Perversion
Anthony Gambrell
University of Helsinki
anthony.gambrell@helsinki.fi
[Draft]
A “perverted”1 act is thought to deviate from an ideal, a social norm, or natural
inclinations. Here, I will be discussing sexual perversion. In labeling a sex act
“perverted,” we indicate its deviation from ideal sex, a sexual norm, or natural
sexual inclinations.
We may, accordingly, express moral objection or distaste; or, moreover,
condemn the act in question as morally wrong. However, I ask: Can we determine certain properties of a sex act, or its lacking certain properties, that make
it “perverted” or “deviant”? Disputing Nagel’s (1969) account of ideal sex in
terms of intimacy and multi-leveled communication, I shall claim that a lack
of communication does not warrant labeling an act “perverted.”
Further, Scruton (1986) claims sexual activity is intrinsically moral, such
that we may designate certain sex acts “perverted” in moral terms, that is, as
morally objectionable, if not immoral, by reason of perversion. Proceeding
from Goldman’s (1977) criticism, I will dispute Scruton’s claim.
The problem is whether we can apply the term “perversion” in such a
way as to make valid (moral) judgements about sex acts. Now, if in labeling a
sex act “perverted,” we merely express distaste or disapproval, judgments on
the ideality of sex or its moral value are not valid.
1
Sexual activity said to be, or considered, “perverted” (“deviant”) is, e.g., homosexuality, onanism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, frotteurism, fethishism (e.g. shoe fetish),
sexual sadism and masochism, transvestism, coprophilia, urophilia, zoophilia,
necrophilia, pedophilia, and incest.
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I
Perfect Sex
Nagel (1969) sets forth a psychological account of sexual “perversion,” irrespective of moral concerns, social norms, etc. Rather than evaluating sex
morally, Nagel (1969) attempts to determine sexual perfection or an ideal form
of sex, whereas the term “perversion” seemingly implies an ideal form of sex
of which it is lacking. (Ibid, p. 16.) Notably, Nagel attempts to determine the
quality of sex not so much in terms of pleasure or enjoyment as in what makes
sex good qua activity. For Nagel grants that “perverted” sex might be preferable to “unperverted,” or more ideal, sex, in terms of enjoyment. (Ibid, p.
16-7.)
Sex, on Nagel's account, is evaluated in terms of an ideal, not enjoyment. As Nagel explains:
[I]n the paradigm case of mutual desire there is a complex system
of superimposed mutual perceptions — not only perceptions of the
sexual object, but perceptions of oneself. (Nagel 1969:10)
Here, levels of reciprocity and sexual self-awareness enhance the sexual experience, or state of arousal. A deviation from this “paradigm case” may be described as a “perversion.” Sex, if (more) complete, entails mutual perception,
awareness, and affection. If sex lacks mutuality and dynamic interaction, it is
incomplete or “perverted,” qua activity.
First, a person is sexually perceived, whereupon the one who perceives
her is, then, perceived in return. Sexual tension, then, generates “a system of
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superimposed mutual perceptions” (ibid, p. 10) wherein sexual agents are
aware of themselves qua sexual objects through each other's perceptions, in a
state of reciprocal tension or arousal. A state of arousal is attained through
“[…] a desire that one's partner be aroused by the recognition of one's desire
that he or she be aroused (ibid, p. 12).
States of arousal can be distinguished by multiple levels, on this account, but the initial three levels or stages, setting the cycle of reciprocal
arousal in motion, may be described as follows.2 (1) A perceives B as a sexual
object, at which point arousal occurs; yet B is unaware of, or unresponsive to,
A's arousal, directed at B. (2) B becomes aware of, or responsive to, A's
arousal, at which point B becomes aroused; thus A, aware of B's desire directed at A, is not only aroused by the mere perception of B as a sexual object but
by being sensed itself as such, through B's desire. (3) A becomes not only
aware of, or responsive to, B's desire directed at A, but becomes further
aroused at B's arousal at being aroused by A; and B becomes likewise aroused
at A's arousal at being aroused by B. From this third stage of mutual awareness
and self-awareness, still heightened and more complex levels of arousal ensue.
(Ibid, p. 10-11.)
