“EU Public Perceptions of China and Policy Implications”
By George Cunningham,
Deputy Head, China and Mongolia Division,
European External Action Service,
Glasgow University,
31st October 2012
Slide 1: Introduction
My thanks to Professor Jane Duckett, Edward Caird Chair of Politics and
Director of Glasgow University’s Confucius Institute and the Confucius
Institute’s Manager Duo Long for having invited me to this important
symposium.
I am also very grateful for Member of the Scottish Parliament Graeme
Pearson’s generous welcome and opening remarks as well as Vincent
Oates from University of Strathclyde whose assistance contributed to this
event. Finally I would like to take the opportunity of acknowledging the
presence of Professor Dong Lisheng of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and Professor Guan Xinping of Nankai University and their
excellent earlier presentations.
It is my first time in Glasgow as well as its fine university. It is also a first
for me to visit a Confucius Institute and see it in action since taking up
my current position as Deputy Head of China and Mongolia Division at
the European External Action Service less than a year ago.
I was particularly impressed about the harmony that exists between Scots
and the Chinese Diaspora here in Glasgow, exemplified by the delicious
Haggis spring roll served to me at a Chinese restaurant today!
The request for this talk on European public perceptions of China wetted
my appetite considerably when I first received it. As a former author of
the European Commission’s Eurobarometer public opinion reports across
the EU and beyond, it was a call to arms after many years of diplomatic
service to come to the crux of any relationship between countries and
China in particular: its people. What do people know and feel about
China and how are their views formulated? Can we bridge any
knowledge gaps to show all the facets of relations to allow people to
make a more informed judgement.
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Slide 2: Discussion Points
My talk this afternoon will be divided into five parts:
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The EU-China relationship
Historic Chinese migration to Europe
China in Europe’s media
Public opinion polling on China
Sum-up and policy implications
Slide 3: The EU-China Relationship
The EU-China relationship is first and foremost often seen through an
economic optic. This is not surprising, given the state of the world today.
The European Union, the United States and China are the three largest
and most vital economies in the world. Since the start of the opening-up
of China’s economy in 1978 and the ongoing enlargement and integration
process of Europe, EU-China trade had increased dramatically. The EU is
now China’s largest trading partner while China is ranked the EU’s 2nd
largest trading partner - only behind the U.S. - and has nearly caught up.
In 2011, the EU’s trade with China was a staggering €428 billion, a little
behind trade with the US at €445 billion.1,2 That is, every single day,
China and the European Union trade easily over 1 billion euro. Twenty
years ago, EU-China bilateral trade was not far off zero. With the effects
of the economic and financial crisis still weighing heavily on us, the
dynamic of the inter-relationship between the EU, US and China
undoubtedly holds the key to world recovery.
The EU established diplomatic relations with China in 1975, when the
European Union was the European Economic Community. The formal
legal basis of the relationship was set out a little over a decade later with
the 1985 EU and China Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
From infrequent meetings once every few years, relations have now
grown to the extent that a comprehensive EU-China strategic partnership
was established in 2003, shortly after Chinese Premier Wen took office.
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2
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/china/
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/
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We held our 15th EU-China summit last month. It was an occasion to take
stock of how far we have gone together during a decade of Premier
Wen’s leadership on the Chinese side, who retires from office shortly
after the 18th Communist Party Congress next month.
The EU took the opportunity of the summit to thank China in particular
for its support of the euro. The Chinese were much more satisfied than
the last summit that EU Member States were on the right track
economically. China has proposed a cooperation package which it sees as
the next stage of the development of the relationship under the expected
new Chinese leadership, which the EU is studying carefully now.
Slide 4 : EU-China Dialogue Architecture
But the economic relationship between the EU and China is only the
beginning of the story. The EU-China comprehensive strategic
partnership has been regularly upgraded through a demand-driven
process by both sides. The EU-China institutional architecture has now
evolved into three pillars: political, economic and trade, as well as
people-to-people contacts. New topics include foreign affairs, security
matters and global challenges such as climate change and global
economy governance.
There are annual summits (in fact there were two summits this year)
along with regular high level dialogues, as well as over 50 sectoral
dialogues covering a broad set of areas such as industrial policy,
education, customs, social affairs, nuclear energy and consumer
protection.
Human rights are discussed as part of the regular political dialogues as
well as during the specific human rights dialogues that have been held
since 1995. These are the toughest of the dialogues as they bring into
sharp focus divergences between the EU and China in terms of their
political systems and value beliefs.
