Review of the operation of the
Fair Work Act 2009:
Submission of the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division
17 February 2012
1.
General comments:
1.1
No institution, group, association or individual making a submission to this
Review can claim to impartially represent the “national interest”. It will be the
case that any party making a submission to the Review will invariably motivated
by some degree of self-interest, even if not overtly articulated. This is because of
the inherent nature of labour law, which seeks to mediate, if somewhat
imperfectly, the competing interests of employers and employees. The Fair Work
Act 2009 (‘FW Act’) is just such a law. It regulates both individual rights and
interests, as well the conduct of relationships built on collective bargaining.
1.2
This statutory review of the FW Act occurs against the background of what we
submit is a contrived and overblown media campaign designed to undermine
confidence in the operation of the Act. The campaign has largely manifested in
the extensive media coverage given to the issue in the national newspapers The
Australian and the Australian Financial Review. This campaign has as its central
motif an alleged direct linkage between operation of the FW Act and Australia’s
relatively poor recent performance on productivity.1 The articles and commentary
See for example, Maher, Sid and Creighton, Adam “Business urges tax and industrial relations reform”
The Australian 11 February 2012; Sloan, Judith “Fix Fair Work and still be fair” The Australian 6 July
2012; Kerr, Christian ‘Fair Work hurting productivity” The Australian 29 August 2011; Kerr, Christian
“”IR regime sees bosses struggling to ‘hold the line’ on productivity” 26 September 2011; The Australian
1
1
on the issue are mostly clothed in the rhetoric of the “national interest”, but upon
close analysis are in reality special interest pleadings that seek a fundamental shift
in the balance contained in the FW Act towards big business.
1.3
In making this submission to the Review, we happily state our self-interest: we
are a union whose fundamental character has been formed around the pursuit of
collective agreements. Our principal objectives are to secure the best possible
outcomes for our members in the areas of safety, remuneration and job security
through collective negotiations with our employers. Our position is naturally one
of seeking to preserve, and where possible enhance, those provisions of the FW
Act concerned with the facilitation of collective bargaining.
1.4
Accordingly, our submission will concentrate on three areas relevant to this
priority:
(i)
The good faith bargaining provisions of the FW Act (Part 2-4).
(ii)
The provisions of the FW Act dealing with industrial action (Part 3-3).
Knott, Stephen “Back to the bad old union days” The Australian 17 February 2012; Editorial “Nation
cannot compete with this IR system” AFR 2 February 2012; Ludeke, Paul “Union power in Fair Work Act
unequal” AFR 14 February 2012; Bassanese, David “IR legislation blunting competitiveness” AFR 15
February 2012; Hanke, Ian “Fair work unfair for employers” AFR 19 January 2012; “Skulley, Mark
“Reduce power of the unions, urges IPA” AFR 16 February 2012; Nickless, Rachel “Partners criticise Fair
Work Act” AFR 17 February 2012. However, the asserted linkage between productivity and the FW Act
has been rejected or downplayed by the Commonwealth Government and economic and media
commentators. See for example, Gillard, Julia. "Building a New Australian Economy Together": Speech to
the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce Lunch, Melbourne 1 February 2012; Committee for Economic
Development in Australia “ACTU and Peter Reith debate IR impact on productivity” CEDA News
http://ceda.com.au/news-articles/2011/12/01/vic_productivity; Gittins, R, ‘Productivity level weak, but
that’s not all bad” The Sydney Morning Herald 5 September 2011; Peetz D, “Workplace ‘reform’ won’t
cure
our
ailing
productivity”
The
Conversation
8
September
2011,
http://theconversation.edu.au/workplace-reform-wont-cure-our-ailing-productivity-3093; Tingle, Laura,
Daley, Gemma and Dodson, Louise “ALP Blames ideological attack” AFR 15 February 2012 Hancock,
Keith “IR offers no panacea for productivity” AFR 16 February 2012.
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(iii)
The provisions of the FW Act dealing with dispute resolution, particularly,
the place of arbitration in both a bargaining and post-bargaining context
(Part 2-5 and Part 6-2).
2.
The good faith bargaining provisions of the FW Act.
