INTR13/71-310
2007
Lecture 7:
Alternative Global Forces: Islamic International Relations
and Transnational Flows (Case Study)
Topics: 1. Islamic Political Visions of the International Order
2. Radical Revisionism, Militant Challenges and Utopian Projects
3. Normative Transnational and International Islamic Institutions
4. Conclusion: Innovation, Reform and Conflict
5. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading
1. Islamic Political Visions of the International Order
As we have seen cultures, religion and politics have a problematic linkage to
foreign policy and the norms mobilised by international institutions (see lectures
1-5). Different religious and cultural systems influence conceptions of national
politics, international financial institutions, and diverse visions of international
system. These demands, moreover, place serious burdens on communities,
governments, and international regimes, and in the most militant cases demand a
violent re-ordering of the regional and global political system. In contrast to the ideas
of culture conflict and clash of civilisations, as fielded by writers such as Daniel Pipes
(1995) and Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), we shall see that these clashes are
driven by divergent political views, different views of social and economic justice,
and different sources of authority that are mobilised. Furthermore, in the case of
Islam, there are intense conflicts and debates within Muslim communities over
appropriate political order that have intensified over the last decade.
Islam represents one of the major world religious and one of the largest cultural
systems of the world. Islam is a strong social presence in most of the Middle East,
Central Asia and parts of Russia, large parts of western and northern Africa, South
Asia and Southeast Asia. Beyond this, however, Islam is growing as a religion
globally, and has adherents in most countries around the world now totalling
some almost 1.5 billion people, with 45 to 50 countries predominantly Muslim,
with sizeable and often growing Muslim minorities even in countries such as
France, Britain, Germany, the U.S. and India, with recent debates by historians
such as Niall Ferguson showing concern over the changing population dynamics of
European verses nearby Islamic societies (Ferguson 2004; Gerner 1996; Esposito
1992). Islam as a cultural system, transformed the face of the world and its
political processes from the 7-16th centuries. Islam also forms part of a complex and
rich cultural mix in Southeast Asia, and formed an important component of political
life in states such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
1
Main Muslim Populations (map courtesy PCL Map Library)
It will not be possible to do fully outline Islam as a religion today. The key idea of
Islam is surrender to the will of God. Muhammad is the most perfect of God's
prophets (living in the 7th century of the Christian dating system), bringing to
completion a long line of earlier messengers (including Abraham, Moses and Jesus)
who had brought revelation to mankind. The most complete of these revelations is the
Qur'an, revealed to Muhammad. Islam is strictly monotheistic, as found in profession
of the faith: "There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God." In
terms of behaviour, Muslims are also required as far as possible to practice the Five
Pillars: - to recite the profession of faith at least once; to observe the five daily
prayers; to pay the zakat tax for the support of the poor; to fast during day-light during
the month of Ramadan; and to perform if possible the hajj, or pilgrimage to the holy
city of Mecca. Islam thus emerged as a powerful ethical vision with demands that
most people could understand. It spread rapidly throughout much of the Middle East,
Africa, parts of Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia, carried by conquest, trade,
cultural diffusion, and itinerate teachers and Sufis (mystics). Its message was aided by
its emphasis on social justice and its inherent devotional appeal.
Today, Islamic affairs in global affairs are represented as both a threat and
opportunity. Samuel Huntington, and other scholars through the 1990s, already
argued that the differences between the Western and Islamic civilization could form a
major area of contest in the coming decades, with this sense of threat re-iterated
through 2001-2007 (Pirio & Gregorian 2006; Hungtington 1993; Huntington 1996;
Lewis 1996; Fuller & Lesser 1995). However, this is a gross simplification of the
nature of Islam as a political entity. Although radical Islam may reject the West, the
main focus of Islam in many countries is the way to keep a core religious belief
alive and secondarily to develop a just, modern culture. These themes are active in
two states with Islamic dominant populations but republican, largely secular political
orders (Indonesia and Turkey), and are a driving concern in countries such as
Malaysia, Morocco and more problematic in countries such as Pakistan and Iran.
2
In the light of the pre-occupation with the revisionist claims of militant Islam since
2001, we will look at some of these radical claims first, which are not fully
representative of the wider Islamic community, but have posed a serious security
challenge to modern states in the 21st century. This will includes claims of the
construction of 'new Caliphate', and at the more specific role of Islamic courts in
Somalia, and the more general effort of Islamic parties to engage in reforming the
political order. From there we will turn towards more normative forms which
underpin an international Islamic community, e.g. the role of the Hajj, the conceptions
of the Ummah, the community of believers (see further below), and then explore on
Islamic adaptation of modern financial institutions. The relative success of Islamic
Banking as an alternative financial system for Muslims has grown into a vigorous
network of institutions that seek to make their conduct compatible to Islamic moral
norms (though serious debates have emerged about whether such systems have
always distinguished themselves from interest-based systems, see further below).
Whether this can link to a wider developmental agenda (via the Islamic
Development Bank or to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and its new
reform agenda since 2005, remains to be seen, Jamil 2007), remains to be seen. As we
shall see, with over 1.5 billion believers, and strong minority communities through
most of the Western world (as well as Russia, China and India), Islam in a loose
collective sense has tried over the last 1400 years to position itself as a major force
in global affairs, and now has the challenge of working within both democratic
and authoritarian state systems, and working within a global system largely
devised by Western, 'post-Christian' states. Historically, Islam shaped a cultural
space stretching from Western Africa to Eastern Turkestan (modern Xinjiang).
If today militant visions of political order are unlikely to the need of Muslims
globally, likewise, it is not clear that the current international order has met the
needs and aspirations of mainstream Islamic communities across the world.
Likewise, the issue of Islamic politics has become entangled with problematic issues
such as Middle Eastern tensions, energy resource access, migration and refugees,
international terrorism, and human rights issues.
2. Radical Revisionism, Militant Challenges and Utopian Projects
Western political terminology can be problematic when applied to different cultural
systems. So-called 'fundamentalist Islamic leaders' often do not fit in with the
stereotype of an anti-modernist, backward looking traditionalism. As noted by
John Esposito 'many fundamentalist leaders have had the best education, enjoy
responsible positions in society, and are adept at harnessing the latest technology to
propagate their views and create viable modern institutions such as schools, hospitals,
and social service agencies'. (Esposito 1992, contra Lewis 1990). Rather, militant
groups such as Al Qaeda have relied on new technologies (mobile phones,
encryption, notebook computers) and new trends in globalisations (flow of
communication, ideas, people and money) to support their agenda (Gunaratna 2002).
Indeed, most Islamic reform groups are not fundamentalist in any literal sense, but
'resemble Catholic Liberation theologians who urge active use of original religious
doctrine to better the temporal and political lives in a modern world' (Wright 1992,
p131). Rafic Zakaria suggests a more fruitful dichotomy, distinguishing between
conservative and liberal trends in Islam, where the 'battle between the
3
fundamentalists and the secularists can perhaps be more accurately described as a
struggle between forces who resist change in Islam and those who wish to accelerate
it.' (Zakaria 1988, p14; see further Olesen 1995). Islam has an indigenous tradition of
'revival' (tajdid) and 'reform' (islah), which suggests that any judgement of Islamic
revivalism (Esposito 1992, p8) needs to place the particular reforms and ideas of a
movement in their historical and ideological context. Islamic revivalism
incorporates a much wider movement than anti-Western militant groups. As
summarised by John Esposito: Revivalism continues to grow as a broad-based socioreligious movement, functioning
today in virtually every Muslim country and transnationality. It is a vibrant,
multifaceted movement that will embody the major impact of Islamic revivalism for the
foreseeable future. Its goal is the transformation of society through the Islamic
formation of individuals at the grass-roots level. Dawa (call) societies work in social
services (hospitals, clinics, legal-aid societies), in economic projects (Islamic banks,
investment houses, insurance companies), in education (schools, child-care centres,
youth camps), and in religious publishing and broadcasting. (Esposito 1992, p23)
It must be stressed that from the point of view of most Muslim reformers, Dawa is
not viewed as political propaganda, but as a serious effort at social and global
reform. These 'call' activities also include a range of social, welfare and teaching
activities (for a negative Western view, see Morris 2006), though such 'call' societies
have also been used to channel and recruit for militant groups (Gunaratna 2002). The
role of the media is thus seen as crucial in the presentation of Islam and in its
relationship with other faiths. For example, Dr Zakir Naik, the president of the
Bombay-based Islamic Research Foundation has sought to use both Western media
and specialised television outlets such as Peace TV, 'a free-to-air, 24 -hour channel
dedicated to comparative religion,' headquartered in Bombay and uplinked from
Dubai for satellite transmission (Wahab 2006) There has been an effort to reverse
some of the negative views of Islam in this new media: Dr. Naik espouses a moderate view of Islam while aggressively defending it against
its detractors. “Countering Islam-bashing is the biggest challenge,” he said. “We
Muslims are unable to present ourselves well; others are coming up with new ways of
bashing Islam. We need English news channels. Our long-term aim is to have a news
channel. Thankfully, the Muslim world has realized the importance of the media. New
channels are being launched.” . . .
Contrary to the opinions of many, he equates Islam with modernity. “Modern
means what is best,” Dr. Naik said. “Islam is the most modern way of life. Islam’s
rules and regulations are the most practical way of life. Islam is the solution, not the
problem. There are black sheep in all communities and some of the media project
black sheep from among us, and then the black sheep are taken as representing all
Muslims. This is sheer media manipulation.” (Wahab 2006)
There is thus as struggle not just over the political role of Islam, but also about the
way its is represented internationally and the way it interacts with the current
international system. Major divergences with the Western tradition emerge in the
role of women1 and a reduced emphasis on individual rights. Thus Islamic rights
1
Though Islam had not been without its own reformers since the 19th century, e.g. Qasim
Amin, 1863-1908 in his works The Emancipation of Women and The New Woman 'denounced the
subjugation of Muslim women as un-Islamic', ESPOSITO, John The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, p58.
4
agendas are often limited by how Islamic law is interpreted, i.e. the phrase 'according
to law' may limit human rights depending on the particular formulation of Sharia that
is accepted (Mayer 1995, pp64-66). Reformist developments in Islamic thought also
lean towards human rights circumscribed by economic rights, social justice, and
cultural legitimacy (Monshipouri 1994). Many Islam leaders around the world (Egypt.
Malaysia, Iran), including religious and political leaders, are in fact keen to emphasise
dialogue rather than confrontation with other value systems (Swidler 1996).
Rather than use the term 'fundamentalism', we approach these issues by addressing
the range of demands made by diverse Muslim communities. These range from
demands for human rights under authoritarian regimes, greater and deeper
democratisation (e.g. through much of Central Asia and the Middle East), through to
more explicit demands for state system run directly on particular formulations of
Islamic law. It is important to distinguish among numerous patterns of demands made
by different groups and ideologies. Over the last decade the following issues have
come into prominence: 1) Demands for greater respect for Islamic customs and sensitivities even by
non-Muslims, both nationally and internationally, including patterns of
restraint, self-censorship and limits on ‘freedom of expression’, e.g. as
recently expressed through 2005-2006 Afghanistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and
much of the Middle East over cartoons published in Western newspapers that
were viewed as demeaning Mohamed.
2) Demands for the ability to pray and live freely as Muslims even within
non-Islamic communities, e.g. a space legally possible in Russia but subject
to diffuse patterns of prejudice and security monitoring (deepened since 2000
and having a strong impact on Russian minorities through 2006-2007), a trend
repeated to a lesser degree in France and the United States. Associated with
this is the desire to freely teach and propagate their views at the local, regional
and global levels.
3) Demands for implementation of aspects of shariah law at the civil and
social level, e.g. regulation of marriage, divorce, and family law. Here
problems emerge over individual rights and gender equality. In more extreme
customary usages this can also lead back to the ‘dignity’ of the family as the
basis for honour codes. For example, even in modernising and 'secularist'
Turkey until regulations from 2002 were brought into play to recognise full
equal rights for women within family structures. Shari'ah is not just a legal
code, but embraced its source concept from the root shr', the road, with
Shari'ah therefore being 'the road that men and women must follow in this
life', (Nasr 2003, p76). It therefore can include a wide range of public and
private life, including moral prescriptions as well as legal requirements.
However, the interpretation of the legal system depends upon the diverse
orientations of the four different legal schools within Islam, and the way later
sayings are interpreted to supported Koranic injunctions. Thus the moderate
form of the Hanafi legal school of Sunni Islam is dominant within Central
Asia, for example (Haghayeghi 2002).
4) Demands for full implementation of one vision of shariah law within
countries with Muslim majorities (early demands made by the Islamic
Renaissance Party and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia, for
example). These demands were also made by minority political groups in
5
Indonesia, under the notion of the Jakarta Charter to change the constitution,
but since 1999 this has never been able to gain more than 14% of electoral
party support (Hosen 2005; Smith 2003, p102; Crouch 2003, p23). Partial and
different levels of application of shariah law have been made in Afghanistan
under the Taliban, in Iran (but under a Revolutionary Islamic model within a
Shiite community), Sudan, and in Somalia with a growing role for Islamic
courts through 2006 until they were forcibly removed, in part due to Ethiopian
intervention (Pirio & Gregorian 2006; sese below), and in some areas of civil
law in Malaysia (relating to the Malay community).
5) The implementation of an Islamic state ruled entirely by Islamic principles
and patterns of governance (claimed as the long term goal of militant groups
such as Jemaah Islamaiah (JI) in Indonesia, of the IMU for Uzbekistan, as the
past and future goal of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and one possible goal for
networks of militants in Iraq.
6) Creation of a modern Caliphate as the basis of international order
providing leadership for the global community of believers, a claim made
for a social movement such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia, and implied in
some Al-Qaeda and JI communications (but needing careful analysis, see
below). Likewise, JI and related groups may have the vision of building and
Islamic state within one nation, but then moving towards a wider Islamic
community across much of Southeast Asia (for controversies over this, see
below). These models seem to be derived from Sunni historical traditions, but
have limited ability to be applied in the modern period (see below).
Several questions flow from this. The first is whether each of these points is a
stepping stone towards a greater and more sweeping revision of national governance
and then the international order. So, for example, does toleration of Islamic political
parties lead to the prospect of governments that will move towards stronger
implementation of shariah law and then eventually towards an Islamic state (with
wider applications of Islamic concepts in governance, morality, and the economy).
Such fears have been mobilised to restrict Islamist parties historically in Algeria,
Turkey (until recently), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Beyond this,
however, we need to consider the demands and problems inherent in each of these
stages, the cost they impose, and the political trade-offs implied. In fact, sustaining a
narrowly interpreted Islamic political order is extremely difficult to achieve.
