Intentionality: Essay
Wylie Breckenridge
0. Introduction
In a recent draft paper, Tim Crane argues that intentionality is not a relation
1
.
Specifically, he argues that an intentional state cannot be a relation between the subject of the state (the person experiencing it) and object of the state (what it is about), because relations entail the existence of their relata and intentional states can be about things which do not exist. He goes on to suggest that we should not feel uncomfortable that intentionality is a 'quasi-relation', that is, an intrinsic property that seems to be a relation, because we already have experience of such a phenomenon in the case of dispositions. In particular, he argues that the way we individuate the intrinsic property of being in a particular intentional state by reference to an object that may not exist is analogous to the way that we individuate the intrinsic property of having a particular disposition by reference to an event that may not occur, and if we can make sense of the latter then we should be able to make sense of the former.
In this essay I will do three things. First, following Crane's line of argument I will present the case for why intentionality is not a relation, clarifying in the process some important points that I think he left unclear. Second, I will argue that the help Crane offers in making sense of non-relational intentionality is no help at all. In particular, I will argue that we can individuate dispositions by possibly non-occurring events only because we can individuate intentional states by possibly non-existent objects, and therefore that we can only make sense of non-relational dispositionality if we can first make sense of non-relational intentionality. Finally, I will argue that we can make sense of non-relational intentionality by adopting a certain point of view on the world, and suggest that doing so may also be helpful to Crane in his quest to establish intentionality as the mark of the mental.
1. The problem of intentionality
An intentional mental state is one that is 'about' or 'directed at' something. When I think that the apple on my desk is red, my thought is about that apple. When I desire to watch a certain show on television, my desire is about that show. When I look at someone walking by, my looking is about (or at) that person. Each of these mental states is about something, and so each is intentional. To fully ascribe an intentional state we need to specify three things: (i) the subject of the state (e.g. me, Macbeth), (ii) the intentional mode (e.g. looking, thinking), and (iii) the object of the state (e.g. an apple, a dagger) - what the state is about. Thus, when we ascribe an intentional state we seem to be ascribing a relation between the subject of the state and the object of the state. It seems that intentionality is a relation.
There is, however, a problem: some intentional states are about things that do not exist.
I can think about things that do not exist (e.g. Pegasus); I can desire things that do not exist (e.g. the last chocolate, which unknown to me has been eaten); I can even see things that do not exist (e.g. the hallucination of a dagger). The problem with this is that relations entail the existence of their relata - if the relata do not exist then there can be no relation between them. So any intentional state whose object does not exist cannot be
1 Tim Crane, 'Is Intentionality a Relation?', revised draft, September 1999.
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a relation to that object. Since there seems to be at least one intentional state whose object does not exist (e.g. me thinking about Pegasus), then there seems to be at least one intentional state that is not a relation between its subject and its object, and so it seems that being such a relation cannot be essential to being an intentional state. In short, it seems that intentionality cannot be a relation.
If this right - if when we ascribe an intentional state to a subject we are not ascribing a relation between the subject and the object of the state - then we must be ascribing an intrinsic property to the subject. Why then, if the state is an intrinsic property, can we only fully ascribe it by mentioning something beyond the subject? How, if intentional states are intrinsic properties, can they be individuated by objects outside of the subject, and how, in particular, can this be so even if those objects need not even exist? This is a problem of intentionality, and, following Crane, I will call it the problem of intentionality.
2. How to avoid the problem
It can be argued, of course, that there is no problem - that the argument given above is unsound and that intentionality is indeed a relation between subject and object. This can be done in one of two ways: either by denying that a relation entails the existence of its relata, or by denying that there are any intentional states whose object does not exist. I will consider each of these in turn.
First of all there is the claim that a relation entails the existence of its relata. Crane says that this is "undeniable", and that "in fact it could be taken as definitive of what is meant by 'relation' in this context"
2
. I agree that a relation does entail the existence of its relata, but I don't think that it does so undeniably. It is not obvious in the case of some relations, for instance, whether or not their relata exist. We say, for example, that the number two stands in the relation of 'is less than' to the number four, but it is not clear what to say about the existence of these numbers. I think that when hard-pressed anyone who believes that two is less than four has to also believe that numbers exist, or else they would be obliged to say things like "there is nothing greater than two", and "there is nothing less than four", which I don't think they'd want to do. Then there are the cases in which we attribute relations between things that we explicitly believe do not exist.
