Introduction
Over the past two centuries, the complicated process of formulating foreign policy
towards Latin America has been guided by strategic, economic, and political factors.
While each of these factors formed the building blocks of United States policy, the
governing ideology of a particular moment in history served as the foundation upon
which these factors rested. The resulting structure formed by this delicate relationship
was the platform upon which government leaders, individuals as diverse as the times in
which they lived, devised policy based on their perceptions of a world in which the
United States was confronted with both threats and opportunities.
As Robert Pastor explains in Exiting the Whirlpool, difficult policy decisions
cannot be made by simply employing one uniform method of determination. If such a
method existed, policy could easily be dictated by a computer program.1 Instead, it is a
non-linear process influenced by competing views of the world, dominated by the notion
that perceptions govern reality, even if this “reality” was based on something other than
fact. It is a process often influenced by prejudices and inflated notions of superiority,
described by Jorge Dominguez as a belief that the United States is “...by and large much
less in need of them (Latin Americans) than they are in need of us.”2 Despite these
seemingly dismissive sentiments towards what William LeoGrande refers to as “our own
backyard”, Latin America has served as the staging ground for a young nation trying to
flex its political muscle on the world stage, the focus of an ideological and military
struggle between two Cold War superpowers, a marketplace for expanding investment
1
2
Pastor, Robert, p. 27
Dominguez, Jorge. The Future of Inter-American Relations: States, Challenges, and Likely Responses.
and economic development, and the focal point for political debates that have influenced
the landscape of United States domestic politics.
In this paper, I will describe how ideological, economic, and political factors have
helped shape United States foreign policy towards Latin American over the past two
centuries. By highlighting specific examples, I will argue that ideology has had the most
significant impact on the course of U.S.-Latin American relations because of its influence
on national security policy, the classification of threats to United States interests and the
“appropriate” responses needed to address these threats. In addition to ideology, the
influence of domestic political and economic factors in guiding policy will be outlined.
While both of these serve as important policy determinants, they have historically played
a secondary role when challenged by conflicting, dominant ideologies, especially during
the Cold War. As Lars Schoultz describes in his work Beneath the United States, what
results from this combination is “…a distinctive mental orientation that officials use to
interpret the bewildering array of incidents and problems that constitute the raw data of
international relations.”
Ideology and U.S. National Security policy towards Latin America
The concept of national security policy has evolved throughout history and varied
from administration to administration. It has always served as an influential framework
for United States foreign policy. As the nation grew in size, wealth, and power, and as its
domestic institutions became more secure, leaders began to look beyond national borders.
With an expanded view of national interests came an expanded view of national threats.
How the nation reacted to these new responsibilities and took advantage of this
2
increasing global influence was largely dependent on the governing ideology. The
security interests of the United States in Latin America have been significantly influenced
and guided by the varying ideological beliefs of those leaders responsible for shaping this
policy and moving the U.S. from a fragile, insecure country to its role as a global
hegemon.
With a new found national confidence, foreign policy shifted from responding
reactively to outside threats to proactively engaging in a hemisphere filled with both
potential threats and a wide range of opportunities. From the Monroe Doctrine to the
Roosevelt Corollary, the United States responded to both perceived and actual European
engagement in Latin America with trepidation, viewing such involvement as a clear
threat to U.S. security and overall national interests. David Dent in The Legacy of the
Monroe Doctrine writes that while the original intent of James Monroe was to create
“…an isolationist policy opposed to extra hemispheric intervention in the Americas, as
the U.S. became more powerful it was amended through various corollaries…” and used
to legitimize Washington’s direct involvement in the affairs of Latin America.3 One of
these additions, the (Theodore) Roosevelt Corollary, gave the United States “…the right
to preemptive military intervention (in Latin America), not to enforce claims of its
citizens, but to forestall European intervention…”4 Such a considerable shift represents
the ideological transformation of a rapidly developing country maturing into a nation
more confident, militarily capable, and strategically inclined to protect what both
LeoGrande and Molineu refer to as the “sphere of influence” from the threat of outside
European interests.
3
4
Dent, David. The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine.
Schoultz
3
During the Cold War, the dissimilar national security priorities of the Reagan and
Carter administrations were the result of two ideologies on the opposite end of the
political spectrum. Pastor describes the conservative and liberal ideological “lenses” that
guided foreign policy towards Latin America. In his view, the “former tend(ed) to see
threats more intensely and the latter tried to understand and be more responsive to the
Latin Americans.”5 While this can be interpreted as the biased opinion of someone who
played an intricate role in the “responsive” Latin American policy of the Carter
administration, the basic principle accurately highlights the obvious distinctions between
the Reagan and Carter policies.