Slide 5: People-to-People Dialogue
Particularly relevant for this talk is the newly-created High Level Peopleto-People Dialogue which was agreed at the 14th EU-China summit in
February 2012, and came into being two months afterwards. The first
round was held on 18 April 2012 in Brussels, co-chaired by Ms
Androulla Vassiliou, European Commissioner for Education, Culture,
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Multilingualism and Youth and Ms Liu Yandong, State Councillor of the
People’s Republic of China.
Practical new steps in promoting mutual understanding are in particular
planned for students and scholars during 2012-2016: the Chinese side
providing 30,000 scholarships, of which 20,000 will support Chinese
students and scholars to study in all EU countries and 10,000 will support
the EU students and scholars to study in China. On its side, the EU will
support the mobility of 5,000 Chinese students and academics to the EU
and 2,000 EU students and academics to China.
There will also be further educational, reseacher mobility, cultural
exchanges and youth promotion programmes, including sustainable
partnerships and networks between Chinese and European youth
organisations to allow for cooperation and exchange of good practices
between them. It is expected that by 2013, a total of 500 youth
organisations from China and Europe will have been involved in such
cooperation projects. Web-based inter-action is also given prominence.
Slide 6: The Importance of Chinese Migration
However, if we want to start looking at EU public perceptions towards
China and its peoples, there is no better place to start than at home.
Stepping back, our first look at European attitudes towards the Chinese
must begin with the Chinese immigrant community living in Europe. For
perceptions of China are not just formulated from what is happening
abroad but by the daily inter-actions between people at home.
One of the earliest real European engagements with China came from
settlement of migrants from the southern coastal provinces of China.
Migrants from Hong Kong, (which had been a British territory since the
1860s) came to settle in port cities like Liverpool (home of the earliest
Chinatown in the UK) and then London, Amsterdam, Hamburg and
Lisbon. There were subsequently multiple migration flows from China to
Europe, coming from specific sending areas to specific destination areas.
Once in Europe, however, there has always been much geographical
mobility among Chinese. These migration flows each have their own
characteristics which go beyond geographical patterns. The timing of
migration, gender balance, age, numbers, sectors of employment and
socio-economic background of migrants from China pre- and postmigration vary greatly as well across the distinct migration flows.
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Flows of migrants from Hong Kong, the New Territories, the provinces
of Zhejiang and Fujian have increased, especially during the last decades
of the 20th century, so that there is now a widespread diaspora across the
whole continent.
Hong Kong and Guangdong migrants primarily settled in the UK, the
Netherlands and Germany; Zhejiang migrants settled throughout the
entire European continent, making up the majority of subgroup Chinese
in Italy, Spain and Hungary; Fujianese settled the UK and the
Netherlands.
The Chinese in the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands were
traditionally owners or employees in the Chinese restaurant business.
And across Europe, the popularity of Chinese food has resulted in a
booming economic sector providing jobs for Chinese from the 1950’s
until the end of the 20th century.
In southern and eastern European countries however, their economic
activities have been concentrated in different sectors. In Italy, the Chinese
are known for being clothing manufacturers and producers of leather
products. In Italy - as well as Spain and Hungary - there are large
numbers of Chinese that own supermarkets.
Hungary is one of the European countries that have witnessed a
spectacular rise in numbers of Chinese migrants during the last decades.
In 1988 visa requirements between the two countries were abolished, just
before the fall of the communist regime. Within a few years time, there
was a very significant influx of Chinese migrants who saw Hungary as a
transit country for entering the more affluent western European countries.
Many stayed, however, and Hungary is now the hub of Chinese imports
to Central and Eastern Europe.
During the last few years in the UK and the Netherlands in particular,
there has been an influx of Chinese university students, adding to the
diversity of Chinese in Europe. These middle and higher-class migrants pursuing an education - has changed the landscape of Chinese
communities significantly. Firstly, they do not originate from a specific
limited number of sending regions like the established migrants but come
from all over China. Secondly, while creating fresh living links between
China and Europe, there is a sharing of culture, ideas and produce.
Moreover a number of these students chose to remain in Europe after
completing their education, creating a new ‘layer’ of Chinese migrants.
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Immigration from China to Europe through legal channels had become
increasingly difficult since the end of the last century. Illegal migration
flourished at first and then seems to have reduced – but this has left its
negative mark as we will see. The reduction was partly a result of the
diminished opportunities in Europe because of the ongoing economic
crisis here, the saturation of the Chinese restaurant sector, and positive
developments in the Chinese economy meaning wealth creation there
became easier. After this period of stagnation in Chinese immigration, it
has revitalised, and differently so, mostly in the high skilled sector.
