Battle Groups to cut short its mobilization time and
carry out quick and swift attacks against Pakistan. Moreover Dr. Jaspal said that India
is spending billions of dollars to overcome their military deficiency which has provoked
an arms race in South Asia. Main focus of Cold Start Doctrine is on Pakistan, but India
links it with China. But in reality latest tanks and other latest equipment cannot be used in
Himalaya against China but they will be used against Pakistan. Dr. Jaspal advocated AzmI-Nau exercise to counter Cold Start Doctrine. In the concluding remarks Dr. Jaspal said
that Pakistan is fully prepared to meet Indian Cold Start Doctrine.
After the Plenary session conference followed breakout sessions. In break out
plenary session Mr. Masood Ur Rehman, Research Fellow, SASSI presented his paper on
Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Capabilities and Limitations. In his presentation he emphasised
on regional security. He said South Asian security is in peril because of the Indian Cold
Start Doctrine. Further he cautioned that Cold Start Doctrine has the potential not only to
operationalise Indian military doctrine on the basis of pre-emption but can also trigger a
nuclear conflict. He said Deterrence in South Asia is delicate because of rapid militarization
and operationalisation of Cold Start Doctrine. In concluding remarks Mr. Masood said,
the conception of limited war will push the region into further instability. The danger of
escalation will also increase. Cold Start Doctrine overlooks the fact that in a crisis the
nuclear threshold will be uncertain.
In breakout sessions, SASSI research fellows coordinated ‘War Games’. In these
war games, participants of the workshop were divided into different sections. All of the
participants were very interested to present their role in these war games. One of these war
games scenarios was about year 2017.
In another war game scenario, an unexpected terrorist attack takes place at
Bangalore Silicon Valley which is known as the IT centre of India. 10 terrorists enter the
building where influential Indian IT company’s offices are located. Terrorists kill almost
500 civilian workers. The Indian army commandos conduct operations against the terrorist
kill all terrorists. However terrorists’ identification is not known. But Indian media starts
blaming Pakistan for initiating such attacks. Indian political leaders vow to give a hardhitting response to Pakistan for carrying out such attacks.
Third session of the workshop was about Cold Start Doctrine assumptions. Brig.
(Retd.) Naeem Salik discussed deeply the Cold Start assumptions and its implication on
strategic stability of South Asia. He said that India’s political leadership would be as prone
to taking the risk of a nuclear escalation as the Indian military and would be willing to loosen
its grip over the military and that India’s political decision makers/civilian bureaucracy will
166
somehow become as nimble in their decision making as the IBG commanders.
Dr. Zafar nawaz Jaspal said that the Cold Start Doctrine has boosted the strategic
optimism of the Indian strategic pundits. The supporter and propagator of the doctrine have
sketched interesting operational advantageous scenarios. The Revolution in Military Affairs
obviously restructures and multiplies Indian Armed forces striking power. The increasing
war-fighting capability of Indian forces has been boosting Indian ruling elites’ strategic
sense of superiority, which could entail devastating misperception and miscalculation
about strategic competitor’s defensive capabilities. This state of mind has been augmenting
destabilizing hypothetical advantageous assumptions in New Delhi. Consequently, the
Indians style of diplomacy is increasingly becoming dogmatic and coercive in South
Asia.
Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani said that in the mid 1980s, the Indian Army started mechanising
some of its infantry formations. The reorganised divisions were given the acronym of
RAPID. At that time it was considered merely part of a process all modern armies undergo,
to enhance mobility. In due course, the concept for their employment also started becoming
a little clear. In all its conflicts with Pakistan- wars, as well as periods of tension that led
to full mobilisation- the Indian military had needed 4-6 weeks to assemble its forces on
the borders. That gave Pakistani forces sufficient time to carry out counter measures and
make a reasonable assessment of the adversary’s likely war plans. Considering, that there
are means available to make up for this unavoidable lag and achieve strategic/ battlefield
deception, in a conventional war scenario, this was for India not a decisive disadvantage.
Dr. Rodney Jones in his speech said that in implementing Cold Start Doctrine
against Pakistan, India would take advantage of the terrorism that is prevailing in Pakistan.
He said that it is very difficult for Pakistan to cope up with the military technological
advancements to maintain a conventional status quo with India. At the same time Pakistan
needs to have advanced military technology to remain an effective deterrent to India. Indian
implementation of cold start doctrine will adversely affect the strategic stability of South
Asian region and this will lead to a never-ending arms race in this region.
Mr. Zafar Ali started his presentation with the historical background of Cold Start
Doctrine. In which he discussed Sunderji’s concept briefly. Then he explained the concept
of Cold Start Doctrine. He said realist would focus on the military might at economic
and social expense of states making out of the box thinking impossible. He further said
that from the Realists’ perspective, Pakistan should be taking counter measures to balance
against the threat. He further said that while there appears similarities to the Cold War
model there are also stark differences.
In his speech Brig Khursheed said that since the creation of India and Pakistan,
both countries have been involved in several conflicts that continue to pose the risk of
inadvertent war. The terrorism phenomenon is an additional factor that has all ingredients
to explode the situation out of proportion thus inviting more troubles in the region. Unlike
in the past, any future war between the two countries, no matter how limited it might be,
will have the potential to escalate into a full-scale nuclear war.
Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema said that there are number of rationales for India’s
formulation of its aggressive Cold Start conventional military doctrine. Primarily however,
Indian frustration with the failure of its military operation Parakram in 2002, wherein it
167
mobilized bulk of its armed forces against Pakistan immediately after an attack on the
Indian Parliament in December 2001, provided the apparent rationale for reformulation of
the Indian military doctrine.
Ms. Sobia Saeed Paracha, Research Fellow, SASSI discussed the structural context
of cold start doctrine and its underlying assumptions. She structured her presentation on
Indian stated and actual assumptions, which were differentiated on the bases of how they
are being stated and how they might actually be operationalized based on the patterns of
Indian preparation and their perceptions about possible Pakistani response.
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Quraishi said that the subject
chosen by SASSI for this workshop “Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its
Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia” is both ironic and provocative. It is
ironic as only last week I hosted His Excellency S.M. Krishna, Foreign Minister of India in
Islamabad as part of our efforts to recommence stalled dialogue in pursuit of our endeavors
for durable peace in the region, albeit without a corresponding positive response.
In conclusion he said that Pakistan and India should work together to institute a
sustained dialogue for peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia. We should not remain
hostage to our troubled past. We must rise to the occasion and take bold decisions to lead
our people to a more hopeful and promising future.