We can see some of these problems in recent trends in Somalia, which had been
through an intense civil war and fracturing of the state among different warlords
since the '1991 ouster of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre', leading to it being one of the
few complete examples of a failed state (Economist 2007a; Associated Press of
Pakistan 2007). International intervention from 1992 was unsuccessful with the
United Nations leaving in 1995, leading to continued conflict among clans, and the
emergence of only a weak Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (after the
2000 Arta Conference in Djibouti, East Africa), which did not control Mogadishu and
operated from the provincial centre of Baidoa (Barnes & Hassan 2007), and sustained
a fragile peace that collapsed by late 2006. In this context, Islamic courts in
Mogadishu, beginning from 1994 but strengthening 2000-2006 began to play a
wider political role than law and order, and became de facto centres of governance
that expanded their influence, e.g. to the ports of El Ma'an and Marka, and the Isaley
airfield (Barnes & Hassan 2007). In the absence of strong government, they suggested
6
a key role for Islam in creating a system that might counter-balance the fragmented
rule of clan leaders in the city.
However, by late 2006 this had led to international intervention, led by Ethiopia,
but supported by the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD, based on the states of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda), Uganda, by the US and UN Resolution 1725 (Barnes &
Hassan 2007; More 2007). The US may have also run covert operations in the country
against suspected Al Qaeda affiliates in 2006, as well as supporting and financing a de
facto 'warlord Alliance', which even if an effective strategy did raise the political
temperature in Mogadishu (Barnes & Hassan 2007; Mire 2007). Likewise, through
January and again in June 2007 the US shelled and bombed ‘suspected’ Al-Qaeda
targets in Southern and Northeast Somalia.
In spite of claims of victory by December 2006 and the installation of the
Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, this did not lead to real peace
(Barnes & Hassan 2007; for an alternative view, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ethiopia 2007). Instead, an Islamic insurgency has grown in the city through
March-June 2007, leading to some 2,000 deaths (including many civilians), more
than 4,300 wounded, and 365-400,000 people being displaced (Nordland 2007;
Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007c). This signals major concerns about
whether a genuine, country-wide peace can be established. The issue here, turns on
some of the broader questions we have already raised. Can and should the Islamic
courts (and their followers) be viewed as legitimate partners in rebuilding the
country, or are they only a symptom of an absence of normal state power? How
can diverse Muslim groups (from moderate to militant) be drawn into a future
agreement that will provide a better future for Somalia, but also reduce the way its
turbulence engages external players (such as Ethiopia and Eritrea) and disturbs the
wider region, including much of East Africa (Economist 2007a; Economist 2007c).
Likewise, if some of the more extreme militant groups do indeed have links to Al
Qaeda, does this pose future problems for both East Africa, Ethiopia, and for US
interests? In turn it has been suggested that Ethiopian forces and the Transitional
Federal Government have given limited cooperation to UN and aid agencies until
recently (Nordland 2007). At present, neither Ethiopia nor the AU seem able to
provide a long-term settlement, and it seems unlikely that a strong UN force will be
deployed (ABC 2007c).
We can summarise these issues by looking at the negative and positive aspects of the
Islamic courts in Somalia as core of stable governance. Positive aspects of the role of
Islamic courts within Somalia included: 

Support for the Islamic courts in Mogadishu had functioned for over a decade, and
did provide local stability, removed road blocks, had reduced criminal elements,
and provided some 'social services and charitable works' (Barnes & Hassan 2007).
Likewise, foodstuff prices had stabilised, but staple goods prices have recently
increased three-fold (Economist 2007a).
In general, the courts were 'broad mosque', bringing in moderate and militant
Islamic groups, e.g. moderate Sheikh Sharrif, and 'radical 'Sheikh Aweys' (Barnes &
Hassan 2007).
7


The Courts were supported by militias that were the first non-warlord forces
since the start of the civil war, with war lords often being viewed as corrupt and selfserving (Barnes & Hassan 2007).
The Courts shifted from narrow clan politics to a wider view of governance: The courts followed these practical actions with the declared intent of bringing an
alternative means of governance to Somalia through sharia law. This was a decided
shift away from factional politics based around clan loyalty. (Barnes & Hassan 2007).

The Courts have been so important that dialogue with Islamist elements must
remain a key element in support for the Transitional Federal Government, and for
long-term peace, a view recognised by the UN, US and the International Contact
Group on Somalia (the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden , Tanzania and the
United States), but yet to be accepted Somalia's President, Abdullahi Yusuf and the
PM, Mohamed Gedi (Nordland 2007; Economist 2007a; Economist 2007c). Slow
progress in this area has delayed again the 'national reconciliation' conference
last planned for 14 June 2007, though Somalia’s parliamentary speaker has suggested
they may be held in July 2007 (Associated Press 2007; Barnes & Hassan 2007;
Economist 2007c).
Negative aspects of the role of Islamic courts within Somalia as core of
governance included: 




The role of the Islamic courts sparked threat perceptions from Ethiopia and the
United States. Ethiopian threat perceptions were driven in part by earlier
operations of Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam, the 'Islamic Union', in the Gedo region which
borders Ethiopia, as well as fears that there might be an effort by Al Qaeda or its
affiliates to 'radicalise' Ethiopian Muslims, though this had not yet eventuated
(Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007). The US has been active in assessing
terror linkage in Somalia, and 2007 bombing raid have targeted Al Qaeda linked
targets in southern Somalia (Mira 2007). It has been claimed that Al Qaeda cells
operating out of Somalia and Yemen were behind the 1998 bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania (Gunaratna 2002).
Ethiopia feared Eritrean support for of the Islamic courts, due to longstanding
'regional tensions' and past conflict with Eritrea (Barnes & Hassan 2007). UN
peacekeepers are still 'manning the frontier after a 1998-2000 war that killed some
70 000 people' (Reuters 2007a)
The courts, though at first driven by local needs and a wide range of interests,
soon included militant and 'extremist groups' that set a wider agenda (Barnes
& Hassan 2007). This included links to 'transnational Islamist and business
finance networks' and 'former member' of Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam, the 'Islamic
Union', a 'chapter of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood' (Barnes & Hassan
2007).
Enforcement of court decisions depended on support of clan power, at first the
Hawiye clan and its business interests, leading to tensions with other clan
'warlords', e.g. with Ali Mahdi, though support was thereafter widened (Barnes &
Hassan 2007).
The courts were supported by a military force, Al-Shabaab, 'the Youth', which
functioned as an autonomous force (Barnes & Hassan 2007). Although a source of
8


law and order at first, local conflicts led to attacks on security officers associated
with the Transitional Federal Government
Militant groups in 2007 soon moved to a wider militant strategy, including the
use of land mines, roadside bombings and some suicide bombings (Nordland
2007; Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007c).
The Courts engaged in some critique of the Transitional Federal Government,
which had some international support, had strong nationalist elements, and
engaged in sharp criticism of Ethiopia (Barnes & Hassan 2007). This undermined
hope of international tolerance of their expanding role.
In the long run, peacekeeping cannot be sustained by Ethiopia, viewed as a
traditional enemy, and promised support from major African Union players
such as Nigeria has yet to emerge in order to create an 8,000 force to support the
1,600 Ugandans deployed (Economist 2007a; 2007b). Through mid-2007 the African
Union has sought logistic and medical support from external sources such as NATO
and the UN (Reuters 2007a). Likewise, in the past Somalia was a major market for
illegal arms, and its been suggested that a solid arms embargo might prevent the slide
of Mogadishu back towards a 'war economy' (Economist 2007a). At present it is not
clear whether Uganda and Ethiopia, with backing from the African Union and the
U.S., can present themselves as 'a bulwark against Islamist expansion in the Horn of
Africa' (Economist 2007b).
2a. Politics and Propaganda
Islamist political claims that it mobilises socio-religious expression of political
dissent (Johns & Lahoud 2005, pp19-20). As represented in Western international
relations analysis and media coverage these are often presented as a range of loosely
connected aims: the right to implement one version of Shariah law within their
communities (either at national or local level); justice for Palestinians; a diffuse
resentment of US and Western imperialism (at times focused into the real fear of
intervention, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, potentially Iran and Somalia); demands for
regime change in countries as diverse as Tajikistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; demands
for self-determination and independence, as in Aceh or for parts of southern Thailand;
or even the reshaping of international borders by independence movements, as in the
vision of an independent East Turkestan (now largely comprising Xinjiang
Autonomous Region within the People's Republic of China). From such viewpoints,
the current international system is viewed unbalanced and unjust, with the
United Nations and related agencies often promoting a double standard, e.g. with
irregular enforcement of Security Council resolutions based on a post-colonial system
of imperfect states.2 In this context, such claims seem to Western interests to be either
'fundamentalist', looking back to an idealised past, or dangerously revisionist,
looking toward a violent future.
Less clearly articulated are the ideas of the creation of modern Emirates and a
reborn Caliphate that would bring together believers in Islamic polities that would
2
See, for example "Declaration of Jihad, August 23, 1996" in MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda
Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p3. For Osama bin Laden, the UN is
'nothing but a tool of crime', "Bin Laden Rails Against Crusaders and UN (BBC News Online, November 3,
2001)", MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North
Atlantic Books, 2004, p37.
9
reshape existing regional and international orders. The call for an Islamic polity at a
national level at times is limited to the demand for a more accountable and ‘Islamist’
government, in other cases justifying rapid transformation of political regimes (as
attempted in Algeria, and partly achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan). In the case
of early Indonesian movements (such as Dar'ul Islam from 1948-1962, under the
leadership of S.M. Kartosowirjo), there was an effort to build an Islamic state that
would give a key political role for Islam within national borders (Kearny &
Wlaters 2005; McAmis 2002, p76). Likewise, Osama bin Laden seemed to have
supported the idea of a future Caliphate, perhaps build out of one successful front of
activity, but eventually embracing a wider footprint in the Middle East (Gunaratna
2002). He has suggested that most of the Gulf states have lost their real sovereignty
and are illegitimate, a call against corrupt regimes re-iterated by al-Qaeda again in
2006 (in Marlin 2004; JUS 2006). When these claims are linked to the call for a
Caliphate, however, they suggest linkages to specifically Islamic forms of
governance. These new forms are inspired by the past but point towards new political
projects, and are not modelled on current national projects in Iran, Sudan, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei or the Gulf states. For a short time the so-called
Emirate of Afghanistan was a partial model to which some militants might turn,3
but one which was readily undermined by American power and by its own
limited legitimacy. In the case of recent publicity concerning Jemaah Islamaiah
operations in Southeast Asia, there has been a claim that they not only wished to
create Islamic polities in Malaysia and Indonesia, and an independent Mindinao, but
also envisaged a new Muslim polity that embraces much of the Southeast Asian
archipelago (Cochraine 2002, p32).
These more militant, revisionist notions have been played out against a wider sense
in Muslim communities that the time is ripe for further development of the role
of Islam on the world stage, either to push forward and help transform a greater part
of the world into the dar al-Islam (house of Islam), including the reform of corrupt
governments, or to find a more lasting interaction between belief, science, and
modernisation that does not undermine the pillars of faith (McAmis 2002, p2).
Several key questions are hard to avoid for contemporary Muslims, even if formulated
in rather blunt terms. A sense of historical dislocation does frustrate many Muslims
who see a 'dramatic decline . . . from the leading civilization in the world for over one
thousand years into a lagging, impotent, and marginalized region in the world.' (Fuller
2003, p1). From this viewpoint they can question whether the West is ' the greatest
threat to Islam in the fifteenth Islamic century?' (McAmis 2002, p72). 'What does it
mean today to be a Muslim in a predominantly non-Islamic World?' (Ahmed, II,
2000, p52). When will the current negative conditions be reversed? What level of
reform is needed in national governments and the international system to sustain
a renewed Islamic civilization? For many Muslims the answer to these questions,
including effective opposition to authoritarian governments that have received support
from Western democracies, is a reforming Islam or Islamism (Fuller 2003, pp1516).
3
In November 2001, Osama bin Laden considered only Afghanistan as an Islamic state, which was not the case for
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, "Osama Claims He Has Nukes: If the U.S. Uses N-Arms It Will Get the Same
Response (Dawn Internet Edition, November 9, 2001, by Hamid Mir)", MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does
Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p43.
10
Western and regional threat perceptions have been confronted by the partial successes
the Taliban through 1996-2001 and their continued embattled survival through 20022005, a sustained Taliban offensive in southern Afghanistan from late 2006, plus
intense combat operations in 'the Chora district of Uruzgan, the province that is the
native place of the Taliban's elusive leader, Mullah Omar' (ABC 2007a), and their
continued survival in Pakistan (which President Karzai view as the key to future
peace, ABC 2007b), plus the ongoing operations of al-Qaeda or related organisations,
the reality of international and transnational terrorism.4 This has furthered intense
debate over justice in the international system that has re-emerged since 2001. The
resurrection of the ‘Caliphate’ as a political term has been seen in popular media
usage through 2005-2007, and has a strange resonance given the fractured history of
the early Caliphate, challenges to its legitimacy, its later territorial subdivision (from
the 10th century, see below), and the eventual withering and disbandment of the
Caliphate as an institution at the end of the Ottoman Empire (through 1922-1924).
From 2004 the 'Caliphate' came into usage in Washington as a term for the focus of
security threats, and was cited by diverse leaders such as Defence Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, Eric Edelman, the Under Secretary of Defence for policy, Stephen Hadley,
a national security adviser, General John Abizaid, the top American commander in the
Middle East, and Vice President Dick Cheney, who stated that a failed democracy in
Iraq might be the basis of this new caliphate that would then destabilise the
Middle East (Bumiller 2005). These warnings were made in part on the basis of a
letter sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leading ideologist of Al-Qaeda in July 2005,
which proposed such a project, even though only 6% of Muslims recently surveyed
in the Middle East supported such an agenda. (Bumiller 2005). These visions of a
'totalitarian Islamic Empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain', as outlined by a
December 2005 speech of President Bush, have been mobilised to bolster waning
public support for US operations in Iraq (Bumiller 2005; Republican Policy
Committee 2005). This vision of a totalitarian caliphate has also been used through
2006-2007 to bolster support for a victory in Iraq (Arkin 2007).
Likewise, no modern 'Islamic state' has the strength and legitimacy needed to
carry forward the leadership claims of an international Caliphate: Iran as a Shi'a
society cannot provide this role for Sunnis, the Emirate of Afghanistan fell to
American intervention, Sudan remains troubled, subject to international scrutiny and
unable to project any leadership or influence, and the battle for Iraq continues, with
the sharp division between Sunni and Shi'a interests making it an unlikely prospect for
a future, united Islamic state willing to project its potential power. Likewise, though
changes of power among groups within Somalia make this a troubled, 'fragile' state
that forms the locus of transnational disturbances (2006-2007) rather than a source of
leadership (see above).
