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Carolyn Woods Eisenberg. Drawing the line: The American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 522 pp.
John F. Hinrichs, University of Houston
Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, a professor of history at Hofstra, presents a monolith
based upon her study of American and British archives. In her Preface and
acknowledgements she relates how it took over twelve years for her to complete this
thoroughly researched revisionist text. Now that the Communist model has collapsed some
readers may hesitate in accepting a general thesis other than an orthodox one-establishing
responsibility for the Cold War in United States-Soviet relations. Similar arguments have
been promoted to justify America’s invasion of Vietnam. She begins with the moving story
of Private Joseph Polowsky, one of the first American soldiers to join up with the Russian
troops on the Elbe River in April 1945. This gathering on the level of the common man
displayed the jubilation of anticipated victory over Nazism. However, the subsequent
developments in Germany determined by the leaders of the Allied supreme powers wrote a
different conclusion. Polowsky’s jubilation turned to hope which was soon smashed
because the United States-Soviet alliance was ruptured by the division of Germany.
Finding in the division of Germany the true origins of the Cold War confrontation,
Eisenberg places the responsibility for the division on the shoulders of the American
policymakers. She details how this final decision fashioned by the United States and joined
in by the British was a reversal of President Roosevelt’s decisions at the Yalta Conference
and in derivation of the punitive military occupation authorized by Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) 1067, on the denazification of Germany. There were ideological cross-currents during
the following Truman years. There were still New Dealers who wanted a more agrarian
Germany and opted for punitive damages just as Secretary Morgenthau had included in his
plan. However, many leaders sent to Germany like William Clayton were leading
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businessmen, and not in favor of trust-busting and powerful trade union bargaining rights.
She describes President Truman as being personally uninformed on German matters and
foreign policy in general. Accordingly, Truman was led by his foreign policy advisors who
favored the creation of a West German state so that economically Germany could be
reinvigorated as soon as possible for the benefit of big business in the United States and
Western Europe. The author carefully explains how key figures on the American side
vacillated in their support for division.
Several key actors switched sides between 1945 and 1949. For example, George
Kennan, a leading foreign service advisor, was an early advocate of partition but later wrote
his famous “Plan A” for unification of Germany (however, it was never placed on the
negotiating table). Also, Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith accepted division in the early
postwar period, but late became disillusioned after the Berlin Blockade supposedly fostered
dire consequences. On the other side of the coin, General Lucius Clay, the military governor
for the United States, was convinced in the early postwar years that the United States could
cooperate with the Soviet Union in a four-power control. But he converted to a harder line
for division in the spring of 1948. Actually, the Berlin Blockade proved to be an American
blessing for it showed American and British air force strength and brought the reluctant
French into the fold. As a child in the early Cold War period, this book informed me about
important people of history. There are many important figures from the four powerful
countries that the author provides much needed details about.
On the American side the reader will see the struggles between the State Department
and the United States Military and Defense Department in general. The leaders are often at
loggerheads not only with the Soviets and oftentimes the French, but with the British and
their own countrymen. Eisenberg unfolds the permutations as the negotiations develop
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chronologically. She reveals the determination of American leaders to create West Germany
and integrate the country into Western Europe without regard to the Yalta (Roosevelt) and
Potsdam (Truman) conferences or the fact that the Soviets had their country completely
plundered by the German army. Are objections or contrary views warranted by the author’s
evidence or lack thereof?
Arguably, American leaders had not forgotten the Hitler-Stalin pact at the outset of
hostilities. Therefore, from a political point of view, distrust is probably too mild a word.
Relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union before 1941 were marked by
hostility that would have made a postwar cooperation extremely difficult. Stalin was known
for his absolute brutality so why would a nation with a Judeo-Christian background want to
join hands with a despot? One has a broader feeling that the author’s conclusion is too
simple in light of the interaction of American and Soviet policies. What was the Soviet
Union doing in other places? American political science scholars knew about Soviet aims for
control and a lack of pluralism in conquered countries. After 1944, there was tragic news of
areas falling under Communist control. Nevertheless, the author’s research shows Stalin and
other Soviet leaders wanted to cooperate and were really only openly obstinate with respect
to their demand for ten billion dollars in reparations.