Many people, including me, hold that Santa Claus lives at the North Pole. Is this not a relation in which one of the relata does not exist? Again, I think it can be shown not to be - by arguing, for example, that what we mean by saying that Santa Claus lives at the
North Pole is that if he existed then he would do so, or by arguing that we are not expressing a relation but analysing the concept of Santa Claus. My analyses of these examples may be wrong, but I think they show that it is not obviously the case that nonexistents cannot stand in relation.
So why does a relation entail the existence of its relata? We use a relation to express a property of one thing, a, that depends in some way on another thing, b, external to it. If this property of a does not depend in any way on b, then b is not needed for its expression and we do not think of it as being a relation between a and b. When we say, for example, that Wagga Wagga is west of Sydney we are expressing a property of
Wagga Wagga that depends in some way on Sydney - its location in this case. We cannot express the same property of Wagga Wagga without reference to Sydney. On the
2 Op. Cit., p. 4.
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other hand, when we say that Wagga Wagga is beautiful we do not need to refer to
Sydney, because this is a property of Wagga Wagga that does not depend in any way on
Sydney, and one that we do not think of as a relation between the two. Suppose, then, that we were to say that a is related to b, and that b does not exist. That would be to say that a has a property that depends in some way on b. But if b does not exist, then what could it be about b on which this property depends? Suppose, for example, it is said that
Wagga Wagga is west of The Black Stump, which does not exist. Have we expressed a property of Wagga Wagga that depends on anything external to it? Have we expressed a property of Wagga Wagga at all? It does not make sense to think that any property of a can depend on something that does not exist, and so it does not make sense to think that a can be related to something that does not exist. If a is related to b then b must exist. By similar argument, if a is related to b then a must exist. In short, a relation entails the existence of its relata.
Consider, now, the objection that there are no intentional states whose object does not exist. Anyone who wants to argue this has to account for the (many) apparent counterexamples. They have to say why, for example, when I think about Pegasus I am not in an intentional state whose object does not exist. They can argue in one of two ways: either by saying that I am not in an intentional state, or by saying that the object of my state does exist. And they will have to take a similar stance on all apparent examples of intentional states whose objects do not exist: either by saying the state is not intentional, or by saying that its object exists.
Anyone who wants to say that an intentional state whose object does not exist is not really an intentional state at all has to explain why it is not intentional. They could argue that because what it is about does not exist it is not, therefore, about anything, and not, therefore, intentional. But that would be to misunderstand what is meant by a state having aboutness. Having aboutness is an introspectively detectable phenomenological property of a mental state, one that is present whenever the subject can make sense of the question, "What is your state about?" Suppose I am thinking about Pegasus. What am I thinking about? Pegasus. The question makes sense to me, and I can answer it. I am in an intentional state. Pegasus might not exist, but my state is still intentional. The key point here is that we cannot rule out a state being intentional based on the purported non-existence of its object. Intentionality is a phenomenological property. If the subject earnestly says the state is intentional, then it's intentional.
Anyone who wants to argue that the object of every intentional state exists can do so in at least two ways. The first can be easily dismissed. This is the suggestion that intentional states are not about tables and chairs and winged horses and other things in the world (or not, in some cases), but about ideas of those things, which necessarily exist along with the intentional state. This is not the claim that everything in the world is just an idea - proponents of this position agree that there are things in the world other than ideas. It is the claim that when, for example, I think about Pegasus I am actually thinking about an idea of Pegasus, and because this idea exists then the object of the thought exists. But this claim cannot be right. When I think about an apple on my desk,
I am thinking about an apple on my desk and not about any idea of an apple on my desk.
When I look at an apple on my desk, I am looking at an apple on my desk, and not at some image of an apple in my mind. When I desire to eat an apple on my desk, I desire to eat an apple on my desk, not the idea of an apple on my desk. These intentional states are not about ideas, but about non-mental things in the world. Note that some intentional
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states might indeed be about ideas, such as when I do think about the idea of an apple rather than about an apple. But the claim in question is that all intentional states are like this, and that doesn't seem to be right.
