Evaluate the view that Soviet foreign policy was dominated by
practical rather than ideological concerns in the period 1928-1941.
Soviet foreign policy was motivated by both practical and ideological
considerations in the period between 1928 and 1941. During the years of Stalin’s
campaign against the kulaks, foreign policy was pursued with the same ideological
zeal. However, when pragmatism came to the fore domestically, it did so too at an
international level.
The foreign policy pursued by the USSR in the period up until 1929 was essentially
pragmatic – attempting to foster cooperation with the capitalist nations, in order to
defend the Revolution from attack. To mollify international opinion, the Bolsheviks
ordered all communist parties around the world to end their hostility to the socialist
parties in their respective countries. The hope was that if the political left united, this
might allow the socialists to come to power, thereby increasing the likelihood of
cooperation with the USSR. For this reason, the policy was known as the ‘united
front’.
Unfortunately, the policy failed to end Russia’s diplomatic isolation, and in 1929
Stalin set the nation in a new direction – one dictated by uncompromising MarxistLeninist ideology. He decided to bring all international communist parties into line
with the radical policies he was embracing in Russia (collectivisation and central
planning). These parties were now ordered to end all cooperation with other leftist
groups, whom they branded ‘social fascists’ – Stalin’s logic being that the Great
Depression would soon bring about a wave of revolutions and that the Communists
must eliminate rival leftist groups in preparation for taking power.
The result of this policy shift was disastrous. The German Communist Party
directed its opposition to the Social Democrats rather than the Nazis, allowing the
Nazis to become the largest party in Germany. Within four years, Hitler had become
leader and the Communist Party banned. Other left wing groups soon followed. All
military cooperation between Germany and Russia ended.
Stalin now realised his mistake, and switched his foreign policy back to a more
pragmatic approach. He immediately began seeking better relations with the western
nations, in the hope of ending Russia’s diplomatic isolation. In consequence, the
United States recognised Russia for the first time since the Revolution (1933), and the
USSR joined the League of Nations (1934). Stalin also signed treaties of alliance with
France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and ordered the various international communist
parties to form a ‘Popular Front’ with all anti-fascist groups in Europe.
Unfortunately, Stalin’s attempts to woo Britain and France into an alliance against
Germany failed. Both nations stood by while Germany reoccupied the Rhineland,
then invaded Austria in 1938. When Hitler began making demands on
Czechoslovakia, Stalin tried to get France to make a stand – enforcing the 1935 treaty
to defend the country. However, France was not willing to contemplate a war with
Germany at that stage. At the Munich Conference in 1938, France and Britain gave
Hitler control of the border regions of Czechoslovakia. As historian J.N. Westwood
has put it: “Thus the Munich agreement of 1938 was not only a betrayal of
Czechoslovakia, but in a sense of Russia too. Probably it was at this time that Stalin
began to visualise his own Munich, a bargain with Germany. He still preferred an
alliance with Britain and France but these two powers, though less uncongenial,
seemed unenthusiastic and unreliable. He probably did not expect the western powers
to fulfill Britain's guarantee of the Polish frontiers in the event of a German attack.”
(Westwood: 331)
The first hint of Stalin's intentions came in April 1939, when he replaced the prowestern Litvinov with Molotov as foreign minister. The Germans responded by
offering Russia large tracts of land in Eastern Europe in return for Russian neutrality
in their coming war with Poland. For Stalin, this was an attractive proposition, since it
gave him breathing space to build up his forces and recover from the purge of the Red
Army. It also gave him a buffer zone against future German aggression.
When Britain and France were unable to make an acceptable counter offer, Stalin
decided they were not serious about an alliance. In August 1939, he accepted the
German offer and signed a ten-year Non-Aggression Pact (the so-called ‘Nazi-Soviet
Pact’).
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two and a half weeks later – once
the Polish army had been defeated – the Red Army did likewise. Germany and Russia
formally agreed to partition Poland and eliminate it as a state.
Even before the ink had dried on the pact, and before the blood had dried in the
streets of Warsaw, Stalin began preparing for the attack he knew would come. This
time, though, he was without allies. The best he could hope for was to lull Hitler into
believing Russia was no threat to him, thereby delaying for as long as possible the
inevitable attack on the USSR.
And so by 1941, Russian foreign policy had come full circle twice over – from the
mild pragmatism of the ‘United Front’, to the ideology-driven war against the ‘social
fascists’, to the desperate pragmatism of the ‘Popular Front’, to the cynicism of the
Nazi-Soviet Pact. It was this inconsistency in policy, more than anything, which
isolated the USSR during the period, and which left it vulnerable to an attack by its
greatest enemy, Nazi Germany.