Conference Summaries:
Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan –
Researching Today’s Private Military
and Security Industry
London, 17 November 2011
© 2011
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Summary: Panel I
Panelists: Mark Erbel, Maj Gen Rtrd David Shouesmith, Dr. David Moore, Hugo Rosemont
Mark Erbel (PMSRG):
Mark was addressing the question of how defence policy might be conceived in the future relying on
the market and facing a new threat environment. While security was conventionally defined within
the realm of a state, the provision of military and security services have traditionally been
characterized as public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable in nature. Therefore,
throughout the Cold War such services were provided by the state military whereas military strategy
was developed by the state that was positioned at the top of a security policy hierarchy passing
defence policy-related decisions to other players in a top-down process. However, from the 1980s
onwards, states experienced an increasing gap between their security-related commitments and the
resources available to live up to these commitments. In light of the neo-liberal conception of the
state in the 1980s, the market stepped up to fill this gap supporting the state in being able to fulfil its
defence policy related commitments. Mark claimed that in this process, the state’s monopoly on
shaping defence strategy was lost as the market increasingly also interfered with the supply of
strategy. Giving an outlook towards potential future threat scenarios for Western states, Mark
outlined that future threats and possible resulting contingency operations will be globalized in
nature. Despite the trans-state nature of these threats and the private character of future
opponents, reading security policy will continue through the prism of the state, while many securityrelated services will be provided by private corporations that will further impact defence policymaking through new networks and a changing security policy hierarchy.
Maj Gen Rtrd David Shouesmith:
Having worked for the HM British Forces as well as for the industry, Mr. Shouesmith analysed in his
presentation the rationale behind the outsourcing of military and security services. Mr. Shouesmith
identified two reasons for the strong reliance on the market in contingency operations since 9/11:
first the operational and second the economic imperative. The operational imperative arises from
the fact that some operations such as securing the supply lines in Pakistan require the use of
contractors as countries such as Pakistan would not allow for the deployment of foreign soldiers on
their soil. Apart from that, the relatively small contingent of British soldiers in Afghanistan limited by
the political leadership to 10,000 troops would not suffice on its own to fulfil the mission
requirements giving the market the opportunity to work as a substantial force multiplier. The
economic imperative simply holds that relying on private companies to provide particular support
services allows considerable cost-savings as private corporations are believed to work more costeffectively. Mr. Shouesmith, however, recognized certain limitations to what the industry can
supply. For the industry to be able to provide offensive combat support services, private contractors
would require a much more sophisticated skill set and PMC operations would have to be much
closer integrated with HM Forces’ operations. Moreover, Mr. Shouesmith identifies problems with
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the cost-efficiency argument regarding the industry as the sometimes oligarchic nature of the
market does not allow for free competition allowing companies to overcharge the MoD as a major
client. Nonetheless, with the industry focusing on its actual raison d’être of supplying maintenance
and support services and with the MoD more closely monitoring its relationships with PMCs, Mr.
Shouesmith argues that the industry in the future will continue to be a reliable partner, which
delivers a set of indispensable services.
Dr. David Moore (Cranfield University):
In his presentation Dr. Moore gave an overview over the most important factors in successful
outsourcing of services from the MoD to the market. Dr. Moore’s most important criticism of the
current outsourcing regime was the MoD’s following of ‘process’ rather than judgment when
awarding contracts to the market. Instead of focusing on technology and equipment, the MoD
should focus on capability. The lack of an outsourcing framework, which could function as a
monitoring mechanism able to formalize institutional learning within the MoD impeded a learning
process whereby the MoD could draw constructive conclusions from the outsourcing experience. Dr.
Moore argued that an institutional learning process could help to improve the selection of the most
suitable supplier, which is imperative to both an effective and efficient outsourcing process. A
formalized outsourcing process within the MoD would be able to consist of a circular learning
process starting from awareness and knowledge about the mission’s requirements, continuing with
an internal assessment of potential suppliers and the actual selection of suppliers before monitoring
the collaboration and finally validating the provision of the contracted services. Dr. Moore claims
that after such a thorough review process the MoD would be more capable of making an informed
judgement of whether or not to continue the collaboration with a particular company.