United States foreign policy towards Latin America during the Carter
administration was largely dominated by the Panama Canal Treaty and the promotion of
human rights. As Stephen Rabe explains, “only in the case of Carter’s human rights
campaign did a president launch a significant initiative in Latin America that did not have
strong Cold War overtones.”6 Jimmy Carter, a deeply religious man, strongly believed
that it was his responsibility to send a message to foreign governments, even Cold War
ideological allies, that the United States would not tolerate human rights abuses and
would restrict and potentially deny economic and military support to those governments
that sanctioned such acts. In Carter’s view, this was a valid, gentler policy for a nation
still recovering from the scandals of Watergate and the horrors of the Vietnam War.
Since the Panama Canal was completed in 1914, it was both a strategic and
symbolic asset for the United States because of its geographic location. It opened up new
trade routes and represented U.S. dominance in the region. As Pastor describes,
5
6
Pastor, p.27
Rabe, Stephen. The Presidency.
4
“presidents became pre-occupied with protecting this strategic asset from the region’s
instability.”7 While previous presidents strongly believed that the canal should be kept on
a very tight leash by the United States government (and military), President Carter felt
that events in Panama and, in his opinion, the maltreatment of the Panamanian people,
constituted substantial threats to the overall security of the Panama Canal. The signing of
the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977, which mandated the transfer of the canal to Panama by
the year 2000, was interpreted by many as a sign of weakness and a threat to a vital
national interest. However, Carter did not have to be reminded of the importance of
national security and, as Pastor recalls, Carter clearly “opposed intervention in the
internal affairs of other countries unless (author’s italics) U.S. security interests were
directly threatened.”8
For Carter, what constituted a “threat” and what defined “intervention” were
influenced by his ideology and view of the United States role in world affairs. U.S.
security interests could best be achieved by expressing empathy towards a country
historically mistreated by United States policy. Carter’s goal was not to compromise the
position of the United States in the world, but to preserve its position of power and
influence. Carter felt, however, that this could not be achieved by shaking a clenched fist
at the rest of the world. The dominant hemispheric position of the United States could be
maintained through understanding and flexible, not rigid, policies towards the people and
governments of Latin America.
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought about a dramatic shift in United
States foreign policy towards Latin America. The Reagan administration’s categorization
7
8
Pastor, p. 25
Pastor, p. 44
5
of national security interests in this region was dictated by a hard line ideology defined,
as LeoGrande articulates, “primarily through the prism of the East-West struggle.”9 Not
only was this a conflict motivated by ideology, it was a battle between ideologiesdemocracy versus communism. From this perspective, the new administration considered
the human rights policy of Carter as “not only ineffectual, but down right dangerous.”10
During this period, Molineu explains Latin American countries served a unique strategic
purpose because they “…were not important in and of themselves, but they could be used
to send a signal to Moscow that a new team was in charge.”11 The fight against Soviet
expansionism was viewed as a zero sum game. A gain for one side anywhere in the world
was nothing less than a loss for the other. From this perspective, the Reagan
administration implemented policies towards Latin America that established partnerships
with rightist dictators opposed to communism, no matter what their human rights record,
and covertly funded “contra” groups to topple leftist governments, which were seen as a
threat to the hemisphere. If the United States could not defend its interests in its “own
backyard” then how could it expect to lead the fight against communism anywhere in the
world?
These types of ingrained ideologies at the source of foreign policy decisions have
their own foundations which can be traced back to singular life experiences, moral and
religious beliefs, and the notion American “exceptionalism”, strong feelings of national,
cultural, and spiritual superiority intertwined with a sense of duty and responsibility to be
the guiding light for a world longing for the freedom and democracy.
9
LeoGrande, p. 5
Jeanne Kirkpatrick quoted in LeoGrande, p. 54.
11
Molineu, p. 226
10
6
A young John Quincy Adam’s unpleasant trip to Spain greatly influenced his
negative opinions of Hispanic individuals, characterizing them at the young age of twelve
as “…lazy, dirty, nasty…”12, a sentiment which continued into his adult political life and
was shared by many of his colleagues. Theodore Roosevelt was also motivated by a
desire to teach the “jingos” a lesson. These types of prejudiced beliefs helped to enforce
the notion of American “exceptionalism”, which often led to the mistreatment of those
deemed culturally and morally subservient, relative to civilized American standards.