In this setting, the claims that Jemaah Islamaiah and related Islamic dissident
groups seek to set up a new Caliphate based on a wide territorial footprint across
Muslim-populated areas of Southeast Asia seem a remote political agenda. The
term ‘caliphate’ in this setting may be a symbol or stereotype, perhaps used as
propaganda by both proponents and critics in the current ideological wars that are
one front of the so-called ‘war on terror’. As we shall see, the aims of regional
'Islamist' organisations is actually quite diverse, with different goals and methods
4
Transnational linkages often work across borders into adjacent states, either operating on a regional basis, as in JI
'cells' in Southeast Asia, or seeking to revise existing borders as illegitimate, as in the Jammu-Kashmir dispute.
11
deployed in a generally reformist agenda. Likewise, the term ‘caliphate’ has emerged
in some media in relations to tensions in ‘Greater Central Asia’, viewed in this
context as a band of discontent and political transition stretching from Dagestan to
Tajikistan (Saidazimova 2006a).
Though there are some proto-democratic features in Islamic thought (shura,
consultation, and consensus of judgement based social solidarity, Esposito 1992;
Gellner 1994, pp26-29; Hefner 2001)5, there is no automatic guarantee that this will
be shaped into a liberal democratic pattern of governance. Put another way, within
this general orientation there 'is no such thing as human rights without human
responsibilities', but these responsibilities are to the 'Giver of human life' and are
framed by divine revelation, not just by human laws (Nasr 2003, p30). Purely secular
political solutions, with a sharp division between religion and state, are problematic in
Islam. Thus traditional Islamic patterns of government are not so much a theocracy
as a nomocracy, focusing on the 'rule of Divine Law' and not a Church or priesthood
(Nasr 2003, p30). Though there are also strong aspects of consensus and
consultation within Islamic traditions, these do not directly equate with Western
concepts of representative liberal democracy. In this sense, the current conflict is
very much among Muslims themselves as much as with Western states, and
involves both deep religious and ideological divisions (Fradkin et al 2005, p1). It is
thus much more than a reaction to American foreign policy and the issue of Palestine
(though this are important factors), but a deeper conflict over fundamental
principles, and for some militants such as Abu Musab al Zarqawi modern democracy
remains fundamentally 'incompatible with Islam' (Fradkin et al. 2005, pp5-11).
It seems that current claims made by militant Islam and its Western critics has
generated a divisive non-dialogue of propaganda and counter-propaganda
directed to divergent audiences, and leaves little space for genuine political dialogue
or accommodation.6 It may be necessary to generate a deeper we wish to open up a
social and transnational space in which violence remains the last, rather than the first,
resort to those (whether states or social movements) seeking their own vision of
justice.
2b. The Caliphate as Islamic Governance
A number of terms from Islamic governance have been imported into popular
analysis without a clear appreciation of their lineage and meaning (Kinyon 2004, p1;
Nasr 2003, pxii). Terms such as Emir (a general, prince or noble who has an
independent command or leads an independent state), Emirate, Sultan, Sultanate,
Caliph, Caliphate, Sherif and Mahdi are used to signal various pattern of religious and
political leadership in accounts of the Arabic and Muslim history.
The term Caliph in its most basic sense means successor and in its original
context means 'the vicegerent of the Prophet', or 'Deputy of God' implying a
delegated power such as that held by Abu Bakr as the first khalifah (Nasr 2003, p11;
5
For a reformulation of democracy 'not as a human invention, but divine intention', see KHORASANI, Rajaei
"Democracy in an Islamic System", Echo of Islam (Tehran), No. 118, April 1994, pp24-26. On the 'Pious Sultan
theory', see OLESEN, Asta Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, Richmond, Curzon Press, 1995, p9.
6 On the desperate need for such a political space, see ALI, Tariq The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades,
Jihads and Modernity, London, Verso, 2002.
12
Kennedy 2004, pxix). Although the caliph was at first viewed as the temporal,
political leader of the threatened Islamic community, it was also expected in the
earliest period that he should be 'a man of piety, trust, knowledge, strength, justice,
integrity and righteousness' (Ahmed 2000, I, p27). Traditionally, it was also expected
that the Caliph should be a member of the Quraish, the tribe to which Muhammad
belonged, though some groups such as the Kharijites argued that office should be
open to any 'capable' Muslim (Ahmed 2000, I, p61). This placed an enormous
burden on the person chosen within the community to have spiritual, moral and
pragmatic leadership abilities, though in later period it was not expected that he
would necessarily be an expert in law or its interpretation. During the early period he
was also the head of the community in that he led the community in prayer and
supported key legal decisions, though later Caliphs sometimes chose to delegate this
task to specialised officials, the khatibs, from the early 9th century onwards (Ahmed
2000, I, pp275-278). During the period of the first four caliphs an effort was taken to
provide consultation among the wider Islamic community, and to try to ensure that
some form of community consensus could be achieved, i.e. it was at least protodemocratic in principle (Ahmed 2000, I, p64, p91), though tensions emerged as soon
as the claims of Ali ibn Abu Talib were deferred until he eventually became the fourth
caliph through 656-661 (Kennedy 2004, p3). The first four caliphs are generally
regarded by Sunnis as righteous and pious, signified by the term 'rightly guided
caliphs' (Khulfa e Rashidoon, though doubts are sometimes expressed about the third
caliph, and sometimes Omar bin Abdul Aziz is added as a later fifth rightly-guided
caliph), but this was not sustained in the following the assassination of Ali and the
creation of Umayyad dynasty, which in effect converted the caliphate into a
'hereditary sultanate' (Nasr 2003, p116; Ahmed 2000, pp59-73). Writers such as Ibn
Khaldun argued that dynasties based on hereditary succession were in fact not caliphs
but rather kingships (in AZRA 2005, p7). The assassination of Ali and later conflicts
also led to the split between Sunni and Shiites, with the later favouring rule by
descendents of the Prophet through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali.
The idea of the caliphate as a focus of political leadership and legitimacy linking the
international order back to the times of the Prophet and the first caliphs continued to
be sustained at the formal and rhetorical level. Thus in the theory of Sunni Islam,
even when the Caliphate was itself weak the 'legitimacy of rule . . . flowed from
the Caliph who bestowed his favors on ambitious princes and soldiers through a
whole range of titles' (Ahmed 2000, I, p58). The early Caliphs, plus even the Caliph
Mansur (from 754 C.E), for a time preserved the notion of 'the public performance
of monarchy', with the caliph visible at the Friday prayers, and allowing courts of
complaint and petition (the mazalim court) where any individual, even the poor and
dispossessedm could seek redress for the wrongs of officials, though this process
tended to fall to disuse and had to be revived, e.g. in 870 C.E., and strong welfare
elements for Muslims (Kennedy 2004, p14, p49, p141, p146, pp204-206).
Illegitimate governments, of course, find it harder to mobilise social and religious
support, and tend to need greater levels of force to sustain their regimes (Ahmed
2000, I, p58). At the broader level, Ibn Khaldun asserted that function of the Caliphate
was to provide the conditions that allow the community of believers (ummah) to live
according to Shariah.7 Islam, with its universalist claims, its wide outreach into
7
Adapting the account in AHMED, Nazeer Islam in Global History: From the Death of Prophet Muhammed to the
First World War, 2 vols., Concord, American Institute of Islamic History and Culture, 2000, Vol. I, p274.
13
communities from Africa to China, with its willingness to include diverse races and
its support for international communication and trade, could this be viewed
metaphorically as a form of 'proto-globalization' linking Africa, Eurasia, and an
emerging Indo-Asian network. It was perhaps 'the waning of this universalist tradition
that led to localization and atrophy of what was once an open and searching
intellectual society' (Fuller 2003, p5).
In the long run, it was not possible even within the Sunni world for the Caliphate
to retain real military power as the Abbasid caliphate weakened and began to
fragment: Gradually the actual military power of the caliphs diminished; real military and political
power fell into the hands of local kings, and the caliph retained only nominal authority.
Under these conditions a new theory of political authority was developed by the Sunni
jurists (fuqaha'), in which the caliph remained the symbol of the unity of the Islamic
community and the rule of the Shari'ah, and the king or sultan, with actual military and
political power, had the duty to preserve public order and protect the borders of the
Islamic world. (Nasr 2003, p111)
After the first four rightly guided Caliphs, fierce disputes would arise concerning
the leadership of the Islamic world, leading to the split between the Sunnis and
Shiites, the later supporting the claims of Ali (as son-law and married to the Prophet's
daughter, Fatimah) and his descendants to political leadership, and who still owe
allegiance to Imams. The dispute in this case was not just on the issue of who should
succeed, but also on the nature of the caliphate itself: The Sunnis believed that the function of such a person should be to protect the Divine
Law, act as judge, and rule over the community, preserving public order and the
borders of the Islamic world. The Shi'ites believed that such a person should also be
able to interpret the Quran and the Law and in fact possess inward knowledge.
Therefore he had to be chosen by God and the Prophet, not by the community. Such
a figure was called Imam. (Nasr 2003, pp12-13)
Likewise, from the 860s onwards there was a serious decline in the Abbasid
caliphate, which was now virtually controlled by its Turkish bodyguard, and which
encouraged the rise of independent dynasties in Morocco and Egypt (Ahmed 2000,
I, p49). In this context, the Fatamids (as Isma'ili Shiites) would establish their own
powerful empire (909-1171), centred on Egypt and stretching from Tunisia to Syria
and make their own claim to the caliphate in the name of their Imam , and from '910
the Fatimid Ubaidullah had declared himself the Mahdi and the Caliph of all Muslims'
(Nasr 2003, p11, p124). Thus there were three different claims to caliphal political
leadership, by the Abbasids (based on the power of the Turks), by the Fatimids from
Cairo (a claim temporarily relinquished in 1171 when Al Aazid died), and the
Umayyads from cosmopolitan Cordoba (Ahmed 2000, I, pp171-217; Ali 2002, p33).
One of the great disasters remembered within the Islamic world was the invasion of
the Mongols, who conquered Baghdad and killed the last Abbasid caliph in 1258
(Nasr 2003, p128). This led to a short period when there was one recognised Caliph in
North Africa (al Mustanir from 1260-1261), but in 1261 the Mamluke's of Egypt
'resurrected the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo' by inviting a surviving relative to come to
Egypt and continue the Abbasid link as a propaganda tool in their conflicts with the
Mongols (Ahmed 2000, I, p234, p308). Although later Mongols leaders adopted Islam
14
as the Il-Khanids, they and the following empire of Timur and his descendants lacked
the international credentials to lead the Muslim world. By the sixteenth century, the
Islamic world had been fractured into three great polities that would represent
themselves as leaders of the large Muslim communities - the Ottomans, the Safavids
(of Persian), and the Moghuls, controlling most of South Asia (Ahmed 2000, I,
p28).
The Ottomans were at first content to use the 'military-political institution' of the
Sultanate as their focus for governance (Ahmed 2000, I, pp124-166). The title
Caliph, though sometimes used by earlier Ottoman leaders, was formally taken over
by the Ottomans in 1517 by bringing the last surviving Abbasid caliph to
Istanbul where he abdicated in favour of Selim I (Ihsanoglu 2001, p135; Ahmed II,
p40). In part it was taken up due to successful campaigns in Iran (1514) and Egypt
(1517), and also a desire in later periods to mobilise this role within the Islamic
world as a partial balance against the growing power of European states, though
Seyyed Nasr contents that they were really only sultans adopting 'a political order that
functioned in many ways like the other caliphates' (Nasr 2003, p131; Ihsanoglu 2001,
p203). The re-assertions of the Caliphate from the 13th century onwards might be
viewed as necessary 're-inventions' in order provide an international focus for
the religious needs of the wider Islamic community during the very periods when
its unity had been largely splintered (Ahmed 2000, I, p304).
The diverse line of dynasties that might take up the Caliphate could thus lead to
disputes among great powers as to where the Caliphate resided, e.g. between
Ottoman and Moghul claims: However, there was a clash of grandeur. Both monarchs called themselves 'Caliph',
'shadow of god', 'refuge of the monarchs of the universe'. Ottoman authorities
behaved with insolence to Mogul emissaries in Constantinople. The Moguls, for their
part, never forgot descent from the great Timur, who had captured the Ottoman
Sultan in 1402. Mogul emperors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries claimed
that their capital Agra was the 'abode of the Caliphate'; Constantinople was merely
'seat of the Ottoman sultanate'. (Mansel 1997, p190)
In time the Ottomans extended their claims to the Caliphate to buffer their
political power, even as it began to wain in the 18th century: This matter took on an even more active form during the reign of Suleyman I. During
that time such titles as "halîfe-i kübrâ" (greatest caliphate), "imâmete-i uzmâ"
("supreme imamate"), and "halîfe-i Müslimîm" ("caliph of the Muslims") were used.
They were expressions of a universalist perspective on the caliphate which was
interpreted as a mission bestowed by God on the sultan. As far as can be
determined, for the Ottoman sultan the caliphate took on a somewhat different
meaning than it had held during the Abbasid period. For the Ottomans, the idea of the
caliphate took on a new meaning which included responsibility for looking after the
security of the hajj routes, protection of the sacred places, the defence of Islam, and
the inclusion of all Muslims under a security blanket combined with the gazâ tradition.
. . . Later, particularly during the period of loss and diminution of the empire, the
Ottomans began to place great emphasis on their being the caliphs for all Muslims so
as not to lose the authority they had possessed within the Muslim world. (Ihsanoglu
2001, p31; Ahmed 2000, II, p72)
In such roles the Ottoman sultan might also be described as 'God's shadow on earth',
'the leader of the believers', and 'protector of Islam' (Ihsanoglu 2001, p494). One of
15
the specific claims and duties of the later Caliphs was that they protected (directly
or indirectly) the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and the major hajj caravans.
This could be hard to sustain, with the Caliphate soon finding itself unable to cover
the breach between different reform and nationalist movements.
In Arabia, the thought of Ibn Wahhab aimed at a return to a 'golden age' of a pure
and early Islam, but was in fact the force both for a reformist revival chained to
Saudi political ambitions: Ibn Wahhab provided a theological justification for almost everything Ibn Saud
wanted to achieve: a permanent jihad that involved looting other Muslim settlements
and cities, ignoring the caliph, imposing a tough discipline on his own people and,
ultimately, asserting his own rule over neighbouring tribes in an attempt to unite the
Peninsula. After lengthy discussions, the emir and the preacher agreed to mithaq, a
binding agreement, that would be honoured by their successors in eternity. The two
clauses inserted by Ibn Saud indicated what he had in mind. Spiritual fervour in the
service of political ambition, but not vice versa. (Ali 2002, p75)
Even through the 19th century Muslims were keen to invest concern with the
presence of a Caliph on the world stage, perhaps in part due to the increasing of
colonialism. Thus once the Moguls fell, Indian Muslims were politically supportive
of the Ottoman Caliphate (the pro-Ottoman Khilafat movement), and one British
Viceroy suggested that if Britain allowed Istanbul fell to Russian control this would
cause violence in India (Mansel1997, p306, p384). For a relatively short period in the
late 19th and early 20th century the Ottomans gained some international prestige as
the last independent Muslim power and defender of Islam. (Mansel 1997, pp320322) Thus, even some modernising Sultans would provide a short-term focus for the
Islamic world: The greatest tribute to Sultan Abdul Hamid is that even today many Muslims around
the world invoke his name with nostalgia for a bygone era when a venerated caliph
provided a semblance of political focus for the global Islamic community and gave it a
sense of universal brotherhood. Muslims as far away as India and Nigeria looked to
him for guidance in maters small and large. His office radiated religious, political,
cultural and social influence across the Islamic world. The Ottoman fez became not
only a hat for the Turks but for Indian Muslims, Egyptians, Moroccans and
Malaysians. His failure was that he pursued his modernization program through a
highly centralized, personal style, which opened him to charges of despotism.