2.1
The CFMEU Mining & Energy Division welcomes the promulgation of the good
faith bargaining (‘GFB’) provisions of the FW Act. We believe that the GFB
provisions have generally had a positive impact on industrial behaviour and have
the potential – if properly understood and applied – to promote the take up of
collective agreements across the Australian economy consistent with the objects
of ss3(f) and s171 of the FW Act.
2.2
The good faith bargaining provisions of the FW Act are found in Division 8, Part
2-4. In 2011, the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division published a book entitled
Promoting Good Faith Bargaining under Australia’s Fair Work Act 2009. The
book analysed the GFB provisions contained in the FW Act, their intended
purpose, similarity to provisions appearing in New Zealand and Canadian labour
law and application in practice by Fair Work Australia. An electronic copy of the
book is annexed to this submission for the use of the Review Panel in its
deliberations.2
2.3
This submission will not repeat the central arguments and findings in Promoting
Good Faith Bargaining, which we invite the Review Panel to read. However, we
wish to bring to the attention of the Review Panel the following key findings or
recommendations:
The book Promoting Good Faith Bargaining under Australia’s Fair Work Act 2009 by Alex Bukarica and
Andrew Dallas is the copyright of the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division. We consent to the Fair Work
Review Panel referring to, or reproducing parts of the book for the purposes of its report, but we do not
consent to the entire book being made available on the Review Website. A second edition of Promoting
Good Faith Bargaining is being published by Federation Press and will be publicly available in April or
May 2012.
2
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o The obligation to bargain in good faith is a substantive and not merely
procedural obligation.3 The parties to collective bargaining must come to the
table with the intention of attaining a mutually satisfactory enterprise
agreement. Whilst the jurisprudence of Fair Work Australia in this area is still
developing, there are signs that this concept is being more widely accepted
and applied.4
o The articulation of clear rules of conduct is essential to the proper operation of
a GFB system. Whilst the matters adumbrated in s228 of the FW Act are
crucially important, Government should also give consideration to
promulgating by regulation, a “Code of Good Faith Bargaining” - which has
been a feature of New Zealand labour law for some years.5
o The involvement of Fair Work Australia in bargaining disputes should be
more pro-active and ‘muscular’. The expertise and corporate knowledge
contained within the Tribunal make it ideally placed to play a positive role in
facilitating enterprise agreements being made.6 Government should support
and encourage Fair Work Australia to perform a more active role in
bargaining, including by facilitating the creation of a dedicated “bargaining
panel” in the Tribunal.
2.4
The effect of the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division submissions on the GFB
framework of the FW Act can be summarised shortly: the legal framework is
sound, but its implementation by Fair Work Australia is less than optimal. There
3
Promoting Good Faith Bargaining at pp 11, 29-34, 55-60, 75-78, 88-90.
4
See in particular, Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers, Australia, The
Collieries’ Staff Division v Endeavour Coal Pty Limited [2012] FWA 13.
5
Promoting Good Faith Bargaining at pp 58-60, 82-85.
6
Ibid at pp 98-100.
4
remains significant room for improvement in the area of GFB. Moreover, these
improvements can be facilitated with minimal legislative amendments to the Fair
Work Act. Rather, what is required is that the GFB obligations contained in the
FW Act are understood and applied in accordance with their intended purpose.
3.
Industrial action provisions of the FW Act
3.1
Access to legally protected industrial action in pursuit of collective agreements
has been a central feature of Australian labour law since 1993. 7 A right to
‘protected action’, in defined circumstances, would be regarded by most
mainstream commentators as a necessary corollary of a decentralised industrial
relations system based on enterprise level collective bargaining. In other words, it
is recognised that without realistic access to the ultimate economic sanction of
industrial action, most employees would not be in a position to bargain with their
employers on anything like an equal footing.
3.2
That is not to say that protected industrial action is at large. Since its introduction
in 1993, there have been a number of legislative constraints or restrictions on the
ability of employers and employees to undertake protected industrial action.
These restraints reached a legislative high-water mark in the 2006 “Work
Choices” amendments, which unfortunately, have been fundamentally retained in
Part 3-3 of the FW Act.
3.3
The CFMEU Mining & Energy Division has considerable experience in
successfully navigating and operating under both the “Work Choices” and FW
Act provisions relating to protected industrial action. This however, does not
mean that those provisions operate fairly or rationally.