At the same time, there is an increase in interest of Europeans to learn
Mandarin and Chinese culture. The popularity of university programmes
and secondary school courses of Mandarin and Chinese culture in Europe
has increased. Also, studying Mandarin in China, or doing internships in
China has become more popular over the last decades amongst European
students.
With the economic opportunities that corporations, companies and
individuals see in China, there is a growth in interest in Chinese culture,
language and its history. From Europe to China, and China to Europe
there is a growth of numbers of tourists who are interested in each other’s
culture, history, food and peoples. The intensification of contact between
the EU and China takes place not only in the economical and political
realm, but ‘on the ground’, among everyday people.
These are the tangible people to people links between the EU and China,
which are important when we come to think of how we perceive each
other. We have moved from being isolated from each other to a period in
which we are increasingly inter-linked. Migrants to and from China are
critical carriers, ambassadors if you will, of messages and impressions of
their originating country. The migration background is therefore
significant as a factor when we talk of what European views might now
be of China in an era when it is changing so quickly and becoming so
much more important in the world.
Slide 7: China in Europe’s Media
However, even if there is an increasing amount of inter-action between
European and Chinese on the ground, much of what we think about China
is inevitably formed by searing images of what is happening abroad, in a
country which is very far away from Europe but nonetheless
acknowledged to be of increasing importance. The prime shaper of that
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image of a far-away place where few European have yet travelled is
inevitably the media.
While no exhaustive survey of EU media has been done on its reporting
of China, in the last few years there have been key moments when the
media have been perceived at least by the Chinese side as antithetical or
at least over-critical.
The most vivid example of that in living memory must surely be the
events surrounding Tiananmen Square in 1989. Of course, the impact was
huge, not just in Europe but with the rest of the world. It was so huge
because the world's press was in Beijing in late May and early June to
cover the visit of President Gorbachev, and this meant that the events that
followed on June 4th – in particular the visual impact - received even
larger coverage than they might have done otherwise.
Chinese leaders have often complained since then about the negative
press coverage they have received. The usual trigger for media response
to China is indeed clustered around more negative issues like human
rights within China, or images which reinforce the idea that the Chinese
government is repressive, dictatorial and unfeeling about rights issues or
the rule of law generally.
The award of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2010 for instance to
imprisoned dissident Liu Xiaobo, or the execution the same year of
British citizen Akmal Sheik for smuggling heroin into China, all received
huge negative coverage across Europe. As did of course Chinese
denunciations when national leaders like German Chancellor Merkel or
former French President Nikolas Sarkozy met with the Dalia Lama in
2008 which were equally reflected by very negative media coverage
within the EU.
However this sits alongside the generally very positive coverage of the
Chinese economy, especially since 2008, and of China’s increasing
wealth and prosperity, all of which gets coverage mostly, either as
something that the EU can benefit from, or something which is at least a
source of optimism during a period when most of the developed world is
still suffering economic hardship. The narrative of China being 1.3 billion
consumers, trade with whom will make Europeans better-off, is as
powerful now as it was almost a century ago when the American
businessman Carl Crow wrote his famous `400 Million Customers’ book.
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This division between the good story of China’s economic rise – albeit
peppered with concerns that two-way trade should be a level playing field
- and the benefits that might come to the EU because of it, and the dislike
of the Chinese political system and some of the government behavior
might explain to some extent the ambiguity of European views on
China’s renaissance.
The role of the press across the EU is seen most clearly when senior
Chinese leaders visit the EU as part of major delegations. At these times,
as when Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Germany in June 2011, one
sees European governments making big efforts to reach out to China and
create good links, while the more market-driven media tend to seek to
create narratives of a threatening and more negative China.
It is important to note that the apparent general remoteness of Chinese
leaders during the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao period has not helped their
cause, especially at press conferences. The media sees them as more used
to delivering highly controlled set speeches and operating in the most
restricted circumstances. Their ability to reach out beyond this, to the EU
man in the street, for linguistic, cultural and other reasons, is therefore
highly restricted.
Whether media shapes these views, reinforces them, or actually merely
reflects what people want to hear, is a vexed issue. The most one can say
is that most major European news channels and printed media now have
correspondents in China, and that the level of news coverage has
increased. China is front page news more often than ever before.