(Ahmed 2000, II, p279)
This tilt towards Islam did provide some groundswell support for the Ottomans,
but in the late 19th century it also undermined their claims towards building a
multi-religious, cosmopolitan state (Ahmed 2000, II, p275). Even as late as 1914 the
Ottomans may have hoped to strike at the British through an eastward campaign to
link up with Muslim populations in north-east India, a move that was pre-empted by
Russian pressure on north-eastern Turkey and northern Persian (Ahmed 2000, II,
p94). In turn, some Indian soldiers were reluctant to fight fellow Muslim Turkish
soldiers in Iraq (Ahmed 2000, II, p312), but overall British control remained intact.
Indeed, both the British and French were keen to see the collapse of Caliphate as
one of the few symbols around which resistance to their geo-political and colonial
projects might be focused (Ahmed 2000, II, pp316-317). British willingness to
weaken the Ottoman's at various stages helped mobilise opposition in South Asia: -
16
In 1919-24 India was swept by the Khilafat movement, an explosion of hostility to
Britain and the loyalty to the Ottoman Caliphate which had resurfaced in 1877-8 and
1912-1913. Indian Muslims' concern for the future of Constantinople was shared by
Gandhi and some Hindus. The All-India Khilafat Conference organized mass
meetings in Delhi, Bombay and Karachi and sent a delegation to Constantinople.
There was a pro-Khilafat rising in the Muslim province of Kerala. (Mansel 1997, p391)
Thus the future of the Caliphate as either a religious or temporal institution was of
major issue of the modernising Turkish Grand National Assembly. Ataturk's
modernising policies saw Islam as an obstruction to modernisation and nationalbuilding, thus forcing the National Assembly to abandon the institution as a burden
that could not be sustained (Ahmed 2000, II, p320). The Caliphate was abolished
through early 1924 (Ihsanoglu 2001, p131; Mansel 1997, p413).
It is not surprising that powerful monarchs such as the Ottoman Sultan saw the
Caliphate as a mean of reinforcing their (waning) power and authority, with 19th
century scholars in such as Abu'l-Huda and Jamal al-din al-Afghani supporting the
idea of absolute obedience to the Caliph (Mansel 1997, pp322-323). Thus, for a short
time, there was a linkage between pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideals, but this could
be sustained in the face of nationalist and modernising trends in Turkey and the
Arabic world (Mansel 1997, pp357-358). This eclipse of the Ottoman Caliphate
remains significant, and is explicitly cited as a turning point in the weakening of
the Islamic world in an al-Qaeda training manual: After the fall of our orthodox caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the
colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the
Moslem nation. These rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the
colonialists themselves. Moslems have endured all kinds of harm, oppression, and
torture.8
It is in this context that the effort of various Islamic reformists and modernists
became extremely urgent from the late 19th century onwards. One of the most
controversial of these was Seyyed Jamaluddin Afghani, who sought to unite the
Islamic world under one caliph in Istanbul, which would require a reconciliation
between Persia and the Ottoman Empire (Ahmed 2000, II, p286). He also sought to
modernise Islam, and his followers influenced reform movements in Egypt, India, and
Indonesia, but his efforts to create a wider Renaissance in Islamic thought were not
initially successful (Ahmed 2000, II, pp286-287). This call for revival and reform, in
different forms, has become more urgent in the late 20th and 21st centuries (see further
below). In general, the sense of crisis due to the collapse of the caliphate and the
growing power of the West and nationalism has been threefold: -
8
Declaration of Jihad (Holy War) Against the Country's Tyrants: Military Series (Al Qaeda Training Manual),
UK translated document posted on United States Department of Justice Website, Accessed 2005, p7 [Internet
Access via http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm]. The document was found by Manchester police in 2000,
and thus is also known as the Manchester Document but copies have also apparently been found in Afghanistan,
and was used in a 2001 U.S. trial of terrorists (MILES, Donna "Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behaviour at
Guantanamo Bay", American Forces Information Service, 29 June 2005 [Internet Access at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/20050629_1901.html). The presence of this manual on a hard disc
itself seems to be a breach of the kind of security precautions it outlines, while the technologies in the document
itself seem somewhat dated, e.g. facsimile and wireless are discussed but not email, computers, or mobile phones,
e.g. see pp29-31. The material seems to reflect lessons learned in the 1970s and 1980s, and may reflect experience
from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, with the manual mentioning travel security when going for
training in Afghanistan via Pakistan, pp58-59.
17
In general, I would suggest there were three kinds of responses. First, confronting the
European through jihad, which eventually failed. Second, accommodating and
adopting European ideas, concepts and practices. This second type of response was
the most common one that resulted in the adoption of European ideas, concepts and
institutions such as "nationalism", "nation-state", "modernism", "secularism", and the
like. The third response was proposing alternative concepts and institutions by
returning to the romanticized and ideal Islamic concepts. With respect to this, some
Muslim scholars and activists such as al-Afghani and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi,
for instance, appealed for the re-invigoration of the caliphate (al-khilafah) as the
single, universal Islamic political entity, which, it was believed, would unify the
fragmented ummah. Other Muslim theologians, who found that it was very difficult to
establish such a caliphate, proposed another alternative concept, namely the dawlah
Islamiyyah (Islamic state), which would be founded in a certain Muslim country. (Azra
2005, pp7-8)
2c. Resurrecting the Caliphate for the 21st Century?
In spite of Western efforts to de-legitimize Osama bin Laden as a psychologically
warped extremist, in fact he not only been able to maintain a following but has also
been granted some credibility within wider Islamic sensibilities (Kinyon 2004, p1).
This is not based on being a learned or holy man, but rather his role as a warrior who
claims to be acting in defence of both the holy places of Islam and in defence of the
wider Islamic community which he sees as being under attack both from US (and its
allied) military power and from insidious Western values. In this context his apparent
popularity in parts of the Islamic world rests on a sense of generalised dissatisfaction
with the global system, and specific sense of political dislocation. He has also tried to
mobilise historical and traditional elements of Islamic thought. The warrior
tradition was a noted part of the early expansion and defence of Islam, as well as reiterated in the defence and expansion of the borders of the Islamic world as the
Ottomans expanded their own frontier. Today: Bin Laden's support rests on his claim that he is a self-declared amir (commander),
who is willing to do what no other Arab leaders are doing. In the absence of true
leadership, he is a de facto military commander, the only one willing to stand up
against the western infidels and occupiers. In Islam, there is no obligation for the
military leader to be a religious man as well, and bin Laden makes no claim on being
one. (Kinyon 2004, p1)
Although Bin Laden might claim a role as an Emir or General (Gunaratna 2002),
he is not able to assume other titles such as Caliph, since he is not the leader of or
supported by a powerful Muslim state. He does not meet all the criteria for the Mahdi,
whose apocalyptic proclamation in any case would probably not sit well with the
revolutionary agenda of al-Qaeda and related groups, contra the confused comparative
efforts made by some Western writers (see McDonald 2002; Nasr 203, pp73-74). Nor
does Osama bin Laden have the kind of religious training that would entitle him to
issue a fatwa, which in any case are usually only viewed as valid if they have been
debated by religious scholars and a wide consensus reached (Marlin 2004, p18;
Gunaratna 2002). In June 2007, in response to the knighthood awarded writer Salman
Rushdie, conservative Pakistani clerics gave Bin Ladin the title of '"Saifullah", or
sword of Allah' (Apunyi 2007), but this seems a largely reactive measure.
It is possible, however, that both al-Qaeda and JI seek to establish a strong Islamic
state within initial borders, before a wider range of regional operations that might
18
reshape international politics. On this basis, a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, a key
al-Qeada leader, to Iraqi insurgents suggests that the collapse of the US presence was
crucial as a prelude to establishing an Islamic state in Iraq that would then take the
conflict to key 'secular' neighbours including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and only
then confronting Israel (JUS 2006). There are some scattered political claims that
suggest a more pragmatic approach towards sustaining a project future caliphate.
One of these is not just the protection of holy sites and Muslims, but also an effort
to protect the physical resources of the Middle East, as noted in one of the early Al
Qaeda communiques: I would like here to alert my brothers, the Mujahideen, the sons of the nation, to
protect this (oil) wealth and not to include it in the battle, as it is a great Islamic wealth
and a large economic power essential for the soon-to-be established Islamic state, by
Allah's permission and grace. We also warn the aggressors, the U.S.A., against
burning this Islamic wealth (a crime which they may commit in order to prevent the oil,
at the end of the war, from falling into the hands of its legitimate owners, and to cause
economic damage to the competitors of the U.S.A. in Europe or the Far East,
particularly Japan, which is the major consumer of oil of the region). 9
The situation in Southeast Asia is equally problematic for groups seeking to
sustain radical political projects. In general terms, Islam in Indonesia has been
strongly influenced by pre-Islamic syncretic systems (leading to 'Kejawen' forms of
Islam), a strong mystical inclination, and the importance of Sufism (Aveling 1979;
McAmis 2002, p45). In part, this divergence has been accommodated by the concept
of adat or local customary law, which has in most areas has run alongside the core
religious tenants of Islam, creating a wider social space for divergence (McAmis
2002, p63). Other patterns that may have been influenced by the Hindu past include a
special reverence for the teacher (guru), though this has in part converged on the idea
of the special blessings that Muslim teachers and holy persons can impart on their
students (McAmis 2002, p69).
However, it is also true that small but influential numbers of Arabs, Persians, South
Asians, those who returned from the struggle in Afghanistan, and those returning from
the Hajj have also added new layers of Islamic belief since the 17th century. We
should note that large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims make the pilgrimage
to Mecca each year, and in the past the Indonesian government gave some financial
support for up to 10,000 people making the trip (McAmis 2002, p69). Arabic has also
remained the primary language of advanced Islamic instruction, though in many cases
used ritually rather than fully understood linguistically, and Malay became a
secondary vehicle for commentary and dialogue on Islam at least as early as the late
17th century when an interpretation of the Qur'an was provided in Malay by Shaykh
Abdul Rauf al Sinkili (Ahmed 2000, I, p396; see further Mansurnoor 1990). During
these centuries Malay was not only one of the key lingua franca for regional trade,
but was also one of the vehicles for religious transmission as well (Ahmed 2000 I,
p398). This transnational linkage provides a direct sense of community with the
wider Islamic global society, as well as being a focus for renewed missionary and
'call' activities, da'wa, including the call religious renewal (McAmis 2002, p80).
People who have been through this experience not only have increased prestige within
9
"Declaration of Jihad, August 23, 1996" in MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited
Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p9.
19
their local communities, but are unlikely to impressed by Western visions of global
affairs as presented in modern media outlets and foreign policy agenda.
It is in this context that we can see the enormous prestige and influence of Muslim
religious leaders both via village institutions and through teaching institutions such
as the pesantren, madrasah (theological schools, whose role became formalised in the
Islamic world from the 11th century onwards), sekolah Islam (Kennedy 2004, p260;
McAmis 2002, p65). Though local custom have been strongly influenced by local
belief systems at the level of the 'abangan', sometimes viewed as nominal Muslims, it
now seems that the santri as devout Muslims seem to have gained some greater
influence at the grass roots level in recent years (McAmis 2002, p49). It is such a
context that figures such as Abu Bakar Bashir, via the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI), can gain a certain degree of influence among a strong religious minority
within Indonesia. In is important not to exaggerate the conservative or negative
teaching of some pesantren in Indonesia. In fact the pesantren are a key element in
the national educational program and since 1994 of these have been modernised
through the adoptions of the curricula developed by the Ministry of National
Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Azra 2005, pp13-14). Likewise,
Indonesia remains a multi-religious society, with most Muslims in the country
supporting a pluralist democracy and not favouring a move towards an Islamic state,
nor supporting wholesale extension of strict shariah codes of law (see Hosen 2005).
It can be seen, then, that the political project of the Caliphate as put forward by alQaeda, JI and related groups is at best fragmentary, often mixed with
revolutionary elements of 20th century European political practice (Nasr 2003, pp181184), and at worst a utopian reworking of a call to the past that does not coincide with
the current challenges facing Islamic communities, in spite of some superficial
similarities. Thus: The modernism and so-called fundamentalism that are evident in certain sectors of
Islamic society and in certain lands have caused traditional Islamic life to wither, but
have been unable to create any significant theological world view that could challenge
the traditional one (Nasr 2003, p174).
This project might seem unlikely in the face of the U.S.'s dominant strategic power,
continued Russian and Chinese tensions with Islam, continued international
interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia, and the apparent robustness of
governments in Southeast Asia, though Thailand and Philippines have come under
increasing pressure from 2006 (see Strategic Comments 2006a; Yong 2006).
However, militant Islamists have viewed themselves as the victor in the war
against the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan from 1979), as slowly winning the war of
hearts and minds in the Islamic world, and Al Qaeda has spoken of its victory against
the U.S. in Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu (in Marlin 204, p13, p73). From the point of
Osama bin Laden, these different conflicts are part of a longer chain of an
integrated war between Crusaders and Muslims (in Marlin 2004, p39), thereby
engaging a long-term viewpoint and a global strategy of conflict. From this point of
view, conditions in Pakistan, Palestine, and Iran are far from positive, while ongoing
repression in the Central Asia also provides a possible focus for conflict. Problematic
and slow stabilisation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that there is a need for
sustained multilateral international support for these new governments if they are
to become genuinely accepted as local and legitimate sources of governance. At
20
present, groups such as JI and Al-Qaeda seem able to disturb the current international
order but destroy it. Nor do their statements suggest an adequate vision of
alternative governance. In the contemporary setting, this leave open the issue of how
Islamic society should sustain itself in the modern period of Western global
dominance.