Hugo Rosemont (PMSRG):
In his presentation, Hugo connected the redefinition of security over the last two decades with many
states’ increasing reliance on private military and security services. Whilst traditionalists have
defined security within the realist framework, “wideners” have taken a broader approach to the
concept of security; also including the protection against non-conventional threats. Hugo drew on
the British Government’s National Security Strategy of 2010 to show that the political leadership in
the UK has adopted a wide definition of security including threats such as cyber insecurity and
international terrorism. For the state to be able to counter these threats, he argued, it has to rely on
the technical and professional expertise of contractors as companies either own or operate critical
infrastructure or hold the expertise on such wider security threats. Hugo drew on the work of Philip
Bobbitt to argue that against the backdrop of this wider approach to the concept of security, the
nation-state is shifting towards becoming a “market state”. He argued that this means there are
increasing levels of interdependency between the state and the private sector in the
implementation of many aspects of security policy, including but extending beyond the military
domain. Hugo explained what Abrahamsen and Williams call the “ubiquitous” nature of the private
sector’s involvement in UK national security by bringing in some of his own experience of working
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with private contractors and in helping to develop the security framework for the London 2012
Olympic Games.
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Summary: Panel II
Panellists: Andreas Krieg, Patrick Wellington, Elke Krahmann, Christopher Beese
Andreas Krieg (PMSRG):
Andreas examined to what extent the concept of the state’s monopoly on violence (SMOV) remains
valid in a contemporary context. He first analysed the role of the state according to social contract
theory, drawing on the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke in examining the validity of the realist
notion that “every man is the next man’s wolf”. The purpose of security in this sense, it was argued,
is to provide physical security. The military is the agent that is tasked to provide this, and the state
obliges the soldier to risk his/her life for the security of the state. Andreas explained that the SMOV
concept was coined by Max Weber in 1919, and that it crucially places an emphasis on the
legitimacy of the use of force (i.e. the state is the sole source of the right to use violence). Andreas
drew on the work of Wulf, Baker and Avant, before examining what constitutes “vital national
interests” in the Twenty-First Century. The globalisation of conflicts and the rise of alternative
systems of governance mean that a new political geography of power is emerging. Andreas stated
that against this backdrop it is vital to consider “against whom” security is to be provided, in the
widest sense, arguing that it is increasingly difficult to apply the SMOV concept to post-modern
conflicts lying outside popular interpretations of the social contract. This is because in many
instances the state has lost its omnipotence and it is also difficult to define the “national interest” in
the absence of bipolarity. Andreas concluded that the “top down privatisation” of violence through
PMSCs does not constitute a breach of SMOV. Instead, in many cases PMSCs appear more suitable
providers of security and military services than the state.
Lt. Col. Patrick Wellington (5 – RMP):
The speaker explained that he is currently serving in the British Army and that he would provide an
entirely tactical and qualitative opinion as to why in his opinion soldiers had left the army to join
PMSCs (or return from them). The context is that since 1995 there has been in the area of close
protection both “outflows” and “inflows” in specialisations. In 1997, in the context of Northern
Ireland related conflict, people joined the Army to serve their country, and would seek to specialise
in protection (for example, by joining the SAS). This trend was maintained through the first Gulf War,
and it was only during the second Gulf War that people quickly realised the opportunities to provide
close protection outside the Army. Patrick argued that there were two reasons why lots of people
moved to PMSCs during this period; firstly, for reasons of thrill-seeking (“close, sharp contact”) or,
secondly, for simply personal economic security (“money”). To exemplify the latter, Patrick
explained that an Officer for the Royal Signals could expect to be paid £15k in the British Army, but
£25k for Vodafone. An additional trend was that where an officer had taken a decision to leave the
Army to join a PMSC, there would be many instances where he would take trusted people with him.