Religious and moral convictions rigidly mold perceptions of the world and the
role that one must play in carrying out a “higher” mission. Schoultz describes President
McKinley’s enthusiastic description of a divine message which conveniently served as
“…a perfect justification-exactly what was needed to induce public support for
imperialism.”13 Molineu argues that the Reagan administration possessed “…an
unshakable ideological and moral view of the world that once put into place made it
nearly impossible to consider any compromise.”14 Through these experiences and
feelings of confident righteousness, rigid ideologies were formed and leaders emerged
who strongly believed they had an obligation and moral responsibility to share and
implement their visions of the world.
Economic factors
With an emergent national economy and increasingly saturated domestic market,
producers and manufacturers began to contemplate the economic benefits of expanding
beyond national borders. Understanding this reality, the United States sought to establish
12
13
As quoted in Schoultz, page 1.
Schoultz, p. 89
7
economic ties with its newly independent neighbors in Latin America. As governments
sought to protect these new markets from the interference of other nations, these
economic relationships quickly became influenced by ideologically defined notions of
national security and the need for hegemonic power to ensure regional stability.
According to Schoultz, “the nation’s leaders had convinced the public that prosperity
depended upon trade (and) expanded trade required dominance.”15
In order to rebuild a severely crippled post Civil War economy, a healing nation
expanded its foreign trade in search of new markets. It was almost immediately
confronted with the daunting obstacle of competing with foreign, mainly British,
competitors for access to these new trade opportunities. In order to effectively compete
and protect these new investments, the government, as Shoultz describes, initiated an
ambitious plan to exponentially expand its naval force.
Promoting strong economic ties with Latin American has been a priority for the
United States largely due to the potential impact on the strength of our national economy.
Both President Taft’s “dollar diplomacy” and Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine were motivated by a desire to insure economic stability in Latin
America in order to preserve the strength and accessibility of increasingly vital markets
for U.S. products. At the same time, these new markets were viewed by some as a threat
to the national economic strength because of competition between foreign and domestic
goods and services. The debate over the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement centered
around the potential threats to domestic labor when faced with less expensive alternatives
in Mexico.
14
15
Molineu, p. 236
Schoultz, p. 88
8
Despite concerns over what H. Ross Perot referred to as the “giant sucking sound”
of jobs leaving the United States, economic trade between the United States and Latin
America has flourished. The continuation of this relationship is an important component
of U.S. policy towards the region. As Professor Brenner explained, the need for a global
hegemon to ensure regional and global economic stability is important in this era of
globalization and increased economic interdependence.16
Domestic Political Influences of U.S. Foreign Policy
Domestic factors have also impacted United States relations with Latin America.
These factors are the result of the growing activism of citizens hoping to influence policy
and politicians willing to respond to the extent that it insures their political future, often
without the need for a substantial shift in ideology.
An anxious public, dealing with the effects of what Brenner and Plague refer to as
both the “Vietnam syndrome” and the prevalence of illegal drugs, “…one of the most
publicized issues in the U.S. during the 1980s,”17 earned the attention of politicians who
were both guided by ideology and at the same time cognizant of the fragile nature of
political life and survival.
The influence of interests groups grew with the end of the Cold War, an event
which Brenner, Haney, and Vanderbush explained “…generated a relative decline in the
importance of traditional security interests…” and “…opened the door to greater interest
group activism over foreign policy.”18 During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate
Bill Clinton’s endorsement of the Cuban Democracy Act, which was supported by the
16
17
Brenner, Phil. US-Latin American relations. March 28, 2003.
Brenner and Plague
9
influential Cuban American lobby in Florida, caused President George H.W. Bush to
alter his position and lend his support to the act as well.19 In the 2000 campaign, George
W. Bush’s support for Cuban Americans and his hard line position toward Castro was
essential for not only his own political ambitions, but also for his brother, Jeb Bush, the
governor of Florida.
While domestic political concerns have directly impacted several Latin American
policy decisions, there are many examples where ideology only temporarily took a
backseat to the dynamics of electoral politics. Public sentiment opposed to the perceived
imperial interests of the United States impacted President McKinley’s decision to
advocate for Cuban independence during the presidential campaign. While permanent
occupation was no longer an option, the passage of the Platt Amendment still insured a
continuing U.S. presence in order “…to maintain control over people whom they were
convinced were unfit for self government.”20 During the 1904 campaign, Roosevelt was
also concerned about being labeling an imperialist by his opponents. As Schoultz
described “…it was only with the election behind him that the Roosevelt
Corollary…became a formal part of U.S. foreign policy.”21 In both cases, ideology
returned to dictate policy, while domestic concerns were adhered to long enough to
ensure political survival and convince wavering constituencies.