3. Normative Transnational and International Islamic Institutions
It is possible to conceptualise key elements of Islam's religious system as
supporting current normative roles for Muslims within global society. The five
pillars of Islam, of course, are the Shahada (profession of faith), the Salat (five daily
prayers), the Hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina where possible (the 'greater' Hajj
occurs during the last lunar month of the year), Zakat (giving of money to hose in
need) and Sawm (fasting in daylight hours of the month of Ramadan, see further Nasr
2003). We can link some of these fundamentals to wider flows in the transnational
system today, e.g. the Hajj which brings together hundreds of millions of Muslims
each year, with the number reaching 1,557,447 pilgrims in 2006 (BNA 2006). The
geographical centrality of the holy places in Arabia is also reinforced by the
tradition whereby prayer is conducted facing towards Mecca, with the mihrab, a
niche, or even small plaque, showing the direction of the holy site (Kennedy 2004,
p141)
3a. The Ummah as the Community of Believers
Likewise, the ummah, the community of believers, provides another focus for a
transnational network that is nearly global in reach and comprises almost 1.5 billion
members. It is crucial to note that for many Muslims this is a key level of their
identity, especially when state or governmental structures have been weak or
oppresive. As noted by Seyyed Nasr: One of the key concepts in Islam is that of the ummah, or the totality of people who
are Muslims and constitute the Islamic world. Islam sees history itself in religious
terms and refers to other people not primarily by their linguistic or ethnic affiliations
but their religious identity, hence the reference to the ummah of Moses or Jesus so
often found in Islamic text when discussing Judaism or Christianity. The Islamic
ummah is one, bound by solidarity to the Quranic message of Divine Oneness and
Sovereignty, the messengership of the Prophet, and acceptance of the Divine Law
(al-Shari'ah). Muslims are united by the powerful bond of brotherhood and sisterhood,
a bond that is felt strongly to this day despite all the turmoil that has pitted and
continues to put Muslims against one another. (Nasr 2003, p15)
This sense of solidarity and brotherhood, ukhuwwah, helped make Islam an
appealing religion not just to Arabs, but soon spread to Persian, Turks, Egyptians and
a wider community that stretched from Western Africa through Central Asia to
enclaves in southern China (Nasr 2003, pp15-16; Quran 3:103). In theory,
membership within Islam overcame barriers of ethnicity, race, and status, and
'rejected all forms of racism and tribalism' (Nar 2003, p16, following Quran
49:13), making it an ideal universalising religion. In theory, alongside its core
religious believes, Islam could benefit from the great diversity of its followers.
Persians, Turks, and Indians would soon contribute to the rich culture and intellectual
tradition of Islam. Thus, 'Islam is like a vast tapestry into which all these local cultural
21
modes and varieties are woven like arabesques; the larger pattern they make reflects
the Oneness of the Divine Principle' (Nasr 2003, p24).
Having said this, political unity became problematic as soon as the Prophet died,
and could not even be easily sustained even through the Abbasid period (Kennedy
2004). The division between Shia and Sunni groups, different claims by different
leaders to the prestige of the Caliphate, and a range of orthodox and nonorthodox practices soon created a range of division within the Islamic world. This
can be seen, for example, in secondary pilgrimages made to the shrines and tombs
of saints by many Muslims, a practice common in Central Asia (especially
Uzbekistan), Iran, parts of Iraq Pakistan, and parts of Indonesia, especially Java
(Kennedy 2004, p239). This belief in the intercessory power of saints, teachers, and
Sufi sheikhs has been viewed as at best unorthodox and verging on idolatry by stricter
interpreters, e.g. it is strongly opposed in modern Arabia and Malaysia. Likewise, the
impact of de-colonisation, nationalism and modernisation has left a checkerboard of
Muslim societies whose states are often at odds with each other, e.g. historical
tensions between Syria and Turkey, Iran and Turkey, and between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. In such a context, the identity with the umma remains as an ideal and
aspiration, and the structures of family and local community may become a
stronger reality for many Muslims (Nasr 2003, p103).
Early Islam focused on the ideal of Tawhid as a widely conceived 'God-centred
civilization' which could be established on earth (Ahmed 2000, I, p74, p89). This also
implied a debate on authentic and 'unauthentic' traditions and practices, and a
utopian push towards a universal political order based on a unity among believers
across diverse cultures and transcending states: Islamists furthermore suffer overall from a tendency to seek an idealized social unity,
and idealized homogeneous national - or even umma - identity that discourages
diversity and difference that is seen as fractious, divisive and harmful to the umma.
(Fuller 2003, p19)
Likewise, Muslim communities under pressure within Western countries, e.g.
France through 2003-2006, have at times rebounded towards a stronger Islamic
identity focused on the ummah, particularly if they remain within minority
communities and do not work within the wider French community (Spencer 2005).
Islam has emerged as the second largest religion in France, with over 4 million
Muslims in the country in the late 1990s and heading towards 10% of the population
in the 21st century (see Caldwell 2000; Crittenden & Ferguson 2006), and when
compared with the 8-9% of highly active Catholics, this has worried conservative
commentators (Hanley 2003, p28). At the broader level, it can also be asked in the
post-2001 whether France and Europe as a whole is really willing and able to
protect the rights of its Muslim Minorities, in spite of the legal requirement to do
so. From 1989 the 'Islamic Scarf' case was concerned with the refusal of a junior highschool principal to allow three Islamic girls to wear scarves in school, basically on the
basis of secularism in schools and egality in education, a debate that continued
through the 1990s down to 2004 (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12; Wieviorka 1994,
p250). The issue of the division between Church and State, laicité (Pierre & Quandt
1995, p140), a core tenant of French republican tradition, was re-iterated through
February 2004 with the National Assembly banning all religious symbols in state
22
schools, including headscarves, turbans, skullcaps, and large crosses (Milner &
Parsons 2003, p12).
At various time Islamist groups have also sought an internationalised approach
through linkages into the wider umma. Thus from 1990 with the formal creation of
the 'all-Union' Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) which aimed to create a revival of
Islam in Eurasia and Central Asia, with three main structures: the first in Central Asia,
plus a Moscow based centre to help Muslims within Russia, and another group based
in the North Caucasus. The group soon set up branches in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,
aimed at helping propagate Islam and be involved in 'cultural, sociopolitical and
economic life'. (Akcali 1998). This organisation, however, had a strongly
internationalist orientation, based on the view of a global community of believers
(the umma), leading to early contact and cooperation between members in Tajikistan
and the mujahidin in Afghanistan. For many Central Asians, the ability of
Afghanistan to resist the Soviet invasion during the 1980s, showed it was possible for
Islamic communities to resist Russian domination in the 1990s (Akcali 1998), a
lesson being partly repeated through the continued resistance of the Taliban parts of
southern Afghanistan through 2005-2007. These patterns of local and transnational
identity have made it very difficult for the top-down approach of nation-building to be
applied in Central Asia, especially if religious and opposition are effectively excluded
a political voice (see further Akcali 2003). Likewise, for radical thinkers such as
Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) Muslims should constitute a jama'at, a
community rather than a nation, and as such 'secularism, nationalism and
democracy are the roots of calamities' (Johns & Lahoud 2005, p12). ). More
generally, for many Muslims living in troubled states there is a real tension between
religious and national identity.
3b. Islamic Views on Trade and Banking
The Islamic tradition has a generally positive view of trade, largely based on the
early history of Mohammed’s involvement in the Arabian caravan trade. The view of
Mecca as a major trading centre with direct connections onto the incense trade has
recently been challenged as invalid since Mecca is not directly on the incense route,
and since Mecca itself was only a centre for pilgrimage after the rise of Islam (Crone
1987, p196). This does not reduce the reality of some form of local caravan trade
being conducted between Mecca and southern Syria (Crone 1987, pp160-168).
Montgomery Watt suggests that in the 7th century Mecca had already established
a commercial network, with recorded winter caravans to the Yemen, and summer
caravans to Syria, along with relations with Abyssinia (Watt 1988, pp39-44; Qu'ran
106:2). Once Mohammed had established his role as the foremost prophet in Arabia,
this meant that both Mecca and Medina in turn became centres for pilgrimage and
trade, a trend which continued for over a thousand years (Crone 1987, p172; MeilinkRoelofsz 1962, p225). Pilgrimage and attendant trade in Mecca developed more
strongly after the rise of Islam (Crone 1987, pp173-177).
Even though Islamic morality is strongly opposed to usury (Udovitch 1970, pp61-62;
see further below), its demand for truth and honesty in contracts, oaths and
verbal agreements has meant that it is a religious ethic which aids the role of trade in
wealth generation for the community. The hadith tradition itself repeatedly
emphasises values such as 'acting justly, trustworthiness, diligence, perseverance,
23
initiative, creativity' (Ghazali 1996, p15). Likewise, good reputation and honest
conduct were essential for business activities such as the 'credit partnership', as found
in Hanafite law (Udovitch 1970, pp54-55). Therefore, in order to create a just, Islamic
economic system, it was necessary for many Islamic values, 'including honesty in
business dealings, faithfulness to contracts, and the duty of sharing with others' (Iqbal
& Mirakhor 1987, p23) to be internalised individually and enculturated within society
as a whole.
Islamic jurisprudence also readily allowed the creation of responsible and flexible
business partnerships which facilitated long-distance trading arrangements
(Udovitch 1970, p38), probably aiding the success of Muslim traders in long sea
voyages into the Indian Ocean and further eastwards (see further Chaudhuri 1990). In
particular, this included 'partnership and commenda contracts which were the two
basic legal instruments through which these economic functions could be
accomplished' (Udovitch 1970, p38; see also Meilink-Roelfofsz 1962, p296). The
commenda was particularly useful for investment in such trade:
The commenda is an arrangement in which an investor or group of investors entrusts
capital or merchandise to an agent-manager, who is to trade with it, and then return
to the investor(s) the principal and a previously agreed share of the profits. As a
reward for his labour, the agent receives the remaining share of the profits. Any loss
resulting from the exigencies of travel or from an unsuccessful business venture is
borne exclusively by the investor(s), the agent is in no way liable for a loss of this
nature, losing only his expended time and effort. (Udovitch 1970, p47)
Qurannic principles formed the basis of a virtual 'merchant law' designed to exclude
'unjustified enrichment', and reduce elements of chance in contracts (Udovitch
1970, p40; see further Attia 1986, pp101-102). The fourteenth century thinker Ibn
Khaldun (1332-1402) should argue that the most advanced form of sedentary
civilisation required mutual trade and cooperation, international trade and
economic growth (Mehmet 1990, pp82-83).
Islamic economic systems, including banks, investment houses and insurance
companies, are part of a broadly based Islamic revival in many parts of the world,
seeking to return Islam to a central social role in modern life (Esposito 1992, p23;
Ferguson 1996). Islamic banking is an area where different cultural systems have
interacted vigorously. Any Islamic institution must seek to correlate its activities
with the basic tenants of Islamic law, but due to the very changed economic
environment of the modern era, sustained debate has emerged on appropriate limits
of Islamic financial activities.
The main divergence between Islamic and Western economic systems is the rejection
of unfair interest in money lending (viewed as Usury, Riba) and an effort to
reconcile social justice with the needs of market economies, resulting in various
combinations of social intervention and planning alongside market mechanisms
(Kandil 1995; Khan & Mirakhor 1990, p353; Preley & Sessions 1994, p585). A
concise formulation of the interaction of Islamic conceptions of social justice with
the economy has been provided by John Presley and John Sessions: Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have equal opportunity and
does not imply that they should be equal in poverty or in riches . . . However, it is
incumbent on the Islamic state to guarantee a subsistence level to its citizens, that is
24
a minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Quran 2:2759). The major purpose is to moderate social variances within Islamic society, and to
enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life in dignity and
contentment. (Presley & Sessions 1994, p585)
No definite agreement has been reached on the difficult problem of whether
interest should be banned altogether, a view taken by many Islamic jurists, or
whether some sort of low interest rate indexed to inflation (Mehmet 1990) is
allowable under Islamic principles. Even within Islamic scholarship opinions vary. In
1995, for example, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheik Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, had
suggested that there was little real difference between fixed interest rates of Western
banks and the investment schemes offered by Islamic banks, a view not supported by
many traditional scholars (Evans 1995). For Muslims the key moral concern with
usury is that it often exploits the poor (Haque 1995, p1). As noted by Prof. Bob
McKeon at the University of Alberta: 'In static economies, it's extortionary to take any
interest from the needy. But in advanced economies, where concentration of capital
multiplies productivity, interest is no longer simple usury.' (in Woodward 1995)
Usury, Riba, seems to be based on the notion of unfair addition added to a loan in its
repayment (Mehmet 1990, p78). There are 20 injunctions against Riba in the Koran,
of which 2:275 is extremely clear where it states: 'But God has permitted trading and
made usury unlawful' (in Maurer 2005, p55). Ozay Mehmet suggests that it is,
'therefore, open to debate as to whether the Islamic prohibition refers to the interest
rate (as the opportunity cost of capital) or usury (as an unjustified extra value in
excess of the allowable opportunity cost of capital)' (Mehmet 1990, p78). On the other
hand, most Islamic scholars insist that any sort of set interest is forbidden under
Shariah, including any indirect advantage or benefits that might be owed to the lender
(Nienhause 1986, p3; Afzaal 1997; Nomani & Rahnema 1994, pp1-20). In general
terms, the aim seem to be to ensure that both the lender and debtor share risks and
uncertainty, and become more equalised in the transaction (Maurer 2005, p56).
Fortunately, a number of financial operations which do not involve interest at all,
and which work quite differently from the creation of debt, are open to Islamic banks.
These include Murabaha, where the 'bank buys the goods in question from suppliers
and delivers them to the customer at an agreed marked-up price', Mudaraba, where
money is invested for worthwhile projects in trade and commerce with some of the
profits returned to the investors (Inalcik 1994), and the bank receiving a management
fee, Musharaka, similar to normal joint ventures, Modaraba, a form of capital trust
financing (with the capital protected), and Ijara, similar to leasing.10 Mudaraba,
10
KHAN, Mohsin S. & MIRAKHOR, Abbas "Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and in Pakistan", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38, January 1990, p355; IQBAL,
Zubair & MIRAKHOR, Abbas Islamic Banking, Occasional Paper No. 49, Washington DC, IMF,
March 1987, pp3-4; PRESLEY, John R. & SESSIONS, John G. "Islamic Economics: The Emergence
of a New Paradigm", The Economic Journal, 104, May 1994, p587; WARREN, Peter M. "With a
Scholarly Touch, Citicorp Makes Its Pitch for Islamic Investors; Finance: Bank Counts on 'Guardians
of the Faith' to Make Sure Money is Handled in Accordance with Laws of the Koran", Los Angeles
Times, 11 August 1996, (Orange Country Edition, pD-9) [Electric Library, Internet Access];
NIENHAUS, Volker "Islamic Economics, Finance and Banking - Theory and Practice", in EL HELW,
Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp9-10;
ALTAMIMI, Younes "The Experience of Islamic Banks in the Middle East", in EL HELW, Mahmoud
(Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, p33; ALLAWI, Luay
"Leasing: An Islamic Financial Instrument", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and
Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp120-127. At least until 1990, it has been argued that many
25
profit sharing, and the business organisations built around the shirka (partnership)
were the bases of commercial trade in Muslims societies of the past (Haque 1995,
p129). In all these operations, some real service, good, or resource is transacted,
i.e. the bank provides some direct business function, and is not simply involved in
manipulating paper values. It was through these mechanisms that capital and traders
were brought together, sharing a set ratio of the profits of any venture, but not a set
rate of return on a principle sum invested. Risk and responsibility was also
distributed legally beforehand in these operations, depending on the type of
relationship between the different parties (Haque 1995, pp160-162).