However, close protection can be a dull endeavour (“like taxi-driving”) and money can “only go so
far to alleviating boredom.” As this increasingly became the sort of work contractors would conduct,
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and PMSCs increasingly recruited non-specialists from society to complete the work, the pattern of
the outflow changed. Increasingly, soldiers sought to return to the military because the dynamic of
PMSCs had changed. It was concluded that in the area of close protection the outflow of soldiers to
PMSCs had reversed and that generally most companies were now no longer providing this type of
service.
Elke Krahmann (Brunel University):
In her paper titled “Whither the State Monopoly on Violence?” Professor Krahmann examined the
character, activity and evolution of PMSCs in the context of norm change. The SMOV, she argued,
should be seen as a norm rather than as a theoretical concept. It is difficult to measure a change in
norms (“How do you measure a change in behaviour?”), but it is important to understand the SMOV
as a norm in the sense that the use of force should operate within the rule of law (domestic and/or
international). It is also necessary to ask “what is a norm?” and this can be conceptualised as
“collective social expectations about generalised normative standards of behaviour.” But if we have
idealised standards of behaviour, how do we measure them? Three empirical indicators were
offered: 1. The prominence of the norm (i.e. the general acceptance that behaviours are changing):
2. The precedence of the norm (e.g. if the behaviours of “norm entrepreneurs” becoming
regularized): 3. The coherence of the norm (i.e. if the new norms that are emerging are linked to
other norms (e.g. neoliberalism) and if they are eroding the SMOV). There is significant evidence of
norm change , including for example: the substantial ratio of contractors to soldiers in international
conflicts, the increasing challenge to state legitimacy through regulation (or self-regulation) of
PMSCs, the issuing of “medals to contractors, and the changes that are taking place in international
law to reflect the participation of contractors in hostilities. Professor Krahmann concluded that we
are witnessing a redefinition of the SMOV - which blurs what is ‘civilian’ and what is the ‘military’ and that this should be through the lens of evolutionary norm change.
Christopher Beese (Olive Group):
Christopher provided an analysis of how the military sees industry, and vice versa. The US military
would no longer contemplate entering an environment without contractors. In the UK, there is now
recognised value in private armed capacity. The Dutch understand the issues, but it is not for them
now. It is a (Spanish) case of “no way José” for the Germans. The realities, as industry sees them, are
that PMSCs must operate within the ICRC code of conduct and that their role is to supplement
military capacity (“traffic wardens do not replace the police”). In reality, the SMOV should be looked
upon as a “graduated” as industry also uses force. We should also be aware that our adversaries
(e.g. the Taliban) will unlikely to know or care about the difference between who is a contractor and
a commissioned soldier. In terms of the qualifications and experience of PMSCs, they do not try to
induce soldiers from the military and do not undertake six month rotations like national militaries; in
Iraq, for example, there are now more companies operating in the country than ever and many have
been there for over five years.. PMSCs are also unlikely to work for one client, but multiple
customers (e.g. FCO, DFID, UN, DOD), and therefore “don’t dance to one organisation’s tune”. The
reasons why different states adopt such different approaches to the use of PMSCs is a matter of
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policy. In the UK there is engagement with MoD, which industry welcomes, and academia has an
important role to play as an independent assessor of this activity. Christopher concluded that,
however defined, the use of private companies should be seen not so much as outsourcing than as
capacity. The perception of “armed contractors” would be better replaced with the terminology of
the “JAC” (“Just another contractor”).