Although opinion polls suggest that public support for Ronald Reagan’s policies
towards Latin America, specifically El Salvador, was considerably low, LeoGrande
writes that “…yet, there was a deep reluctance among the Democratic leadership to do
18
Brenner, Haney, and Vanderbush, p. 199.
Brenner and Plague
20
Schoultz, p. 148
21
Schoultz, p. 184-185
19
10
battle…” with the president. Polls were “considered unreliable, especially in foreign
policy” because of the president’s inherent ability to cause a “surge in patriotism.”22
Therefore, while public opinion was on their side, many democrats feared to challenge
the ideologically driven hard line position of a president who was overall very popular
with the American people. The most important poll is on election night and as Molineu
emphasizes, President Reagan’s “electoral mandates in 1980 and 1984 were generally
interpreted as supporting hard lines against communism”23, which was at the core of
Reagan’s ideologically driven policy towards Latin America.
The influence of interests groups and other domestic constituencies has always
been acknowledged by politicians intent on ensuring their own political longevity.
However, when these interests directly challenged a leader’s dominant ideological
agenda, especially during the period of the Cold War, every step was taken to temporarily
disguise this agenda from public scrutiny.
Conclusion
While ideology has been a dominant influence, especially in the area of national
security policy, it is rational to argue that there is not one singular causal factor that can
explain the complicated nature of United States policy towards Latin America over the
past two centuries. Many of the factors outlined are also dependent on each other.
Ideology not only influenced the notion of national security, but the existence of these
security threats also had the effect of molding and solidifying hard line ideologies.
Economic factors were often intertwined with domestic political concerns. A strong
22
23
LeoGrande, p.217
Molineu, p. 232
11
economy is an important issue on Election Day, so the ability to open new markets,
thereby strengthening the domestic economy, was both a sound economic and political
strategy. Overall, this has been a relationship influenced by a wide range of historical
events that have themselves been shaped by the responses of complex, politically
ambitious personalities driven by ideological visions of world order.
An additional influence that has unfortunately shaped and continues to shape
United States policy towards Latin America (and many other regions of the globe) is
ignorance. The unwillingness to understand and learn about (and from) different peoples
who are directly impacted by our often misguided policies has been pervasive throughout
our nation’s short history. As David Dent describes, “the Monroe Doctrine was a
unilateral pronouncement of foreign policy principles designed to confirm to the interests
of the United States in a hemisphere it hardly understood.”24 Throughout the decades that
followed, Dent continues to argue that “those who found this spirit of Monroe useful did
not worry about the need for accuracy of information about Latin America.”25
As Schoultz explains, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Ambassador to the United Nations during the
Reagan administration, who was very influential in formulating policy towards Latin
America, “...never visited El Salvador before writing about its political culture” and
instead relied on second hand information that was based on historical Anglo prejudices
towards the Hispanic culture.26 Foreign policy, while obviously guided by multiple,
often competing interests, should always strive to attain a certain level of understanding.
Being empathetic towards a country’s culture, customs, and history will not always
guarantee mutually beneficial diplomatic relations. However, it is an important step
24
25
Dent, David. P. 4
Dent, David. P. 5
12
towards implementing policies that address issues and concerns based on fact and not
mere perceptions of reality or feelings of prejudice.
While recalling his service as a staff member on the National Security Council
during his guest lecture, Robert Pastor strongly felt the presence of a historian would
have been a valuable asset when difficult policy decisions needed to be made.27 It is now
important for our nation to learn from the lessons of our relationship with Latin America
and use this knowledge of history as a reference guide for future foreign policy decisions.
26
27
Schoultz
Pastor, Robert. US-Latin American relations class, 2/28/03.
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Brenner, Philip, Patrick Haney and Walt Vanderbush, “The Confluence of Domestic
And International Interests: US Policy Toward Cuba, 1998-2001”,
International Studies Perspectives, May 2002.
Dent, David. The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: a reference guide to U.S. involvement
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1999.
Dominguez, Jorge. “The Future of Inter-American Relations: States, Challenges, and
Likely Responses”, in The Future of Inter-American Relations (2000) ed., Jorge
Dominguez.
LeoGrande, William M. Our Own Backyard: the United States in Central America,
1977-1992. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Molineu, Harold. “Making Policy for Latin America: Process and Explanation” in
David Dent, ed., US-Latin American Policymaking: a reference handbook.
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995.
Pastor, Robert. Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean. 2nd edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001.
Rabe, Stephen. “The Presidency”, in David Dent, ed., U.S. Latin-American
Policymaking: a reference handbook. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1995.
Shoultz, Lars. Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998.
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