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The Implications of Different Analogies between Biology and Society
for Effective Functionalist Analysis
Edmund Chattoe
Department of Sociology
University of Leicester
University Road
Leicester, LE1 7RH
ecb18@le.ac.uk
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Abstract
Criticisms of functionalism broadly occupy three classes: “those denying that functional
claims have adequate evidence, those denying that functional claims are sufficiently
explanatory … and those that claim there can be no real analogue of natural selection in
the social realm” (Kincaid 1994, p. 416). This paper examines the last class because it
has received least critical scrutiny. It distinguishes four distinct functionalist analogies
with biological evolution and explores their implications for both our understanding of
social change and the other two classes of criticisms. The paper’s purpose is to show the
value of appropriate analogy for reconstructing functionalism. Pertinent analogy can not
only guide the research process to develop and test theories but also leave traditional
criticisms of the functionalist approach weakened or even dissolved.
Keywords: analogy, evolution, functionalism, social change.
1. Introduction
There are three broad classes of criticisms levelled against functionalism: that it is
empirically inadequate, logically inadequate as an explanation and inapplicable to social
(rather than biological) systems. Persuasive arguments appear to rebut criticisms of
empirical and explanatory inadequacy (Cohen 1994, Kincaid 1994). In this paper,
therefore, I investigate the applicability critique (which has received little attention and
is thus the weakest link in any convincing functionalist account) by distinguishing four
distinct analogies between biological evolution and social change found in traditional
functionalism. Presenting these analogies in detail, I will show that this clarification not
only bears on the forcefulness of the applicability critique (as intended) but also on the
strength of the other two critiques. In addition, the clarification process highlights an
analogy, previously obscured by conflation, which is both defensible against the
traditional critiques and provides practical guidance for design and empirical testing of
functionalist theories.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses analogy and argues
that relating biological evolution and social change is scientifically useful. The next
four sections describe the major biological analogies identifiable in functionalism and
discuss their implications. The simplest analogy occurs between social change and
single species adaptation in a stable environment (section 3). This analogy is the only
one that lacks coherence and it is presented solely to underpin subsequent discussion. In
reality, only multiple species ecosystems exist. The implications of societies as
ecosystems were not explored in classical functionalism but they are considered as a
fourth analogy (in section 6). The second analogy (discussed in section 4) is that
between whole societies and individual organisms. This analogy is both the most
problematic and the most pervasive in functionalism, echoing Social Darwinism. The
third analogy discussed (in section 5) is between increasing ecosystem complexity and
social differentiation. Section 7 uses the clearer analogies described in previous sections
to motivate additional rebuttals to the empirical and explanatory inadequacy critiques.
Firstly, this section demonstrates a methodological analogy between the testing of
evolutionary theory in biology and how it should be tested in sociology. This discussion
refutes the suggestion that functionalism is either intrinsically non-empirical or so
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difficult to test using sociological methods that it is effectively so. Secondly, the section
argues that the explanatory emphasis on “functions” (with all the resulting problems of
identifying these and evaluating functional equivalence) is unnecessary once the
implications of different analogies are clearly stated. Surprisingly, given their
eponymous role, “functionalism without functions” proves to be coherent, empirical and
recognisably evolutionary in terms of the objectives laid down by traditional
functionalism. The final section concludes.
For two reasons, this paper does not attempt an analysis of different analogies in the
work of particular functionalists. Firstly, this would be a project in the history of ideas
rather than contributing to explanations of social change. Secondly, the low status of
functionalism seems to rest on perceived weaknesses of such theories as a class. If
functionalism is to be re-appraised, it is the class of theories that must be examined
rather than individual instances.
2. The Purpose of Analogy
Before examining analogies between social and biological evolutioni it is worth
considering why analogy is useful at all. The answer lies in two principles of scientific
method: the academic division of labour and the search for generalised theory
(Brodbeck 1968, Hesse 1963). Since biology has spent nearly 150 years refining
evolutionary theory, developing empirical tests and removing inconsistencies, it would
be wasteful to ignore this when developing theories of social change.
However, there is clearly an inherent tension in analogy. No matter how well
understood a theory, there is no point in applying it to a new domain if the logic of the
cases is different. Conversely, even if the logic of two different domains shows
excellent correspondence, there is little value in importing a theory that is poorly
understood in its original context.
The requirement for successful analogy, therefore, is that it takes well understood and
tested theory from one domain and demonstrates that its structure can be mapped onto a
different domain. This must be done without altering the logic of the original theory so
much that either its conclusions or its explanatory ability are impaired.