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Summary: Panel III
Panellists: Christopher Sanderson, Ian Ralby, Nigel White, Mervyn Frost
Christopher Sanderson (Director Libya, Control Risks):
As an active member of the UK’s AeroSpace, Defense and Security (ADS) group, Chris presented
many of the regulatory issues facing both land and maritime companies within the Private Military
and Security Industry. As the chair of the “Security in Complex Emergencies” group (SCEG), Chris
explained how the Montreaux document was the international community’s ‘precursor’ to
regulating PMSCs (the document serves to remind countries of previously-agreed-upon obligations
that pertain to the hiring and usage of PMSCs) and that the International Code of Conduct (ICOC)
was later founded to try to establish a baseline of ethical operating standards. During consultations,
most companies would have favoured government-imposed regulations however the outcome thus
far has been a self-regulated system of which ADS and SCEG are government-affiliated partners. The
goal of the SCEG is to create legislation that is effective, inclusive, transparent, and affordable. Any
and all PMSCs worldwide are welcome to give input into creating international regulations for
PMSCs. Currently, it is not clear that the majority of the ICOC signatories want to be deeply involved
in drafting international regulations; however, it is in every PMSC’s interest to be so. There are no
firm international laws governing PMSCs despite the challenging environments that both armed and
unarmed companies are operating in. Chris highlighted incidences in Iraq and Afghanistan to show
that, with regards to armed security, serious consequences can stem from an individual’s response
to events on the ground. Regulatory “effectiveness” can be measured by its impact on human
behaviour.
Ian Ralby (Intl. Lawyer):
Ian Ralby highlighted areas of difficulty in putting the written ICOC into enforceable practice within
the international community. The ICOC currently boasts 211 states as signatories however three
main challenges face those who would like to rigorously implement the code. Firstly, most
international laws are not universally interpretable and the ICOC has similar problems in that each
signatory may interpret aspects of the ICOC in different ways. Secondly, the standards advocated in
the ICOC must be written in an audible format, similar to ISO standards. PMSCs would then need to
be trained and certified according to the standards. Third, as a natural consequence of the first two
points, an international governance or oversight committee would need to be established to
interpret the ICOC and monitor adherence. Many questions for administrating such a body include:
How would the body be funded? How would the body impose legal controls on a non-legal process?
What liabilities would the body itself be subject to? And how many clients or vendors would remain
partial to the ICOC after such a body were established? Ian concluded that the ICOC was a
significant and positive step forward but only the beginning of a very lengthy and challenging
process.
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Nigel White (University of Nottingham):
Nigel White’s presentation pointed to many challenges in developing a control regime for PMSCs.
Nigel first framed his presentation by outlining the different regulatory instruments currently
available. He briefly referred to the Montreux Document and the ICOC and then offered a
third mechanism: a UN Draft Convention on PMSCs that was begun at roughly the same
time as the Montreux document but has yet to reach the same level of publicity. To date,
international law has not been much help in overseeing the behaviours of PMSCs. Illegal
acts can only be ascribed to individual contractors; it is difficult to attribute wrong-doing to
a state, corporation, or company. Under current laws, a plaintiff would have to prove that a
PMSC accused of wrong-doing was integrated fully into a nation’s armed forces, or that the
PMSC was performing an inherently governmental task in order for the plaintiff to hold the
hiring state responsible. There is currently no universally accepted idea of what constitutes
an “inherently governmental function” or to what extent a PMSC is “under the control of
[the] state.” It is generally agreed that states have an obligation to protect against human
rights abuses and provide effective remedies for human rights abuses. And that states and
companies both have due diligence obligations. But, Nigel emphasized, there are a number
of weaknesses in the Montreux document, International Humanitarian Law, state military
legal processes, and laws that address states rather than individual companies. Nigel
concluded that there are currently no effective regulation to ensure that states control,
audit, or closely supervise PMSC conduct.
Mervyn Frost (King’s College, WSD):
Mervyn began his presentation by pointing to the many examples of privatisation outside
the realm of security, including railways, airline services, and other international labour and
service providers prone to litigation. Mervyn stated that many kinds of companies are
concerned with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the international community has
thus far found effective ways to regulate most companies. The question was then poised:
what about PMSCs makes their regulation different or more difficult? The answer seemed
to be that the architecture of ethical accountability found within strong states cannot be
taken for granted. PMSCs normally operate within quasi- or weak states where citizens
have no mechanism to hold a government accountable for companies that overstep
boundaries. The same domestic systems that that allow citizens of successful states to
pressure governments into punishing commercial ethical infractions (i.e. voting or
revolution) do not exist within weak states. The most common victims of PMSC infractions
are normally not governments, commercial entities, or customers; they are instead citizens
who have no formal mechanism for pursuing grievances. Mervyn then presented a cursory
review of complaint mechanisms that are currently in place and emphasised the importance
of the free press in bringing infractions to light (“free press” was differentiated from
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“embedded press”). Mervyn concluded his presentation by stressing that self-regulation is
not enough. Regulation in theatre is necessary.
