Prague Enlargement Dialogue 2012
Discussion paper
David Král, Vladimír Bartovic
edited and commented by Vít Beneš
The following document does not necessarily represent the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Czech Republic.
1
The place of enlargement in the current EU strategic debate
For the European Union, enlargement is no longer a grand strategic political project
anymore. The reality of the European Union in 2012 is that the forward looking
strategic thinking in the EU is driven mainly by the Union internal developments that
have evolved in the past two years in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, and to that
end it tends to focus on the issues of the future of economic and monetary union, coordination of economic policies, adding of “missing links” to sustain the single
currency, debt mutualisation, balancing the fiscal discipline and growth etc.
The current state of the strategic EU debate is best reflected by the two reports that
have appeared in course of 2012, trying to frame the current discourse as well as
provide some guidance for European policy makers (albeit sometimes rather vague
ones) in terms of future direction of policies, as well as institutional changes that
should underpin them.
The first of the quoted reports, published ahead of the June European Council, was
produced by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy in close cooperation with the Commission President José Manuel Barroso, President of the
Eurogroup Jean Claude Juncker and the President of the ECB Mario Draghi. The
report addresses primarily the issues pertinent to the economic and monetary union, as
its title suggests1. The paper does not mention enlargement at all. To some extent, it is
understandable, given the fact that the report deals merely with the internal issues
mainly of the Eurozone. On the other hand, it is quite telling that no link is seen
between the growth, jobs and stability, which is one of the main focus points of the
document, and the enlargement. This link is something that will be explored later on
in this paper.
The second report that merited substantial attention of the European policy
community and media lately is the so-called “Westerwelle group report”, published
on 17 September 2012 by a group of like-minded foreign ministers which emerged
from the initiative of the German foreign policy chief Guido Westerwelle 2. Unlike the
previously mentioned report, this paper addresses a wider range of issues, including
the external relations of the European Union (which was be expected given that it was
tabled by foreign ministers). However, even here enlargement is mentioned only
marginally among other areas concerning external action, along with the
neighbourhood policy, development, trade and external economic affairs,
management of migration flows, climate change and energy security. Much more
attention is devoted to CFSP which is clearly perceived as a major challenge in the
realm of EU external action, while no specific reference as to how to give a boost to
the enlargement process are made. Implicitly, enlargement can be seen as a potential
challenge in terms of future treaty reforms, when in the last section dealing with the
long-term overall functioning of the EU it is acknowledged that “in an EU with 28 or
more Member States, treaty reform will be more difficult”3.
1 Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy,
EUCO 120/12. Brussels, 26 June 2012
2 The so-called Westerwelle group consists of the foreign ministers of the following EU member states: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain
3 Final Report of the Future of Europe Group, pg. 9
2
The brief overview of these three main strategic papers from recent period underpin
the waning importance of the enlargement for the EU. It does not translate into a
grand strategic project like the post-Cold war 2004 “big bang enlargement”. One can
sense this not only from the reports that were alluded to, but also from other
documents. For instance, enlargement was in the run up to 2004 quoted as a priority
of almost every single EU Council presidency. Recently, perhaps as a result of a
tendency to cut down the number of presidency’s priorities, the enlargement agenda is
usually hidden under the broader “Global Europe” or “EU in the world” clause, and
often it seems it is there more from the inertia rather than from the genuine belief of
the presidency. But also the rhetoric around the enlargement has been changing
considerably. While prior to 2004 it was referred to by policy makers as an
opportunity, stressing its positive sides rather than the risks, after 2004 and especially
after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, we come across much more
clichés like the “enlargement fatigue” or the need to consider the EU’s “absorption
capacity” in the enlargement discourse.
Unlike the grand European project that the enlargement was a decade ago, currently it
is merely conferred to the “unfinished business” of the perspective accession of the
countries of Western Balkans and the strongly contested issue of the accession
negotiations with Turkey. This can be explained by several broader considerations.
Firstly, the process lacks strong advocates at the EU level, both at the level of member
states and personalities. Especially the strong German backing which was
instrumental in making the “big bang” happen is missing in the current atmosphere.