The claim that natural selection is thoroughly understood (and thus eligible to support
an analogy) can be justified on two grounds. The first is that even among biologists
embroiled in evolutionary controversies, there is little question that the outcomes will
be consistent with the Darwinian framework. These controversies are no longer about
whether the theory is correct but how its details play out in particular contexts. The
second justification is that many perceived weaknesses of functionalism echo “wrong
turnings” in the development of evolutionary biology (such as teleology and
Panglossianism) which have subsequently been corrected. We can be confident that
understanding biological evolution will enhance functionalism because both have
apparently followed the same intellectual path. Unfortunately, functionalism seems to
have bogged down in wrong turnings (thus becoming deeply unpopular) without
exhausting the resources of evolutionary biology to put it back on track.
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3. Social Change as Single Species Adaptation
The simplest account illustrating “survival of the fittest” involves a plain containing
only grass, ponds and rabbits. We suppose that selection pressure on rabbits only arises
from non-evolving (exogenous) environmental features.ii An example might be the
hazard from ponds tainted with poisonous minerals. Random genetic variation will
sometimes produce phenotypic changes beneficial to the rabbit possessing them. The
mutant rabbit may be better at detecting tainting by smell or colour subtleties for
example. In these circumstances, the mutant will reproduce more effectively than the
existing population. (The relative fitness of mutants can thus be measured directly via
differential reproductive success compared to non-mutants.) Because of inheritance, the
mutant’s offspring are also likely to have the advantageous trait and (provided the
environment is stable and the trait thus remains beneficial) ultimately displace nonmutants. Given enough time and continuing environmental stability, we might expect
(through repeated mutations) that the rabbits would become effectively adapted to all
environmental hazards, perhaps even to the point where no further beneficial mutations
were possible.
It appears to be this view of evolution that underpins both functionalist claims that
particular societies (or classes of societies) should tend to homogeneity in their routines
(the dominance of the nuclear family under capitalismiii) and that it makes sense to
consider some arrangements “fitter” than others. In practice, as soon as we alter the
environmental hazard from tainted water to another animal species (foxes for example),
the whole structure changes and now constitutes an ecosystem. Although we can still
define the fitness of particular rabbit mutations other things being equal, other things no
longer are equal. Foxes are also evolving continuously in response to rabbit capabilities.
This has two important consequences. Firstly, it becomes inappropriate to claim that
species are definitively “well adapted” since what they are adapting to changes
continuously. A trait may even turn from beneficial to harmful over time. The best we
can say for species is that they persist. Following from this persistence, however, we
cannot say that species have any sort of teleological “destiny”. Family universals
remain fascinating for sociology, but any evolutionary explanation suggesting that
families tend towards a single form implies a stable environment and is therefore almost
certainly wrong. Secondly, whatever we say about relative fitness within species, we
cannot say anything about fitness across species. It makes no sense to argue that rabbits
are generally fitter than foxes because they are more numerous or that foxes are fitter
because they prey on rabbits. If rabbits (or other suitable prey) did not reproduce in
sufficient numbers, how could foxes (or predators generally) ever have evolved? Even a
predator-prey relationship turns out to involve interdependence rather than superiority.
Clearly, adding more species increases ecosystem complexity, exacerbating
environmental dynamism and making notions of optimal adaptation and “fitness” even
less applicable. Introducing other small herbivores to the ecosystem allows foxes to
change their prey under rabbit scarcity for example.
Two subsidiary implications of the shift from single to multiple species are also relevant
for understanding functionalism. Firstly, change can originate through mutation in any
species. Species should not be viewed as inevitably conforming to environmental
pressure. Sometimes they initiate change to which other species must respond. This is
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significant because, in social systems, innovations may also arise from deliberation,
creativity and diffusion. The analysis of the nuclear family presented by Parsons
suggests a (presumably unintentional) Marxist account of social change in which the
family must accommodate the factory but not vice versa. Secondly, although a static
environment might allow a single species to reach a point where all further mutations
were harmful, this explanation for the potential disadvantages of change doesn’t apply
in dynamic environments.
The implications of the “society as ecosystem” analogy will not be examined in detail
until section 6. However, even the discussion here shows how the study of ecosystems
replaces unjustified notions of teleology and fitness with the empirical study of
adaptability and persistence. In order to understand rabbit success, it is necessary to
study their interactions with foxes and vice versa. It should also be very clear why the
single species analogy (and its implications) are inapplicable to social systems. It is
impossible to give a coherent account of evolution in a stationary environment for the
biological case, let alone the social one.
4. Society as Organism (SAO)
This analogy involves a major shift in perspective. Here, each society is treated as a
single complex (differentiated) organism. The organisation of society is presented in
terms of specialised “organs” like the economy and polity.iv In the biological case, the
heart and lungs each have their functions for the whole organism and are co-evolved to
perform these effectively.