7
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth), section 170PG.
5
3.4
In this submission we identify a number of shortcomings with the system of
protected industrial action provided for in Part 3-3 of the Act, having regard to
international norms and the democratic character of our union. We identify those
issues as:
o The unnecessary requirement that unions be required to seek approval for a
ballot of employees, before “approval” is given for industrial action.
o The ability for employers to interpose their views and interests (via Fair Work
Australia proceedings in relation to a protected action ballot) in what is
essentially a matter of internal union democracy.
o The ban on protected action being used in respect of “pattern agreements”.
o The lack of any requirement for proportionality in respect to the length or
severity of employer lock-outs – which are, after all - intended to be
“response” action to employee industrial action.
o A possible deficit in the powers of Fair Work Australia to direct employers to
assist an Authorised Ballot Agent to conduct a protected action ballot on the
employer’s premises.
3.5
Protected action ballots are unnecessary, at least in the form envisaged in the FW
Act:
3.6
The conceptual justification behind the protected action ballot provisions of the
FW Act (or the antecedent Workplace Relations Act 1996) seems to be based on a
concern with ensuring “transparency”8 and a “fair, simple and democratic
8
WR Act, s449(1).
6
process”.9 However, the framework of Part 3-3 seems to operate on the
presumption that these qualities are not the norm in most unions seeking to utilise
protected industrial action. The provisions of Part 3-3 are therefore imbued with
the deeply conservative prejudice that most rank and file unionists are naïve and
are easily led by manipulative union officials into unnecessary and damaging
industrial action.
3.7
We are fundamentally at odds with such a view and submit that it is contrary to all
the available evidence concerning employee behaviour and voting patterns for
protected action ballots. It is clear for example, that the ballot results published on
the Fair Work Australia website generally show a very high endorsement level
amongst voters in protected action ballots, often in excess of 80 or 90% voting
“yes”.10 This speaks of an elemental truth: unions do not pursue industrial action
unless they are very certain of membership support for such a step. To do
otherwise risks a very significant strategic misstep– that is, demonstrating to the
employer that the union does not have the necessary capacity to exercise
economic leverage on the employer during bargaining.
3.8
In the case of the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division, the requirement to seek
permission for a protected action ballot,11 is very odd given the union’s internal
democratic processes12 and its exemption under s186 of the Fair Work
(Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (‘FW RO Act’) to conduct its own internal
elections. That is, there appears to be a contradiction in the fact that CFMEU
Mining and Energy Division is able to conduct its own internal elections for
officers (which are a combination of attendance ballots and postal ballots) free
from the direct control or supervision of Fair Work Australia or the Australian
9
FW Act s436.
10
http://www.fwa.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=industrialballotsresult
11
FW Act s437.
Which includes membership endorsement by direct plebiscite of all decisions of the Division’s governing
body. See rule 8(iv) of the registered rules of the CFMEU Mining and Energy Division.
12
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Electoral Commission, but is required to comply with the provisions of Part 3-3 in
respect of protected action ballots.
3.9
In our submission, protected action ballots are not necessary to ensure transparent
and democratic decision-making and are instead, merely a device to frustrate or
delay the taking of industrial action by employees. Arguably, they are also
contrary to Australia’s international labour standard obligations in that “…the
manner in which the ballot requirement has been constructed under the FW Act
has the effect of unduly impeding the right to strike in contravention of the
principles of freedom of association”.13 However, if protected action ballots are to
remain a feature of the FW Act, then at least there should be provision in the FW
RO Act that would have the effect of extending any exemption under s186 to
allow a union to conduct its own protected action ballots without the need to seek
permission from Fair Work Australia under Part 3-3 of the FW Act (as to this last
point, see also below).
3.10
Employers have no legitimate role in proceedings concerning protected action
ballots:
3.11
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 automatically provided that employers had
standing to appear in protected action ballot applications. The FW Act has no
equivalent provision, but as a result of the Full Bench decision in Australian
Postal Corporation v CEPU,14 it now appears settled that employers will
generally be given the right to appear in proceedings concerning whether a
protected action ballot should be granted. As McCrystal has observed, the tests
introduced for ascertaining whether permission for a protected ballot should
granted (which in substance remain the same as the WR Act provisions) have
13
14
McCrystal, Shae The Right to Strike in Australia Federation Press at p 261.