Although there is still a relatively strong group of like-minded countries that see the
enlargement as a strategic priority for the EU, they fail to translate this support into
strong political signal and the German clout to push the other Member States and .
The Eastern enlargement was seen much more in symbolic, even idealistic terms as a
necessary step towards bridging the divisions that emerged across Europe as a result
of the Cold War, as a historical duty or obligation and as such was often portrayed by
the EU leaders. Perhaps this has enabled the politicians in the EU to sell this story to
the public, although the public support remained significantly lukewarm in many
Member States (e.g. Austria, France). This idealistic and symbolic rhetoric is,
however, not present in the current political discourse. It is difficult to make this
argument in relation to Turkey. But even where it could be convincingly made, such
as in the case of Western Balkans (not least because of the inactivity syndrom
strongly present in many EU capitals), it is not happening at the rhetorical level to
boost the process politically.
Another possible explanation is a failure to accompany the inclusion of more
countries with necessary structural changes in the EU. This trend is especially evident
since the failed referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands
in 2005. The grand project of EU Eastern enlargement was accompanied by not least
as grand a project of drafting the European constitution. After the failure of the
process, the abyss between the “deepening” and “widening” has increased even
further. No matter how much disputed the link between the two processes could be by
academics and think-tankers, it is still central to thinking of many policymakers
across Europe. The failure of the EU to deliver on one side of the coin (in this case
deepening) automatically results in a perceived need to slow down on the other side
3
too (in this case on enlargement), with the fear that otherwise the Union as a whole
risks strong paralysis. Many have hoped that the atmosphere will grow more
favourable after the Lisbon Treaty has been finally adopted, by which the widening –
deepening dilemma was supposed to be – at least for the time being – settled. But the
outbreak of the debt crisis proved that the framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty
by far does not represent a stable and durable solution for the internal EU issues.
Current assessment of the state of play in EU enlargement
Enlargement is a policy that involves all the main political institutions of the
European Union (European Council, Council, European Parliament and European
Commission) as well as the member states and their national parliaments. Although
the strategic political decisions related to the enlargement are in the hands of the
European Council, the main engine of enlargement is currently the European
Commission. As a result of the “strategic shift” in relation to the enlargement policy,
the process has much less political backing, especially among large member states.
The Commission’s approach can be described as technocratic. Once the article 49 of
the Treaty on European Union is activated by the European Council and the
Commission is asked for the opinion on the application, the standard bureaucratic
procedures starts. Although the Commission in this process acts as the “member
state’s agent”, it is steadily increasing its influence on both creation and
implementation of the enlargement policy. The negotiation frameworks with Croatia,
Turkey and Iceland show that the European Commission was given a space to act as a
mediator between the member states of the EU and applicant countries.
However, Commission lacks the necessary political and strategic clout that the
member states possess. This can be illustrated by the different degree of attention that
the Commission or Member State representatives receive in the candidate countries.
Merkel’s or Sarkozy’s statements are much more noticed and commented by the
Turkish media or political elites than those of Barroso, Ashton or Füle. Similarly,
when Angela Merkel suggested she would appreciate more open-minded attitude of
the Serbian government vis-à-vis Belgrade – Prishtina dialogue, things indeed started
to move forward unlike in case of similar statements made by EU institutions
(Cooper, Füle).
Despite the fact that the enlargement is less politically driven, it is however much
more politicized. There is a growing tendency to use the accession process as a
bargaining chip in dealing with bilateral issues. There are dozens of points in which
any member state can stop or slow down the accession process of the applicant
country. Starting with the assessment of the application, decision over the candidate
status and opening of the accession negotiations, through the negotiation phase when
the consent is needed for opening and closing of each individual negotiation chapter
until the end of negotiations, conclusion of the accession treaty and its ratification.
Although the attempts to make use of the accession process to settle bilateral disputes
were present already during the previous rounds of accession, for the first time it has
had serious impact during the Croatian accession process. While negotiations with
countries from so-called Helsinki group of states lasted less than three years, Croatia’s
negotiations were prolonged to six years mainly due to the blockage by Slovenia.