Although some Soviet archives were looked into and the author did not find
anything to change her overall thesis, more research into Soviet material may have helped
her presentation. There was a lack of references to German materials. Since we are writing
about a country that had risen from the ashes once before and only a few decades before her
context, the assembling of German primary sources would have been an improvement. The
Germans are relegated to the side, and the book, except for the descriptions of political
parties and labor unions, does not explain the interaction with the four occupying countries
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or the degree to which they affected the choices of these decision-makers. There is a sense
that important German leaders and not just the industrialists wanted a division for they knew
the Soviet Union was devastated economically. They had an appreciation for what the Ruhr
Valley industries could do if allowed to gather steam. The industrial heart of Germany was
located in the non-Soviet sectors. The American industrial machine was at full blast and
getting stronger by the day. Additional research with an understanding of the political and
economic pictures rather than a military perspective guides one to believe influential
Germans wanted a West German state at all costs. They had witnessed the rape and
bludgeoning of their country by the Russian victors. The leads to a question about Moscow
policies.
Moscow policy was as convoluted as American. The author presents it in somewhat
simple terms, but it must have been as complex as that of the other four powers. She
adequately outlines the primary Russian leaders and what they engaged in as far as
negotiations are concerned. One criticism (although it is difficult to criticize such as great
work as this) is that the context of six years, 1944-1949, is constricted in terms of defining
why and how the decision to divide Germany evolved. She wrote 522 excellent historical
pages and still could not include additional German and Soviet materials. After working on
her manuscript for twelve years, there must have been a point where decisions were made to
cover these aspects later or let other historians take up the mantle. Indeed, the eminent
historian, Melvyn P. Leffler, has already assisted.
Writing in Foreign Affairs, titled “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened”
he depicts a Russian adversary on the defensive. He writes that Stalin had no master plan
for Eastern Europe. He found as General Clay predicted when he goaded for his military
convoy down the autobahn to breach the Berlin Blockade that the Soviets feared the atomic
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capability of the United States and wished to avoid a military encounter at all costs. These
Soviet archives show that American policy in Germany contributed to the arms race and
heightened the Cold War. These archival records turn some traditional thinking about the
eventually of a confrontation on its head. Leffler infers that some of Stalin’s successors may
have been amenable to curtailing the Cold War and reviving a spirit of hope like Joseph
Polowsky carried his entire life until he was buried near where the victorious armies met in
1945. These revelations have made an impact on this reviewer.
The Cold War lasted for forty years. Millions of people have paid a dear price,
especially the people in Eastern Europe who were forced to live under Soviet hegemony.
Possibly the Soviet satellites were treated harsher due to the Cold War. What about the
Americans who died in Korea and Vietnam? Is it the usual decision for making money as
quickly and efficiently as possible even at the expense of precious lives? The author places
the decision on division in the American realm. She expounds, “divided Germany was not
simply a symbol but also a stimulus to East-West confrontation” (p. 460). Everyone seems
to have someone in their family or network who served in Germany after 1945. Europe
became militarized after the creation of West Germany. After reading the title of this book,
I wondered where her path would lead me. No matter how times look in this twenty-first
century after the fall of the Iron Curtain, there may have been a less painful path to the
reconstruction of Germany and Europe. There was a necessity for trade after the
implementation of the expensive Marshall Plan for stabilizing war torn Europe. Eisenberg
writes, “a conception of national security that took the expansion of West European free
trade as an absolute requirement for the United States” (p. 492). Since the Soviet model was
flawed, could there have been informed sources in Washington who believed Soviet
influence would ultimately collapse? Future scholars can engage in a dialogue over the moral
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and political ramifications. Her book should be read by those who are interested in the
origins of the Cold War.