Criminal Law Provocation June 2006 Definition - D kills V as a result of V’s action: “some act by the V to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person and does so cause in the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self control, rendering accused subject passion so as to make him for the moment not master of his mind.” Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 per Lord Devlin Section 23 – Trial for murder - provocation (1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation and, but for this subsection and the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder, the jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find the accused guilty of manslaughter. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death is an act done or omitted under provocation where: (a) the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and (b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased, whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time. (3) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), there is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if: (a) there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission causing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission, (b) the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted suddenly, or (c) the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted with any intent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm. (4) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the act causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted under provocation. (5) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder Scope & Rationale of Defence - Parker (No 1) (1963) 111 CLR 610 - Burke [1983] 2 NSWLR 93 Conduct amounting to Provocation Holmes [1946] AC 588 Scriva (No 2) [1951] VR 298 Parker (No 1) (1963) 111 CLR 610 Parker (No 2) (1963) 111 CLR 665 Terry [1964] VR 248 Edwards [1973] AC 648 On principle, D cannot rely on the predictable results of his own blackmailing as conduct constituting provocation, but if hostile reaction by person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme lengths it might constitute provocation even for the blackmailer. Moffa (1977) 138 CLR 601 Hill (1981) 3 A Crim R 397 The Queen v R (1982) 28 SASR 321; 4 A Crim R 127 Quartly (1986) 11 NSWLR 332 Gardner (1989) 42 A Crim R 279 Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 Thorpe [1999] 2 VR 719 Subjective Test – s23(2)(b) i) D react suddenly - Section 23(3), sudden and temporary loss of self control - Parker (No 1) (1963) 111 CLR 610 ii) Intent not consistent with invocation of defence - Lee Chun-Chuen v R [1963] AC 220 - Johnson v R (1976) 136 CLR 619 iii) Intoxication - Webb (1977) 16 SASR 309 iv) Mistaken belief - Where D is mistaken as to the fact of, or source of provocation Objective Ordinary Person Test - Would an ordinary person in D’s position be provoked into losing self control to such an extent? i) Reasonable or ordinary person - An ordinary person in the position of the accused ii) Characteristics of ordinary person - Stingel v R (1991) 171 CLR 312 - “Person having the power of self control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused.” R v Camplin [1978] AC 705 - “A person possessing all characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the accused; age, sex, race, colour, physical defects etc., that would have affected his conduct in the circumstances the accused found himself.” Dutton (1979) 21 SASR 356 - Bedder v DPP [1954] 1 WLR 1119 - Enright [1961] VR 663 - Moffa (1977) 138 CLR 601 - Baragith (1991) 54 A Crim R 243 - Masciantonio (1994) 183 CLR 58 iii) Provocation would or might cause an ordinary person to react as D reacts iv) Conduct must be capable of provocation retaliation of a relevant degree - Stingel v R (1991) 171 CLR 312 v) Intoxication - S428F says intoxication cannot be taken into account in the ordinary person test vi) - Actual Loss of Self Control Stingel v R (1991) 171 CLR 312 Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 Masciantonio (1994) 183 CLR 58 The Queen v R (1981) 28 SASR 321 Act of Retaliation need not be proportional to provocation - Johnson v R (1976) 136 CLR 614 Battered Wives - Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 Offences other than murder - Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588 - Helmhout (1980) 1 A Crim R 464 a) Attempted Murder - Duvivier (1981) 5 A Crim R 89 - Wells (1981) 28 SASR 63 - Cunningham [1959] 1 QB 288 b) Serious Assault Self defence and provocation defence can be used concurrently Perks (1986) 41 SASR 335 The Ordinary person test Moffa (1977) 138 CLR 601 Camplin [1978] AC 705 Dincer [1983] VR 460 Stingel (1991) 171 CLR 312 Masciantonio (1994) 183 CLR 58 Green (1997) 148 ALR 659 Smith [2000] 3 WLR 654 Actual loss of self control Van den Hoek (1986) 161 CLR 158 Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 Osland (1998) 197 CLR 316 Procedural Aspects s23(4) a) b) c) - Judge Webb (1977) 16 SASR 309 Van den Hoek (1986) 161 CLR 158 Jury Evidential Onus Lee Chun-Chuen v R [1963] AC 220 Parker(No 1) (1963) 111 CLR 610 Da Costa v R (1968) 118 CLR 186 R v Camplin [1978] AC 705