Title of Work: Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy
Date of Meeting: 3/20/09
Preparer of Notes: Paulie from the Block
Summary of Book IV:
In this book, Boethius begins to raise a series of questions for Philosophy based on all that has
come before. Specifically, the question of evil in a world governed by an omnipotent and good
God is the central dilemma of this book. Philosophy answers by demonstrating that not only
does evil not prevail in the world, but in fact evil men are both powerless and (shockingly), nonexistent. Furthermore, she shows that no evil can harm a good man, and that the wicked harm
themselves in their very vice. Finally, Boethius turns to the question of fate and providence,
since seemingly indifferent fate could account for the injustice in the world, but not providence.
Philosophy responds by distinguishing between providence (the divine reason itself by which all
things are ordered) and fate (the order and disposition as it is seen in the unfolding of events in
time).
Summary of Book V:
Boethius begins this final book by inquiring about chance, to which he is answered by
Philosophy with Aristotle’s classic definition. Then he raises the much more difficult question
of the possibility of free human choice in a world governed by divine providence. To this
question, Philosophy affirms the reality of both. Eventually the question resolves itself to that of
foreknowledge and freedom: If God has perfect foreknowledge, and if whatever he foresees must
happen, how can human beings freely choose what happens? If human choices are free, and so
uncertain and unnecessary, how can God know them? Philosophy answers that God does not
know as we know, but knows all things outside of time as eternally present. God’s
foreknowledge is an eternally present knowledge.
Central Insights, Definitions, Quotations, Take Home:

Detailed Notes:
Book IV
Prose 1: Boethius: Given the divine government of all things, how can there be evil, and,
more importantly, how can evil go unpunished?
Philosophy: There is no evil, and evil never goes unpunished.
1. The good are always powerful and the evil always weak and futile
2. Vice never goes unpunished nor virtue unrewarded
3. The good prosper and the evil suffer misfortune
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Prose 2:
1)
2)
3)
4)
The good always have power and the wicked do not; since good and evil are
contraries, we can prove this in two ways (by showing the good to be powerful; by
showing the evil to be weak). Furthermore, evil turns out to be nothing.
The good are powerful
a) Human action depends upon both will and power (without will, nothing is attempted;
without power, nothing is actually achieved)
b) In Book III, we showed that happiness is the good, and that all (good and bad) have
their purpose in striving to attain the good
c) Since men become good by attaining the good, then good men attain what they seek,
while evil men do not
d) So good men are powerful while evil men are impotent
The evil are impotent
a) Suppose two persons have the same natural function assigned
i) One accomplishes this action by natural means
ii) The other uses unnatural means, and even then doesn’t accomplish the action, but
only pretends to do so
iii) The more powerful of these two is the former, and the latter is impotent
b) Likewise, good men seek the highest good via the natural means of the virtues
c) Evil men seek the same good indeed, but by means of concupiscences, which are both
false goods, as well as unnatural
d) Hence the evil men are impotent to attain the goal they actually seek
Furthermore, evil men do not exist
a) A thing is which maintains its place in nature and acts in accord with its nature
b) Whatever fails to do this loses its existence which is proper to its nature
c) Furthermore, God cannot do evil, but God can do all things, and therefore evil must
not be a really existing thing
Platonic doctrine upheld: only the wise can do what they want to do; the wicked can
follow their desires, but they cannot accomplish what they want.
Prose 3: The good are always rewarded, and the wicked are always punished
1) The aim or goal of an action = the reward of that action
2) Happiness is the good for which all human actions are done
3) Good men always achieve this end, because they accomplish their proper action
4) Therefore one can only lose this reward by ceasing to be virtuous
5) And, conversely, wickedness itself is a punishment for the wicked man, since in being
wicked the wicked man does not achieve his end, and thus loses his human nature and the
possibility of happiness
Prose 4: The wicked are miserable, impotent, and to be pitied (despite appearances)
1) Boethius objects that, although vicious men are punished within themselves in their own
sins, still it is terrible that they are allowed to ruin good men
2) But Philosophy responds first by saying that the evil man is worse off for being able to
accomplish his will, and so this is necessary for their punishment
3) A (Platonic) paradox: the wicked are happier when they are punished than when they
evade justice
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a. If an unhappy man receives some good, then he is more happy than he was
b. Punishment, inasmuch as it is just, is a good
c. Thus, when wicked men receive punishment, they must be more happy; if they
avoid punishment, they become more evil, and increase their misery
4) Even more paradoxically, those who injure others are more unhappy than those whom
they injure
a. Since the wicked are unhappy, for them to do evil is to the misery of more evil
b. But the recipient of the injury has justice, and thus the good, on his side
c. The corollary of this is a shocking one: we ought to abolish hatred – for no one
hates a good man, and hating an evil man is senseless, akin to hating (rather than
sympathizing with) someone who has a disease.