Ms. Sajida Mansoor, Research Fellow, SASSI discussed the issue of military
developments in line with Cold Start Doctrine and their implications for an arms race
in South Asia. She highlighted that the main objective of this Cold Start Doctrine is to
launch a massive offensive conventional attack against Pakistan in multiple sectors that
would cause significant damage to the Pakistan armed forces. Both India and Pakistan have
maintained a hostile bilateral relationship as a result of various ideological, historical and
territorial differences since their independence in 1947. These differences and subsequent
disputes have impacted on national security concerns of both the nations and that have
eventually led them to opt for continuous arms race by acquiring the latest high-technology
defence equipment. India continues to buildup arms at a fast pace in recent years while
equipping its armed forces with the latest jet fighters, warships, radars, tanks, missiles,
submarines, weapons systems and platforms. She was of the view that the Indian modern
high-technology arms buildup has forced Pakistan to maintain adequately strong military
equipment and weaponry to ensure its national security and sovereignty.
In his presentation, Mr. Hamid Hamza said that Cold Start doctrine or 4th generation
warfare, Use of 4th generation warfare against Pakistan is a more dangerous and disturbing
angle of Indian doctrine which most defense analysts in Pakistan have overlooked.
Mr. Nasir Naveed Dogar explained the definitions of Deterrence and Strategic
Stability. After that he said that Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) will have significant
implications on strategic stability in South Asia. After the execution of Cold Start Doctrine
(CSD) strategic stability would be disturbed because Pakistan will have to respond to it to
defend its sovereignty and integrity.
Sania Abdullah said that Nationalism at times makes human mind hard nut.
Therefore one may be harsh in imagination but one fact is clear that nuclear weapons
keep caution on our thinking to make it rational. The failure of deterrence among nuclear
weapons states is disaster and a lose-lose game for each party to the conflict. The military
168
capabilities of both states as a result of the massive arms race were to maintain deterrence
at minimum credible level.
Dr. Tanveer Ahmed khan, in his speech concluded the session by saying that the
strategic stability revolves primarily around the development of a relation of mutual
deterrence among the adversaries. It can be broadly viewed as a result of effective deterrence.
Its remit goes beyond nuclear stability to include the wider issues of chemical, biological
weapons and conventional force balance.
Tariq Osman Haider outlined two basic parameters of this entire exercise in which
we are engaged in regarding the Indian Cold Start or as it is also known by them as their
Proactive Doctrine. On the one hand, it is important to draw international attention to an
essentially aggressive doctrine which is at variance by the pronouncement of the Indian
political leadership that India has no aggressive designs against Pakistan and wishes to
develop better relations and to live in peace with Pakistan.
Former Ambassador Sarwar Ali Naqvi said that perhaps the most important, and in
all likelihood, the most immediate response to a Cold Start offensive against Pakistan on
the part of India would be that of China. Important because it would be a determining factor
in the eventual outcome of the debacle, and immediate because of China’s proximity to
both Pakistan and India. While there does not seem to be any official Chinese comment or
position on Cold Start as such, it would be my endeavor to deduce the contours of a likely
Chinese response on the basis of a broad survey of Pakistan-China relations followed by
a surmise regarding the response in the context of the present situation. I will then briefly
look at the East Asian response.
Brig. Feroz Hasan khan said that the security landscape in South Asia has changed
dramatically over the last 12 years, since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be
nuclear weapons powers. In 2001 the Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond
to a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. After nine months of
full mobilization, Indian forces withdrew to the barracks.
Dr. Noman gave his views on the Cold start doctrine and national response. He
mentioned that the Pakistan’s national response will be at three levels; Doctrinal, operational
and political. He stated the three options that Pakistan could go for. These are; Defuse
conflict situation, engage/embroil and escalate—Fight. In addition, he said that India must
take into account Pakistan’s nuclear threshold and must not ignore the response from China
and US.
Former Foreign Secretary, Akram Zaki, said that Pakistan has the ability and
credibility to counter any Indian aggression whether conventional or unconventional.
Cold Start Doctrine initiated instability and concerns among regional and international
community that any future war between India and Pakistan would escalate to nuclear
war. Pakistan is peaceful state and wanted to resolve the issues through negotiations and
amicably.
The breakout session for national response was through a war game, which was
based on an assumed scenario, portraying the implication of the Indian cold start doctrine
against Pakistan. The scenario was such that a massive terrorist attack had taken place in
India in the year 2015, and making it as the basis, India has attacked Pakistan at Kasur.
Right in accordance with the doctrine, India also opened a multiple thrust, surprise attack
169
throughout the Pakistani border. This causes a psychological paralysis for the military,
political leadership, Government and the masses of Pakistan. In addition, it has greatly
affected the decision making body of Pakistan. India also, apprehended that there is a
politico-military discord in Pakistan.
Maria Sultan Director General SASSI, in her speech regarding Pakistan’s nuclear
doctrine and implications for deterrence and strategic stability: the theory of integrated
strategic equivalence, said that the future war in South Asia can never remain conventional.
Presenting the new theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence as Pakistan’s possible counter
measures to Cold Start Doctrine, objective was to ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the
threat of pre-emption.
In Concluding Remarks she said the use of Sub-Critical or Fourth Generation
nuclear weapons, as a measure for creating intra-war deterrence are required, especially
after the initiation of Cold Start Doctrine. This is based on the central idea of deterrence
that is communication of threat and the credibility of threat combined with the intention
to use force during operations. She said there was a need to study the possible response
options available to Pakistan in the realm of the nuclear deterrence theory. Whether Cold
Start Doctrine has the ability to create a gap between conventional and nuclear deterrence is
another question. Currently, the Pakistani deterrence posture is based on minimum credible
deterrence and centralized command and control and strategic value targeting its need to be
consent given the new changing dynamics of threats and the theory, if strategic equivalence
can help to fill up the gap.
Lt. Gen. (R) Tariq Waseem Ghazi said that Cold Start is an aggressive doctrine
aimed at Pakistan, such a doctrine against a nuclear weapon state will put the region into
quagmire of volatility and dismay. Threat of deterrence failure would increase if India
operationalised her Cold Start Doctrine. The analyses of the level of funding allocated for
the modernization of Indian armed forces and its endeavor to overcome its deficiencies,
show that India may operationalise Cold Start Doctrine in next five to ten years.
Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in his remarks said that India and Pakistan have fought
many wars since independence, including the 1999 Kargil conflict. Though relations at the
strategic level continue to be reasonably stable, instability persists in South Asia. The Cold
Start doctrine is a work-in-being. Its implementation would have major ramifications for
strategic stability in South Asia. He further said that no Pakistani could ever allow Indian
troops to enter Pakistan and occupy a strategic area in a so called limited war. The Cold
Start Strategy is a variation of India’s plan to take over Lahore in 1965. It did not work
then, and it will not work with a nuclear armed Pakistan.
Gen (retired) Ehsan Ul Haq said Pakistan had been seeking peaceful resolution to
disputes and normalization of relations with India. Our defence and security policy have
been entirely focused on deterring war, he said that restraint and responsible had been the
watchwords of our nuclear policy.