Similarly, other veto players on the EU side, in particular Greece in case of
Macedonia and Cyprus and France in case of Turkey, cause that the process of
4
enlargement is becoming much more hostage to bilateral issues/problems than was the
case previously. This behaviour of some member states is setting a negative example
for the applicant countries that will join the Union sooner than the others. Given the
complexity and inscrutability of relations among Western Balkan countries it might
have serious impacts on future negotiations.
While 2004 enlargement is being consensually considered as a success story, we
cannot say so about the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. In case of the countries
acceding in 2004, the accession conditionality was more or less thoroughly applied
and these countries fulfilled the accession criteria. Bulgaria and Romania were
admitted to join the EU as full members despite serious shortcomings in fulfilling all
the vital conditions. Strict conditionality was replaced by the policy of so-called postaccession socialisation secured by safeguard clauses in their accession treaties and
creation of the verification mechanisms. However, this approach was not perceived
positively and left negative experience that influenced European Commission’s and
member states’ attitudes toward enlargement with the common denominator of
significantly increased cautiousness. As a result, the process of enlargement differs
significantly to that from last “Eastern” round. It is much more concentrated to the
pre-negotiation phase where the candidates are required to show compliance with
requirements that were previously tackled in the negotiation phase.
In case of Western Balkans countries we can even talk about additional conditionality
or “Copenhagen Plus” criteria. They tackle region-specific problems such as the full
co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
neighbourly relations or regional cooperation.
Commission follows its own enlargement strategy from 2005 based on “three C”:
consolidation of political commitments, strict conditionality and communication. This
strategy was backed in 2006 when the European Council conclusions on enlargement
stated that: “the enlargement strategy based on consolidation, conditionality and
communication, combined with the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, forms
the basis for a renewed consensus on enlargement”. New European Commissioner for
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle complemented these
three C with the fourth - “Credibility of the accession process”.
For the EU's enlargement policy to proceed successfully, it has to be credible in two
respects, according to the Commission. For the member states, credibility of the
enlargement process means rigorous conditionality towards the applicants. Only those
who are fulfilling all the criteria and only once they are fully prepared, they can be
recommended by the Commission to conclude negotiations. On the other hand,
candidate and potential candidate countries must have tangible European perspective.
They shall be promoted throughout the enlargement process step by step as they
comply with individual benchmarks. Once they fulfil all the conditions and achieve
full preparedness they shall be admitted to join the EU without being hindered by
other issues such as internal developments in the EU or its member states.
In this respect some positive developments can be observed. The European
Commission together with member states was able to prepare a set of opening and
closing benchmarks that serve as a pivot key for the applicants. New approach in
leading the negotiations was adopted when the most difficult and complicated
5
negotiations chapters shall be opened among the first and closed among the last, thus
giving enough space and time for implementation of all the necessary reforms. This
approach will also enable to monitor not only the formal implementation but also to
observe a track record and real change achieved by the applicants. The Lisbon Treaty
has in a way helped in sidelining the absorption capacity issue, as the lack of new
institutional settlement was often presented as one of the principle arguments why the
enlargement process cannot proceed. For the future, the absorption capacity issue will
be not a general but sector-specific issue, with the Commission examining possible
threats and obstacles in integrating new members in individual policies and according
to that assessment proposing transitional periods or permanent derogations.
Last couple of years have brought some positive achievements in the enlargement
process, especially vis-à-vis Western Balkans. Without any doubt, the conclusion of
negotiations and signing of the Accession Treaty with Croatia in 2011 has been major
success in the enlargement since completion of the “Eastern” round of enlargement in
2007. This step showed that the process, despite all the complications and pitfalls,
continues. It provided a positive example to other applicants that concentrated effort
in delivering necessary reforms will eventually bring results. Croatia being the first
“truly Western Balkan” country to enter the EU is thus opening the doors also for the
rest of the ex-Yugoslav fellows and Albania.
