Philosophy 3260 Questions about Lewis on Physicalism
1. Outline how Lewis’ argument for an identity theory works (hint: Transitivity of
identity is involved).
2. Does Lewis’ argument depend on assuming functionalism?
3. What is functionalism (about mental states)?
4. Explain how to turn a theoretical sentence into its Ramsey sentence.
5. What does Lewis mean when he talks about these ‘stories’ being ‘nearlyrealized’?
6. What is a modified Carnap sentence? How does it differ from an (ordinary)
Carnap sentence?
7. What is Lewis’ formal version of a functional definition?
8. What do our names of mental states get their meaning from, according to Lewis?
9. What is Sellars’ myth of our ‘Rylean ancestors’?
10. How does this account of the meaning of names for mental states supply the
covering laws required to link descriptions of (say) my mental state(s) to actions
that those mental states explain?
11. Do you accept the infallibility of introspection? Discuss, consider the alternatives
& make a case for your answer. **