Director General SASSI Maria Sultan said in concluding session that the gravest
danger in our times lies in the possibilities of war and conflict. This is perpetuated by the
military planning divorced of regional realities and the lack of the ability to control the
spiral of violence generated by the non state actors. This reality becomes all the more
relevant when we find ourselves at the cross roads of extremism; military adventurism and
170
the probability of a nuclear war.
She added more that Today, the unresolved conflicts around the world have
unfortunately made all of us a future witness to the probability of wars becoming a reality;
a reality which may become history of this region if the roots of misadventurism are not
seriously reconsidered by the politico- military elite of our neighbouring country India.
For the implications can be far reaching and offsetting for regional peace; if not recalibrated in the interest of peace.
She welcome the scholarly and deliberate effort made by the intellectuals/strategic
community through these three day workshop on cold start and its implications for the
region to come up with policy recommendations and perhaps solutions which may help
to provide insights to ways and measures to bring about strategic stability in the region.
She congratulated the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) for deliberating
on this very important subject and its implications for regional and global security order.
She further added that We in the Defence Committee of the Senate will benefit from the
recommendations that will come through this august gathering of scholars, policy makers
and the intelligencia regarding the doctrinal implications for maintaining and managing
the crisis through effective and reliable crisis and deterrence stability.
She further said that for any democratically elected government the primary
responsibility remains the upholding of the territorial integrity through defence of borders
and security of the state and the people as they pass through turbulent and trying times. In
these times, however sovereignty remain the key dominator for all self respecting states
and peoples.
Dr. Hans Eberhart concluded the session with the words, “Particularly with regard
to the topic “International response” is valid: Politics/diplomacy should come first, the
military’s response when needed and called by the government. But, both angles should
be embedded into an agreed national security policy/”CSWD”-answer. Apart from further
work, as highlighted above, a systematic analysis of the UN Charter could serve. This
in order to formulate a consistent, well comprehensible plan of action for Pakistan in its
action-taking in the international arena.”
List of Electronic & Print Media Coverage
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) successfully organized a three
day (21 July to 23 July 2010) International Conference on ‘Indian Military’s Cold Start
Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability of South Asia.’ The Conference’s
Media coverage was tremendous and almost above five hundred (500) national and
international newspapers and television channels covered the international Conference.
Defense Secretary Lt General (retired) Athar Ali inaugurated the International Conference.
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qurush was the Chief Guest of the Conference. FM
delivered a Key Speech on Cold Start Doctrine which had been highlighted by the National
and International Print and Electronic Media.
Director General SASSI, Dr. Maria Sultan also gave an important speech on Cold
Start Doctrine. The National and international Media and intelligentsia appreciated the
SASSI Endeavour for organizing a successful International Conference on a crucial subject
171
which deals with the South Asia’s Strategic Stability. The main National and International
Print and Electronic Media who covered the International Conference include, Dawn
Newspaper, The News, The Nation, Geo News Channel, Dawn News Channel, The Times
of India, Hindustan Times, One India, Zee News and several others.
1.
The Daily Times. Published in 20th July, 2010 issue.
SASSI Warns Of Indian Unilateral Strikes
2.
The Dawn Newspaper. Published in 21st July, 2010 issue.
India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Conventional war strategy best answer
3.
The Dawn Newspaper. Published in 24th July, 2010 issue
Cold Start Doctrine Risks Nuclear War: Experts
4.
The Nation. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Indian military’s Cold Start Doctrine irrational: Qureshi
5.
The Indian News. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pak would respond ‘immediately’, ‘proportionately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine
6.
One India. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pak would respond ‘immediately’, ‘proportionately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine’
7.
Bangladesh Sun. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pak would respond ‘immediately’, ‘proportionately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine’
8.
One Pakistan. Published in 26th July, 2010 issue.
SASSI lauded for conducting moot on Cold Start Doctrine
9. Daily Mail News. Published in 21st July, 2010 issue.
Non-state actors want instability in South Asia
10. India Times. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pak to respond ‘immediately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’!
11. Zee News. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pak to respond ‘immediately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’
172
12. The Express Tribune. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Give up aggressive Doctrine: Qureshi
13. Geo News. Published in 21st July, 2010 issue.
Qureshi sees Regional Growth at Stake on Nuke Imbalance
14. News Gate. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Regional Balance imperative for Strategic Solidity: Qureshi
15. The Muslim Observer. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
India & Pakistan: “Cordial, Frank & Useful” Talks
16. Andhra News. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pak would respond immediately, proportionately against India’s Cold-Start Doctrine
17. The Hindu. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
We’re willing to walk the Extra Mile: Qureshi
18. India Today. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine an ‘Irrationally Dangerous Concept’: Qureshi
19. DNA India News. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
India not responding positively on restarting talks: Pakistan
20. Daily The Nation. Published in 23rd July, 2010 issue.
Beyond Cold Start
21. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP). Published in 19th July, 2010 issue.
Pakistan Desires Peaceful Coexistence with Neighbours on Equal Footing: Samsaam
22. My News. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Qureshi Spews More Venom, this time on Indian Army
23. Din News. Published in 26th July, 2010 issue.
SASSI Lauded for Conducting Moot on Cold Start Doctrine
24. All Voices. Published in 22nd July, 2010 issue.
Pakistan Wishes Good Ties with India
25. High Beam Research. Published in 20th July, 2010 issue.
173
Intl Workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine, its Implications for Strategic
Stability in S. Asia
26. The Press Enterprise. Published in 26th July, 2010 issue.
SASSI Lauded for Conducting Moot on Cold Start Doctrine
27. Hamari Web. Published in 20th July, 2010 issue.
Indian Military Doctrine has Serious Implications: Samsam
Details of Cold Start Conference’s Electronic & Print Media Coverage
1. The Daily Times:
SASSI Warns Of Indian Unilateral Strikes
20 July 2010
ISLAMABAD: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) organised a three
days’ workshop on Monday, which was, inaugurated by Minister of State for Information
Samsam Bukhari. Talking to the inaugural session, Samsam said that India has seemingly
war-gamed its strategy since 2004, which is based on the assumption that occupation of
limited Pakistani territory, following a surgical military strike, could be used as a haggling
chip to force Islamabad to heel. “But I am happy that there is someone (SASSI) who are
monitoring whole the current scenario and have courage to aware Pakistanis,” he said. Maria
Sultan, SASSI Director General, in her speech said the main objective of the workshop is
to address the core issues and aware nation regarding “Cold Start Doctrine”.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C07%5C20%5Cstory_20-72010_pg11_11
2. The Dawn Newspaper:
India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Conventional war strategy best answer
21 July 2010
ISLAMABAD, July 20: Defense analysts at a workshop here on Tuesday called upon
the government to revisit conventional war strategy to counter the India’s Cold Start Doctrine
(CSD), which means offensive action against Pakistan without crossing its nuclear threshold.
