Gender and Development
Degree programme: MSc Development Studies
Course: Gender and Development
Essay No: 1
Seminar Tutor: Indra Dhewan
Essay Title: Q. 2. To what extent are intra-household power differentials conditioned by
extra-household institutions? Discuss with reference to concrete examples.
Submission Date: 16th April 2012
Word Count (including footnotes): 2962
Grade: 68
No comments available until May 11th.
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Gender and Development
Introduction
Debates in literature across feminist, anthropologic and economic have greatly contested the
household from one that fits the unitary family model to one that operates on a framework of
bargaining and negotiating of intra-household dynamics. This paper will be examining how
extra-household institutions such as land, the state and the labour market are crucial to
determining intra-household differentials of bargaining power. The discussion on bargaining
and access to land considers the impact of land for women and men in India; whilst it may
increase a woman’s agency in the household it could also lead to a descent in masculinity in the
wider community. The role of the state will be outlined to illustrate how legal jurisdictions in
Latin America can further enhance male patriarchy but with recent changes incorporating
gender equality and supporting female households it can have perverse effects. Finally the
discussion on the labour market will look at how Latin American women entering the labour
force has lead to better bargaining positions in the scramble for resources during economic
crisis but it has in turn created a crisis in masculinity. In concluding, the final case study in
Columbia highlights different elements cross-cutting intra and extra-household institutions
which helps a woman to recondition her fall-back position and increase bargaining power.
Bargaining power and access to Land
Bina Agarwal (1997) discusses the operational dynamics of a household where interaction is
based on cooperation and conflict. These constitutive elements are manoeuvred to the extent
that household members will cooperate when it places them in a better position than to not
cooperate. This better position possesses power and the outcome of this can be differentiated
further by contributing factors such as resources, tasks and division of goods. Possessing more
or less of these (e.g. resources) can place a household member with a certain level of bargaining
power which in essence creates ‘the underlying conflict between those cooperating’ (Agarwal,
2003; 575). Agarwal elaborates on the build up of bargaining power in terms of the ‘strength of
a person’s fall-back position’ which is the resources connected to the extra-household options
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that serves as a safety net to survive in the outside world should the cooperation fail. This is also
described as the ‘threat point’ which when established as greater (better outside options)
‘would lead to an improvement in the deal the person gets within the household’ (Agarwal,
1997; 4). Agarwal’s work references particular areas in India which this section of the paper
will be discussing.
It is noted that gender inequalities are particularly seen ‘in intra-household allocations from
resources controlled by men’ and amongst these is ‘land distribution’ (Agarwal, 2003; 191).
Generally land reform schemes in India are favoured towards male members of the household,
the recipients tending to be parents and adult males (ibid; p.197). As each adult male is counted
as an individual entity this leads to each adult son holding ‘land in his own right’. With this
intact ‘unmarried adult daughters get totally excluded in most states’ thus have no land to claim
from marital families (ibid; p. 198). This illustrates the subjective nature of access to land rights
and claims which lends intra-household power differentials of the male members over the
female. Men are therefore placed in a better bargaining position with more power as per
ownership over land. However, if women had ownership over land, Agarwal argues that this
would give them a ‘stronger fall-back position [with] greater bargaining power than landless
women vis-à-vis the allocation of household subsistence’(1997; 7) Agarwal (2003) examined
how land as an extra-household institution can determine a greater fall-back position and
condition or rather recondition the intra-household power differentials for women.
In Krishnapur, West Bengal, one area which Agarwal discusses is women’s access to land via
groups. The DDS – Deccan Development Society sets up sangams, groups (women only), who
apply to purchase or lease land via government programmes all across India. This initiative has
made a significant difference in the lives of the women participating, who through cultivation
have had better access to economic means giving them better bargaining power over wages and
in Krishnapur ‘about half of the women now control the produce and income from their land’
and also report the ability to ‘exercise greater control over household income’ (Agarwal, 2003;
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213). For many women, especially those previously landless also state the added ‘selfconfidence’ from economic security with particular emphasis on ‘improved treatment from
husbands and kin.’ (Agarwal 1994; 1997; 7) With the power to distribute income and exert
agency over household decisions, women are more likely to improve children’s nutrition,
particularly enhancing their ‘daughters’, prospects for education and non-farm employment in
the future’ (Agarwal, 2003; 194) This illustrates the role of land as an extra-household
institution that has influenced intra-household power differentials in this case, to the advantage
of women. Other members of the family, such as the elderly also operate with vested interests
to utilise their possession of land ‘to bargain for better care and support from their families’
(Agarwal, 1997; 13). Whilst the elderly may possess the bargaining power at first hand, once the
land is passed on to their heirs, the power accorded with the land will also go hand in hand to
the heir(s) future bargaining position.