The SAO analogy has roots in Social Darwinism: theories attempting to understand the
“organs” of society and their interplay (Bannister 1979, Jones 1980). Unfortunately, the
influence of Social Darwinism was pervasive in traditional functionalism and caused
considerable harm to its plausibility (even if functionalists like Parsons and Merton
explicitly repudiated it). The fundamental weakness linking both approaches is the
environment within which societies supposedly operate. Very few modern states face
selection pressure from the physical environment, invasion and destruction or total
internal collapse.v There is thus no reason to suppose that societies will display the
finely honed co-evolution of “organs” observed in complex organisms for which
survival is an “all or nothing” matter. This difficulty in defining a plausible environment
for societal selection is recognised in two widespread criticisms of functionalism.
Firstly, that it makes no sense to talk of societies having needs as individuals do and,
secondly, that functionalism assumes societal consensus without justification. It makes
sense to talk of societal needs and functional consensus only if it makes sense to talk of
societies as single organisms under constant threat of destruction. Unless selection
pressure is sufficient to put society on a knife-edge between persistence and
annihilation, there is no reason why diversity of interests and even overt conflict should
not occur. Clearly, there must be mechanisms regulating internal conflict or societal
collapse would be more common. However, as I shall argue, there is a more plausible
explanation for this regulation based on the “society as ecosystem” analogy.
Examination of the SAO analogy reveals another difficulty relevant to functionalism.
Although we can describe the heart as having the “function” of pumping blood, this
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only makes sense within a specification of roles for other organs such as the circulatory
system, kidneys and lungs. Ineffective (and contradictory) attempts to identify family
“functions” may founder on inadequate specifications of roles for other institutions
(pubs, churches and psychiatrists) in satisfying individual (and indirectly social) needs.
For this reason, function talk about institutions considered in artificial isolation is
imprecise shorthand for actual processes by which these interact and reproduce
themselves. In biology, discussions of species capabilities and observations of their
survival implications have superseded such talk. An ecologist doesn’t ask what the
function of running is, let alone what function rabbits serve, s/he only asks whether
running faster conduces to reproductive success in rabbits and why. Similarly, it is
much easier to establish empirically whether some family forms are more effective at
passing on financial resources or educational advantage (thus reproducing themselves)
than to explain, in general terms, what families are “for”. As we shall see in the next
section, the SAO analogy also sits awkwardly with discussions of social differentiation.
5. Speciation and Social Differentiation
One of the perceived strengths of Darwin’s theory was that speciation was explicable
without recourse to additional mechanisms beyond selection, inheritance and variation.
Returning to the previous example, a population of rabbits relocated to a region with
distinct predators would find different mutations beneficial than the rabbits remaining
behind. One unintended consequence might be, if differences between the environments
were sufficiently marked, that the populations evolved independently until they could
no longer interbreed. According to the modern definition, one species has become two.
This terminology is quite different from the “folk” understanding of species. Because
folk notions are often based on appearance rather than constitution, it is presumed that
all sparrows are effectively the same (a natural kind). This is misleading on two counts.
Firstly, it is genetic variation in the sparrow population that allows the species to
respond to environmental change. Sparrows may all look rather similar but turn out to
have important differences in capabilities that are revealed when disease strikes or the
climate worsens. Secondly, two species may be genetically similar but different in
appearance or similar in appearance and genetically quite distinct.
Thus it transpires that, contrary to folk belief, “natural kind” species are not the
evolutionary building blocks. Instead, species are defined by genetic similarity between
ancestors and descendants induced by the environment. Unfortunately, this insight sits
awkwardly with the SAO analogy. It is appealing to see increasing social differentiation
as an adaptive response to environmental pressure particularly since the biological
record suggests that simple organisms have given rise to complex ones by progressively
“delegating” functions to specialised organs. However, as before, closer examination
suggests that we cannot reconcile the SAO analogy with this biological process. In
biology, it is argued that there is “more room at the top”. It is better (in survival terms)
being the first predator species preying on herbivores than being just another competing
herbivore species. Although one might make a historical analogy with empire building
pace Eisenstadt (1963), modern societies do not convincingly display any such
hierarchy. Unfortunately, arguments applicable to sets of species in ecosystems do not
necessarily apply to particular species or instances of a species. Ecosystems may
become more complicated through new predator-prey relationships but it does not
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follow that the rabbit species will necessarily become more complicated over time let
alone individual rabbits. (Viruses remain simple and devastatingly effective because
they operate on cellular architectures common to most species.) Returning to the case of
societies, therefore, it is not clear what functional (as opposed to deliberate or other)
advantages there are to increasing social complexity. Even if such advantages do exist
(and I shall return to this point), the SAO analogy mistakenly postulates increasing
complexity in particular instances of a species (or perhaps increasing complexity of a
speciesvi) rather than, as in biology, increasing complexity through speciation. It may be
this awkward relationship between the SAO analogy and differentiation that produces
the tension in functionalism between the implied superiority of current social
institutions (apparently originating in the single species analogy) and the historical
benefits of increased social differentiation. It is this kind of special pleading for the
present (perhaps resulting from a confusion of analogies) that gave functionalism its
reputation for conservative apologia.