This was discussed during a workshop on Indian military Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) under
the auspices of South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) being attended by defense
attachés of 38 countries here at Serena Hotel. Besides Secretary Defense Syed Athar Ali, the
workshop was also attended by Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA)
Khalid Banuri, former President National Defense University Lt-Gen Hamid Khan director
general South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) Maria Sultan and Assistant Professor
174
International Relations department of Quaid-e-Azam University Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal,
Academic Adviser, National Defense University Brig (retired) Naeem Salik and former
Director General Inter-Services Intelligence Lt-Gen (retired) Asad Durrani.
In his speech, defense Secretary Athar Ali said that idea of fighting or creating
space for short intense battles under the shadow of a nuclear over-hang as described by
Indian military Cold Start Doctrine was both dangerous and inherently a self-defeating
argument. Director General SASSI, Maria Sultan said that the goal of this workshop was
to bring together the think-tanks, experts, as well as government officials and specialists
from international and national organizations to work on the evolving discourse of Cold
Start Doctrine and regional stability.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/
local/islamabad/indias-cold-start-doctrine-conventional-war-strategy-best-answer-170
3. The Dawn Newspaper:
Cold Start Doctrine Risks Nuclear War: Experts
24 July 2010
ISLAMABAD, July 23: Security experts have criticized India for destabilizing peace
in the region by operationalizing its cold start doctrine (CSD) saying it would heighten the
risk of a nuclear war in the region. They were speaking at the concluding session of a
seminar on “Indian military’s cold start doctrine (CSD) and its implications for the strategic
stability of South Asia” organized by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI).
Former chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen (retired) Ehsanul Haq said
Pakistan had been seeking peaceful resolution to disputes and normalization of relations
with India. He further said “Our defence and security policy have been entirely focused on
deterring war,” he said and added that ‘restraint’ and ‘responsible’ had been the watchwords
of our nuclear policy. Lt. General (retired) Javed Ashraf Qazi said: “We are committed to
peace and we shall remain open to all such efforts which allow the region to come close in
dealing with common challenges.”
Director General SASSI Maria Sultan said the future war in South Asia can never
remain conventional. Presenting the new theory of integrated strategic equivalence as
Pakistan’s possible counter measures to Cold Start Doctrine, she said its objective was to
ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the threat of pre-emption.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/
local/islamabad/cold-start-doctrine-risks-nuclear-war-experts-470
4. The Nation:
Indian mly’s Cold Start Doctrine irrational: Qureshi
22 July 2010
175
July 22, 2010 ISLAMABAD (Agencies) – Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood
Qureshi Wednesday termed balance of power between Pakistan and India vital for strategic
stability in the region. Addressing a seminar on Indian military’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’.
Qureshi said being the nuclear powers the two neighbours should act responsibly, as the
Indo-Pak nuclear imbalance would impact the economic growth of the whole region. He
said Pakistan wanted economic cooperation and hence, the resolution of Kashmir issue,
nuclear deterrence and balance in the traditional armed forces were crucially vital.
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online//Politics/22Jul-2010/Indian-mlys-Cold-Start-Doctrine-irrational-Qureshi
5. The Indian News:
Pak would respond ‘immediately’, ‘proportionately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine
22 July 2010
Islamabad, July 22 (ANI): Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine’ as an ‘irrational’ start, and said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’
and proportionately’ if New Delhi acts on that policy. Speaking during a seminar here,
Qureshi said that the India Army is trying to dominate the region, which was evident from
its policies.
Qureshi stressed that the nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan was
adversely affecting the regional growth and development, The News reports. The Foreign
Minister also said that he has made it clear to his Indian counterpart SM Krishna that
Islamabad wants economic cooperation with New Delhi, and in order to succeed in that
aspect, a resolution to issues like Kashmir, nuclear deterrence and balance in traditional
armed forces were vital. Qureshi said that India should look to do away with its ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine’ and cooperate with Pakistan for the well being of people of both the neighbouring
nations.
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-would-respond-immediatelyproportionately-against-indias-cold-start-doctrine_100399760.html
6. One India:
Pak would respond ‘immediately’, ‘proportionately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine’
22 July 2010
Islamabad, July 22 (ANI): Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘Cold-Start
176
Doctrine’ as an ‘irrational’ start, and said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’
and proportionately’ if New Delhi acts on that policy.
Speaking during a seminar here, Qureshi said that the India Army is trying to
dominate the region, which was evident from its policies. Qureshi stressed that the nuclear
imbalance between India and Pakistan was adversely affecting the regional growth and
development, The News reports.
The Foreign Minister also said that he has made it clear to his Indian counterpart
SM Krishna that Islamabad wants economic cooperation with New Delhi, and in order to
succeed in that aspect, a resolution to issues like Kashmir, nuclear deterrence and balance
in traditional armed forces were vital. Qureshi said that India should look to do away with
its ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ and cooperate with Pakistan for the well being of people of both
the neighbouring nations.
http://news.oneindia.in/2010/07/22/pakwould-respond-immediately-proportionatelyagainsti.html
7. Bangladesh Sun:
Pak would respond ‘immediately’, ‘proportionately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start
Doctrine’
22 July, 2010
Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood
Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ as an ‘irrational’ start, and
said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’ and ‘proportionately’ if New Delhi
acts on that policy. Speaking during a seminar here, Qureshi said that the India Army is
trying to dominate the region, which was evident from its policies.
Qureshi stressed that the nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan was
adversely affecting the regional growth and development, The News reports. Qureshi said
that India should look to do away with its ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ and cooperate with Pakistan
for the well being of people of both the neighbouring nations. India’s “Cold War Doctrine”
involves joint operations between all the three services and integrated battle groups for
offensive operations.
http://story.bangladeshsun.com/index.php/ct/9/cid/303b19022816233b/id/662747/cs/1/
8. One Pakistan:
SASSI lauded for conducting moot on Cold Start Doctrine
26 July 2010
Islamabad - In order to congratulate South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI) for conducting three-day workshop ‘Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and
its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia’, Finance Minister, Government of
177
Punjab, Tanvir Ashraf Kaira, hosted a dinner in honour of the organization at the Punjab
House, says a press release issued here Sunday.
The dinner was also attended by Federal Minister for Industries, Production and
Special Initiatives Jahangir Khan Tareen, and State Minister for Railways Muhammad Afzal
Sindhu. The three-day workshop has nine sub-themes, theme 1-Introduction and Theoretical
Reference, theme 2 -Cold Start Concept and Evaluation: Definitions (Cold Start/Proactive
Ops) Conventional Doctrine - Pakistan-India, theme 3-Cold Start Assumptions, theme
4- Military Developments and Implications for Arms Race, theme 5- Strategic Stability
Implications: Pakistan’s Response, theme 6- International Response, theme 7- National
Response, theme 8- Pakistan Counter Measures and Nuclear Doctrine, and last theme 9
was the Concluding Session i.e. Implications for Strategic Stability.