[2009] FWAB 599.
8
“…proved to be fertile ground for employers wishing to oppose ballot
applications by trade unions”.15
3.12
But why should this be so? Is not the question of whether industrial action should
be taken one solely for affected employees? Why should employers have the
ability to delay or even prevent a protected action ballot from occurring? These
rhetorical questions highlight the apparent inconsistency between the purported
purpose of the protected action ballot requirement and its actual effect.
3.13
The interests and role of the employer in bargaining are amply protected by the
GFB provisions and the extensive provisions dealing with the means by which an
employer (and in certain circumstances, another affected person) can apply to
have a bargaining dispute conciliated by Fair Work Australia; or alternatively,
industrial action suspended and terminated.16 There is no justifiable basis to
allow a further level of objection from employers that in effect amounts to
interference in the right of employees to democratically decide whether or not to
support protected industrial action.
3.14
The ban on protected action being available for industry or sector level bargaining
(“pattern bargaining”) is inconsistent with Australia’s international treaty
obligations:
3.15
A further hangover of the WR Act era preoccupation with constraining the ability
of employees to take protected industrial action is the restriction of its use in
respect of what is defined as “pattern bargaining”. It is an international norm that
workers and employers are free to choose the level of bargaining that is
appropriate for them in the circumstances, free from the interference of State
actors. As Creighton and Stewart have observed:
15
McCrystal, at p 162.
16
FW Act, ss 240, 423 and 424
9
The denial of the right to take industrial action in support of industry level
bargaining is, rightly, treated as de facto denial of the right to choose the
level at which bargaining is to take place. This is not, of course, to suggest
that conformity with ILO standards requires that parties must actually
bargain at industry level: the point is that one side should be able to take
industrial action to persuade the other to negotiate at that level if they so
choose.17
3.16
The effective prohibition on “pattern bargaining” under the FW Act should be
removed. There is no sensible economic basis for the assertion that confining
collective bargaining to the enterprise level necessarily results in optimum
productivity or efficiency outcomes. International comparisons between countries
with high levels of bargaining and union density on the one hand and those with
very decentralised wage bargaining and low union density on the other, have
shown no conclusive link between macro-economic performance and the level of
wage bargaining, with either model capable of delivering very good or poor
economic performance.18 In reality, the most appropriate level of wage bargaining
for an industry or sector will depend upon a number of factors, primarily related
to the characteristics of the industry in question. The FW Act should not proceed
on the basis of a “one-size fits all” approach to the level of wage bargaining in
Australia.
3.17
The lack of a requirement for ‘proportionality’ in employer lock-outs is a serious
problem with the operation of the FW Act:
3.18
The dramatic events surrounding the grounding of the entire Qantas fleet on 29
October 2011 allegedly in preparation for a general lock-out of employees,
highlights the very significant deficiency in the FW Act in relation to employer
response action. That is, the Qantas lock-out, whilst technically in response to
relatively low-level union protected action, was massively disproportionate to the
employee protected industrial action. The ability of employers to respond in a
17
Creighton, Breen and Stewart, Andrew Labour Law (5th Edition) The Federation Press at p.777.
Calmfors, Lars Centralisation of Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Performance – A Survey OECD
Economic Studies No 21 Winter 1993.
18
10
disproportionate way to employee protected action is not conducive to good faith
bargaining and the promotion of mutually satisfactory enterprise agreements. In
fact, one can scarcely imagine a form of response more calculated to create
hostility, fracture long-standing employment relationships and destroy postbargaining cooperation than a large scale employer lock-out. The Review needs to
consider an amendment to Subdivision B of Part 3-3 of the FW Act to require that
any employer response action is directly proportionate to the employee action it is
responsive to.
3.19
There may be a lacunae in the FW Act in respect to the power of Fair Work
Australia to issue orders in respect of the conduct of attendance ballots on the
employer’s premises:
3.20
In the course of seeking a protected action ballot order to apply to employees of
the BHP-Biliton-Mitsubishi Alliance (‘BMA’) in the coal mining industry in
Queensland in late 2011, there emerged a further issue relating to the conduct of
protected action ballots under the FW Act. In opposing the granting of orders,
counsel for BMA made a submission concerning a deficit in powers on the part of
Fair Work Australia, to the effect that the Tribunal did not have the power to issue
orders that would require the employer to assist in providing facilities for the
conduct of an attendance ballot on its premises.