Returning back to male bias in access and claims to land, Cecile Jackson (2003; 463-4) argues
that with the movement of female access to land this begs the question of rural men and their
‘descent’ of masculinity. For men in south Bihar, Jackson argues that land is crucial to their caste
identity. This can be in terms of employment as farmers, ownership via inheritance or ‘even in
their reputation for land grabbing’. Jackson further adds that ‘land is part of relations of
solidarity and competition in the inter- and intra-household relations of men’. If women’s rights
are claimed over land or given via redistribution this would create a discord in the community
land relations where competition against other caste groups or new incomers had otherwise
brought a sense of unity for male members. It is with particular concern to the latter that
Jackson reiterates that women’s rights are eliminated ‘by necessity’ in the process to ‘erase
divisions within the community’ (ibid). Whilst this may explain why women’s rights may not
always be intentionally denied to keep them in subordinate positions this does not mean that
women should be denied their rights and claims to land. There is a great deal of power that is
derived from the possession of land and rather than adhering to norms which are perceived to
keep masculinities intact, distributing to remove gender inequalities could be a priority.
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State institutions and the labour market
The role of State as an extra-household institution is crucial in many ways to defining rights and
needs that determine the bargaining power of intra-household dynamics. The State can
implement legal rulings, jurisdictions and policies which can be in the favor of one or both
genders. Whilst history shows the patriarchal nature of many state institutions, over time there
has been significant change towards a more gendered approach in bringing women’s concerns
to the public arena. In particular, Agarwal describes the state as able to ‘increase women’s
access to productive resources, employment, information, education and health; to provide
protection from gender violence; to influence discourse on gender relations in the media and
educational institutions’ (Agarwal, 1997; 32). In providing these measures it would help to
support and strengthen a woman’s fall-back position.
Sylvia Chant (2002) discusses how ‘the ‘male-headed nuclear model’ has long been the
framework for which family legislation and social policies operate in Latin America. Terms often
used are ‘familia completa’ (‘complete family’) describing male-headed family units, and where
there is family breakdowns the terms on programmes formed to ascribe reunions are
‘paternidad responsable’ (‘responsible fatherhood)’ and to reduce the prevalence of domestic
violence it is termed as ‘violencia familiar’ (‘family violence’). Chant argues that although in
theory such programmes and legislations are in place to protect the rights of women and
children it rather ‘reinforce[s] the hegemony of the male-headed model’ (Chant, 2002; 19) thus
strengthening the bargaining power of men over women in household decisions and reinforcing
the image of the male as the breadwinner. The image of the woman in the reproductive role as
the primary carer is also reinforced in programmes and legislations which seek to promote
female-headed households. Initiatives which direct resources to all female households seen as
‘vulnerable and residualised group’ firstly exclude the potentially economically weak women in
male-headed units and secondly ‘alienate men still further from assuming responsibilities for
children’s upkeep’ (ibid, p. 20). The gender divisions in intra-household dynamics therefore
heightens under these conditions where domestic activities and care of children continues
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Gender and Development
under the concern of the mother and resources and income allocation is further associated with
the father.
The role of labour markets in many parts of Latin America has through neoliberal policies and
globalisation opened up the doors to witness a surge in women’s participation in the labour
force. As a result women now have ‘declining dependence on male incomes’ (Chant, 2002; 6)
and with economic security in place it has further strengthened their bargaining power. In
addition, removing the demarcation of gender specific roles in the household through domestic
and child care provisions, many middle class women are sustaining their careers over a longer
period and making more informed choices and decisions over resources, income and tasks in
the household (ibid). The opportunity to fund these domestic duties is not available for most
Latin American women who take up informal work and are more likely add to their extensive
domestic and child care duties.
Chant adds that in the era of economic crisis, more men are dependent on female income and
this has ‘threatened masculine identities’ (ibid, p. 10). The labour market here has shifted the
power differentials to advantage women in terms of intra-household income provider but the
‘loss of economic primacy’ for men has undermined their capability to steer their family and
reinforced their insecurity on the ‘allegiance on the part of wives and children’(ibid). With the
erosion of female dependence on men in the household, power differentials have altered to
strengthen women’s fall-back options to survive and so women are more confident to leave
their ‘husbands on their own and/or their children’s account’ (ibid, p. 11). For many men who
have become increasingly frustrated at the economic situation to be unemployed and feeling
threatened of their masculine identities have begun to express this by attempting to overexert
their power in the household by ‘withdrawing financial support’ abandoning their families to
‘rising levels of domestic and community violence’ (ibid). Chant also adds that in the modern
day, Latin American women are now more likely to demand better treatment from their
husbands or leave to form ‘their own households’ as they are ‘better placed to fend for
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Gender and Development
themselves economically’ (ibid). This highlights the growing instability of family households
where shifts in power differentials are causing more family breakdowns as a result of extrahousehold institutions such as the market and its failure to provide economic stability.