In the concluding session SASSI Director General Dr. Maria Sultan said that the
future war in South Asia can never remain conventional. Presenting the new theory of
integrated strategic equivalence as Pakistan’s possible counter measures to Cold Start
Doctrine, she said its objective was to ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the threat of
pre-emption. “The use of sub-critical or fourth generation nuclear weapons, as a measure
for creating intra-war deterrence is required, especially after the initiation of Cold Start
Doctrine.” This is based on the central idea of deterrence that is communication of threat
and the credibility of threat combined with the intention to use force during operations.
She said there was a need to study the possible response options available to Pakistan in
the realm of the nuclear deterrence theory. “Whether Cold Start Doctrine has the ability to
create a gap between conventional and nuclear deterrence is another question,” she added.
“Currently, the Pakistani deterrence posture is based on minimum credible deterrence and
centralized command and control and strategic value targeting its need to be consent given
the new changing dynamics of threats and the theory, if strategic equivalence can help to
fill up the gap.”
http://www.onepakistan.com/news/local/islamabad/54924-SASSI-lauded-for-conductingmoot-CSD.html
9. Daily Mail News:
Non-state actors want instability in South Asia
21 July 2010
ISLAMABAD - Defense Secretary, Lt. General (retd.) Syed Athar Ali has said that
the region is facing unprecedented threats as the non-state actors wanted to destabilize
the whole region. Addressing an inaugural session of a three-day workshop on ‘Indian
Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia’
organized by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), the Defense Secretary
said that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear country and does not have any aggressive designs
against any other country.
The Defence Secretary urged the formulation of a combine policy for peace and
178
anti-terrorism in the region. He said that Pakistan has always adopted a responsible policy.
Lt. General (retd.) Syed Athar Ali warned that any future war between Pakistan and India
would not be limited, adding strategic balance is needed in the region. He said that the Cold
Start Doctrine is not in the interest of the region.
Earlier, inaugurating the conference, Director General SASSI, Maria Sultan has
informed the participants about the objective of the conference. She underlined that the
main objective of the workshop is to address the core issues.
http://dailymailnews.com/0710/21/CityPage/index.php?id=7
10. India Times:
Pak to respond `immediately` against India’s `Cold-Start Doctrine`!
22 July 2010
Islamabad: Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah
Mehmood Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ as an ‘irrational’
start, and said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’ and proportionately’ if
New Delhi acts on that policy. Speaking during a seminar here, Qureshi said that the India
Army is trying to dominate the region, which was evident from its policies.
Qureshi stressed that the nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan was
adversely affecting the regional growth and development, The News reports. The foreign
minister also said that he has made it clear to his Indian counterpart SM Krishna that
Islamabad wants economic cooperation with New Delhi, and in order to succeed in that
aspect, a resolution to issues like Kashmir, nuclear deterrence and balance in traditional
armed forces were vital.
Qureshi said that India should look to do away with its ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ and
cooperate with Pakistan for the well being of people of both the neighbouring nations.
India’s “Cold War Doctrine” involves joint operations between all the three services and
integrated battle groups for offensive operations.
http://oneclick.indiatimes.com/article/02Um0kp58hgDm?q=Pakistan
11. Zee News:
Pak to respond ‘immediately’ against India’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’
22 July 2010
Islamabad: Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah
Mehmood Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ as an ‘irrational’
start, and said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’ and proportionately’ if
New Delhi acts on that policy. Speaking during a seminar here, Qureshi said that the India
Army is trying to dominate the region, which was evident from its policies.
179
Qureshi stressed that the nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan was
adversely affecting the regional growth and development, The News reports. The foreign
minister also said that he has made it clear to his Indian counterpart SM Krishna that
Islamabad wants economic cooperation with New Delhi, and in order to succeed in that
aspect, a resolution to issues like Kashmir, nuclear deterrence and balance in traditional
armed forces were vital.
Qureshi said that India should look to do away with its ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ and
cooperate with Pakistan for the well being of people of both the neighbouring nations.
India’s “Cold War Doctrine” involves joint operations between all the three services and
integrated battle groups for offensive operations.
http://www.zeenews.com/news642786.html
12. The Express Tribune:
Give up aggressive Doctrine: Qureshi
22 July 2010
Foreign minister warns against military adventurism
ISLAMABAD:
Foreign
Minister
Shah
Mahmood
Qureshi
Wednesday
BAD F
i Mi
i t Sh
hM
h
dQ
hi on W
d d called
for New Delhi to dismiss its military’s Cold-Start Doctrine and increase cooperation with
Pakistan in the interests of regional peace. During his lecture, Qureshi said he had told
his India counterpart during a recent visit that Pakistan wanted economic cooperation,
resolution of the Kashmir issue, nuclear deterrence and a balance in the traditional armed
forces.
He said that being an atomic state, Pakistan was aware of its responsibilities, and
added that to restore peace in the region all neighboring countries should avoid military
adventurism against each other. Pakistan has been facing episodes like the Mumbai attacks
daily, and Pakistan wanted to expose all terrorist elements, Qureshi said. Qureshi also
touched on other pressing issues, stressing that the rise in temperatures globally would
cause the glaciers in the Himalayan Range to melt, spawning a water crisis.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 22nd, 2010.
180
13. Geo News:
Qureshi sees Regional Growth at Stake on Nuke Imbalance
21 July 2010
ISLAMABAD: Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi termed irrational the
Indian army’s theory of hegemony in the area, Geo News reported Wednesday. The FM
Qureshi said he told his India counterpart that Pakistan wants economic cooperation and
hence, the resolution of Kashmir issue, nuclear deterrence and balance in the traditional
armed forces are crucially vital. Qureshi stressed the raise in temperature would cause the
glaciers of Himalaya Range to melt, which would spawn drought, exposing the people in
the two countries to food crisis.
http://www.geo.tv/7-21-2010/68725.htm
14. News Gate:
Regional Balance imperative for Strategic Solidity: Qureshi
22 July, 2010
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said that it is vital for India and Pakistan
to have balance of power for strategic stability in the region. Addressing a seminar in
Islamabad on the topic of Indian military Cold-Start Doctrine, he said if India acted upon
this doctrine, Pakistan would respond immediately and proportionately.
The FM said Pakistan and India are nuclear powers and they should act responsibly.
He termed irrational the Indian army’s theory of hegemony in the area. He said that the
Indo-Pak nuclear imbalance would impact the economic growth of the region as well.