What is needed now is a proper monitoring exercise of what EU coverage
proportionately is negative or positive, how this links with public opinion
surveys which have been commissioned, and other issues connected with
this.
Slide 8: Polling Data: Do you have a favourable view of China?
Similarly when we get down to trying to quantify what Europeans really
think of China from public opinion polls which are available, we can get
only a sketchy picture and only for some EU countries at present. Unlike
the Nottingham University study on Chinese perceptions of Europe, we
do not have a tailor-made mirror study of European perceptions of China.
Thus we need to rely on research done by others as parts of different
surveys in an ad hoc way. I will refer in particular to three sets of data.
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One is from the Pew Research Institute, which has undertaken an annual
worldwide survey on international relations from 2005, including in a
changing mix of EU Member States which asked a number of questions
on China. The second is from the BBC Global Span/Pipa institute, which
has undertaken surveys in the last two years. I also focus one question
from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer which gives us a snap
shot on one issue - but usefully across all the EU’s 27 Member States.
We therefore have some information about attitudes essentially in the six
biggest EU Member States by population size, nationally-representative
therefore of over two thirds of the half billion population of the EU27.
Occasionally we have information as well about some other countries
According to the worldwide poll conducted by Pew Research, favourable
views of China were marginally more positive than negative for all five
countries surveyed in 2005-06 but then showed a sharp dip in 2007-08
before climbing back, except for Germany.
Why was there is a big dip in 2008? The Pew question was asked in the
Spring. We may recall at the time that the media were reporting about the
Olympic Torch’s procession across Europe which aroused strong
feelings, particularly in France. The media used these moments as
opportunities not only to celebrate China’s thirty years of enormous
achievements domestically but also highlighted China “warts and all”.
Hollywood celebrities called for a boycott of what they branded
Genocide Olympics in reference to Darfur, there was an outburst of
ethnic violence in Tibet in Western China and reports of the bulldozing of
people’s homes to make way for the Olympic grandeur. As we can see,
China’s image has gradually improved since then in the aftermath of the
Olympics games in Beijing - and further in 2011, the year after the
Shanghai Expo, but not to the same extent as before.
A survey carried out by Globescan/Pipa between December 2011 and
January 2012 – at a different time and with different question wording
than the Pew survey - confirms nevertheless that - within those countries
surveyed in the EU - China is viewed most unfavourably in France and
Germany, although less negatively than the Pew survey.
In the 2012 Pew survey, the majority of French and Germans are joined
in their negative views of China by most Czechs and especially Italians.
While Spain is borderline, British and Polish people seems on balance to
be more favourable than unfavourable towards China nowadays. Greece
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is the most positive of those surveyed in 2012. We will proffer some
views on why all this is the case later on.
Slide 9: Polling Data: Fair/Unfair Trade Relations
According to the Globescan/Pipa poll of 2010/20113, there are concerns
prevalent in many European countries about China’s trade practices being
unfair. All European populations have majorities thinking that China is an
unfair trading partner, although the UK is the most benign with a relative
negative majority in this regard. Germans and French are the most
critical.
Slide 10: Polling Data: China becoming More Powerful Economically
This factor means that the European public has divergent views on
China’s economic rise. On the one hand, the majority of British and
Spaniards welcomed this fact in 2010-2011, while the majority of
Italians, French and Germans did not. In fact, Germany had a 2:1
majority indicating they were negative about it. This is a reality that
European governments have to take into account in terms of their policymaking.
Slide 11: USA v. China: The World’s Leading Economic Superpower
Nevertheless most Europeans perceive that China is now a more
significant economic superpower than the United States. The change in
perceptions is very clear. Only Poland believes that the US and China are
on a par. Fair trade or not, China is perceived more powerful
economically than the United States (even if it is not true in fact!).
Slide 12: German Attitudes: World’s Leading Economic Superpower
German attitudes towards the evolution of economic power in the world
are particularly intriguing. The Pew question also puts the European
Union in the mix of potential economic superpowers. Although the EU
does not figure in a major way in other countries, it does in Germany.
Indeed in 2009, Germany put the EU as an economic superpower ahead
of both the US and China. However German perceptions that it would be
China soon took off, reaching a convincing near two thirds of those
Please refer to the link http://www.globescan.com/commentary-and-analysis/pressreleases/press-releases-2011/94-press-releases-2011/132-rising-concern-about-chinasincreasing-power-global-poll.html
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Germans polled in 2012. Meantime belief that the US is the world’s
leading economic superpower has been in almost continual decline.