In the previous sections I have examined three distinct analogies between social and
biological systems. I have discussed the implications of each analogy, how it might
have influenced the conclusions of functionalism and, in some cases, how functionalist
analysis appears to have muddled different analogies. In the next section, I shall
consider a fourth analogy, implied but largely undeveloped in traditional functionalism,
which may contribute to resolving these difficulties.
6. Society as Ecosystem
It is clear that single species accounts of social change are unsatisfactory. What would it
mean to treat society as an ecosystem?
The basic hypothesis would be that similar (but still heterogeneous) bundles of social
routinesvii would constitute species just as similar bundles of genes do in biology.viii
Thus churches or firms would form identifiably distinct species. There might be both
competition between churches (to secure worshippers) and between species (with
churches and firms both demanding “adherence” from members). There would be no
attempt to assess the relative fitness of churches and firms but there might be
assessments of the relative success of firms or of churches (Hannan and Freeman 1988,
Iannaccone 1994).
Focusing on routines in this way avoids many problems raised by previous analogies.
Innovations (deliberate or accidental) can arise in any species. There is no implicit
assumption about which parts of society “drive” social change. The routine of
management training by moving trainees around branches might impact on the relative
success of nuclear and extended families in accessing the managerial class. Conversely,
however, reproductive routines endogenous to the family might require changes to the
organisation of production – increased automation or a “family wage” for example.
Routine bundles also allow speciation to be defined in a way that is compatible with
biological evolution. The emergence of secular schools or hospitals involves the
development of sustainable bundles of routines that are able to replace the “integrated”
educational and medical roles previously performed by churches. This is not a case of
roles being transferred between existing species but of a new species sustaining itself by
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performing a role previously only available as part of a “package”. As in the biological
case, “environmental” effects may cause bundles to diverge to the point where exchange
of routines between institutions is no longer possible. A routine for setting piecework
rates in a factory would be unusable in a hospital treating patients on demand. This
approach to speciation also reinstates a plausible evolutionary justification for
increasing social complexity. The existence of a particular set of institutions may make
new social forms sustainable. For example, the possibility of consulting requires the
existence of both codified technical knowledge and measurable success in
organisational species. Consultants can profit by offering advice improving relative
performance but only once a particular set of institutions exists (Bell 1999).
The ecosystem approach also provides a significantly different justification for societal
stability. This neither requires a mysterious consensus or supra-national selection
pressure. Instead, ecosystem stability results from internal homeostasis. New
opportunities for sustainable routine bundles (like consulting) arise from the existing
population of institutions. New resources result in adaptations of existing institutions (or
creation of new institutions) to exploit them and the scale of resource availability
regulates the level of adaptation/innovation. (Just as lions will always be less numerous
than gazelles in a sustainable ecology, so will management consultants be less
numerous than firms.) In biology, overall ecosystem stability is still compatible with
extreme conflicts of interests (predator-prey relations for example) because of the rich
web of resource exploitation. A sudden disease induced slump in the rabbit population
will not typically lead to fox extinction both because rabbits have evolved disease
resistance and are likely to recover their numbers but also because foxes can shift to
other prey if necessary. In the same way, societies can remain broadly stable despite
quite intense competition and even moderate amounts of overt conflict.
However, it is very important to stress that while homeostatic stability forms part of a
coherent analogy, it does not reintroduce a Panglossian view of social order.
Ecosystems (and societies) do collapse and routine bundles (like species) do die out.ix In
fact, the ecosystem view is vital to removing misleading concepts (like Panglossianism)
from functionalism. I have already discussed the incoherence of measuring relative
fitness across species. The dynamics of multi-species environments also destroy the
possibility of teleology and thus any Panglossian implication that species are absolutely
“well adapted” as discussed in section 3. As argued above, talk about “functions” of
institutions in isolation is likely to be insufficiently explanatory and needs to be
replaced by observations of the ways that institutions interact and what impact these
interactions have. For example, what is it about the routines of strict churches that
means that they are able to both recruit and keep worshippers better? Specifically, how
do churches impinge on the work, school, family and social lives of members and how
does this “fit” enhance reproduction of some churches and not others (Iannaccone
1994).