Qureshi said he told his India counterpart that Pakistan wants economic cooperation
and hence, the resolution of Kashmir issue, nuclear deterrence and balance in the traditional
armed forces are crucially vital.
http://www.news-gate.info/hourly/regional-balance-imperative-for-strategic-solidityqureshi/
15. The Muslim Observer:
181
India & Pakistan: “Cordial, Frank & Useful” Talks
22 July 2010
NEW DELHI: Paradoxically, Indo-Pak talks held recently have invited more
criticism than appreciation from several sections in the subcontinent. They have been
described as “a stalemate,” “disappointing,” “a failure,” having “collapsed,” “hypocritical”
and so forth. Some parties, including India’s key opposition party- Bharatiya Janata Party
have even demanded that Indo-Pak dialogue process should be called off. A close analysis
of statements made by participants in the talks, however, conveys a different picture.
The talks were held in Islamabad between Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna and his
Pakistani counterpart Shah Mahmood Qureshi (July 15).
After their meeting, while addressing a joint press conference with Qureshi,
Krishna began by thanking his Pakistani counterpart for “sentiments he has expressed
about good neighborly relationship between our two countries.” “That’s what we have
been striving for the last so many years. At times, we have succeeded, at times we have not
been able to make for the kind of progress that we expected, we thought we would,” He
described his talks with Qureshi as “cordial and useful.” “We reviewed the current state
of bilateral relations and discussed steps to promote trust and confidence in keeping with
the mandate given to both of us by the respective Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan
during their meeting in Thimphu,” Krishna said. “I think our talks have enabled us to
develop better understanding. We are starting on this journey cognizant of the complexities
in our relationship, the challenges that lie ahead and the promise that a good neighborly
relationship between our two countries holds for our peoples,” he pointed out.
Krishna conveyed India’s concern about terrorism to Qureshi, laying stress that not
allowing “territory of Pakistan to be used for terrorism against India would go a long way
in building trust and confidence.” In addition, they discussed a number of other bilateral
issues. “The bottom line is that it was good and constructive discussion,” Krishna said. To
continue the discussion, “I have invited Qureshi to visit India, and I would look forward to
welcome him to India in the near future,” Krishna said.
“We had a very frank, candid and honest discussion on where we stand, how we
look at our bilateral relations, and how do we move forward,” Qureshi said. “Pakistan has
always wanted friendly, cooperative, and good neighborly relations with India. We have
started a process to achieve this objective. Both sides recognize that process had made
incremental progress,” he pointed out. To “move forward,” dialogue is necessary and so
is addressing issues of mutual concern, Qureshi said. “Today, both India and Pakistan are
victims of terrorism. How do we face this challenge? We have come to the conclusion that
the best way to deal with this challenge is to recognize this as a common enemy and adopt
a common approach vis-à-vis this menace,” he said.
Referring to Mumbai-strikes, Qureshi said: “Pakistan would take the leads provided by
the (Indian) Home Minister very seriously because we want to move on.” “And progress visà-vis the Mumbai trial, cooperation in overcoming the challenge of terrorism is important and
has taken a very prominent role. One recognizes that,” he said. There are also issues of “core
182
importance” to Pakistan, on which, “We have agreed on the need to discuss them, to make the
process meaningful,” Qureshi stated. They discussed “all issues that are of importance whether
it is terrorism, Jammu and Kashmir, the recent developments in Jammu and Kashmir, Sir Creek,
Siachen,” he pointed out. They also talked in “very open, in a very frank, and in a very candid
manner” about “opportunities of economic cooperation,” “economic integration” and “peopleto-people contacts” to facilitate and sustain the dialogue, Qureshi said.
Concluding his statement, Qureshi described the meeting as “useful in creating
an understanding on how to move forward.” He said: “We also feel that the progress
made through a concerted effort in the last four years should not come to naught and we
should build on it. So, to that extent I would say this was a useful meeting; it was a useful
engagement; and we have agreed to continue this engagement in the days to come.”
When questioned about his Pakistan-visit in Delhi, Krishna replied: “I am quite
satisfied.” On “gains” of his visit, he said: “The very fact that I went to Islamabad and
I talked about core issues in our relationship…if you consider it as a gain, I am ready to
along with it.” “I have invited Qureshi to India. I am looking forward to resuming the
dialogue from where we left,” Krishna said.
Irrespective of whether Krishna-Qureshi talks are criticized as a failure or not, India
and Pakistan seem committed to continuing their dialogue-process. Ahead of his meeting,
Krishna said: “I am carrying with me a message of peace and friendship from the people
of India and we hope to undertake this voyage of peace, however long and arduous, jointly
with the Government and people of Pakistan.” After the talks, on his plans to visit India,
Qureshi said: “I do not want to visit India for a leisure trip. I want to go for meaningful,
constructive and result-oriented talks if the right atmosphere prevails and if they are fully
prepared (for talks).”
Undeniably, it will take years, perhaps decades for India and Pakistan to resolve
their differences on certain issues. But at least at present they are keen to continue the
dialogue-process. Ruling out the option of calling off this process, Indian Foreign Secretary
Nirupama Rao said: “I think dialogue with Pakistan is essential and continues to be the best
option to engage Pakistan.”
http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=6558
16. Andhra News:
Pak would respond immediately, proportionately against India’s Cold-Start
Doctrine
22 July 2010
Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood
Qureshi has described the Indian Armys Cold-Start Doctrine as an irrational start, and said that
Islamabad would respond to it immediately and proportionately if New Delhi acts on that policy.
Islamabad, July 22 : Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan Foreign
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Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’
as an ‘irrational’ start, and said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’ and
proportionately’ if New Delhi acts on that policy.
Speaking during a seminar here, Qureshi said that the India Army is trying to
dominate the region, which was evident from its policies. Qureshi stressed that the nuclear
imbalance between India and Pakistan was adversely affecting the regional growth and
development, The News reports.
The Foreign Minister also said that he has made it clear to his Indian counterpart
SM Krishna that Islamabad wants economic cooperation with New Delhi, and in order to
succeed in that aspect, a resolution to issues like Kashmir, nuclear deterrence and balance
in traditional armed forces were vital. Qureshi said that India should look to do away with
its ‘Cold-Start Doctrine’ and cooperate with Pakistan for the well being of people of both
the neighbouring nations.
India’s “Cold War Doctrine” involves joint operations between all the three services
and integrated battle groups for offensive operations. A key component is the preparation
of India’s forces to be able to quickly mobilise and take offensive actions without crossing
the enemy’s nuclear-use threshold.
http://www.andhranews.net/Intl/2010/July/22/would-respond-immediatelyproportionately-30191.asp
17. The Hindu:
We’re willing to walk the Extra Mile: Qureshi
22 July 2010
Pakistan, according to Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi, is
willing to walk the “proverbial extra mile” with India in pursuit of peace, but for this the
two countries need to return to the negotiating table with the political will to resolve all
outstanding issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, peacefully and in
accordance with international law and morality. Mr. Qureshi was addressing a three-day
international workshop on “Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for
Strategic Stability of South Asia” here on Wednesday.