Slide 13: Polling Data: China becoming More Powerful Militarily
On the topic of China’s military power, most Europeans consider the
possibility of China becoming more powerful very negatively. Germans,
Italians and French are particularly concerned about China’s growing
military power. In Spain negative feelings have softened, but remain
heavily negative overall.
This is perhaps unsurprising. China’s military expenditure, according to
data from the US and the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) has had double digit growth for much of the last two
decades. It is now second after the US in terms armaments and weaponry
expenditure. The EU maintains an Arms Embargo on military and dual
use equipment, which was put in place in 1989 after the Tiananmen
Square uprising that year, and has been a source of great contention with
the Chinese government for some time.
Slide 14: Same interests when it comes to dealing with Globalisation?
Another sign that European public does not feel the same way about the
world as it perceives China does is globalisation. By this we mean the
impact of a shrinking world with increased inter-action between peoples
and the growing challenges it brings, whether economic, migration,
climate change or other issues. This is the only time we have a complete
picture at this moment in any public opinion poll of what citizens in all
the EU’s 27 countries thinks about China.
EU citizens feel by a majority of two-to-one that the EU and China do not
have the same interests as each other when dealing with globalisation.
The Chinese-hospitable Hungarians are the only ones with a relative
majority saying the interests are more likely to coincide. While both
Greece and Cypriots are divided on this issue, there are very strong
feelings about us not being on the same page from Nordic, Benelux, as
well as France, Germany, the UK, Czech Republic and Spain.
The belief that interests diverge is clearest among the higher educated
respondents, respondents who are very interested in politics and among
managers (for all categories here it was more than 60% believing interests
diverged). However, in some countries such as Malta, Bulgaria and
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Romania, half or more of respondents felt unable to express their opinion
about this question.
Slide 15: Will China replace the US as the world’s leading superpower?
And finally the biggest question of all. Do people believe the China will
replace the United States as the world’s leading superpower? The answer
from just over half of those polled in most countries according to Pew is
yes, it will eventually replace the United States. Only Poles are not sure,
with more thinking it will never supersede the United States. China’s
perceived economic supremacy is therefore not translated automatically
in people’s eyes to overall superpower status at this stage.
Slide 16: Views of Particular European Countries
As a sign of the diversity of the EU internally, it is perhaps unsurprising
that perceptions of China differ greatly across EU Member States, There
are a range of different historic, economic and cultural issues that might
impact on this, including of course the experience of the particular
member state of Chinese inward migration, and previous political links.
According to polling data, one of the EU countries whose people have the
most positive views on China is the United Kingdom. There might be
three significant reasons for this. Firstly the UK’s mercantilist tradition,
shown clearly in the polling results, which shows most believe China’s
growing economy is good for the UK. Secondly, it might also be because
of the link through Hong Kong, which, although it reverted to Chinese
sovereignty as a special administrative region in 1997, gave the two a
great deal of common understanding and knowledge. Thirdly, there is the
success of the Chinese Diaspora in the UK, including the recent large
influx of Chinese students. However, despite the relative good feelings of
the British people towards China, there is evident concern about China’s
growing military power and clearly a belief by most that our interests do
not coincide when it comes to globalisation.
It would have been good to look at Scottish attitudes separately but the
sample size would have been too small to draw reliable results.
It may come as a surprise that most Germans seem so negative about
China. After all, Germany too is the sole European country that enjoys a
trade surplus with the People’s Republic of China, through its great
strengths in manufacturing and automotive. Indeed almost half of all EU
exports to China come from Germany. China recognises the key
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importance of Germany, having held three summits and high-level visits
with Chancellor Merkel in 2012 alone.
The reason may be linked primarily to the extreme competitive situation
between Germany and China that has comes from economic success and
perceptions that China is not playing by the rules to gain competitive
advantage, whether via the purchase of German companies to gain access
to high tech, IPR evasion or even espionage for instance. The situation is
not further helped by incidents such as the mass food poisoning this
month of more than 11,000 German school children of imported
strawberries from Shandong contaminated by norovirus.
Since starting diplomatic relations with China in 1964, France has
enjoyed one of the strongest relations with China, holding numerous
cultural events, advertising France as a tourist destination, and enjoys a
highly positive image within China.
Polling data shows however an extreme sensitivity among the French to
perceived unfair trade and China’s growing more powerful economically.