In general, Muslim economic principles accept the notion of normal profits and the
operation of a generally free market, but are opposed to exploitative practices
based on interest, unfair profits, monopolies, oligopolies, hoarding, the sale of
future values of crops, and speculation (Mehmet 1990, p77). Certain types of
investment, e.g. in brewing or gambling, pork processing industries, or industries
associated with pornography prostitution, are also prohibited in Islamic thought, with
armaments industries and tobacco sometimes included in this list of prohibitions
(Maurer 2005, p62; Mustrull 1996; Mehmet 1990, p77; Allawi 1986, p122). Riba is
thus a much wider concept than just set interest on a loan, it includes a wide range of
economic activities which are conceived of as unjust, exploitative, or not offering a
fair balance between the parties involved in a transaction (Haque 1995, p168). It
must be stressed that this condemnation is not just on technical grounds: it is a
powerful moral argument that those who 'devour riba' are wicked, greedy and sinful
(Haque 1995, p8). From this point of view such persons deserve punishment since
they are destroying others and undermining their own communities.
There has sometimes been an unwillingness to see a distinction between interest on
loans and shared profits or dividends from investments, but this distinction between
interest and shared profit systems is not just a matter of semantics or clever
accounting (Maurer 2005, p57; Economist 1993;Ingram 1986, p54; Carlson 1986,
p79). Although these criticisms might be valid in some particular cases, there are
substantive reasons not to be dismissive of the role of the Islamic economic
institutions globally. There are four immediate reasons which suggest that Islamic
economic institutions will remain important. Firstly, for Muslims globally, many
of whom are seeking to retain the heart of Islamic belief during periods of rapid
industrialisation and modernisation, there is in fact a huge global market for a
religiously acceptable and culturally compatible form of banking. In the past, some
observing Muslims have either had to refuse interest on conventional bank accounts,
to donate such interest to a charity, or to rely on investing in stocks directly (Mastrull
1996). Recent estimates suggest that Islamic banks globally have assets of over $60
billion, and are actively involved in infrastructure development, with total financial
Islamic banks often in fact rely on short-term trade financing, since mudaraba and musharaka involve
'an unusually close and trusting association between the bank and the borrower', MOORE, Clement
Henry "Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey", Middle East Journal,
44 no. 2, Spring 1990, pp234-235. For other permitted types of loan and investment structures, see
KHAN, Mohsin S. & MIRAKHOR, Abbas "Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and in Pakistan", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38, January 1990, pp355-356.
Islamic Banks have also used Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) investment schemes to some extend,
though this does expose the bank to greater risk, NIENHAUS, Volker "Islamic Economics, Finance
and Banking - Theory and Practice", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and
Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp9-11.
26
assets of Islamic Banks and companies in 2005 at $250 billion 'not including
Islamic investment funds and insurance' (BNA 2006b; Mardini 1996; Warren 1996;
Aziz 1997). Private-sector commercial banks offering these services have greatly
expanded since the opening of the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975 (Moore 1990, p235).
It has been estimated that there from the mid-1990s some 300 Islamic banks and
financial institutions have been operating in 25-40 countries (Mardini 1996;
Warren 1996). Islamic banking has grown rapidly recently and although at first
mainly located in the Middle East, Africa, South and South-East Asia, this tradition
has now spread to North America, Europe, Central Asia (Mardini 1996; Kamaludin
1989; Khalaf 1995, p35; Al Bahar 1996), and Australia.
This growth has meant that even traditional Western banks are willing to open
Islamic branches, e.g. in July 1996 Citibank opened such a branch in Bahrain (Citi
Islamic Investment Bank), with the Netherlands' largest bank, ABN Amro, following
suit later in 1996.11 In the Citibank case, special Sharia boards will oversee
investment schemes to ensure they confirm to religious requirements (Warren 1996).
Bearing in mind the growth of Islam globally, and the continuing economic
development that is occurring in much of the Middle East, South and South-East Asia,
this area of banking is likely to continue to grow. Such Islamic assets in the 1990s
have been growing on a global basis at 10-15% annually, while total assets for
Banks (outside of companies) rose in 2005 from $ 61 to 85 billion, marking a 35%
increase rate (BNA 2005b; Khalaf 1995; Straits Times 1996), and are likely to
become an important element of the global financial system.
Although US and Canadian institutions are not all fully compliant with Shariah rules,
and there has been greater scrutiny of such funds and informal money transfer
systems (hawala) since 2001 (Maurer 2005, pp59-60; Abuza 2003; Parker 2006),
they have made efforts at accommodating these Islamic markets and funds,
including large institutions such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and
Bank of America (Parker 2006). In the past, such informal transfer systems and
Islamic aid agencies had be view as transnational conduits for terrorist funding,
especially by Al Qaeda in the 1990s (Gunaratna 2002).
In developing countries, of course, there is a possibility that segments of the
population remain trapped in real poverty or development lags. These trends
suggest that alternative economic systems, which do not reject the notion of social
justice as an external economic cost, may have a major role to play in aiding social
cohesion and distributed economic development. At the community level, Islamic
banks or credit unions can provided a needed source of 'social investment'. Islamic
banking can therefore provide a focus for communally-based financial
operations. Islamic banking can also provide more affordable ways for ordinary
people to buy homes, utilising interest-free credit unions. The scheme is for
prospective house buyers to pay into a fund, receiving the entire amount for their
11
WARREN, Peter M. "With a Scholarly Touch, Citicorp Makes Its Pitch for Islamic Investors;
Finance: Bank Counts on 'Guardians of the Faith' to Make Sure Money is Handled in Accordance with
Laws of the Koran", Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1996, (Orange Country Edition, pD-9) [Electric
Library, Internet Access]. In fact major Western banks have been helping channel excess liquidity from
Islamic banks into non-interest based investment for some years, with an estimated 10% of Islamic
funds being channelled into major Western banks, KHALAF, Roula "Banking the Islamic Way", World
Press Review, January 1995, p35.
27
house 'when their turn comes up, and keep paying until the fund is reimbursed'
(Woodward 1995). Other possible uses for this type of 'social lending' include
financing student education (Ingram 1996). Of course, Islamic banks or credit unions
would be prohibited from taking over or refinancing existing interest-based debt: they
are not a source of 'free money'. At the same time, moreover, interest-free banking
of this type could be attractive not just to Muslims, but also to Christians and Jews
who strictly follow prohibitions against usury in their own traditions.12
Islamic banking may offer opportunities to specific countries in the South Asian,
Asia-Pacific and Afro-Middle Eastern regions. Malaysia in particular, with it
developed economic and communication infrastructure, combined with its
understanding of Islamic realities, has provided a major service in helping further
develop Islamic banking in South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, and
the Middle East, and in the developed nations with Islamic populations. Malaysia has
had experience with Islamic banks since 1981, and has also been active in the creation
of an Islamic insurance company, an Islamic Economic Development Foundation and
IKIM, the Institute of Islamic Understanding, and an Islamic University (Camroux
1996). Malaysia has developed a sizeable Islamic banking sector, a true Islamic
interbank market, and strong international operations being developed on the island of
Labuan, an international offshore financial centre, IOFC (Aziz 1997; Khalaf 1995).
There are several opportunities for this international role to be extended. Malaysia
was given the brief to develop Islamic banking and insurance within the D8
organisation, a grouping of Islamic states designed to cooperate with each other and
act as a parallel organisation to the G8. The D8, launched in June 1997, includes
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, and aims
'to develop trade, industry and financial projects’ (Butler 1995). Within this
organization each country has been given areas for special attention, with Indonesia
focusing on human resources, while Malaysia focused 'on privatization, banking and
Islamic insurance' (Butler 1997). The Declaration of the D8 stressed the need for
development and the eradication of poverty. The group also noted that ‘old policies of
double standards, discrimination and oppression have continued and in some cases
intensified’ and ‘the insufficient share of our economies in the global trade activities
as well as the inadequate role of our countries in the global economic decisionmaking’ (D8 Declaration 1997). The fifth D8 Summit was held in Bali in 2006,
with poverty and energy issues being central issues discussed, with dialogue on
'lowering trade barriers and boosting economic cooperation' and Iran's nuclear
program (News Agency Qatar 2006; Radio Australia 2006). Malaysia, with its careful
positioning of an important but not dominant role for Islam within its multicultural
state, has been well suited to develop Islamic banking in this wider regional context.
The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), founded in Jeddah in 1974 by 37 Islamic
countries, and active in some 45 countries or more, has played an active role in 'cofinancing projects, trade financing, equity participation, promoting training and
12
Both religions were originally deeply opposed to interest on loans, e.g. in the Middle Ages Christians
were not supposed to be involved in money lending. However, by the early modern period,
justifications were found to step around this regulation, HAQUE, Ziaul Riba: The Moral Economy of
Usury, Interest and Profit, Kuala Lumpur, Ikraq, 1995, p169. The ability to raise and use capital, of
course, was one of the pre-requisites for the capitalist age, and for the great trading expeditions that
spread around the world from the 16th century onwards. Put another way, the West decided to legally
regulate interest on loans, rather than ban it.
28
research in the fields of Islamic banking and economics' (Altamimi 1986, p31; see
also El Helw 1986), using a multilateral approach and Islamic principles. From 2005,
the IDB has developed a future vision statement looking toward major poverty
reduction in Muslim countries through till 2020 (News Agency Emirate 2005).
However, the IDB has taken up a very wide scope of activities, as can be seen by a
selected sample of their activities and meetings through 2005-2006, perhaps
indicating an over-ambitious agenda.
IDB Events 2005-2006 (modified from http://www.isdb.org/english_docs/idb_home/news.php)
08/07/2006
02/07/2006
26/06/2006
20/06/2006
15/06/2006
29/05/2006
14/05/2006
10/05/2006
08/05/2006
27/04/2006
10/04/2006
09/04/2006
01/04/2006
25/03/2006
15/03/2006
14/03/2006
21/12/2005
01/10/2005
Moody's Investors' Service Assigns Aaa Long-Term and Prime-1 Issuer Ratings to
the Islamic Development Bank
Workshop on Capacity Building in Facilitation of Trade and Investment
Workshop on "Capacity Building for Facilitation of Trade and Investment for OIC
member countries"
Speech Delivered by RT Hon Gordon Brown MP, The Chancellor of the Exchequer,
HM Govt., UK, at the Islamic Finance and Trade conference 2006, London
Chancellor of the Exchequer Announces UK to Become Gateway for Islamic Trade
And Finance
Islamic Development Bank Provides Urgent Relief Assistance to Indonesia for
Victims of the Java Earthquake
Proclamation of the Three Academic Research Institutions and Centres that Won the
IDB 1427/2006 Prize for Science and Technology
IDB support for infrastructure projects in Pakistan
Proclamation of the Winners of the 1427H/2006 IDB Prize for Women's
Contribution to Development
US$ 36 Million from IDB for University Reconstruction in Indonesia
IDB Extend US$ 10 million For trade financing operation in favor of Tunisia
IDB Manages Islamic Financing to Rabigh Refinery & Petrochemical Project in
Saudi Arabia
Yemeni Trade and Industry Minister seeks IDB assistance for joining WTO
HRH Prince of Wales Endorses the Establishment of Youth Enterprise Programmes
in IDB Member Countries .
IDB Allocates US$ 103 Million for Combating Bird Flu in affected Member
Countries
The Islamic Development Bank Extends US$ 52 Million for Two Development
Projects in Lebanon
The Islamic Development Bank 1440H Vision Commission Finalizes Vision
Document
The Islamic Development Bank conducts a regional vision workshop for member
countries in Africa
There have also been efforts to harmonise international Islamic banking, shariah
commitments, and international banking rules via a review process, conducted by
liaison among groups such as the OIC, and the Bahrain-located Accounting and
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, AAOIFI (Maurer 2005, p60),
the Islamic Financial Services Board,13 and the IDB: 13
The IFSB describes itself as ' The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) , which is based in Kuala
Lumpur, was officially inaugurated on 3rd November 2002 and started operations on 10th March 2003.
It serves as an international-standard setting body of regulatory and supervisory agencies that have
vested interest in ensuring the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry, which
is defined broadly to include banking, capital market and insurance. In advancing this mission, the
IFSB promotes the development of a prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry
through introducing new, or adapting existing international standards consistent with Islamic Shari'ah
principles, and recommend them for adoption. To this end, the work of the IFSB complements that of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organization of Securities Commissions
29
Approving a product for Islamic banking purposes is a laborious affair that
can take up to two years. Researchers are commissioned to examine a paper on
the subject. This finding is then discussed by up to five members of the Sharia
board supervising the given institution. They will accept, amend or reject the
paper.
The board will then refer it to another Sharia committee who will review it in
conjunction with the person who originally launched the inquiry.
Next a board of 15 scholars, who meet twice a year in Mecca and Medina, will
undertake a further review. The outcome is then reviewed by the entire industry
from bankers to legal bodies across all the Islamic states. . . . (Watts & Gamazo
2006)
Islamic Banking and other services could provide another needed area of trade
and investment in underdeveloped regions. Here we see the meeting of modern
economic cultures (accounting, communication and investment systems) with the
demands of the traditional Islamic economic system. Furthermore, the
enhancement of linkages in the region via Islamic Banking is likely to further
strengthen regional trade and investment, Here, the development of culturally
compatible forms of banking could help mobilise more savings and act as a source
of funds to allow further regional development and investment.
4. Conclusion: Innovation, Reform and Conflict
As we have seen, there has been considerable innovation in making modern
institutions, from elective democracy to modern banking, more compatible with
Islamic norms. However, with current relative failures in some states with Islamic
populations, and the limited accountability of others, its remains to be seen whether
these nations will meet the need of the wider ummah. Fortunately, radical utopian
projects such as a revitalised caliphate seem to have limited resonance with modern
Muslim populations. In this area, both hard and soft power options, including
breaking down cultural prejudices and building new patterns of trust (Effendy 2007),
are needed to reduce ideologist conflicts that are being played out globally but are
inflamed by local conflicts, e.g. in Palestine, Somalia, and Central Asia. We can
question, however, whether the international system is responsive enough to meet
the deeper aspirations of almost one quarter of the global population.
5. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading
Resources
The Islamic Development Bank group, a 'multilateral development financing institution,
established to foster social and economic development of it's member countries and
Muslim communities world-wide', has its homepage at http://www.isdb.org/
Basic information on the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) can be found at
http://www.icci-oic.org/oi/1.htm and http://www.oic-un.org/
and
the
International
Association
http://www.ifsb.org/index.php?ch=2&pg=1&ac=1].
30
of
Insurance
Supervisors'[
Al Nakhlah is a useful, free, on-line journal on Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs,
provided by the Fletcher School, Tufts University, located via
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/
A range of critical views on Islam in world affairs can be found at the Hudson Institute,
located at http://www.hudson.org/
Further Reading
AHMED, Akbar S. Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization, N.Y., Brookings
Institution, 2007
ALI, Tariq The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, London, Verso,
2002
BARNES, Cedric & HASSAN, Harun The Rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts,
Chatham House Briefing Paper, Africa Program, AFP BP 07/02, April 2007
[www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf]
ESPOSITO, John The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1992
NATHAN, K.S. & KAMALI, Mohammad Hashim (eds) Islam in Southeast Asia: Political,
Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005
JOHNS, Anthony H. & LAHOUD, Nelly (eds) Islam in World Politics, London,
Routledge, 2005
KINYON, Rebecca "Osama bin-Laden: Legitimate within Islamic Legal Thought?", al
Nakhlah,
Spring
2004,
pp1-5
[Internet
access
via
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/]
Bibliography and Further Research
ABC "Fierce Afghanistan battles 'kill more than 100", ABC News Online, 19 June 2007a [Access via
http://abc.net.au/]
ABC "Afghan President Dismisses Taliban Threat", ABC News Online, 22 June 2007b [Access via
http://abc.net.au/]
ABC “AU Begins Somalia Peacekeeping Patrols”, ABC News Online, May 2007c 2007b [Access via
http://abc.net.au/]
ABUZA, Zachary "Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: the financial network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 2, August 2003, pp169-199
AGUIRRE, Mariano "Guerres de civilisations?", Le Monde Diplomatique, (Internet Access),
Décembre 1994
AHMAD, Zailani "Only 22 Deviant Groups Because of Rehab Plan", The Star, 6 July 1997 [Internet Access]
AHMED, Nazeer Islam in Global History: From the Death of Prophet Muhammed to the First World War, 2 vols.,
Concord, American Institute of Islamic History and Culture, 2000
AKCALI, Pinar "Islam as a 'Common Bond' in Central Asia: Islam Renaissance Party and the Afghan Mujahidin",
Central Asian Survey, 17 no. 2, 1998, pp267-284
AKCALI Pinar "III. Nation-State Building in Central Asia: A lost Case?", Perspectives on Global Development &
Technology, 2 no. 3-4, 2003, pp409-429 [Access via Ebsco Database]
AL-ATTAS, Syed Naguib "Islamic Culture in Malaysia", in ALISJAHBANA, S. Takdir et al. (eds.) The Cultural
Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Society of
Orientalists, 1965, pp123-130
AL-ATTAS, Syed Naguib Some Aspects of Sufism As Understood Among the Malays, Singapore, Malaysian
Sociological Research Institute Ltd., 1963
AL BAHAR, Adnan "An Overview of Developments and Potential in Islamic Banking and Finance", International
Investor, Islamic Banking & Finance Conference London, 22 April 1996 [Internet Access:
http://www.tiikwt.com:80/education/potential_index.htm]
AL-GHAZALI Deliverance from Error, translated in WATT, William Montgomery (trans.) The Faith and
Practice of Al-Ghazali, Oxford, Oneworld, 1994, pp17-92
AL-HUJWIRI, Ali B. Uthman Al-Jullabi The Hashf Al-Mahjub: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism, trans.
Reynold Nicholson, London, Luzac and Company, 1976
31
ALI, S. Husin "A Note on Malay Society and Culture", in ALISJAHBANA, S. Takdir et al. (eds.) The
Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian
Society of Orientalists, 1965, pp65-74
ALISJAHBANA, S. Takdir "The Confluence and Conflict of Culture in Malaysia in a World Perspective", in
ALISJAHBANA, S. Takdir et al. (eds.) The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast
Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Society of Orientalists, 1965, pp20-39
ALISJAHBANA, S. Takdir et al. (eds.) The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Society of Orientalists, 1965
ALI, Tariq The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, London, Verso, 2002
ALLAWI, Luay "Leasing: An Islamic Financial Instrument", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic
Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp120-127
ALTAMIMI, Younes "The Experience of Islamic Banks in the Middle East", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman)
Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp28-42
APUNYU, Bonny "Pakistan: Muslim clerics honour Osama bin Laden", SomaliNet News, June 22, 2007
[http://somalinet.com/news/world/World/11307]
ARKIN,
William
"The
Caliphate
Scare",
Washingtonpost.com,
June
2007
[Access
via
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/]
Associated Press, "al Qaida No. 2: Get Set to Fill Iraq Void", Netscape News, 11th October, 2005 [Internet Access]
Associated Press “Somalia's parliament speaker says much-delayed peace conference will go on”, 3 June 2007
Associated Press of Pakistan "International Contact Group on Somalia calls for advancing political process", 6
June 2007 [Access via http://www.app.com.pk/en/]
ATTIA, Gamal "Financial Instruments Used by Islamic Banks", EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman)
Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp101-119
AVELING, Harry (ed.) The Development of Indonesian Society: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day,
Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1979
AZIZ, Azlina "BIMB's Offshore Banking Subsidiary to Operate Next Month", The Star, 18 June 1997
[Internet Access]
AZRA, Azyumardi The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and
Middle Eastern 'Ulama' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Sydney & Honolulu, Allen &
Unwin and University of Hawai'I Press, 2004
AZRA, Azyumardi "Islamic Thought: Theory, Concepts and Doctrines in the Context of Southeast Asian Islam",
in NATHAN, K.S. & KAMALI, Mohammad Hashim (eds) Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social
and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005, pp3-21
BADAWI, Samir T. "Accounting Policies and Procedures", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking
and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp86-100
BALJON, Johannes M.S. "Islam in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan", in ARBERRY, A.J. (ed.)
Religion in the Middle East: Three Religions in Concord and Conflict, Cambridge, CUP,
1969, Vol. 2, pp119-144
BARNES, Cedric & HASSAN, Harun The Rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts, Chatham
House Briefing Paper, Africa Program, AFP BP 07/02, April 2007 [Access via
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf]
BBC, "'New al-Qaeda Tape' Is Released", BBC News, 2 October 2004 [Internet Access]
BHATIA, Umej "The Sea Speaks Arabic", History Today, 55 no. 5, May 2005, pp12-14
BNA "Numbers of pilgrims from abroad in 75 years", News Agency, Bahrain, Jan 11, 2006 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
BNA "Title: Islamic banking growing importance", News Agency, Bahrain, May 28, 2006b [Access via
Ebsco Database]
BORGU, Aldo & FEALY, Greg Local Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia, Canberra, ASPI, 28
September 2005
BOWRING, Philip “The Anwar Doctrine”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 June 1991, pp55-56
BUMILLER, Elisabeth "White House Letter: Watchword of the day - Beware the Caliphate", International Herald
Tribune, 11 December 2005 [Internet access via
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/11/news/letter.php]
BURNS, David J. & BRADY, John T. “Retail Ethics as Appraised by Future Business Personnel in
Malaysia . . .”, Journal of Consumer Affairs, 1996 [Electric Library, Internet Access]
BUTLER, Daren "Beleaguered Erbakan Hosts Muslim Eight's Summit", Reuters, 14 June 1995 [Electric Library,
Internet Access]
BUTLER, Daren "Muslim Nations Declare cooperation at D8 Summit", Reuters, 15 June 1997
[Electric Library, Internet Access]
CALDWELL, Christopher "The Crescent and the Tricolor", Atlantic Monthly, 286 Issue 5, November
2000 [Access via Ebsco Database]
CAMROUX, David "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation, Co-Option and
Confrontation", Asian Survey, 36 no. 9, September 1996, pp852-868
CARLSON, Terrence L. "Legal Issues and Negotiations", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic
Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp69-85
32
CASE, William “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy”, in ALAGAPPA, Muthiath (ed.)
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1995, pp69-107
CHAUDHURI, K. N. Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam
to 1750, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990
COCHRANE, Joe "'Bin Laden Is a Hero': Abu Bakar Bashir looks like a gentle cleric. But his words are chilling,
and investigators believe he leads a terror network", Newsweek, Oct 28, 2002, p32
CRITTENDEN, Stephen & FERGUSON, Niall "Niall Ferguson on Islam and demographics", The Religion
Report,
(Interview
Transcript)
29
March
2006
[Internet
Access
via
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport/stories/2006/1603430.htm# ]
CRONE, Patricia Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987
CROUCH, Harold "Political Update 2002: Struggling to Maintain Momentum", in ASPINALL, Edward &
FEALY, Greg (eds) Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation,
Singapore, ISEAS, 2003, pp15-34
DAWOOD, N.J. (Interpreter) The Koran, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1993
“D-8
Declaration”,
Muslimedia
International,
http://www.au.malaysia.net/muslimedia/]
2
July
1997
[Internet
Access:
Declaration of Jihad (Holy War) Against the Country's Tyrants: Military Series (Al Qaeda Training Manual), UK
translated document posted on United States Department of Justice Website, Accessed 2005 [Internet
Access via http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm]
DI MEGLIO, Rita R. "Arab Trade with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula from the 8th to the 16th
Century", in RICHARDS, D.S. (ed.) Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford,
Bruno Cassirer, 1970, pp105-135
DIWAN, Ramesh "WTO, MAI and National Interest", Indolink Analysis, 1997 [Internet Access]
DIWAN, Ramesh "Globalization: Myth vs. Reality", Indolink Analysis, 1997 [Internet Access]
Economist "For God and GDP", The Economist, 7 August 1993, p35
Economist "A Failed State that Threatens the Region: Somalia", 7 April 2007a [Access via Infotrac Expanded
Academic]
Economist "America's Friend: Uganda", 17 March 2007b [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
Economist "No Peace, More Terror; Somalia", 2 June 2007c [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
EFFENDI, Bahtiar “Putting All Cards on the Table: Trust and Soft Power in the War on Terror”, RSIS
Commentaries, 63/2007, 18 June 2007
EGAN, Colleen "Ocean Rim Forum May Open $300bn Trade: Evans", Australian, 12 June 1995a, p3
EGAN, Colleen "S Africa Rejects Evans Security Motion", Australian, 13 June 1995, p2
EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986
ESPOSITO, John The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992
ESPOSITO, John "Beyond the Green Menace", MSANEWS, (16-5-1996), reposted from Current History, (Internet
Source), January 1994
EVANS, Dominic "Egypt's Mufti Creates Stir by Backing Interest", Reuters, 30 May 1995 [Electric
Library, Internet Access]
FARRELL, Karen "Arab Spice Trade and Spread of Islam: SPICE Case", TED Case Studies, no. 334, June 1996
[Internet Source. http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/SPICE.HTM]
FERGUSON,
Niall
"Eurabia",
Hoover
Digest,
no.
3,
2004
[Access
via
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3020481.html]
FERGUSON, R. James Meeting on the Road: Cosmopolitan Islamic Culture and the Politics of Sufism, Bond
University, The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Research Paper no. 4, December
1996
FORBES, Cameron "World Bank Strives to Avoid Dark Scenarios", Australian, 15 June 1998, p44
FRADKIN, Hillel "Recent Statements of Islamist Ideology: Bin Laden and Zarqawi Speak", in FRADKIN, Hillel,
HAQQANI, Husain, BROWN, Eric (eds) Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume I, Washington,
Hudson Institute, 2005, pp5-11
FRADKIN, Hillel, HAQQANI, Husain, BROWN, Eric (eds) Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume I,
Washington, Hudson Institute, 2005
FRANCK, Irene & BROWNSTONE, David The Silk Road: A History, N.Y., Facts on File Publications, 1986
FRANK, Andre G. "The World Economic System in Asia before European Hegemony", The Historian, 56 no. 2,
Winter 1994, pp259-276
FULLER, Graham E. "Islam, A Force for Change", Le Monde diplomatique, September 1999 [Internet Access]
FULLER, Graham The Future of Political Islam, N.Y., Palgrave, 2003
FULLER, Graham E. & LESSER, Ian O. A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Boulder,
Westview Press, 1995
GELLNER, Ernest Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1994
GERNER, Deborah J. "Islamic Revivalism and International Politics", Mershon International Studies
Review, 40 Supplement 1, April 1996, pp104-109
GHAZALI, Aidit Haji A Study of Industrialisation: From the Qur'an, The Sunnah and the Islamic Civilisation,
Kuala Lumpur, Institut Perkembangan Minda, 1996
GUNARATNA, Rohan Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 2002
33
GUPTA, Ashin Das "Trade and Politics in 18th Century India", in RICHARDS, D.S. (ed.) Islam and the Trade of
Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1970, pp181-214
GUPTA, Ranjan "Members' Diversity Creates Problems for New Trade Bloc", Weekend Australian, 18-19
February 1995a, p18
GUPTA, Shekhar India Redefines its Role, Adelphi Paper 293, London, IISS, 1995b
HAGHAYEGHI, Mehrdad "Changing Dynamics of Islamic Politics in Central Asia", Muslim World, 92 no 3/4,
Fall 2002, pp315-331 [Access via Ebsco Database]
HANEEF, Mohamed Aslam Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought: A Selected Comparative
Analysis, Kuala Lumpur, 1995
HANLEY, David “French Politics in the Twenty-First Century: Invention or Muddling Through?”, in MILNER,
Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003, pp21-34
HAQQANI, Husain "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups", in FRADKIN, Hillel, HAQQANI, Husain,
BROWN, Eric (eds) Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume I, Washington, Hudson Institute,
2005, pp12-26
HAQUE, Ziaul Riba: The Moral Economy of Usury, Interest and Profit, Kuala Lumpur, Ikraq, 1995
HEFNER, Robert W. " Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization", Sociology of Religion, Winter, 2001
[Internet Access via www.findarticles.com].