After a long period since Macedonia applied for membership in 2004, four countries
delivered their membership applications to the Council during 12 months (starting
with Montenegro in December 2008, followed by Albania and Iceland in April and
May 2009 respectively, and Serbia in December 2009). After a short period of
hesitations and uncertainty whether the Union and its member states would stick to
their promises made in 2004 Thessaloniki summit, the Council has passed the
applications to the European Commission asking for its opinion, thus starting the
procedures according to the Article 49 of Treaty on the European Union. Following
the positive track record in delivering the necessary reforms, Montenegro was granted
the candidate status in December 2010 and started the accession negotiations in June
2012. Major breakthrough was achieved by Serbia especially thanks to a longawaited arrest of two ICTY indictees Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić in 2011 which
eliminated one of the two biggest obstacles for Serbian EU accession process. Serbia
has made certain progress in addressing its unsettled relations with Kosovo – the
second issue that hampers its integration ambitions. In 2011 the EU facilitated
Belgrade – Pristina dialogue also finally started, bringing for the first time the
representatives of Serbia and Kosovo behind negotiating table. The ability of Serbian
government to make some limited concessions from its previous positions brought its
fruits in March 2012 when Serbia was granted a candidate status.
Last but not least, the decision of the European Union to grant visa free travel to the
countries of the Western Balkan with the exception of Kosovo should be accounted
for. Since 2009 citizens of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia and since 2010
citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina do not need visa in order to travel to
whole Schengen area. This decision with the most significant direct impact on the
citizens of Western Balkan countries proved that the applicant countries are able to
progress swiftly if the outcome is tangible, clear conditions and benchmarks are set,
and there is public pressure forcing their authorities to act.
6
At the same time, many setbacks and stalemates in the accession process were
encountered. Repeating failure to reach an agreement on the opening of accession
negotiations with Macedonia, despite the previous positive recommendations from the
European Commission and the International Court of Justice ruling on the name issue
makes Macedonia the longest standing candidate for opening of the negotiations.
With seven years of waiting for the negotiations to start (from 2005) even broke the
record of Turkey that has started negotiations after six years from being granted
candidate status (1999 – 2005). Similarly, there is a stalemate in the accession
negotiations with Turkey that are de-facto frozen mainly thanks to the veto from
Cyprus and France, but also thanks to the lack of political will to make positive steps
on part of Turkey. It is becoming questionable whether the accession process of
Turkey continues only formally and whether in fact both sides - the European Union
and Turkey - had definitely lost their mutual integration ambitions.
Absolute lack of progress in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo can be
considered a major failure not only of the enlargement policy but of the Union’s
foreign policy as such. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that the carrot of
EU membership is sometimes not strong enough to overcome the internal stalemates
and problems of the applicant country. On the other hand, in case of Kosovo the lack
of unity among the member states represents failure of the Union’s ambitions to act as
a leader in Western Balkans. In many respects it is also impeding Kosovo to progress
further on its integration path.
A negative impact of the debt crisis in the Eurozone on the enlargement process can
also be observed. The European Union – its institutions and member states instinctively concentrate on solving their internal problems (TGSC, rescue packages,
banking union). Enlargement slowly vanished from the EU presidencies top priorities
and it is becoming more difficult to argue in favour of the enlargement that entails
costs (all the applicant countries with the possible exception of Iceland would become
net recipients from the EU budget) in the times of austerity measures. The economic
crisis in many countries of the Union also increases the leverage of Eurosceptic
parties that are largely opposed to EU enlargement (Party for Freedom - PVV, Finns,
Jobbik). For majority of standard political parties across the EU, enlargement is not a
battlefield where they would invest their energy, especially in the light of citizens’
opinions on the enlargement.