Referring to the meeting last week with his Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, Mr.
Qureshi said Pakistan’s efforts to recommence the stalled dialogue in pursuit of “our”
endeavors for durable peace in the region did not draw a “corresponding positive response.”
However, the Minister maintained that the two countries should work together to institute a
sustained dialogue for peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia. “We should not remain
hostage to our troubled past. We must rise to the occasion and take bold decisions to lead
our people to a more hopeful and promising future.”
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article527020.ece
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18. India Today:
Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine an ‘Irrationally Dangerous Concept’: Qureshi
22 July 2010
Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi on Wednesday described
Indian military’s “Cold Start Doctrine” (CSD) as an “irrationally dangerous concept” and
questioned the rationality of the Indian military planners behind it.
This was second round of blasting fired by of India by Qureshi. Leading daily
The News said addressing a workshop on ‘Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its
Implications for Strategic Stability of South Asia’, organized by Sassi, the foreign minister
said that it was hard to imagine that any “rational mind” could come up with such dangerous
ideas like the Cold Start. He said, “One wonders, if anyone was now willing to undertake
an adventure beyond deterrence”.
Qureshi hoped Indian political leadership, civil society and intellectuals would
discourage any doctrine that would cause instability in the region. “Pakistan remained
committed to the objective of peace and stability in the region and for this end wants to
settle all outstanding disputes, including Kashmir with India,” he said.
The minister said that the region needs peace so that serious issues like poverty
eradication and dangers of global warming could be addressed. “Therefore, Pakistan wants
to resume the Composite Dialogue with India and tried to resume it last week,” he said.
Many scholars also addressed on the 2nd day of the workshop including Dr.
Maria Sultan, Dr. Riffat Hussain, Chairman Department of Defence & Strategic Studies,
Hamid Hamza Khan, Tariq Osman Hyder, former ambassador, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, former
ambassador, Major General (Retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, Khalid Banuri, Director Arms
Control & Disarmament Affairs.
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/106281/Zain+accepts+Bharti’s+offer+for+African+
assets.html?complete=1
19. DNA India News:
India not responding positively on restarting talks: Pakistan
22 July 2010
Pakistan today accused India of not responding positively to its efforts to restart the
dialogue process and contended that it would go the “extra mile” if New Delhi takes steps
in this regard.
A week after his talks with external affairs minister SM Krishna ended in sharp
differences, Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said the two countries
should not become “hostage to history” and should take “bold decisions” for ushering in
peace in the region.” It goes without saying that neither peace nor stability can be achieved
185
in isolation. They need strong partnerships and willingness to build bridges and walk the
talk on the high road to peace and equal security,” he said at a seminar here.
Qureshi, who was speaking on the topic ‘India’s Cold Start Military Doctrine’, said
the subject of discussion was “ironic” as he had recently hosted Krishna for talks “as part
of efforts to recommence the stalled dialogue in pursuit of our endeavors for durable peace
in the region, albeit without a corresponding positive response.”
Pakistan, on its part, is prepared to go the “extra mile” if India takes steps to resume
the peace process, he insisted. Qureshi’s talks with Krishna here on July 15 ended on
an acrimonious note with sharp differences coming out in the open at their joint press
conference.
Qureshi said Pakistan wants to discuss all outstanding issues, including the “core
issue” of Kashmir so that they can be resolved peacefully.” Pakistan remains firmly
committed to the objective of peace and stability in South Asia,” he said. Qureshi said
Pakistan is pursuing a three-pronged approach with India to achieve durable peace and
strategic stability in South Asia. Qureshi also said during the recent foreign minister-level
talks, India had focused only on its concerns related to terrorism and the 2008 Mumbai
attacks even though Pakistan faces Mumbai-like incidents almost daily.
Describing the so-called “Cold Start doctrine” as “irrational”, Qureshi said he
hoped India’s political leadership, civil society and intellectuals will discourage any move
or doctrine that endangers peace in South Asia. India and Pakistan need to avoid an arms
race in the region and resolve outstanding issues so that they can focus on more pressing
issues like tackling poverty and boosting socio-economic development, Qureshi said.
Qureshi also contended that India had not responded to several proposals made by
Pakistan during 1974-1998 to keep South Asia free of nuclear weapons. “As a consequence,
we were forced to respond to Indian nuclear tests which were followed by highly provocative
statements made by senior political leaders in May 1998,” he said.
Addressing the seminar organized by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
yesterday, Defence Secretary Lt Gen (retired) Syed Athar Ali said the idea of fighting
short intense battles under a nuclear overhang, as envisaged by the Cold Start doctrine,
is dangerous as it “underestimates the nuclear reality of South Asia” and the “Pakistani
resolve to deter any future war...through all means available to it”.
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_india-not-responding-positively-on-restartingtalks-pakistan_1412791
20. Daily The Nation:
Beyond Cold Start
23 July 2010
FOREIGN Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi declared India’s Cold Start Doctrine
186
as irrational and an attempt to establish Indian hegemony in the region. He also stated
that Pakistan would respond immediately. All this is ironic because Cold Start has been
floated by the Indian strategists and adopted by its military since 2004 and they have been
developing a capability to operationalise this strategy since. Effectively, Cold Start is a
tactic aimed at gaining the initiative in a quick strike against the enemy with the element
of surprise. It requires a close enmeshing of the three services and in India’s case it was the
first attempt by Indian planners to break out of the nuclear deterrence - or what the Indian
perceive as a nuclear “deadlock”.
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/
Editorials/23-Jul-2010/Beyond-Cold-Start
21. Associated Press of Pakistan (APP):
Pakistan Desires Peaceful Coexistence with Neighbours on Equal Footing: Samsaam
19 July 2010
ISLAMABAD, July 19 (APP) - Minister of State for Information Syed Samsam Ali
Bukhari said on Monday that Pakistan desires peaceful coexistence with all its neighbours
with dignity and on the basis of equality. He commented that while inaugurating a threeday workshop on “Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic
Stability in South Asia organised by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) here.
The inaugural session was attended by Minister for Housing Rehmatullah Kakar, Minister
of State for Defence Production Sardar Salim Haider, Punjab Minister for Finance Tanveer
Ashraf Kaira, defense attaches of foreign missions.
The minister said that he was happy to learn about institutes like SASSI are
monitoring the current scenario and have courage to make Pakistanis aware of it. Samsam
Bukhari said that the cold start doctrine has serious basic flaws as it assumes that Pakistan
will accept any Indian military adventurism passively which is contrary to the truth.