3.21
Attendance ballots are a common feature under the FW Act and normally occur
with little demurrer from employers in relation to the use of facilities on site.
Indeed, in the case of the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division, attendance ballots
are the principal form of democratic decision making within the organisation for
the election of officers of the union and industrial decisions, such as protected
action ballots. The submissions of counsel for the BMA (whilst not conceded by
the CFMEU) caused the union in that case (in an abundance of caution) to hold its
attendance ballots in tents immediately adjacent to the entry of the BMA coal
mines. Whilst the outcome of the ballots was not affected by this argument about
11
the scope of powers in Subdivision 8 of Part 3-3, it did lead to unnecessary
expense on the part of the union – not to mention the disrespectful treatment of
employees by the world’s largest mining company.
3.22
Regulations 3.13(7) and (8) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009, provide that the
authorised ballot agent is to have access to the workplace for the purposes of
notifying employees of the protected action ballot, preparing for the protected
action ballot and conducting the protected action ballot. It would appear that the
intention of the drafters of the FW Act is that an authorised ballot agent should be
free to conduct an attendance ballot on an employer’s work site, if so ordered by
Fair Work Australia. We would say that a necessary implication to be drawn from
this purpose is that the employer is render the necessary practical assistance to
ensure that the attendance ballot occurs. However, given that the submissions of
BMA referred to earlier cast some doubt on this interpretation, any lacunae could
be easily remedied by a further amendment to the Regulations to make explicit
the implication referred to above.
4.
Dispute resolution in pre and post bargaining context
4.1
The role and powers of Fair Work Australia in respect to the resolution of
industrial disputes between parties to collective bargaining, remains a crucial
question, notwithstanding the legislative emphasis upon the parties directly
involved in resolving their own issues.
4.2
There are two aspects to this question. The first concerns the proper role of the
tribunal in respect to bargaining disputes, during which the ‘interests’ of the
parties are still in play. The second aspect concerns the ongoing role (if any) of
Fair Work Australia in dealing with disputes which emerge in respect to the
application, interpretation or non-compliance with the matters dealt with in a
concluded enterprise agreement. Both aspects have been the subject of
12
controversy during the operation of the FW Act and are a point of serious
disagreement between particular employer interests and the union movement.
4.3
The position advanced by the CFMEU Mining & Energy Division is that the
framework of dispute resolution in the context of a system of collective
bargaining must primarily be guided by pragmatism and common sense, and not
by an attachment to ideological shibboleths. In particular, it is important that the
power of Fair Work Australia to arbitrate in respect of both ‘interest’ disputes and
in circumstances where a dispute exists over a bargain that has already been
struck, is approached from the perspective of how to make the system work
better, rather than some pre-determined position that denigrates any expanded role
for Fair Work Australia in dispute resolution.
4.4
Arguably, the pendulum on the role of arbitration in dispute settlement has swung
too far in the direction of non-intervention. This is manifested in two features of
the legal architecture of the FW Act:
(i)
‘Interest’ arbitration19 of collective bargaining disputes is practically
unattainable, unless one party (as in the case of Qantas) is able to inflict
massive damage on the economy, or part of it; and
(ii)
The question of whether Fair Work Australia is able to arbitrate on a
dispute arising from an enterprise agreement is a matter for bargaining
itself, leading in practice, to major corporations imposing an effective veto
on access to arbitration during the term of agreements.
4.5
As to the first issue, it is clear that the capacity to obtain access to interest
arbitration of industrial disputes (in all bar the most exceptional cases) is
unattainable due to the very high threshold established under ss423 and 424 of the
Forsyth, Anthony “Why Australian needs interest arbitration” Workplace Law and Corporate Law
Research Group, Monash University.
19
13
FW Act. This is clearly the intended effect, but is it the most appropriate setting
for an Australian system of collective bargaining? As the Qantas dispute has
demonstrated, there is a strong residual respect in the Australian community for
the role of an “independent umpire” in industrial disputes20 and (one can surmise)
a corresponding distaste for bitter and protracted industrial disputation.