There is a growing negative trend in the EU public opinion towards enlargement than
ever before. According to the Eurobarometer 76 (Autumn 2011) only 36 percent of
the EU citizens support the enlargement process while 53 percent are opposed. This is
for the first time than more than half of EU citizens oppose the enlargement. In
several countries, the number of people opposing exceeds 70 percent of population
(Germany, France Austria, and Finland). The biggest shift of public opinion is
however encountered in new EU member states (with the exception of Poland). In the
Czech Republic or Slovakia, the support fell down during one year by 20 percent
(from 57 to 38 in case of CZ and from 68 to 48 in case of SK). So far, there is no
serious sociological analysis explaining these negative trends. However we can
assume that these trends are underpinned by the worsening economic situation in
many EU member states. They also strongly correlate with the feelings towards the
EU as such and thus cannot be attributed exclusively to the enlargement or to the poor
reputation of the individual applicant countries. These changes in public opinions
7
diminish the political support even further. Low public support thus becomes a handy
excuse for the politicians that are not supportive of the EU enlargement. This situation
recalls the 2004 enlargement when majority of citizens of the EU-15 was shortly
before the accession date 1st May opposed to it - 43 percent vs. 37 in favour.
However, just after the big bang enlargement the public support for enlargement in
half a year raised to all time high 54 percent. This shows that the public opinion can
swing within a relatively short time, so this could be the case also in the current state.
On the other hand, support for membership of citizens of applicant countries remains
relatively stable. Opinion polls (Balkan monitor by Gallup 2010) show that absolute
majority of citizens in all the countries of Western Balkans (with the exception of
Serbia) support EU membership (87% in Kosovo, 81% in Albania, 69% in BiH, 73%
in Montenegro, 60% in Macedonia). However, we can observe that public opinion in
these countries is also sensitive towards the messages sent from the EU or its member
states. For example, public support in Croatia for the EU accession in 2010 was only
at the level of 25 percent due to blockage of the negotiations, although after their
conclusion 66 per cent voted “yes” in the accession referendum in January 2012.
Stagnation of the accession process of Macedonia has led to a decline of public
support from 76 percent in 2006 to 60 percent in 2010.
There is also a question of the continuation of the enlargement beyond Western
Balkans and Turkey. Positions of the major EU players (especially Germany and
France) are centred only around the existing commitments but without any appetite to
go much further than absolutely necessary. It is almost unconceivable that any other
country would be given the full-fledged membership perspective at the moment. This
is undermining the EU ambitions especially in the Eastern neighbourhood where it
voluntarily gives up its sweetest carrot. Only full membership perspective proved to
attract the EU neighbours to undergo necessary political and economic reforms. The
Central and Eastern Europeans who are the biggest supporters of further enlargement
are not strong enough to promote this idea and lately prefer to keep low profile
approach.
Why the enlargement process should continue?
The EU enlargement is not an EU policy per se, but in fact has evolved into such. One
can say that the whole machinery which was developed around it, with a specific
Commissioner and directorate-general in charge of the process clearly distinguishes it
from the other areas of EU external action. In fact, one can see in it a practical
implementation of Article 49 of Treaty on European Union. Thus, one could argue
that member states should, in compliance with the loyalty principle, undertake all the
actions in good faith to bring this article into life.
In the following section, we would like to offer what we see as several principle
arguments why the EU enlargement should continue.
1. The idealistic argument: Europe whole and free
8
Despite the fact that the concept of “Europe whole and free4” comes mainly from the
US strategic thinking, viewing this as a way of making Europe part of a solution, not
a problem for US foreign policy, it was fully taken on board by the European
decision-makers during and after the Cold War. But also the concept of “Europe
whole and free” corresponds to the original raison d’être of the European
Communities. Even though the European integration started as a West-European
project, the founding treaties had a pan-European ethos. On paper, they allowed for
the inclusion of any European country, which upholds democratic values. After the
end of the Cold War, the supporters of the EU eastern enlargement pointed out to the
original pan-European idea of the West-European integration project (EC/EU) and
successfully promoted the idea that the winners of the Cold war (the West) have a
political and moral duty to support the democratization and reintegration of the new
democracies in the Central and Eastern Europe. Today, the EU needs to revive this
moral dimension if it wants to accomplish its mission of bringing peace and security
to Europe.
The argument of “European reuinification” is however, not voiced fervently enough
in the current enlargement debate. Until recently, the citizens of most Western Balkan
countries, once the holders of Yugoslav passports enabling them to travel both East
and West, were subject to cumbersome and often humiliating procedures of having to
apply for the Schengen visas, thus creating a new “paper” curtain across Europe.