The second is not so easily dismissed, but seems equally implausible. This is the suggestion that the object of every intentional state, despite what we may think, does exist, not merely as an idea, but as a genuine object in the world. This is to claim, for example, that when I think about Pegasus then Pegasus must exist, and that whenever I hallucinate there to be an apple on my desk, there must really be such an apple.
Everything that I can think about, then, exists. And everything that I see, whether or not it is an illusion or an hallucination, exists. This is a different position to the first, which claims that the object of every intentional state exists as an idea in the subject's mind.
The position being put forward here is that the object of every intentional state exists, independently of the subject's mind. It would be difficult for proponents of this view to argue that the objects of my thought always exist in the way that I think of them. It would be difficult to argue, for example, that when I imagine a red apple on my desk there really is a red apple on my desk. It is not so absurd, however, to suggest that the apple exists in some other form. I guess the motivating idea is that we can only think about and experience the actual, even if what we think or experience differs from the way those things really are. There is something appealing about this view, but it seems to quickly run into trouble when it comes to explaining exactly what it means to say that the object of a particular state exists. How much, for example, can what I think about an apple differ from the way the apple actually is and yet it still to be the case that I am thinking about the same apple? How much alike the winged horse that I am hallucinating to be in my room is the actual winged horse? Is it in my room? Does it have wings? I will not attempt to investigate these difficulties here, but suggest instead that we should come back to this view only if and when we need to (let's agree to mark it as a last resort).
So none of the attempts to avoid the problem is successful. We have to accept that (i) a relation entails the existence of its relata, and (ii) some intentional states are about things that do not exist (my thoughts about Pegasus, for example). We have to accept, therefore, that intentionality is not a relation.
Some clarifying remarks before moving on. What we have established is that some intentional states cannot be a relation between the subject of the state and the object of the state. Being such a relation, therefore, cannot be essential to a state being intentional. That is what is meant by saying that intentionality is not a relation: an intentional mental state does not have to be a relation between its subject and object.
This is not to say that it cannot be such a relation. Indeed, it can be argued that some intentional states are, in fact, relations to their objects, and therefore entail their existence. But it cannot be in virtue of being intentional that such states are relations, because intentionality is not a relation. It must be in virtue of something else.
To make this clearer, consider the case of knowledge. I cannot know that Kylie
Minogue is 152cm tall unless Kylie Minogue is, in fact, 152 cm tall. In particular, I cannot know that Kylie Minogue is 152cm tall unless Kylie Minogue exists. This is an example of an intentional mental state that entails the existence of its object, and therefore one that is a relation to its object. But it is not its intentionality that makes it a relation. I might be mistaken - Kylie might be 153cm tall, or Kylie might not even exist,
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in which case the state would not be relational. But it would still be just as intentional. It would just be an intentional state other than knowledge - perhaps best called mistaken belief. A similar example in the case of perception is the intentional state of looking at something. I cannot look at an apple on my desk unless there is an apple on my desk.
This is also an intentional state that entails the existence of its object and that is, therefore, relational. But, again, it is not relational in virtue of its intentionality but in virtue of something else. I might be hallucinating an apple, in which case the state is not relational. But it would still be very much intentional. It would just be a different intentional state - hallucinating something rather than looking at something.
It might be interesting to distinguish those intentional states that entail the existence of their objects (such as knowing something, or looking at something) from those that do not (such as thinking about something). Call these latter states intentional*. Then for any given intentional state, if the object of the state must exist for the state to be what it is, then the state is intentional. If the object of the state need not exist for the state to be what it is, then the state is intentional*. (Crane describes this idea in a different way. He talks about intentionality coming in two varieties, D and R. A D-state is one whose object must exist, and an R-state is one whose object need not exist.) But it must be kept in mind that what is common to all of these states is their intentionality. Since, as we have shown above, there are some intentional* states - that is, non-relational intentional states - being relational cannot be part of what is common. Intentional states are not necessarily relational, so intentionality is not a relation.