Maria Sultan, Director General of SASSI said the main objective of the workshop
is to address the core issues and make the nation aware about the Cold Start Doctrine, to
highlight the threats to the Strategic Stability in South Asia by Indian strategy. She said
that this strategy became significant with the statement of Indian Chief of the Army Staff
General Deepak Kapoor in November 2009 that the possibility of a limited war under a
nuclear hangover in the region was likely to exist and was a reality.
Maria Sultan said the aim of the doctrine is to increase the Indian military strike
options for possibly retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan without invoking the
Pakistani nuclear threshold in short aiming to create conditions of a limited war. The Cold
Start doctrine envisages an increase in the Indian military options based on a situation where
Indian armed forces can have sufficient military success that can be used to achieve limited
political objectives before an international intervention or the conflict turns nuclear.
http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=109822&Ite
mid=1
187
22. My News:
Qureshi Spews More Venom, this time on Indian Army
22 July 2010
Islamabad: Spewing venom against India once again, Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah
Mehmood Qureshi has described the Indian Army’s ‘cold-start doctrine’ as an ‘irrational’
strategy, and said that Islamabad would respond to it ‘immediately’ and proportionately’ if
New Delhi acts on that policy. Speaking during a seminar in Islamabad, Qureshi said that
the India Army is trying to dominate the region, which was evident from its policies.
Qureshi stressed that the nuclear imbalance between India and Pakistan was
adversely affecting the regional growth and development, The News reported. The foreign
minister also said that he has made it clear to his Indian counterpart SM Krishna that
Islamabad wants economic cooperation with New Delhi, and in order to succeed in that
aspect, a resolution to issues like Kashmir, nuclear deterrence and balance in traditional
armed forces were vital.
Qureshi said that India should look to do away with its ‘cold-start doctrine’ and
cooperate with Pakistan for the well being of people of both the neighbouring nations.
Since the most significant aim of this new war doctrine is to strike offensively without
giving away battle indicators of mobilization, it is imperative that all strike formations,
headquarters, armoured divisions and armoured brigades are re-located from their existing
locations in central India and Punjab to forward locations.
http://www.mynews.in/News/Qureshi_spews_more_venom,_this_time_on_Indian_
Army_N73495.html
23. Din News:
SASSI Lauded for Conducting Moot on Cold Start Doctrine
26 July 2010
Islamabad -- In order to congratulate South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI) for conducting three-day workshop Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its
Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia, Finance Minister, Government of Punjab,
Tanvir Ashraf Kaira, hosted a dinner in honour of the organization at the Punjab House,
says a press release issued here Sunday. The dinner was also attended by Federal Minister
for Industries, Production and Special Initiatives Jehangir Khan Tareen, and State Minister
for Railways Muhammad Afzal Sindhu.
In the concluding session SASSI Director General Dr. Maria Sultan said that the future
war in South Asia can never remain conventional. Presenting the new theory of integrated
strategic equivalence as Pakistan’s possible counter measures to Cold Start Doctrine, she said
its objective was to ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the threat of pre-emption.
http://www.dinnews.tv/dinnews/national/sassi_lauded_for_conducting_moot_on_csd96616.aspx
188
24. All Voices:
Pakistan Wishes Good Ties with India
22 July 2010
ISLAMABAD: Former chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General (retd)
Ehsan ul Haq has said that Pakistan has been seeking a peaceful resolution of disputes and
normalizations of relations with India.
“Our defence and security policy have been entirely focused on deterring war.
‘Restraint’ and ‘Responsible’ have been the watchwords of our nuclear policy. It is in
pursuit of this policy that it has proposed the strategic restraint region to achieve stability
and foster mutual confidence,” he stated this while addressing the concluding session of a
three-day workshop on ‘Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its implication for the
strategic Stability of South Asia’ organized by the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI). He said, “As long as destabilizing concepts like the Cold Start Doctrine are being
projected, Pakistan has to undertake all measures to safeguard its territorial sovereignty.
Fortunately the government armed forces are alive to these challenges and have been keenly
evaluating their impact on our security.”
Addressing the workshop, Lieutenant General (retd) Javed Ashraf Qazi said, “We
are moving away from this ethos and discourse and democratically elected governments of
two nations are ready to establish peace and stability in line with the traditions of the great
nations of the world.”
The Director General SASSI, Maria Sultan, said no future war in South Asia could
remain conventional as the rings of escalation can easily be extended and may include
unintended consequence. While presenting new theory integrated strategic equivalence as
Pakistan’s possible counter measures to Cold Start Doctrine, she said that the objective of
this strategy is to ensure that Pakistan no longer fears the threat of pre-emption or remains
under the threat of a conventional threat of coercion/oblique war and retains the initiative
thought out the battle space and war.
Especially after the initiations of Cold Start Doctrine. She also highlighted the use
of sub-critical or fourth generation nuclear weapons, as a measure for creating intra wart
deterrence. She said that this is based on the central idea of deterrence that is communication
of threat and the credibility of threat combined with the intention of the use of force during
operations; this is the bedrock of deterrence stability.
http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/6368291-pakistan-wishes-good-ties-with-india
25. High Beam Research:
Intl Workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine, its
Implications for Strategic Stability in S. Asia from 20th
20 July 2010
189
Islamabad, July 19, 2010 (PPI): A Three-Day International Workshop on Indian
Military’s Cold Start Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia will
be held from 20th -22nd July here at a local hotel. The workshop has been organized by
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI).
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-232129427.html
26. The Press Enterprise:
SASSI Lauded for Conducting Moot on Cold Start Doctrine
26 July 2010
Monday, July 26, 2010 Islamabad In order to congratulate South Asian Strategic
Stability Institute (SASSI) for conducting three-day workshop Indian Military Cold Start
Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia.
http://topics.pe.com/article/00gP4wW8Do92E?q=Islamabad
27. Hamari Web:
Indian Military Doctrine has Serious Implications: Samsam
20 July 2010
ISLAMABAD: Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Samsam
Bukhari on Monday inaugurated a three-day workshop on Indian Military’s Cold Start
Doctrine and its Implications for Strategic Stability in South Asia organised by the South
Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) at a local hotel, says a press release.
Addressing the inaugural session, Samsam Bukhari said India has seemingly
unveiled this strategy since 2004. It is based on the assumption that occupation of limited
Pakistani territory, following a surgical military strike, could be used as a haggling chip to
force Islamabad to heel. But I am happy that there is someone (SASSI) who is monitoring
the whole current scenario and has courage to create awareness among the people of
Pakistan, he added.
Samsam said: We are a strong nation and have a capability to face and fight any
aggression against Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and system are safe and invincible.
SASSI Director General Ms Maria Sultan said in her speech that the main objective of the
workshop is to address the core issues and make the nation aware regarding Cold Start
Doctrine to highlight threats to the strategic stability in South Asia by the Indian Cold Start
Doctrine.
http://www.hamariweb.com/enews/indian-military-doctrine-has-serious-implicationssamsam_nid289459.aspx
190