HOSEN, Nadirsyah "Religion and the Indonesian constitution: a recent debate", Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, 36 no. 3, Oct 2005, pp419-440 [Access via Infotrac Database]
HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp22-49
HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, N.Y., Simon &
Schuster, 1996
IHSANOGLU, Ekmeleddin (ed.) History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation, Istanbul, Research Centre
for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), 2001
INALCIK, Halil The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, London, Phoenix, 1994
INGRAM, Tim "Islamic Banking: A Foreign Bank's View", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking
and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp53-68
IQBAL, Zubair & MIRAKHOR, Abbas Islamic Banking, Occasional Paper No. 49, Washington DC, IMF, March
1987
IRVING, Mark "West To Nurture Economic Links with 11 Nations", Australian, 13 June 1995, p2
ISMAEL, Jacqueline S. & ISMAEL, Tareq Y. "Cultural Perspectives on Social Welfare in the Emergence of
Modern Arab Social Thought", The Muslim World, 85 no. 1-2, January-April 1995, pp82-106
ISSAWI, Charles "The Decline of Middle Eastern Trade, 1100-1850", in RICHARDS, D.S. (ed.) Islam and the
Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1970, pp245-266
JAMIL, Sofiah “The OIC’s Journey to Enlightenment”, RSIS Commentaries, 57/2007, 7 June 2007
JOHNS, Anthony H. & LAHOUD, Nelly (eds) Islam in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2005
JUS News Desk “Al-Zawahri “We Must work on Four Fronts”, 7 March 2006 [Internet Access via
www.jihadunspun.com/]
KADETSKY, Elizabeth "Small Loans, Big Dreams", Working Women, 20 no. 2, February 1995,
pp46-53 [Internet Access to Infotrac SearchBank].
KAMALUDIN, S. "Partners in Profit", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 November 1989, p72
KANDIL, Magda "Review of NOMANI & RAHNEMA, Islamic Economic Systems", Ethnic New Watch,30
April 1995 [Electronic Library, Internet Access]
KEARNY, Simon & WALTERS, Patrick "SE Asian Muslims Turn to Radicals", Australian, 29 September 2005,
p4
KELLY, Marjorie "Microlending Shows Capitalism at Humane, Life-Affirming Best", Star Tribune, 27 January
1997 [Internet Access to Electric Library]
KENNEDY, Hugh The Court of the Caliphs: When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World, London, Phoenix, 2004
KHALAF, Roula "Banking the Islamic Way", World Press Review, January 1995, p35
KHAN, Mohsin S. & MIRAKHOR, Abbas "Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in
Pakistan", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38, January 1990, pp353-375
KHANDKER, Shahidur Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability, Washington, World Bank,
1995
KHORASANI, Rajaei "Democracy in an Islamic System", Echo of Islam (Tehran), No. 118, April 1994, pp24-26
KIBBLE, David G. "Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism", Al-Saud House Website, (Internet Source), 1996
KINYON, Rebecca "Osama bin-Laden: Legitimate within Islamic Legal Thought?", al Nakhlah, Spring 2004,
pp1-5 [Internet access via http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/]
KOHUT, John & CHENG, Allen T. “Return of the Merchant Mandarins”, Asia, Inc. Online, February 1996
[Internet Access]
KUMAR, Ann "Developments in Four Societies Over the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries", in AVELING, Harry
(Ed.) The Development of Indonesian Society: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, Brisbane,
University of Queensland Press, 1979, pp1-44
LEWIS, Bernard "The Roots of Muslim Rage", Atlantic Monthly, 266 no. 3, September 1990, pp47-60
LEWIS, Bernard From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004
MACFARQUHAR, Emily "A Banking Lesson from Bangladesh", U.S. News & World Report, 3 April
1995 [Internet Access to Electric Library].
34
MACKERRAS, Colin Eastern Asia: An Introductory History, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1992
MAHATHIR, Mohamad “Islamic Development Bank Seminar: Speech by the Prime Minister at the Opening
Ceremony of the Seminar Entitled ‘Developing a System of Islamic Financial Instruments’
at
the
Islamic Centre, Kuala Lumpur, on April 28, 1986”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 19 no. 2, June 1986, pp1822
MAHATHIR, Mohamad “Seminar on Islamic Thoughts: Speech by Prime Minister Dato Seri Dr Mahathir
Mohamad at the Opening of the 3rd International Seminar on Islamic Thoughts at Kuala Lumpur on July
26, 1984”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 17 no. 3, September 1984, pp226-231
MAHBUBANI, Kishore “The Pacific Way”, Foreign Affairs, 74 no.1, January/February 1995, pp100-111
MANSEL, Philip Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997
MANSURNOOR, Iik Arifin Islam in An Indonesia World: Ulama of Madura, Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada
University Press, 1990
MARDINI, Ahmad "Gulf-Business: Islamic Banks Cash in On Emerging Economies", Inter Press Service
English New Wire, 26 November 1996 [Electric Library, Internet Access]
MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic
Books, 2004
MARTIN, Hans-Peter The Global Trap, London, Zed, 1997
MASTRULL, Diane "Muslim Credit Union Will Open on Second St.", Philadelphia Business Journal, 15, 4
December 1996 [Electric Library, Internet Access]
MAURER, Bill "Reformatting the Economy: Islamic Banking and Finance in World Politics", JOHNS, Anthony
H. & LAHOUD, Nelly (eds) Islam in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2005, pp54-66
MAYER, Ann Elizabeth Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995
McAMIS, Robert Day Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, Grand
Rapids, William B Eerdmans Publishing, 2002
McDONALD, W. Wesley "Osama bin Laden's Forerunner", World and I, 17 no. 6, June 2002 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
McDOUGALL, Derek “Indian Ocean Regionalism: Perspectives from Mauritius, The Seychelles and
Réunion”, The Round Table, 341, January 1997, pp53-66
MEHMET, Ozay Islamic Identity and Development Studies of the Islamic Periphery, London, Routledge, 1990
MEILINK-ROELOFSZ, M.A.P. Asian Trade and European Influence In the Indonesian ArchipelagoBetween
1500 and About 1630, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962
MEILINK-ROELOFSZ, M.A.P. "Trade and Islam in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago Prior to the Arrival of the
Europeans", in RICHARDS, D.S. (ed.) Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford, Bruno
Cassirer, 1970, pp137-157
MILES, Donna "Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behaviour at Guantanamo Bay", American Forces Information
Service,
29
June
2005
[Internet
Access
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/20050629_1901.html ]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia “A Week in the Horn of Africa”, 4 April 2007 [Access via
www.mfa.gov.et]
MITTON, Roger "Speaking Out Again: Mahathir Calls for a Review of Islamic Law", Asiaweek, 9 August 1996
[Internet Access]
MOISO, Dominique "Chirac of France: A New Leader of the West?", Foreign Affairs, 74 no. 6,
November/December 1995, pp8-13
MONSHIPOURI, Mahmood "Islamic Thinking and the Internationalization of Human Rights", The
Muslim World, 84 no. 2-3, July-October 1994, pp217-239
MOORE, Clement Henry "Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey",
Middle East Journal, 44 no. 2, Spring 1990, pp234-255
MOORE, Subithra "Grameen Bank: Empowerment and Dependency for Women in Bangladesh", in
ISMAEL, Jacqueline & HILL, Enid (eds.) Social Welfare and Social Development: Asian
Experiences, Calgary, Detselig Enterprises, 1997, pp45-60
MOREWAGAE, Boitumelo et al. "Access to Credit for Non-Formal Micro-Enterpreises in Botwsana",
Journal of Development Studies, 31 no. 3, February 1995, pp481-503 [Internet Access to
Infotrac SearchBank]
MORRIS, Benny "The Future of Hamas: Alms and Arms", New Republic, 8 July 2006 [Internet Access via
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20060710&s=morris071006]
MILNER, Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003
MIRE, Amina "Grim Future: Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia Has US Fingerprints", New Internationalist, 398,
March 2007, p23 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
MUDAWI, Al Bagkir "The Placing of Medium and Long Term Finance by Islamic Financial Institutions", in EL
HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp128-140
MUDDATHIR, 'Abd Al-Rahim The Development of Fiqh In the Modern Muslim World, Kuala Lumpur, IKIM,
1996
NANDA, Prakash "14 Nations will Form Indian Ocean Group - India Will Be Key Member", The Times of India
News Service, 3 March 1997 [Internet Access]
35
NARAYANAN, Suresh "Fiscal Reform in Malaysia: Behind a Successful Experience", Asian Survey, 36 no. 9,
September 1996, pp869-881
NAYAGAM, Xavier S. Thani "Ideas and Values Common to South and Southeast Asian Cultures",
in
ALISJAHBANA, S. Takdir et al. (eds.) The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast
Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Society of Orientalists, 1965, pp80-89
NASR, Seyyed Hossein Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization, N.Y., Harper San Francisco, 2003
NATHAN, K.S. & KAMALI, Mohammad Hashim (eds) Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic
Challenges for the 21st Century, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005
New Agency Qatar "Iran S President And Leaders From Seven Other Predominantly Muslim Nations", 12 May
2006 [Access via Ebsco Database]
News Agency Emirates "Wipe Out Poverty in Islamic World", December 23, 2005 [Access via Ebsco Database]
NIENHAUS, Volker "Islamic Economics, Finance and Banking - Theory and Practice", in EL HELW,
Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp1-17
NOMANI, Farhad & RAHNEMA, Ali Islamic Economic Systems, London, Zed Books, 1994
NORDLAND, Rod "John Holmes: 'Not Absolutely' Normal: This is the Worst Single Displacement of People this
Year Anywhere in the World", Newsweek International, 28 May 2007 [Access via Infotrac Expanded
Academic]
OLESEN, Asta Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, Richmond, Curzon Press, 1995
PARKER, Mushtak "Muslim money still talks in America', The Times (United Kingdom), 26 April 2006 [Access
via Ebsco Database]
PENNELL, C.R. Morocco: From Empire to Independence, Oxford, Oneworld, 2003
PIERRE, Andrew & QUANDT, William B. "Algeria's War on Itself", Foreign Policy, 99, Summer 1995, pp131148
PIPES, Daniel "The Muslims Are Coming! The Muslims Are Coming!", National Review, 19 November 1990,
pp28-31
PIPES, Daniel "There Are No Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist Islam", The National Interest, Fall 1995,
pp48-57
PIRIO, Gregory Alonso & GREGORIAN, Hrach "Outside View: Jihadist threat in Africa", UPI International
Editor,
8
July
2006
[Access
via
http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20060708-100934-7727r]
PITT, Mark Household and Intrahousehold Impact of the Grameen Bank and Similar Targeted Credit
Programs in Bangladesh, Washington, World Bank, 1996
PITURRO, Marlene "Collective Entrepreneurship - What Developing Nations are Teaching American
Women About Business", On the Issues, 1 March 1997 [Internet Access to Electric library].
PRESLEY, John R. & SESSIONS, John G. "Islamic Economics: The Emergence of a New Paradigm", The
Economic Journal, 104, May 1994, pp584-596
PURI, B.N. Buddhism in Central Asia, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1987
Radio Australia "Iran's nuclear programme dominates D8 summit", ABC, 13 June 2006 [Access via
http://www.abc.net.au/]
RAHMAN, Ahmad Faiz Abdul “Islamic Way of Life as Best As We Can”, The Star, 29 July 1997 [Internet
Access]
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE The Strategy for Success in Iraq, Republican Policy
Committee, United States Senate, Washington, 20 December 2005 [Internet Access at
http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Dec2005IraqStratMS.pdf]
Reuters "African Union urges UN help for peacekeepers:", IOL, June 16 2007a [Access via
http://www.iol.co.za/
RICHARDS, D.S. (ed.) Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1970
RYAN, N.J. The Cultural Heritage of Malaya, Longman, Kuala Lumpur, 1971
SEEKINS, Donald M. "The Malacca Sultanate and the Evolution of the Malay Identity", Chapter 1B in Malaysia,
1991 [Electric Library, Internet Access]
SIMKIN, C.G.F. The Traditional Trade of Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 1968
SMITH, Anthony L. "Indonesia in 2002: Megawati's Way", in SINGH, Daljit & CHIN, Kin Wah (eds) Southeast
Asian Affairs 2003, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003, pp97-116
SPENSER, Robert "Jihad Begins in France", Human Events, 61 no. 39, , 11/14/2005 [Access via Ebsco Database]
SPULER, Bertold "Trade in the Eastern Islamic Countries in the Early Centuries", in RICHARDS, D.S.(ed.) Islam
and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1970, pp11-20
Star "SKSGMS Looking at Possibilities of Introducing Islamic Bank", The Star, 23 June 1997 [Internet
Access]
STEWART, Ian "Windfall for Islam as Malaysia Moves to Impose Compulsory Tithe", The Australian, 6 June
1997, p8
Straits Times Interactive "Malaysia Leading the Way in Islamic Banking", 14 November 1996 [Internet Access]
Strategic Comments “The Politics of Islam in Southeast Asia”,London, IISS), 3 no. 5, June 1997
Strategic Comments "Unstable Democracies in Southeast Asia: The Philippine and Thai Crises", 12 no.
4, May 2006, p1-2
36
SWIDLER, Leonard “The Intimate Intertwining of Business, Religion, and Dialogue”, Gobal Ethic Project, 1996
[Internet Access: http://astro.temple.edu/~dialogue/intim.htm]
TEIK, Khoo Boo Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad, Kuala Lumpur,
OUP, 1995
TROLLE-SCHULTZ, Erik "How the First Islamic Bank was Established in Europe", in EL HELW,
Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp43-52
UDOVITCH, Abraham L. "Commercial Techniques in Early Medieval Islamic Trade", in RICHARDS, D.S. (ed.)
Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1970, pp37-62
VEITCH, James A. "A Case of Mistaken Identity: Muslims and Fundamentalism", Journal of Arabic,
Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, no. 1, 1993, pp1-6
WARREN, Peter M. "With a Scholarly Touch, Citicorp Makes Its Pitch for Islamic Investors; Finance: Bank
Counts on 'Guardians of the Faith' to Make Sure Money Is Handled in Accordance with Laws of the
Koran", Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1996, (Orange Country Edition, pD-9) [Electric Library, Internet
Access]
WATSON, Adam The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis, London, Routledge,
1992
Washington Post, "Text: Osama bin Laden", eMediaMillWorks, 7 October 2001 [Internet Access via
www.washingtonpost.com/]
WATT, W. Montgomery Muhammad's Mecca: History in the Qru'an, Edinburg, Edinburg University
Press, 1988
WATTS, David & GAAMAZO, Alejandro "Scholar emphasises social justice", The Times, April 26, 2006 [Access
via Ebsco Database]
WIEVIORKA, Michel "French Intellectuals: End of an era", Dissent, Spring 1994, pp248-252
WOODWARD, Joe "A Banking Venture of Little Interest", Alberta Report / Western Report, 22, 2 December
1995 [Electric Library, Internet Access]
WRIGHT, Robin "Islam, Democracy and the West", Foreign Affairs, 71, Summer 1992, pp131-145
YONG, Thepchai " Who's really in charge of dealing with southern strife?", The Nation (Bangkok), 20
June
2006
[Internet
Access
via
http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/06/20/opinion/opinion_30006822.php]
ZAKARIA, Rafic The Struggle Within Islam: The Conflict Between Religion and Politics, N.Y., Penguin, 1988
37