3. How to solve the problem: Part A
It seems that the problem cannot be avoided. Being in an intentional mental state is an intrinsic property of the subject, but one whose individuation requires the mention of something external to the subject, something that might not even exist. How can that be? Should we be alarmed?
Crane says no. He points out that we already ascribe intrinsic properties to things in a way that seems relational: in the case of dispositions. Dispositions are individuated by events (their manifestations). When I say that a certain vase is fragile, I am saying that it has the disposition to shatter. I individuate the disposition by an event - the shattering of the vase. When I say that a certain sugar cube is soluble, I am saying that it has the disposition to dissolve in water. I individuate this disposition by the event in which the sugar cube dissolves in water. To fully specify a given disposition, I need to specify its manifestation event. This makes it seem that a disposition is a relation between the thing that has the disposition and the manifestation event. But we have a similar situation to the one we have with intentional states: the manifestation events need never occur for the dispositions to obtain. The vase is fragile, regardless of whether or not it ever shatters. The sugar cube is soluble in water, regardless of whether or not it ever dissolves. Dispositions cannot, therefore, be relations - they are intrinsic properties. And yet we ascribe them as though they are relations. If we can make sense of how we do this, Crane suggests, then we can make sense of how we do it for intentional states.
Note that Crane is not suggesting here that intentional states are dispositions. Even if they were, it would not follow that individuating them as dispositions by possibly nonoccurring manifestations is the same thing as individuating them as intentional states by possibly non-existent objects, because the manifestation of the intentional state cannot
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be the object of the state. When Macbeth hallucinates a dagger before him, the object of the hallucination is a dagger. If the hallucination is a disposition then it is a disposition to do things like reach out and try to grab it, or to ask "is this a dagger I see before me?", which are quite different kinds of things to daggers. So the dagger is not the manifestation. All that Crane is suggesting is that the individuation of intentional states is analogous to the individuation of dispositions, and that the latter may be able to help us make sense of the former.
I don't think that Crane's analogy helps. Specifically, I think that dispositions can be individuated by events that need never occur only because intentional mental states can be individuated by things that do not exist, and that we can, therefore, only understand non-relational dispositionality if we can first understand non-relational intentionality.
Consider the vase again. It is fragile, because it has the disposition to shatter under certain conditions. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that if placed in a certain acid it would dissolve, and let's agree to express this by saying that it's soluble. So the vase is soluble, because it has the disposition to dissolve in a certain acid. The vase, then, has two different dispositions - fragility and solubility - which are individuated by two different events - the vase shattering, and the vase dissolving in acid. Suppose, now, that intentional states cannot be individuated by things that do not exist. Then when we say
"Macbeth is hallucinating a dagger" and "Macbeth is hallucinating an apple" when there is no such dagger and apple, we are saying nothing different about Macbeth in each case. And when I say that "I am thinking about Pegasus" and that "I am thinking about
Santa Claus", I am saying nothing different about myself in each case. That is what it means to say that intentional states are not individuated by things that do not exist. The interesting case is when I say that "I believe the vase is fragile" and that "I believe the vase is soluble". This amounts to saying that "I believe that the vase will shatter under certain conditions" and that "I believe that the vase will dissolve in a certain acid".
Suppose that the vase never shatters and never dissolves. Then the objects of my beliefs, the shattering of the vase and the dissolving of the vase, do not exist. My beliefs cannot, then, be individuated by them. So I am saying nothing different about myself in each case. There is nothing different about believing the vase to be fragile and believing the vase to be soluble. The dispositions are effectively no different. So if intentional mental states cannot be individuated by objects that do not exist, then dispositions cannot be individuated by events that do not occur.
It could be said that instead of interpreting the statement "I believe that the vase is fragile" as saying "I believe that the vase will shatter under certain conditions", it could be interpreted as saying "I believe that the vase has a certain molecular structure" (or whatever it is that makes it fragile). Similarly, the belief about its solubility could be interpreted as "I believe that the vase has a certain atomic structure" (or whatever it is that makes it soluble in acid). Then the objects of the beliefs, the molecular structure and the atomic structure, do exist and thus the beliefs can be effectively individuated.