Finally, the ecosystem analogy has a considerable impact on the status of normative
claims about social change. In the absence of teleology, the fact that a routine bundle is
widespread and persistent makes it a worthy object of study but does not justify any
claims of superiority either in terms of morality or likely contribution to individual
welfare. Given the way that evolution works, homogeneity of routine bundles is not
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necessarily an advantage and may be actively harmful to species in a changing
environment. For this reason, diversity of institutional forms becomes a key part of
functionalism. Today’s minority or failing form may be dominant in a century when
circumstances have changed. Unfortunately, it is not possible to avoid some discussion
of deliberate action and human norms at this point. It is important to distinguish
normative claims about the process of social change from normative claims that shape
that process. It is one thing to claim (without justification) that evolution’s purpose is to
perfect humanity. It is something completely different for individuals to choose cheap
mass-produced goods and thus enhance the success of industrial capitalism. It is
important to be clear that evolution is not incompatible with teleology at the level of
individuals and groups (human goals and preferences) but only at the system level.x
There is thus nothing “unnatural” about humans trying to shape social change by
deliberation even if it is very difficult. In fact, deliberation may be highly desirable
because unshaped social evolution (like biological evolution) takes no account of
individual (as opposed to collective) welfare. Although it is hard to imagine a routine
bundle propagating against the interests of all the participants, it is perfectly reasonable
that a significant fraction should suffer and that a designed (rather than evolved) routine
bundle might improve group and individual welfare. A clear role for teleology and
deliberation thus exists in social systems but not in the form (or with the implications)
that Social Darwinism attributed to it.
In this section, I have argued that some of the difficulties with three analogies between
evolution and social change widespread in traditional functionalism are addressed using
a fourth analogy barely worked out (but implied) in that literature. In doing so, I have
supported my earlier claim that closer examination of the different analogies can start to
rebut the inapplicability critique of functionalism. Not all analogies between biology
and social change are equally coherent, empirically plausible or open to
misinterpretation. In the next section, I shall support my subsidiary claim, that the
examination of analogies not only bears on the inapplicability critique as one might
expect but also contributes significantly to rebutting the empirical and explanatory
inadequacy critiques.
7. Empirical and Explanatory Implications of Different Functional Analogies
So far, I have focused on the applicability critique because it has received the least
critical attention and is therefore the weakest link in attempts to reconstruct a
functionalist account of social change. However, it is all to the good for functionalism if
additional distinctive rebuttals of the empirical and explanatory inadequacy critiques
can be developed. The clarification of analogies challenges the empirical inadequacy
critique through what might be termed a methodological analogy, showing how the
methods by which convincing evidence for evolution has been provided in biology may
be applied (suitably qualified) in sociology. Applying this methodological analogy, I go
on to challenge the explanatory inadequacy critique because it depends on notions of
functions and functional equivalence and, as it turns out, these categories are redundant
(and possibly even incoherent) in biological evolution. As such, despite their
eponymous status, functions are simply not necessary to a functional account of social
change.
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It is a commonplace criticism of functionalism that it took little account of data and
failed to specify theories effectively for empirical testing. However, an important
question is whether this was simply an omission by functionalists or whether there are
factors making the collection of such data problematic or even impossible. In biology,
data on evolution can be divided neatly in two. Firstly, there is research about how
particular sets of genes “construct” specific bodies that are then environmentally
selected. Secondly, there are ecosystem studies examining how different species interact
and how their capabilities affect reproduction and survival. These two kinds of research
are complementary in understanding the evolutionary process and facilitate a crucial
division of labour. Observation can show us how (and when) fast running matters to
species but this understanding is not dependent on immediately tracing the trait right
back to the genetic level. The process of linking genes to capabilities can be carried out
in the laboratory under more controlled conditions using experimental methods.
This distinction also proves crucial to collection of relevant data for understanding
social change. When trying to understand the success or failure of churches, part of the
task is obviously collecting accurate survey data about which churches are actually
growing or shrinking. However, an equally important part is to establish qualitatively
what bundles of routines within churches bear on this outcome and how they do so in
terms of relations with families, schools, places of work, competing leisure activities
and so on. It is explicit mechanisms linking microstructure (genes and routines) to
macro outcome (persistence of organisms and institutions) via capabilities that stops
evolution from being tautologous and makes it a testable theory. With only aggregate
quantitative data, we have no warranted lower level explanation of observed patterns.
With only qualitative data, we cannot tell which routine bundles actually do well in the
environment ex post and are in danger of propagandising for what we believe to be the
likely outcome.
This point is illustrated by the explanatory strategy of organisational ecology, probably
the best known evolutionary approach in contemporary sociology. This field explores
how birth, death and growth processes (shaped by environmental effects like
competition) dynamically affect the population size and properties of organisational
“species” (like credit unions or newspapers). In a typical example, Hannan and Freeman
(1988) estimated statistical relationships between individual, relational and structural
factors (like organisational age, the number of similar organisations and economic
buoyancy) and probabilities that US trade unions disbanded in particular historical eras.
They found, for example, that an organisation’s age was a significant predictor of
survival. The difficulty with this approach (as suggested above) is that mechanisms
proposed to explain particular aggregate associations, while credible, are not
independently established at the micro level. It is certainly plausible that competition
for members becomes more intense as the number of trade unions increases (as their
model assumes) but it is also plausible that more unions provide a wider range of policy
stances and by thus increasing overall membership, effectively decrease competition.