This is echoed frequently nowadays by French politicians who call
regularly for reciprocity when it comes to two-way trade and investment
opportunities. The French also may be very sensitive to human rights
situation in China, as the deep dip in China’s favourability ratings in 2008
shows according to Pew.
For Poland, the relationship seems more on an even keel. Although Poles
reacted like everyone else to events in 2008, it seems to have been a
shallow dip and the relationship is slightly more positive now from a
public opinion perspective. Most Poles are not convinced the days of the
United States are gone, now or in the future. In 2012, China launched a
special business-related initiative with those Member States from Central
Europe that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, as well as Western Balkans
Counties in southern Europe are having very different experience of
China. Greeks are the most favourable towards China according to the
2012 Pew poll. There, the economic crisis has struck hard. During my
time in Greece this summer, I noted that Greeks shopped heavily for
cheap goods in Chinese-run discount stores. Also it is well known in
Greece that the Chinese management of part of Piraeus port has seen the
volume of cargo handled more than double during the past two years.
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By contrast, Italy’s public is almost equal to Germany in its unfavourable
impressions of China. According to media reporting in Italy, sentiments
about China and the Chinese are often associated with illegal activity.
For Italians therefore China’s image is made more at home than abroad.
This month, for instance, the media reported a big Chinese moneylaundering racket with a trail from Spain via Italy and Hungary to China.
In all these cases once again, the mainstream media influence greatly
public opinion on China. This media presentation runs against the fact
that diplomatically, the EU and its Member States have largely positive
relationships with China. Although it is hard to say whether the media
influences public opinion, or rather if the media only shows what the
public wants to hear and see, media coverage and public opinion are
clearly closely connected.
Slide 17: Policy Implications:
With growing challenges facing the world, the relationship between the
EU and China is entering a new phase. There is a certain amount of
anxiety and fear from our publics about where things are heading. China
looks strong, but its economy is slowing too. China’s motives in the long
term seem to be viewed ultimately with some suspicion by our publics,
and the differences in our political system - where China has a one party
monopoly on power - and its culture are not well comprehended and
appreciated outside their country.
China as a large economic player is a relatively late arrival on the global
stage. It is not surprising therefore that the different manifestations and
impacts of its new influence are creating concern, acclimatisation and
adjustment. Managing this has become one of the major tasks of both
Chinese and European leaders
It is therefore right that the EU has a Strategic Partnership with China.
There is much to be gained. The diversity and growing number of the
areas where EU-China interact are considerable. I am continually struck
how much this relationship is a balancing act between the converging and
diverging aspects of both our interests. We need to try and communicate
better the strengths of the relationship, which are wider than just our trade
and human rights related differences. And the only way to bridge those
differences is by open and frank discussion.
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The Chinese Government continues to have problems with its image in
Europe. It may find this difficult, but there is still no better way of
dealing with the issue than by allowing the media unfettered access to
press conferences and to allow visits all parts of China, of China
engaging with European civil society and opinion-forming organizations
in general - without preconditions and restrictions. This would help us all.
Our publics demand fair trade which needs to produce a level playing
field for the economic benefit of both sides. The World Trade
Organisation is helping us achieve this. But we need to do much more to
avoid the necessity of the EU to have so many anti-dumping cases against
China at the present time. Linked to fair trade of course is China's desire
that the EU grants it Market Economy Status.
And there is the EU Arms Embargo. This survey clearly shows that
there is no public pressure or interest to encourage EU Member States to
lift the arms embargo, in place since Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Increased people-to-people ties will help build greater mutual
understanding. As mentioned, the EU and China have commenced formal
people-to-people dialogue this year which should have the positive spin
off such as educational exchanges and language training to build that
contact essential to build the modern world.
I will conclude by saying that we need to do much more work to
understand the views of China within the EU. It is one of the most critical
relations of the modern era, and yet one where perhaps we do not
understand enough, not only about what Chinese think of us, but of what
we think of them. The Chinese initiative of creating Confucius Institutes
is welcomed in this respect. We should not mistake the media portrayal of
China as sufficient for us to understand the reasons why events occur.
Nor should we think that good diplomatic and political relations between
elites translate into public support, or understanding.
The EU is very aware that policy-makers at all levels in Europe need to
take into account the views of our citizens. This event at Glasgow
University has revealed that there is a deficit of information that needs
addressing. If more research can be done on the subject, perhaps we can
meet again in Glasgow next year to go into more depth about the impact
of public opinion on the essential EU-China relationship. Thank you.
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