That may be so, but to make this move would be to change from talking about fragility and solubility as dispositions to talking about them as physical properties, and that would be to try to avoid losing the game by changing the rules. The issue here is whether or not fragility and solubility can be individuated as dispositions by events that may never occur, not whether or not they can be individuated when considered as physical properties.
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This may, in fact, be the reason why non-relational dispositionality doesn't seem as problematic as non-relational intentionality. We can always think of the vase's disposition to shatter as a property of its molecular structure (even if we don't know exactly what that property is). That makes it easy to believe that talk about dispositionality is just convenient shorthand for talk about physical properties, and that the reason why the vase has the disposition to shatter even if it never does is that it has a particular physical structure, a structure that does not depend on any event, occurring or non-occurring. Such a move is not unproblematically available in the case of intentional mental states, however. It is very much a moot point whether or not talking about an intentional state being about something is just convenient shorthand for talking about a physical property of the subject. If we could accept this, then maybe non-relational intentional would not be such a problem.
So I don't think that Crane's analogy between intentionality and dispositions is any help, or at least not in the way that he presents it. I think we can, however, make some progress, as I hope to show in the next section.
4. How to solve the problem: Part B
The problem of intentionality amounts to not being able to give a unified account of what kind of things the objects of intentional states are - that is, of what kind of things intentional states are about. We cannot say that they are about things external to the mind, because some of them (such as the imagination of a winged horse, or the hallucination of a dagger) are not. We cannot say that they are about things in the mind, because some of them (such as thinking about a real horse, or looking at a real dagger) are not. It would be ad hoc to say that intentional states come in two varieties - those about things external to the mind and those about things in the mind - because aboutness is a phenomenological feature of intentional states and there can be no phenomenological difference between these two purported varieties (if there was, then ontology would be too easy - we could tell whether or not the object of an intentional state exists by introspecting the kind of intentionality of the state). So what kinds of things are the objects of intentional states?
I propose that if we adopt a type of idealism then we can answer this question: the objects of intentional states are things in the mind - ideas. My aim in this section is to describe the type of idealism that I propose we adopt, to give some brief arguments for why we should, and then to show that by doing so we can solve the problem of intentionality.
My task in describing the idealism that I am advocating would be easier if I could classify it as one of the various well-known idealisms. Unfortunately these are not so well-known to me, so let me just say that it is inspired by Berkeley and Kant and put the classification to one side. It has two key features. The first is that the object of every intentional state is an idea. When I think about Pegasus I am thinking about an idea; when I think about Sydney I am thinking about an idea; when I look at a hallucinatory dagger I am looking at an idea; when I look at a real dagger I am looking at an idea; when I touch a real dagger I am touching an idea; when I smell a real rose I am smelling an idea. Note that this is not the same view that we met and dismissed in section two.
That was the view that when I think about Pegasus, for example, I am thinking about an idea of Pegasus, and that when I look at an apple, I am looking at an idea of an apple.
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Proponents of that view allow there to be winged horses and apples external to the mind, but claim that our thoughts and perceptions are merely about ideas of them. The view being proposed here is that thoughts and perceptions are about things in the world and not ideas of things in the world, but that these things in the world are just ideas. In fact, the world itself is just an idea. This is a subtle but important difference. If the world is just an idea, then doesn't that mean that we each have our own, possibly different world? If so, why does there seem to be a single world common to each of us?
Yes, each of us has our own world. But the view here does not reject the possibility of there being something non-mental that in some way makes us have the ideas that we have, and in many cases makes us have the same ideas. It just rejects the notion that such a thing is anything like these ideas. What each of us calls 'the world' is completely mental - a collection of ideas - and although there may be something beyond our worlds that makes us have the ideas that we do, it is nothing like those ideas. Note that on this view perception is just a special case of conception - to perceive is nothing more than to conceive (although in a special way, as I will suggest next).
So the first key feature is that the object of every intentional state is an idea. The second key feature is that what we mean when we say that an object exists is that the object is a special kind of idea. Specifically, it is an idea that none of us has complete control over.