Prose 5:
Boethius renews his question: Why does an all-good and all-powerful God
sometimes seem to reward the wicked with happiness, and afflict the good with
sorrow? Aside from the happiness and misery that come to good and evil men’s
souls according to their merits, still good things come to the wicked, and evil comes
to the good. If things happened by chance, this would be understandable. But how is
this compatible with God and his governing providence?
Prose 6:
1)
2)
3)
4)
A distinction is now made by Philosophy between Providence and Fate;
providence is shown to direct all things toward the good.
The questions involved in the compatibility of Providence with human action are: the
simplicity of Providence, the course of Fate, unforeseeable chance, divine knowledge and
predestination, and free will.
We can consider the government of all things by the divine mind in two ways:
a. Providence: considers this government as belong to the purity of the divine mind
i. This is the divine reason itself which belongs to the most high ruler of all
things and which governs all things
ii. The unfolding of temporal events as this is present to the divine mind
iii. The immovable and simple form of all things which come into being
b. Fate: considers the divine government with reference to the things which it moves
and governs
i. This belongs to all mutable things and is the disposition by which
Providence joins all thing in their own order
ii. The unfolding of events as it is worked out in time
iii. The moving connection and temporal order of all things
c. God by his Providence simply and unchangeably disposes all things that are to be
done, even though the things themselves are worked out by Fate in many ways
and in the process of time.
Some things are more subject to fate than others, since some stray further away from the
center of divine providence than other things.
We can only see confusion and disorder, because we can only view divine governance
from the side of Fate, and not from within the center of Providence
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a. We do not know the hearts of man, and cannot fully distinguish between good and
evil men: so how are we to know if the workings of Fate are punishing, testing,
rewarding, etc.?
b. Furthermore, we do not know the limits or the extents of natural dispositions –
some troubles are given to test, others are given good fortune, because adversities
would ruin them and cause them to despair and commit evils.
c. Providence often brings it about that the wicked make other wicked men good,
which is something we could not bring about on ourselves
5) Nevertheless, Providence is a mystery, and cannot be easily penetrated. We must simply
maintain that Providence governs all things to their good end, and then we will see that
the evil in the world is actually non-existent.
Prose 7: Restatement of the thesis that all fortune is good
1) All fortune has as its purpose either the reward or trial of good men, or the correction and
punishment of the wicked, and thus must be good because it is clearly either just or useful
2) One can make of one’s fortune what one will; for any fortune which seems difficult either
tests virtue or corrects and punishes vice.
Book V
Prose 1: Chance is discussed, and is defined in traditional Aristotelian terms
1) In one sense, chance does not exist
a. Define chance as: an event produced by random motion and without any sequence
of causes
b. Since we have already established the fact of divine governance, then there can be
no such thing of chance in this sense
2) In another sense (that taken by Aristotle in the Physics), there is chance
a. Chance is defined as: an unexpected event brought about by the occurrence of
causes which had other purposes in view (i.e. a ‘coincidence of causes’)
b. This is more than compatible with divine Providence, and, indeed, it is
Providence which brings together the disparate orders of causes
Prose 2: Strong affirmation of free will – rational natures must necessarily have free will
1) Any being, which by its nature has the use of reason, must also have the power of
judgment
2) Judgment distinguishes between what should be desired and what should be avoided
3) In rational creatures, there is the freedom of desiring and shunning (else what would the
judgment be for?)
4) But human beings are more or less free, depending on what they turn themselves toward:
if they contemplate the divine mind, they are more free; if they yield and consent to the
passions, they are less free.
Prose 3:
Boethius presents a series of arguments which are designed to prove that divine
providence and human freedom are in fact incompatible.