On this account of dynamic sexual relations, sex is interactive and interpersonal. A person is the object of sexual desire not merely for her attractive
features but via sexual self-awareness of another person and her awareness of
oneself. A person’s features are not the object of a sexual interest towards her.
(Ibid, p. 9.) We may be attracted to a person for her attractive features; yet one
does not desire to the same extent any person carrying the same or similar features; nor would one be motivated to engage any such person in communication.
2
The following description (paraphrased) is extracted from Nagel's own account, in the
''Romeo and Juliet''-section of “Sexual Perversion” (1969).
3
Sexual “perversion,” then, deviates from the person, whereas it is misdirected towards the object, in treating a person as a mere object or in its
fetishized interest in a mere object. Perversion misses, or lacks, interpersonality in sexual relations. If we compare sex to appetite, shoe fetish, e.g., would be
as if “[...] someone liked to eat cookbooks, or magazines with pictures of food
in them, and preferred these to ordinary food” (ibid, p. 7). If one prefers to
fondle footwear, instead of caressing a human body in intimate relations with
another, that would count as an example of “imperfect,” i.e. perverted, sex.
II
Plain Sex
Goldman (1977) sets forth a minimal definition of sex. For Goldman, sex is
not necessarily a means to other extraneous or separable ends, but, rather, a
physical activity pleasurable in itself. (Ibid, p. 276.) However, Nagel (1969),
on whose account multi-leveled interpersonal communication is understood as
the ideal of sexual relations, retains a view of sex as means of communication.
(Goldman 1977:275.) Communication is, however, neither sufficient nor necessary for a definition of sex, as Goldman notes. Rather:
[S]exual desire is desire for contact with another person's body and
for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is
activity which tends to fulfill such desire of the agent. (Ibid, p.
268)
Sexual desire is, in short, “a bodily desire for the body of another” (ibid, p.
268). “A desire for physical contact” is a minimal criterion for common or
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“plain” sex. To qualify (normal) desire as sexual, the desire for physical contact is both necessary and sufficient.
[T]he desire for physical contact in itself, without the wish to express affection or other feelings through it, is sufficient to render
sexual the activity of the agent which fulfills it. (Ibid. p. 269)
Sex is, on this account, not intrinsically interpersonal or a means of interpersonal communication. A definition of sex as a means of communication proceeds not from “the intrinsic nature and the value of the act itself” (ibid, p.
276) but what is auxiliary to sexual activity, though it may be essential for the
preferences of some or most sexual agents. Sexual activity seeks no necessary
goal other than the pleasure in the physical contact and activity itself.
Further, intimacy, or interpersonal communication and (self-)awareness
of a heightened state of arousal, though be it the preference of some or most
sexual agents, may also, in other cases, disrupt or impede sexual experience,
rather than enrich or enhance it. While engaging in sexual activity, one may
wish his or her partner to be passive; and thus an awareness of a heightened
state of arousal by one's partner might become a distraction. Also, in being or
becoming aware of a state of arousal, one interrupts the state of arousal.
Rather than being involved in a state of arousal, one reflects on the arousal.
Sex thus becomes intellectualized, while it is primarily an immediate physical
experience.
A communicative account of sexual desire seeks to refine or intellectualize sexual desire in the attempt to extend it beyond the purely physical domain; accordingly, as Goldman argues, “plain sex” as a (minimally) pure physical desire becomes vulgar, perverted, deviant, etc. (Ibid, p. 279.)
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Nagel's account does not, on Goldman's (p. 278) view, avoid this criticism. What does not fall under a description of reciprocal multi-leveled communication in sex, can be designated, on Nagel's account, as a form or a degree of “perversion”; yet sex, without this mutual awareness, can be described
as “normal” or “plain.” On Nagel's account, we can designate, e.g., voyeurism
as “perverted”; yet we cannot accommodate sexual activity without a high degree of mutual awareness or conscious thought, save by designating it, also, as
“perverted,” at least to a degree. (Ibid, p. 278-9.) If “normal” or “plain” sex is
designated as “perverted,” “deviant,” “defective,” “imperfect,” etc., these adjectives defeat their purpose.
III
Moral Sex
Scruton (1986) sets forth a thesis on a morality of sexual conduct in which the
intention is “[...] [to] give the philosophical grounding for a sexual morality,
and argue that moral consideration cannot be subtracted from the sexual act
without at the same time destroying its distinctive character” (Scruton 1986:2).