The association observed may be the net effect of two (or more) mechanisms, some of
which may have unknown magnitudes. (Hannan and Freeman obviously control for
other associations specified within their model but cannot do so for equally plausible
mechanisms excluded by a lack of data or failure of casual introspection.) Given the
range of possible mechanisms and their potentially complex interplay, claims about net
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effects risk being “just so stories” unless they are grounded in ethnographic research,
historical documents or biographical interviews.xi
The requirement to combine qualitative and quantitative data, while far from
insuperable, immediately suggests why sociologists have not found testing functionalist
theories very appealing. The divide between research quantifying what takes place
“objectively” and understanding people’s subjective reasons for doing things in a local
context runs very deep in practice if not in principle. Furthermore, understanding the
emergent effects of complex interactions between routine bundles at the macro level
may require novel tools like computer simulation.
Of course, making an effective micro/macro link is not the only problem. The
opportunities for ethical controlled experiments in sociology are considerably restricted.
There is no equivalent to irradiating fruit flies to explore heritability or dissecting
organisms with genetic disorders to understand their physiological effects. However,
such difficulties should not be overstated. Natural or comparative experiments may still
be possible. Furthermore, it is interesting to reflect that a logically coherent theory of
biological inheritance considerably predated our ability to “see” genes. If so, subjective
reports about routines may still display regularities which allow us to develop an
effective theory even though we cannot yet (and may never) “see” them as we can
directly observe behaviour.
Setting the different functional analogies in order and considering the ecosystem
analogy in more detail also makes an indirect contribution to the task of studying social
change empirically. This involves modifying the nature of the research question to
encourage empirical analysis and discourage attempts to quantify superfluous concepts
like fitness or teleology. Asking what churches are for provokes metaphysical
speculation. Asking why some churches succeed and others fail provokes fieldwork!
Understanding the role of the family no longer involves trying to identify its abstract
functions but instead studying what it concretely transmits to children (Grabrucker
1988) and what other institutions it interacts with and how (Devine 2004). It turns out
that this perspective shift is not only desirable to encourage empirical sociology but
receives justification from a challenge to the very notion of functions as the basis of
functional explanation.
The basis of this challenge is the other insight suggested by the clarification of different
analogies and bears on the explanatory inadequacy critique. The claim is that the
concepts of function (and thus functional equivalence) are effectively redundant outside
the SAO analogy and of highly restricted use within it. This issue has already been
discussed in passing but can now be stated more clearly. Talking about the “functions”
of the heart only makes sense within a context of other organs and this in turn only
makes sense for an organism surviving in an environment in a particular manner (by
being a fast running predator for example). It does make sense to say that such a
predator is likely to have a more specialised (and thus more efficient)
respiratory/circulatory system than a sedentary insect. However, such function talk
cannot be extended from discussions of the current state of a particular organism
(conditional on its ecological niche) to the architecture of organisms in general. It is not
the case that “something” must always be fulfilling the role of eyes in an organism
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(except in the most generalised and therefore unhelpful sense) since other organisms
may simply depend on hearing and smell instead. Even if we disregard the conceptual
difficulties of environmental selection in the SAO, the persistence of societies no more
prescribes their form in terms of a list of “essential” functions than ecology requires all
animals to be mammals.xii What is essential to a species depends on the role it plays in
the ecosystem and how evolution happens to have equipped it for that role. One
herbivore may be toxic, another very fast and a third very good at blending in.
Identifying “core functions” of social institutions and assessing different ways in which
they are served (societies must either have religion or extended kinship networks
because these are the only ways that the functionalist can envisage group cohesion
being ensured) simply has no workable equivalent in biology even within the SAO.xiii
Outside the SAO, it is hard to make any use of the function concept at all. In the
ecosystem analogy, as already suggested, it makes no sense to ask what the “function”
of rabbits is and little sense to ask about the “function” of running since in one case it
may be used by a predator and in another by prey. Instead, the interest is in how, in
practice, different species manage to persist in the light of particular threats: by running
fast, by hiding, by being poisonous, by breeding prolifically and so on. It is perfectly
possible, indeed easier and less confusing, to study such interactions between evolving
institutions and their outcomes without using any “function talk” at all.xiv It is important
to stress however that removing reified “functions” from functionalism no more makes
the resulting theory non-evolutionary or non-empirical than removing them from
biology did. Because of their problematic conceptual status, the quest for “functions”
has impeded rather than advanced the search for an evolutionary theory that explains
social change in terms of the selection, variation and reproduction of routines, a goal
which traditional functionalists would undoubtedly have endorsed and seen themselves
as contributing to.