Although this issue has been successfully tackled by concluding visa liberalisation
agreements with all the countries of the region except for Kosovo, the citizens of
Western Balkan countries still can not feel like full-fledged citizens of the EU,
enjoying all the benefits of EU citizenship such as the freedom of settlement or work
elsewhere in Europe. The pursuit of enlargement policy to this region is thus a natural
step forward in the thinking of the EU funding fathers, dreaming of peace and
prosperity across the continent. For some policy makers, it is difficult to extend this
argument beyond Western Balkans to Turkey, or possibly to Eastern European
countries, as they do not see this as a part of the European family. But this issue goes
much deeper to the issues of European identity, which cannot be examined in detail in
this paper and the conclusion would most probably be that there can hardly be found a
wide-reaching consensus across the Member States. But at least in relation to the
Balkan countries, the consensus seems to be relatively strongly rooted, at least at the
level of the European political elites.
The purpose of the European integration has always been to promote reconciliation
among nations in order to prevent the repetition of the horrors of the WWI and WWII
and the geopolitical tragedy of the Cold War. The EU has achieved a lot in this
respect. War between Germany and France is unthinkable and the two former enemies
turned into partners and engines of the EU-wide integration.
With no doubt, EU membership helps to pre-empt, prevent and contain conflicts
between countries. The fact that countries and their representatives have to work on
day to day basis in the context of a wider community, dealing with often practical,
technical issues, leads to their better socialisation and “Europeanisation”. What can be
seen as purely bilateral issues or disputes are thus “Europeanised” as well, with the
other Member States and Union institutions acting as watchdogs, arbiters or
interlocutors. Examples have shown that the EU membership has played a highly
positive role in cases such as conflict in Northern Ireland, separatist tendencies in
Spain, or Slovak – Hungarian disputes. This argument is particularly valid for the
4 The title of the speech of President George Bush in Mainz in May 1989.
9
region of Western Balkans, where we can still find many animosities – latent or alive.
This presents a unique opportunity for the EU to address the stability issue through
enlargement process by including it as part of the conditionality. As the countries are
not likely to join at the same time, it is instrumental to impose restrictions on early
entrants not to open the disputed issues in the negotiation phase (as was the case of
Slovenian-Croatian border dispute) but to address them outside of the negotiation
framework.
2. The transformative argument: making most of the EU soft power
There is a relatively strong consensus that out of the EU foreign policy toolbox,
enlargement is the most effective tool at EU’s disposal. In other words, there is no
better way for the EU to pursue democracy and human rights5 than through
enlargement policy. Because unlike in other areas, in the process of preparation for
membership the EU disposes with a very intricate set of tools to set the transformative
agenda (determining the negotiating chapters of the acquis, setting up national action
plans, screening), implement it (through the process of the adoption of acquis) but
also to monitor it. The problem in the current enlargement is that either the process
has not yet reached the negotiation phase where most of the progress was achieved in
the previous enlargements because of the reasons explained earlier on. The EU insists
that much more has to be achieved in pre-negotiation phase, but at the same time it
lacks the sticks to push the candidate countries into the painful structural reforms. Or,
as in the case of Turkey, it has practically frozen the process, thus again depriving
itself of the main stick and carrot to transform Turkey in its image. Thus to make most
of this argument, the best would be to move quickly into a negotiation phase with as
many countries of Western Balkans as possible; this is, however, quite difficult
because of the increased role of veto players and also because some less minded
countries see this as a one-way path of no return.
3. The geopolitical argument: nature does not like vacuum
The 21st century has marked a new era of polycentric world with new rising powers
and increased global competition for geopolitical and economic influence and
resources. The benefits of the EU enlargement are clear. The enlarged EU is more
dynamic and carries more weight when addressing issues of global importance.