Here, Scruton argues against the “modern prejudice” that ''[m]orality attaches
[...] not to the sexual act, but always to something else, with which it may be
conjoined” (ibid). By contrast, sex is, on Scruton's account, intrinsically
moral: “[T]he sexual act is, and must always be, limited by moral
scruples.” (Scruton 1986:3.) Thus, sexual perversion is regarded in itself a
moral problem.
For Scruton, sexual conduct is “normal” where it entails “interpersonal
intentionality” (ibid, p. 26); otherwise “perverted” or “deviant.” Further:
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Sexual desire involves the marshalling and directing of animal
urges towards an interpersonal aim, and an interpersonal fulfilment. (Scruton 1986:289.)
Here, Scruton (1986) distinguishes between human sexual desire and animal
urges, whereas the former directs the latter towards an “interpersonal aim,”
viz. personal relations of mutual respect, intimacy, care, affection, etc. This
distinction accords with Scruton's idea — “following a path trodden by Aristotle” (ibid, p. 288) — of human beings as rational beings as well as animals.
Rational beings are personal or social beings “[...] not merely in the sense of
being made for society, but in the stronger sense of being made by
society” (ibid, p. 288-9). Further:
The rational being is a personal being, characterised not only by
his ability to reason but also by his possession of a first-person
perspective, responsibility and the rich interpersonal emotional life
which those entail. (Scruton 1986:288)
Sexual “perversions” deviate from human sexual desire in which obtains “individualizing intentionality” or “individualizing attention” (ibid, p. 120) viz.
an intention or an aim to engage in interpersonal (intimate or emotional) relations, in which context one’s attention is directed at another qua person.
For
Scruton (1986:289), sex designated as “perverted” is “impersonal” or “depersonalized” where sexual desire is not directed at a person but a mere object,
whether the body or another object, such as clothing. “Interpersonal attitude”
are “elements of normal human nature,” and they express recognition of human social nature, necessary to human happiness and constitutive of human
personal existence. A person who lacks “interpersonal attitudes,” which are
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elements of normal human nature, is devoid of personhood, or “depersonalized.” To lack “interpersonal attitudes” is a “deviation” from “normal human
nature”; and a person, lacking these traits, can rightly be called “deviant” or
even a “psychopath,” viz. not fully or imperfectly human. Impersonal (“perverted”) sex lacks a basic human attitude or a moral perspective. To not recognize another as a person is an insult or an affront to that other — and to oneself — as a human being. Sexual “perversion” is thus morally objectionable or
“morally contaminated.” Lacking “interpersonal intentionality” in sexual conduct, divorcing the other from his or her personhood by objectification, “[...]
we remove what is deepest in ourselves — our life — from our moral commerce, and set it apart, in a realm that is free from the sovereignty of a moral
law, a realm of curious pleasure, in which the body is both sovereign and obscene. This [...] is the major structural feature of perversion, and the feature
which justifies the moral condemnation of perverted desire […]” (ibid).
IV
Distaste, Disapproval
Sex is not, according to Goldman (1977), intrinsically moral.
Any analysis of sex which imputes a moral character to sex acts in
themselves is wrong for that reason. There is no morality intrinsic
to sex, although general moral rules apply to the treatment of others in sex acts as they apply to all human relations. (Goldman
1977:280.)
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Pace Scruton (1986), moral rules applied to sexual activity are not peculiar to
sexual activity but applicable to human activity, thus applicable to sexual activity. Sexual activity is not immediately a moral concern; yet in sexual activity, we engage with others such that moral principles or rules apply, as elsewhere. In short: An act is not wrong because it is sexual. If deemed “right” or
“wrong,” a sexual act is not “right” or “wrong” by reason of sexuality
(“wrong” in case of “perversion”); it is “right” or “wrong” for other reasons
(e.g. inflicting harm) in light of general moral principles or rules applicable to
human activity, including sexual activity.