To see what I mean, consider these four things: an apple that I am imagining, an apple that I am hallucinating, Kylie Minogue, and Pegasus. When I imagine an apple I am free to think whatever I like about it - where it is, what size it is, etc. Because I have such control, I don't believe that it exists. When I hallucinate an apple, however, my thoughts are not in my control - I can't help thinking of an apple of a certain size in a certain position etc. Because what I think about the apple seems to be beyond my control in this way, I believe that the apple exists. Were I to learn that others are not so constrained in their thoughts (i.e. that others cannot 'see' it), then I would no longer believe that it exists. We believe that anyone who stands in front of Kylie Minogue will automatically have certain ideas about her - her size, her shape, etc. None of us has complete freedom over these ideas. So we believe that Kylie Minogue exists. Pegasus is an interesting case. It seems that in some sense Pegasus exists - more so, at least, than my merely imagined apple. I think the view being put forward here can explain why - we are constrained in what thoughts we can have about Pegasus: we must think of it as being a horse and as being winged, or else we would not be thinking of Pegasus. But when we remember that such constraints have been imposed by a person (the creator of the myth), then we no longer entertain the idea that Pegasus might exist. It is a consequence of this view of existence that perception plays an important role in ontology. When I open my eyes and look around my room I form all sorts of ideas - ideas about desks and books and chairs, etc. I can't help it. And because the ideas that I form are beyond my control, I am inclined to believe that the objects of these ideas exist. Perception is conception of a special kind - it is the formation of ideas over which we seem to have no control, and so it is the formation of ideas of objects that we are naturally inclined to think exist.
At the risk of under-representing this type of idealism, I will leave its description at that.
To reiterate, its two main features are (i) that the object of every intentional state is an idea, and (ii) that to exist is to be a certain type of idea. If we are idealists in this way, then we can say that the object of every intentional state does exist. But we must use
'exist' in a different sense to the way it is being used in (ii). To exist in that sense is to be a special kind of idea. So the class of things that exist is a sub-class of the class of ideas.
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It doesn't make sense, then, to say that every idea exists. So if we adopt the idealism proposed, we must form a new concept of existence - one that applies at the level of ideas. Call it Existence. Then every idea Exists, but only some ideas exist. (I think that the distinction between existence and Existence is similar to David Lewis' distinction between existence and actuality in the case of possible worlds.) Armed with this new concept, we can say that the object of every intentional state Exists. That means that we can, if we like, go back to thinking of intentionality as being a relation. But to do so we need to expand our concept of a relation as well. We argued above that a relation can only hold between things that exist. If we allow that a relation can also hold between a mind and things that Exist, which I think is reasonable to do, then we can say that an intentional state is always a relation between a mind and an idea. We could do that, or we could continue to view intentionality as an intrinsic property of the subject. But in that case we no longer have the problem of individuation. Intentional states are individuated not problematically by things that exist, but unproblematically by things that Exist. I suppose that choosing between a relation and an intrinsic property amounts to choosing where to draw the line between subject and object in an intentional state. If we think of the subject as the whole mind, including all of its ideas, then we must think of intentionality as an intrinsic property. If we think of the subject as being one aspect of the mind, consciousness, and of ideas as being another aspect of the mind, then we must think of intentionality as being a relation. Either way, by adopting the type of idealism that I have described (which I think is attractive on independent grounds anyway) then intentionality poses no problem.
On a final note, I think that if Crane adopted this idealism then he could much more easily put forward his case that intentionality is the mark of the mental. If the objects of intentional states are ideas, and if ideas are always ideas of something , then rather than characterize an intentional state as being one that is about something, we can say that to be in an intentional state is to have an idea. This is so because if I am in an intentional state then, according to the idealist view, I am having an idea. And if I am having an idea, then I am having an idea of something, and so I am in an intentional state. Crane says that to have a mind is to have a world. But if we adopt the proposed idealist view then this can't be quite right. To have a world, according to this view, is to have ideas of a particular sort - ideas that are in some way constrained. But shouldn't we allow there to be minds that have ideas, but none of this particular sort? Shouldn't we allow there to be minds that do not have a world? I think that we should, even if it turns out that every mind must have a world. To have a mind, then, is to have an idea, and if to have an idea is to be in an intentional state, then to have a mind is to be in an intentional state.
Intentionality, the idealist can claim, is the mark of the mental.
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