Notes on “Where do Emotions fit?”
Emotions have a slightly peculiar status in our thinking about the mind. On the one hand,
we tend to think of emotions as things which make us human; one common objection to
the possibility of thinking machines (or “artificial intelligence”) is that they will never
have emotions. When we think of robots and other automata, or even creatures such as
Star Trek’s Mr. Spock, we tend to think of them as somehow less-than-human in virtue of
the fact that they don’t experience emotion.
We have all heard phrases uttered along the lines of “Let’s stop being emotional and let’s
talk about this rationally”. So emotion and rationality tend to be presented, in everyday
discourse, as diametrically opposed. Moreover rationality itself has, at least since
Aristotle, also been viewed as a defining feature of humanity; what it is to be human, it is
often claimed, is to be able to reason. So, on the other hand, emotions seem to be the very
opposite of what it is to be human.
Cunningham has quite a neat discussion of the relation between emotion and rationality.
She suggests that the two need not be seen as incompatible, but rather, emotions may be
viewed as more-or-less rational in terms of the behaviour (or other mental states) that
they cause. In this way, it is not the emotion itself which is judged to be rational or
irrational, but rather the action it tends to produce.
It’s important, then, to distinguish what’s constitutive of an emotion (i.e. what an emotion
actually is) from the causal relations between emotions and other states. This become
especially clear when considering physiological theories of emotion, such as William
James’. James’ view is not that emotions are nothing more than physiological states, but
rather that the order in which the states occur is the opposite of what we would normally
think. James’ claim is that one’s perception of one’s own physiological states causes
emotional mental states, whereas we might be (pre-theoretically) inclined to think that
physiological states (e.g. sweaty palms, racing heartbeat) are the result of a certain mental
state.
So, James’ theory seems to imply that emotions are one issue on which “folkpsychology” is wrong. Remember, “folk psychology” is the common sense framework
within which people predict and explain each others’ behaviour in everyday life. We
often appeal to folk-psychology in judging whether or not a theory is scientific
psychology is plausible (indeed, it has been said that cognitive science is an attempt to
turn folk-psychology into a scientifically respectable discipline). It seems fair to say that,
like consciousness, we all have a pretty good idea of what emotions are, and we are
certainly intimately acquainted with what the experience of emotions is like, so, in
evaluating the various theories on the table, you’ll have to assess the relative importance
you attach to this pre-theoretical, introspective knowledge.
Some issues to think about:
(1) Emotions clearly have an important role to play in the survival of the organism; fear
keeps you away from potentially dangerous things, disgust keeps you away from
potentially poisonous things, and so on. To what extent could these functions be achieved
in the absence of emotion? Given that emotion is important in this respect, must we say
that nonhuman animals achieve these feats using emotions too? And if so, doesn’t it turn
out that emotions are not essential to humanity?
(2) What’s the difference between an emotion and a “mood”? Is one a function of the
other? If so, what’s the order of priority? If not, why do we not view them as
independent.
(3) How well can we reconcile our introspective (i.e. first person) acquaintance with
emotions and out scientific (i.e. third person) understanding of them?