4.6
The position we advocate is not one of ready recourse to the arbitration of
collective bargaining disputes, but a recalibration of the tests contained in the FW
Act to provide more flexibility for the Fair Work Australia to interpose itself in
the bargaining environment in appropriate situations. In other words, the
legislative framework needs to shift the emphasis from damage to the economy
per se, to other important criteria such as:
o The maturity of the bargaining relationship and in particular, whether the
bargaining involves an actual or virtual first agreement context.
o The extent to which the parties have conducted themselves in accordance with
their good faith obligations, and in particular, whether the claims or issues
advanced are consistent with reasonable responses, given the relevant
industrial context.
o The damage that continuing industrial dispute is causing, or likely to cause, to
the long term relationships of the protagonists.
o Whether there is any reasonable expectation that the dispute will be solved by
further negotiation.
4.7
Within this framework, compulsory arbitration of the matters dividing the
industrial parties will remain a last resort, but would not be so unattainable as to
See for example, ‘Qantas divides voters, Fair Work Australia the only winner’, Crikey, 7 November 2011
available at: www.crikey.com.au/2011/11/07/essential-qantas-divides-voters-fair-work-australia-the-onlywinner/.
20
14
not exert a moderating influence on the negotiating parties.21 Indeed, there is also
a need for Fair Work Australia to more actively use and explore its conciliation
powers, which unfortunately, s240 of the FW Act prevents unless a party to the
industrial dispute makes such an application.
4.8
Conciliation and arbitration under the FW Act should not be construed as
radically different forms of intervention, but as part of one continuum. That is,
active conciliation and mediation of collective bargaining disputes should always
precede any recourse to arbitration and in turn, a realistic prospect of arbitration
imposing a result on the bargaining parties should always be an influence on the
parties to conciliation.
4.9
In relation to issue of the place of arbitration in settled agreements, we would
strongly submit that every enterprise agreement should be statutorily required to
contain an arbitration clause, and if not, the model clause dispute resolution clause
in the FW Act should be deemed to apply.
4.10
The CFMEU Mining and Energy Division appeared as an intervener in the
Woolworths22 Full Bench matter where the operation of s186(6) was under
consideration. Whilst we supported the initial interpretation of the provision by
Commissioner Smith, it appears that the law as it currently stands holds that the
provision does not require an arbitration clause in enterprise agreements, but only
permits such a clause.
4.11
The effect of the Woolworths interpretation in the coal mining industry has been
dramatic and costly in terms of industrial action. In particular, the determination of
multinational mining companies Xstrata and Rio Tinto to avoid agreeing to an
arbitration provision in any of their enterprise agreements (apparently at all costs) has
See for example, Lansbury, Russell “Back to the future with arbitration?” University of Sydney Business
School, 24 November 2011.
21
22
[2010] FWAFB 1464.
15
meant that industrial disputes in the coal mining industry have been more prolonged
and bitter than might otherwise be the case. In particular, the circumstances relating
to the industrial dispute at the Tahmoor colliery in Southern New South Wales is
indicative of the real consequences of a failure to require arbitration as a mandatory
clause in enterprise agreements. The dispute at the Tahmoor colliery spanned over
two years, cost employees hundreds of hours of lost wages and an involved an
estimated $100 million of lost production for the employer. Throughout this dispute,
the employer’s refusal to countenance an arbitration clause in any enterprise
agreement, was one of three key issues in the industrial dispute.
4.12
The issue of a compulsory arbitration clause in enterprise agreements is essential to
the proper functioning of collective bargaining, because it allows for employee
grievances over the application of the agreement to be dealt with relatively quickly,
cheaply and by persons who have an understanding of industrial issues. The refusal of
certain employers to accept arbitration as a mandatory clause in enterprise agreements
is almost entirely ideological in nature. It is concerned with upholding somewhat
mythical ‘managerial prerogative’, which amounts to no more than the proposition of
‘do as we say, not what you think the agreement means’. It is a remarkable position,
given that recourse to arbitration of employee grievances is not regarded as
antithetical the voluntarist basis of ‘free collective bargaining’ in Canada or the
United States.23
CFMEU Mining & Energy Division
17 February 2012
23
Promoting Good Faith Bargaining under Australia’s Fair Work Act 2009 at p.45
16