Certain sexual “perversions,” most specifically pedophilia, may be
morally objectionable, but they are not morally objectionable by reason of
sexual “perversion” but, rather, on account of inflicting harm, thus opposing
certain general moral principles applicable to human behavior irrespective of
sexuality, viz. to sexual and non-sexual behavior alike. If moral rules apply
specifically to sexual activity, those rules are implied by general moral principles applicable to human activity. (Goldman 1977:280.)
Thus, a sexual act is neither to be condemned nor excused by reason of
sexuality. Sexuality has no immediate bearing on morality. If sexual activity is
condemned morally wrong on grounds of “perversion,” that condemnation denotes mere distaste or disapproval; thus, it is not a valid moral judgment.
Scruton’s account of sex as intrinsically moral amounts to no more
than defending specific (his own) moral values with regard to sex, designating
certain sex acts as “perverted” on a pre-supposed value of “interpersonal
aims.” Further, following Goldman (1977), if sex is intrinsically moral, where
impersonal aims deviate from sexual morality, common or “plain” sex deviates from sexual morality.
V
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Quantitative Abnormality
On Goldman's account, a “perverted” sex act deviates from a social norm in a
mere statistical sense, contra an evaluative understanding of sexual perversion. (Goldman 1977:284.) Though, as Goldman grants, not all statistically
unusual sexual acts are perverted. A sexual act must relate to “the form of the
desire” in question and carry “[...] the typical physical sexual effects upon the
individual who satisfies [unusual sexual desires]” (ibid, p. 284) if we are to
designate that act as “perverted” or “abnormal,” e.g. a desire for contact with
mere clothing. The norm is here understood as statistical or quantitative, viz.
in terms of what is common.
Perverted sex is simply abnormal sex, and if the norm is not to be
an idealized or romanticized extraneous end or purpose, it must
express the way human sexual desires usually manifest themselves. (Ibid, p. 285.)
On this understanding, “perversion” qua deviation from a statistical social
norm, is not a deviation from loving, more intimate, affectionate, or interpersonal sexual relations.
However, the term “perversion” arguably becomes redundant on
Goldman's account, understood as statistically unusual sexual conduct. (Primoratz 1997:250; 1999:56-7.) Moral objection or distaste is here no longer
relevant. To discount the negative (moral) connotation of the term renders it
inapplicable. The concept of sexual “perversion” entails “[...] rich connotations of extremely strange, incomprehensible, distasteful, and morally repel-
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lent sex. [...] If all that is to go by the board, so should the term itself” (Primoratz 1997:250).
Also, as Primoratz (1997; 1999) notes, if sexual “perversion” is defined merely as “statistically unusual sexual behavior,” “atypical,” or “statistically abnormal,” etc., pedophilia and necrophilia might, arguably, not, on that
definition, qualify as a sexual perversion.”3 (Primoratz 1997:250; 1999:56.)
VI
Conclusion
Sex is not intrinsically moral. To label a sex act “perverted” signifies no more
than distaste or disapproval in the interest of pre-supposed moral values by
which sexual conduct, not immediately a moral concern, is judged.
Further, the term “perversion” becomes redundant if only understood in
terms of factual statements, or a descriptive account, as Goldman’s. The term
signifies a negative attitude — distaste, disapproval, or moral condemnation
— towards certain sex acts. Granted, moral condemnation, given certain general moral principles, may prove valid, e.g. where harm is inflicted on a person. Yet moral condemnation is not valid on grounds of an act being “sexual”
and “perverted.”
Sources
3
Primoratz (1997; 1999) does not, however, make much fuzz about this potential objection
against Goldman's account. Also, I doubt necrophilia would not count as “statistically abnormal.” If only because of a lack of access to corpses, I cannot see how necrophilia, at least in
practice, would count as typical, in terms of statistics. Also, pedophilia is, arguably, not “statistically abnormal,” though in terms of activity it might.
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Goldman, Alan H. 1977. “Plain Sex.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6,
No. 3. (Spring, 1977), pp. 267-287. Princeton University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1969. “Sexual Perversion.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
66, No. 1. (Jan. 16, 1969), pp. 5-17. Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Primoratz, Igor. 1997. “Sexual Perversion.” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 245-258. University of Illinois Press.
_____1999. Ethics and Sex. London, New York: Routledge.
Scruton, Roger. 1986. Sexual Desire. A Philosophical Investigation. London:
Phoenix Press.
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