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Summary: Panel IV
Panelists: Alison Hawks, Birthe Anders, Peter Astbury, James Pattison
Alison Hawks (PMSRG):
Alison Hawk’s presentation highlighted issues that have arisen or will likely arise due to the blurring
of lines between civilian and military roles. Under normally circumstances, especially when states
maintain a monopoly on force, it is not possible for people to move freely between civilian and
soldier-like occupations; however, recent trends in private military contracting have made these
lines permeable. Alison expressed two key points that might be important as a result of these
permeable lines: 1) Legal and ‘duty of care’ issues and 2) Social reintegration issues. Many Western
governments recognize the strains and pressures intrinsic to military service and, as a result, they go
to lengths to care for people as they exit the military. PMSCs do not currently take responsibility for
employees leaving the industry and this may result in legal, insurance, or societal issues in the
future. Insurance and other care-of-employee issues may be prevalent if PMSCs do not start
enacting measures now to avoid future litigation. For example, PTSD and psychological liability law
suits might arise if PMSCs do not follow up on the mental health of their employees. There is
evidence to show that members of Special Forces units might have an easier time reintegrating into
society due to PMSCs; it would be good to compare this evidence with how the same units were
reintegrated following other wartime scenarios and with how the reintegration process might look
without PMSCs.
Birthe Anders (PMSRG):
Birthe Anders described the current relationship between PMSCs and Humanitarian Organizations
(HOs) as a tenuous one but she noted that there used to be a similar lack of trust between HOs and
national militaries. Birthe’s presentation explored the links and similarities between these two
organizations. Looking at how HOs and militaries overcame their difficulties may be a model for
PMSCs and HOs to do the same. Although it may not be readily apparent, it seems that the two
groups have already recognized that cooperation is possible. A 2007 ODI study showed that 35% of
HOs currently use PMSCs to provide security training, advice, consulting, and close protection. HOs
and PMSCs actually have a lot in common to include sharing operational space, security concerns, a
short-term business orientation, and loose accountability rules. Questions were raised about the
possibility of PMSCs taking over humanitarian tasks in the future; and about the reasons why many
HOs that currently employ PMSCs are reluctant to admit to doing so.
Peter Astbury (Astbury Marine):
Peter Astbury’s presentation focused on the maritime industry. The maritime security industry is
unique in that the increased presence of armed contractors has not displaced any other groups, nor
has it blurred the lines between state and civil powers to the degree that land-based units have. It is
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also highly possible that maritime PMSCs may have the brightest future of all PMSCs during eras
when there are no major Western military campaigns taking place. This is because maritime security
is the easiest to mainstream and it is, in many ways, of the lowest profile. With reference to the
United States, one of the most influential countries in the world on the subject of armed contracting,
the U.S. government decided not to create one major contract to hire one giant PMSC to secure USflagged ships. No other governments have hired one large company to secure all ships either. This
leaves the security of individual ships owned by individual shipping companies, of all nations, up for
bid by any PMSC willing to provide services. To further spur the maritime industry, the United
Nations Maritime department recently declared that national navies cannot adequately protect
ships; the result was a boom in the maritime PMSC industry. Today, the market is wide open for all
companies. The maritime security industry has seen the greatest growth of all the PMSC sectors and
there is currently more demand for maritime security providers than there is supply.
James Patterson (University of Manchester):
James Patterson’s presentation was based on his upcoming book entitled The Morality of Private
War. This book addresses many of the mainstream arguments for and against employing PMSCs
during armed conflicts and stability-reconstruction operations. Many of the points raised in the
book were covered by presenters during this conference; James’s book codifies these arguments and
poises key questions for readers, citizens, and law-makers to answer before the future of PMSCs can
be determed.
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