Although it is hard to explain a historically unjustified assumption, I think the mistaken
emphasis on functions as usable entities arises from several sources. Firstly, the
muddling of functionalist analogies which permitted the survival of inappropriate
notions of teleology and fitness: the idea that species could be “for” something and
assessed in those terms. Secondly, and perhaps consequently, the “extension” of
legitimate function talk from the case of a particular species with a given niche to the
(illegitimate) case of persistent species in general. (To labour a point, persistent
societies need have no more in common that sharks and butterflies.) Thirdly, the fact
that the folk conception of biology suggests a tight and simple link between genes and
traits. It is a short step from the (mistaken) idea of a “muscle gene” to that of a “group
cohesion routine” and thus to a “core function”. In fact, a set of routine bundles (like a
set of genes) associated with a family or church solves the problem of persistence as a
set and cannot necessarily be decomposed into particular genes or routines for specific
purposes.xv Muscles may be useful both for fast running and cracking bones. Fourthly,
the existence of confusion over the questions that biology (and thus sociology using any
analogy with biology) is capable of answering which may be worsened by particular
sociological views of history. (This returns us to the methodological analogy discussed
earlier.) Biology cannot answer the question “Why is the ecosystem necessarily just like
this?” because the answer is lost in the mists of history and is in any case contingent.xvi
Ecology is never necessarily anything. Nor can it answer the question “Will an
ecosystem always produce something like the rabbit?” because the answer depends in a
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complex way on all the other species that make it up. (The fact that ecology is a
paradigmatic complex system is a corollary of the fact that gene and routine bundles
persist as sets and not as separable traits.) What it can do is answer questions like
“Given what this ecosystem is like, what might happen if it gets colder?” or “Given
what we know about history and the fossil record, what might have happened to bring
the ecosystem we observe into being?” A functionalist account of social change is thus
not compatible with historical determinism under any of the analogies discussed above,
nor does it imply that different societies will find similar solutions to similar problems
(though it is very interesting when they do just as parallel evolution is interesting in
biology). Instead, it is limited (as is ecology) to understanding systems of interaction
between classes of entity (species) and offering some reasoned (but not necessarily
predictive) insights into where society might be heading. It is not clear that any other
theory of social change can credibly claim to deliver more given the existence of
novelty, human deliberation and self-awareness.
In the early stages of a project to reappraise functionalism (and in the course of a single
article), it is not feasible to illustrate this approach with a case study, especially since
conceptual clarity is a necessary precursor for effective empirical research. The purpose
of this section has been to suggest that there is no reason why functionalism should not
collect data analogous to that offering strong support for biological evolution (largely
using existing methods from sociology) and to suggest that difficulties with identifying
functions and functional equivalence may simply be irrelevant. Of course, as with any
novel data collection exercise, unique difficulties may present themselves in practice
but the purpose of laying out the conceptual framework here is precisely to encourage
critical responses that may anticipate these before empirical research begins.
8. Conclusion
Given space constraints, I have not tried to make an active case for “ecosystem
functionalism” as a theoretical (let alone empirical) approach. Instead, I have merely
shown how it avoids the main weaknesses found in the other analogies and how, at least
in principle, it is compatible with normal empirical research in sociology. However,
even this preliminary discussion suggests that the new analogy is hardly a panacea. The
complexities of the relationship between deliberate and unintended action (and their
relative significance) in social change remain to be properly explored. Sense also needs
to be made of the claim that a certain set of routines constitutes a “sustainable”
institution which can “reproduce” itself. (In biology, turning food into energy to resist
the entropic process is a necessary precondition of reproduction. Does it make sense to
treat individuals as “fodder” for churches, factories and schools and if so, what sense?)
Following on from this, is there a theoretical problem raised by the role of individuals
with multiple memberships in sustaining institutional routines? Does it matter for the
sake of the analogy that a person can be a churchgoer, a chair maker and a liberal voter
at the same time? I intend to explore these questions in future work but I hope I have
shown that the ecosystem analogy is an improvement over previous analogies if nothing
more. This is still systematic progress even if, in its turn, the ecosystem analogy must be
replaced by something else or even by an ultimate rejection of biological analogies in
sociology.
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Notes
i
This paper only considers cases where change is explained by a mechanism analogous to biological
evolution in the social domain. This must be sharply distinguished from theories in which social
behaviour or organisation is explained by the mechanism of biological evolution. These theories draw on
sociobiology (1975) in attempting to explain social behaviour through its direct contribution to
reproductive fitness. Rather than forming a part of sociology (as functionalism does), such theories claim
that explaining certain social behaviours is actually the province of biology and not sociology. This
difference should make the sharpness of the distinction between the two types of theories clear.
ii
This is what makes the single species analogy incoherent. We cannot simply postulate a living organism
(grass) which does not evolve and thus influence rabbit evolution.
iii
While Parsons does not explicitly state the ubiquity of the nuclear family in industrial societies as an
evolutionary outcome, he clearly implies it. For example: “It is of course not uncommon to find a
surviving parent of one or the other spouse, or even a sibling or cousin of one of them residing with the
family, but this is both statistically secondary, and it is clearly not felt to be the “normal” arrangement.”