The geopolitical costs of non-enlargement are quite high. The disillusioned candidate
countries may loose interest in the accession. Moreover, they may start look for
alternative models that could provide economic growth and development without too
much of EU flavour (in this respect, it has become fashionable to speak of Singapore
model, or even Chinese model). The power vacuum caused by the lack of
determination on the EU side opens ample opportunities for other rising actors to step
in. They will compete with the EU by offering an alternative in terms of economic
benefits, investments and the model of economic development with much less
emphasis on democracy and rule of law. In case of Western Balkans, Europe should
5 According to the Article 21 of the Treaty Establishing the European Union, the EU supports the following principles and
values in international relations: democracy, human rights, universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity, principles of equality and solidarity
10
not take its influence for granted: other emerging players such as Russia, Turkey or
even China are already stepping in and if the EU is not able to steer the process of
integration forward, it might lose its clout even in its immediate vicinity.
In case of Turkey, the EU risks loosing an ally in a fragile, but important region.
Turkey, disappointed by the lack of European perspective, will develop a more
assertive foreign policy which may not be in line with the EU priorities. The founders
of modern Turkey have been inspired by European modernity, secularism and
nationhood. Today, we risk that the disillusioned Turkey will cease to identify itself
with Europe and its values. This would be a huge loss, as the current process enables
for the first time after centuries to bridge the “them” and “us” dilemma in relation to
Turkey.
4. The pacta sunt servanda argument: respecting our own rules
The European Union likes to portray itself in the international arena as a strong
normative player, obeying by the rules of the game that are either considered
universal or that it helped to create and requiring the same from the others. In the
enlargement process, it thus risks a huge potential loss of credibility if it attempted –
by various means – from such promises or obligations. This is true especially in
respect to Turkey. The acceptance of its membership application in 1987 and granting
of a candidate status to Turkey in 1999 was an implicit recognition of its membership
eligibility, moreover, it was made unanimously by the EU leaders. Although the 2005
negotiation framework leaves an option to ending short of full membership
eventually, the negotiations should be undertaken in good faith that full membership
is the ultimate aim. Anything that the EU or the Member States do to undermine such
commitments can have serious repercussions beyond the sole Turkish accession, but
can be detrimental for the EU’s role at the international stage and for its attempt to
build its image as normative global power.
5. Economic argument: benefits not only for the newcomers
The EU enlargement has been considered a success also from an economic point of
view. The impact of the upcoming enlargements on the EU is somewhat hard to
assess because of the lack of clear-cut timeline for the accession, as well as the overall
economic development in the EU. While the overall impact of the accession of
Western Balkan countries or Iceland is likely to be limited due to the small size of
their economies (even compared to EU-10 accession), the accession of Turkey could
potentially have a significant impact on the economy of EU-27+.
Some guidance can be found in the impact assessment of the 2004 enlargement on
both the EU-15 and the acceding countries. The positive effects on the acceding
countries is beyond doubt: accelerated GDP growth, trade volumes increasing several
fold, foreign investment influx, increasing employment, improvement of
infrastructure thanks to access to structural funds have led to increasing living
standards across EU-10. However, a positive impact on the “old” EU can also be
observed. It is estimated that 2004 enlargement added some 0.5 – 1% additional GDP
growth in EU-15. The extension of the EU single market thus enables the companies
from the current EU states to exploit better economies of scale. The growing demand
for goods and services in the accession countries as they grow richer increases the
export potential of businesses in the former EU. For instance, the British exports to
11
Poland have more than doubled since the Polish accession. The entry of the new
businesses from the acceding countries to the single market increases the overall
competition that inversely leads to increased competitiveness of EU companies on a
global scale. Foreign direct investment originating in the “old” EU in accession
countries in a long run leads to increasing flow of interest profits and dividends,
contributing to the improvement of current account balance of payments in the former
EU members and increases their GNP. The influx of labour from the new members
helps to tackle the labour shortages in the EU, especially in times of economic
growth: many of the current candidate countries have young, dynamic population
which can help sorting out a chronic problem of ageing population in Europe. The
often articulated fear of “relocation” of business from “old” to “new” EU has also
proven incorrect: on the contrary, the investments of companies in the new members
helps to reach out to new markets.
12