Below is a revised list of questions. The exam will be based on one or a combination of
variations over these questions. The readings are also divided into “core readings” and
“supplementary readings”.
B. The firm as an economic institution.
In what sense is the firm a substitute for markets?
How should we understand factory production versus outsourcing; complete contracts
versus authority relations, spot market hiring versus contingent renewal?
Core readings
Alchian and H. Demzets: "Production, information costs and economic organization",
American Economic Review, 62 No 5, 1972.
Steve Marglin: "What do bosses do?, in Giddens & Hold, s. 285-298
Supplementary readings
Ronald Coase : "The nature of the firm" Economica 4, 1937.
Amartya Sen: "Labour allocation in a co-operative enterprise". Review of Economic
Studies vol 33 No 96 October 1966.
C. Organized interests.
What are the economic impacts of unions versus coops?
How are organized interests affected by globalization? What are the comparative
advantages of different systems of collective wage bargaining?
Does coordination in wage setting imply higher real wages?
Core readings:
K. Moene and M. Wallerstein: "Colective bargaining versus workers ownership".
Journal of Comparative Economics, 17, (1993), 628-645.
Supplementary readings
L.Badcock and G. Loewenstein "Explaining Bargaining Impasse. The Role of SelfServing Biases" Journal of Economic Perspectives vol 11, no 1, 1997.
Leif Johansen: "The Bargaining society and the inefficiency of bargaining", Kyklos, 32,
No 3, 1979.
L.Badcock and G. Loewenstein "Explaining Bargaining Impasse. The Role of SelfServing Biases" Journal of Economic Perspectives vol 11, no 1, 1997.
E. Fehr and S. Gãchter. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"
Journal of Economic Perspectives vol 14, no 3, 2000.
K. Moene, M. Wallerstein and M. Hoel “Bargaining Structure and Economic
Performance”, in Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein (eds) Trade Union Behaviour, Pay
Bargaining and Economic Perforance. Claredon Press, Oxford.
D. Markets and profit sharing.
How can one characterize aspects such as the flexibility and stability of capitalist
markets?
How do alternative market economies - such as the share economy - work?
Core readings:
Martin L. Weitzman: "The simple macroeconomics of profit-sharing", American
Economic Review, vol 75, 1985.
Supplementary reading
Martin L. Weitzman: "Profit-sharing capitalism", in Elster and Moene eds, Alternatives
to capitalism, Cambridge University Press 1989, s. 61-70.
S. Bowles Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution Princeton University
Press. chap 7. and chap 10
E. Governance.
What is the impact of bureaucratic organization as compared to alternative ways of
privatization?
What is corruption and what is the impact of such venal practices? Does corruption work
as sand in the machinery or as oil in the machinery?
Why do countries introduce democracy and to what extent is it challenged by
globalization?
Core readings:
Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz: (ONLY first part) "The architecture of economic
systems: Hierachies and Polyarchies", American Economic Review, vol 76, September
1986. (first part)
K. Moene: "Types of bureaucratic interaction". Journal of Public Economics vol 29,
1986.
A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. "Corruption". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993.
Acemoglu, D and J. A. Robinson (2000) “Why did the West extend the franchise?
Democracy, inequality and growth in historical perspective” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115, 1167-1200.
Supplementary reading
J.C. Andvig and . K. Moene: "How corruption may corrupt", Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 13, 1990.
*
F. Welfare states and institutional equilibria
What is the difference between insurance motives versus redistribution motives for the
welfare state?
How does inequality affect the support for the welfare state?
What are the impacts of targeted versus universalistic programs on the political support
for welfare spending?
How is the welfare state affected by globalization?
What is the logic of the Scandinavian model
Core readings
K. Moene and M. Wallerstein: "Social Democratic Labor Market Institutions: A
Retrospective Analysis". In H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J.Stephens (eds)
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Hans-Werner Sinn The New Systems Competition Blackwell Publishers, 2003. ch 3
G. System competition, development regimes and social dumping
How does competition between states and between systems work?
Do economic and political systems converge to a common mode in a globalized world?
Why do some countries produce so much more goods than others?
Do similar workers get different pay in different parts of an integrated world market?
Why?
Core readings
Richard Freeman (1995) “Are your wages set in Beijing” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 9(3).
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much
More Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1999,
114 (1), 83-116.
Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence,
Experimentation, and Economic Performance.
Hans-Werner Sinn The New Systems Competition Blackwell Publishers, 2003. ch 4
Supplementary reading
Rodrik, D. (2000) “How far will international economic integration go?” Journal of
Economic Perspectives,
Janos Kornai “Resource constrained versus demand constrained systems” Econometrica
vol 47, no 4, 1979.
Rodrik, D. (1999) “Democracies pay higher wages” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol CXIV pp. 707-738.