1) The argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge (a necessary component of
providence) and human freedom
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a. Whatever God’s Providence forsees will happen, must happen
b. God foreknows eternally not only all the acts of men, but also their plans and
wishes
c. Therefore all of the acts, plans, and wishes of man must happen
d. Therefore there is no free will
e. (Or, conversely, to affirm free will seems to deny God’s providence, because it
would mean that God’s foreknowledge could not necessarily see into a contingent
and free act)
2) Furthermore, Boethius rejects the specious argument which maintains that Providence
foresees what is to come because it will happen – because this puts the necessity in the
act, and makes God dependent upon the act (rather than vice versa)
3) Summary of the argument:
a. It is necessary that either
i. Things which are going to happen are foreseen by God
ii. or, What God foresees will in fact happen
b. Either way, the freedom of the human will is destroyed
c. For the outcome of something known in advance must necessarily take place (if
that knowledge is true, i.e. certain, knowledge)
d. Therefore there can be no freedom in human decisions and actions, since the
divine mind, foreseeing everything without possibility of error, determines and
forces the outcome of everything that is to happen
4) Boethius now points out the implications of the lack of human freedom
a. There is no point in rewarding and punishing the good and wicked
b. Vice and virtue no longer have any meaning
c. God must be responsible for human vice
d. There is no point in hoping or praying for anything
Prose 4:
1)
2)
3)
4)
In order to see that Providence does not preclude human freedom, we must
distinguish between human and divine knowledge
It is a mistake to think that certain foreknowledge actually causes necessity in the
voluntary things that do happen
The root of this error is to assume that whatever is known, is known only by the force and
nature of the things which are known
But in fact, everything which is known is known not according to its own power but
rather according to the capacity of the knower
The capacity of the divine knower is to foreknow things in such a way that this
knowledge does not impose necessity upon the contingent things known
Prose 5: Distinguish between human and divine intelligence
1) Human knowing
a. There is a passivity to human knowing – external bodies effect the body, creating
sensible stimuli
b. Still, the soul judges these stimuli via its own power, which is active rather than
passive
2) Divine knowing
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a. Because God is a pure intelligence, He knows in a way that does not involve the
sensible impressions of the body
b. If the divine reason is so much above the human reason in the way in which it
knows, then we should now consider the way in which this supreme knowledge is
able to know contingent future events, and to know them certainly
Prose 6:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
The problem of Providence and free will is solved once we understand the
simplicity and eternal present of divine knowledge, and when we distinguish
between simple and conditional necessity
Since everything knows according to its nature, and an aspect of God’s nature is that He
is eternal, then we must investigate the nature of His eternity
a. Eternity is the whole, perfect, and simultaneous possession of endless life.
b. It is not an endless progression from past to present to future
c. Rather, whatever being is eternal must be in full possession of itself, always
present to itself, and must hold the infinity of moving time present before itself
d. God is eternal, but the world is merely perpetual
God’s knowledge, which must be according to His nature, therefore transcends all
movement of time and abides in the simplicity of its immediate present
Thus, God’s foreknowledge is not, properly speaking, the foreknowledge of future
events, but rather the knowledge of a never changing present
This, in turn, means that God’s “fore”knowledge does not imply necessity for contingent,
eternally present things
a. Simple necessity is the necessity in which a thing cannot be other than it is: i.e.,
men are mortal
b. Conditional necessity is the necessity in which whatever is known to in fact be the
case, is the case: i.e., when someone is known to be walking, then he must
necessarily be walking (yet this is not simply necessary)
c. The same future even its necessary with respect to God’s (eternally present)
knowledge of it (this is conditional necessity); but free and undetermined if
considered in its own nature (thus it does not have simple necessity)
“There is no doubt, then, that all things will happen which God knows will happen; but
some of them happen as a result of free will.”
a. God has an immediate vision of all things not from the outcome of future events,
but from the simplicity of his own nature.
b. Since this is true, the freedom of the human will remains inviolate
c. If you will face it, the necessity of virtuous action imposed upon you is very great,
since all actions are done in the sight of a Judge who sees all things
Questions, Notes:
Note how Boethius tackles (convincingly, to my mind) the problem of Divine Foreknowledge
and human freedom. However, it still remains an open question how God can order all things to
His own ends, when human beings can freely choose as they will. Clearly, knowledge is needed
for this ordering, but so too is the Divine will. I don’t think that Boethius answers how God can
will everything for good, and yet men can freely will evil.
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