(Parsons 1956, p. 10) And again: “It is the combination of these two functional imperatives, which
explains why, in the “normal” case it is both true that every adult is a member of a nuclear family and that
every child must begin his process of socialisation in a nuclear family.” (ibid., p. 17) It is unclear whether
“normal” refers to societal judgements, in which case its connection to the functional survival of
“deviant” forms is unclear or whether it is intended rhetorically to downplay such “survivals”.
iv
“That the order of evolution [for organisms and societies] is necessarily the same in the two cases, is
just as clear. In a creature which is both very small and very inactive, like a hydra, direct passage of
nutriment from the inner layer to the outer layer by absorption suffices. But in proportion as the outer
structures, becoming more active, expend more, simple absorption from adjacent tissues no longer meets
the resulting waste; and in proportion as the mass becomes larger, and the parts which prepare nutriment
consequently more remote from the parts which consume it, there arises the need for a means of transfer.”
(Spencer 1969, pp. 56-7) This quotation also illustrates the SAO view that societal change arises from
interaction with an external environment.
v
This approach may remain appropriate for historical sociology. Eisenstadt (1963) develops an
impressive theory of the origin and persistence of bureaucratic empires (although his approach gives
much weight to the intentions of contending power groups and is thus not strictly functionalist).
Similarly, much of Herbert Spencer’s analysis deals with historical societies and should be criticised
separately from his Social Darwinist prescriptions for Victorian England. This paper does not intend to
dismiss historical sociology but focuses on the role of functionalism in understanding industrial societies
that no longer develop by conquest or geographical expansion, an aim shared by those like Parsons and
Merton now most widely regarded as “traditional” functionalists. For a detailed review of functionalist
explanation in the specific context of historical sociology, see Holmwood and O’ Malley (2003).
vi
It is seldom clear in these discussions whether societies are taken to be distinct species or instances of
the same species but both interpretations face the same problem.
vii
It is hard to find terminology for repeated non-calculating behaviour that has not already acquired a
specific set of associations in social science. I have avoided “practices”, “strategies”, “institutions” and
“rules of thumb” because I do not want to have to endorse or reject the complex debates that have grown
up around them. For the purposes of the argument all I want to convey is that institutions can have
different sets of repeated behaviours (actions on a production line, rituals in an act of worship) which are
more or less similar. (Church rituals, while different, recognisably share elements unlikely to be confused
with activities on a production line.)
viii
The arguments for “routine bundles” in individuals and institutions are different and differently
compelling so I shall consider only “institution functionalism” here. For individuals, it can always
plausibly be argued that deliberation outweighs routine. By contrast, for institutions, routines can
reasonably be seen as constitutive (following Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy) and the role of
individual deliberation heavily circumscribed by co-ordination difficulties. For this reason, the extensive
literatures on cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985) and memetics (Blackmore 1999), both of
which consider routines at the individual level (albeit sometimes with collective benefits) are beyond the
scope of my paper.
ix
Cloistered orders of monks and nuns appear to be an example at present.
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15
x
Of course, matters can become very complex when human goals are applied to the system level – an
example would be the legal framework within which firms compete while selected for profitability – but
the distinction remains coherent. The evolutionary process has no intrinsic system level teleology.
xi
Simulation approaches to organisational ecology have very recently been developed in an effort to make
stronger links between micro interactions and macro associations (Bruderer and Singh 1996). However,
this style of research has had no impact on sociology as yet and still makes negligible use of qualitative
data to ground its micro level assumptions (coming as it does from a theoretical strand of economics and
management research).
xii
It is true that ecology tries to characterise general aspects of organisms (respiration, excretion and the
like) but this is an inductive typological or didactic exercise and not a basis for serious functional
analysis.
xiii
Furthermore, this assumes that societies cannot create routine bundles to achieve their goals.
xiv
This observation provides another justification for the term “selectionism” to describe a suitably
reconstructed functionalism (Runciman 1998). Since the analysis no longer focuses on the identification
of functions, the old name is actively misleading.
xv
It is a recognised objective of ethnography, particularly in anthropology, to show how cultural
complexes achieve their effects holistically while individual practices and beliefs may be hard to make
sense of.
xvi
In the light of this point, the emphasis on the difficulties of functional equivalence is surprising. What
other sociological theory would be expected to deliver necessary truth?
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Bibliographical note
Edmund Chattoe is a Nuffield Foundation Research Fellow in the Department of
Sociology at the University of Oxford. His research interests centre on the application
of computer simulation to the understanding of social behaviour, specifically the
evolution of social structures and decision strategies.
Address
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ,
Email: edmund.chattoe@sociology.oxford.ac.uk