Friedemann-Sánchez (2006) provides an insight into the example of how labour markets in
Columbia can influence intra-household power differentials. The cut-flower industry in towns of
Chı´a and Cajica´ north of the Sabana de Bogota´ in central Colombia consists of a large female
workforce. Some of the recurrent issues observed amongst the women were low self-esteem
and domestic violence. The farms responded by facilitating workshops to increase self-esteem
and raise awareness about domestic violence, the women’s rights and equal status to men and
methods to resolve conflict. Although the underlying motive for farms might have been to
reduce issues affecting the wellbeing hence productivity it did also equip the women with the
knowledge capacity of their rights and self-perception of their worth. In this way, the women’s
bargaining power was strengthened through economic means and human capital. FriedemannSánchez’s interviews with a number of these women reported ‘fairly high perceptions of their
self-worth’ to the extent that they ‘recognize[d] housework and childcare as activities of value
and use[d] the threat of withdrawing them, which is ostensibly possible only if they can support
themselves through their own wage income’ (Friedman-Sanchez, 2006; 259). The variety of
bargaining strategies which the women discussed varied according to the level of assets they
owned, level of wage, social capital and self-esteem. Friedemann-Sánchez asserts that the
strongest of these was the level of wage which could determine ‘the strongest fall-back position’
but social capital should also not be denied as it was just as strong in providing access to all
other means (ibid, p. 260).
One interesting case study highlighted by Friedemann-Sánchez is of Olga, a 38 year old razial
(native of the area) worker who temporarily abandoned her home and her four children as a
‘bargaining chip’, having been domestically abused every weekend by her husband (ibid, p.2633). Olga is not just any worker, but one who is a supervisor with a permanent job at the flower
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Gender and Development
farm, ‘earning four times the base wage’ in comparison to her husband earning a ‘third’ of her
wage giving her a strong fall-back option, noticed considerably with her leave. In addition to
this, the greater bargaining power which Olga possessed was her social capital of family and
friends networks that assisted with childcare as well as her human capital drawn from skills in
childcare and housework. These particular ‘assets’ which are unpaid and ‘unrecognized socially,
and deemed unproductive’ provided Olga with greater leverage as her husband did not possess
these skills or the capacity to handle the tasks. Her husband’s ownership of the property meant
his fall-back option resulted in the power over Olga to leave the house. Olga’s return after 5
months came with negotiation on better treatment where she would not be abused and the
freedom to work as per her choice and more control over household income and household
decisions. To be able to sustain this, Friedemann-Sánchez highlights that it is Olga’s ‘emotional
tenacity’ as a strong asset that has held onto these conditions 7 years later. This particular case
study is interesting in highlighting a number of elements that are tangible and intangible and
cut across intra and extra-household institutions. Such as the labour market equipping Olga
with wage as leverage, knowledge about her rights and increase in self-esteem to recognise her
intra-household power constitutive of maternal rights and skills in domestic work and
childcare. In addition, the household circumstance changed 7 years later to one which was
purchased by Olga further strengthening her fall-back option and bargaining power (ibid).
Conclusion
The argument in this paper has sought to illustrate the strength of extra-household institutions
such as land, the state and the labour market in examples of India and Latin America as critical
to conditioning intra-household power differentials. The discussion on bargaining and access to
land outlined resources and extra-household institutions as the underlying factors for
bargaining and negotiation in the household. The possession of land itself is generally favoured
towards men and women who are able to access land via groups had noticed an increase in their
fall-back options and better treatment from their husbands. However the shift in such resource
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allocation of land also noted the potential concern of the descent in masculinity by Cecile
Jackson. This recurring concern was also seen in the example of Latin America, where economic
crisis led to considerable unemployment for men and the feminisation of the labour market
further heightened their concerns resulting in damaging effects such as the increase in domestic
violence. However, women’s participation in the labour force has also helped them to gain
better bargaining positions and the case study in Columbia highlights how workplaces can be an
institution of positive difference to intra-household power differentials equipping women with
monetary, social and human capital to re-negotiate and re-condition difficult living
environments by tackling domestic violence and gaining more autonomy in household
decisions.
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