International Negotiation
Vol. 9 No. 2 2004
This issue
Innovation in International Negotiation: Content and Style
Guest editors
Jan Ulijn
Eindhoven University of Technology
Dean Tjosvold
Lingnan University
Innovation in International Negotiation: Content and Style
JAN ULIJN*
Department of Organization Science and Marketing, Eindhoven University of
Technology, 5600 MB Eindhoven, the Netherlands (E-mail: J.M.Ulijn@tm.tue.nl)
DEAN TJOSVOLD**
Department of Management,
tjosvold@ln.edu.hk)
Lingnan
University,
Hong
Kong
(Email:
The Effect of Dutch and German Culture on Negotiation Strategy: An
Exploratory Study to Compare Innovation and Operations Contexts
JAN M. ULIJN *
Department of Organization Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5600 MB
Eindhoven, The Netherlands (e-mail: J.M.Ulijn@tm.tue.nl)
ANDREAS LINCKE **
Faculty of Economics, Darmstadt University of Technology, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany
(e-mail: alincke@gmx.de)
FINN WYNSTRA ***
Erasmus Research Institute of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Rotterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: fwynstra@fbk.eur.nl)
Abstract. Different business settings may induce different types of negotiation
behavior. More specifically, clearly defined problems in an operations management
(OM) setting may lead to different negotiation behavior than more diffuse innovation
management (IM) problems. In addition, negotiators from different national cultures
may react differently to such variations in business settings. This article addresses
these issues through a set of experiments. The specific goal of our study is to
understand whether there is a difference between German and Dutch negotiators
regarding their negotiation behavior in IM and OM settings. To analyze possible crosscultural differences, negotiations that took place in a German monocultural setting and
those which occurred in a Dutch monocultural setting are compared. Two hypotheses
were tested:
 German negotiators are more cooperative in the OM context than in the IM
context.
 Dutch negotiators are more cooperative in the IM context than in the OM context.
Both hypotheses were confirmed by using speech act analysis and personal pronoun
analysis in a 2x2 experimental design. Dutch negotiators had difficulties adopting a
cooperative attitude and building empathy in an OM context, whereas German
negotiators encountered these problems in the IM setting.
Establishing Trust via Technology: Long Distance Practices and Pitfalls
GAYLEN D. PAULSON *
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712 USA,
(E-mail: gaylen.paulson@bus.utexas.edu)
CHARLES E. NAQUIN **
Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46656 USA
(E-mail: charles.naquin.1@nd.edu)
Abstract. Global negotiators often depend upon communication technologies to convey
information and strike deals. Unfortunately, negotiations conducted via more “lean”
media (e.g., e-mail, telephone) have been associated with low levels of trust and
difficulties in reaching agreements. We explore two approaches to building trust while
communicating via the internet. Derived from the literature on interpersonal trust,
negotiators were asked to adopt one of two strategies. The first was to build personal
rapport. The second was to discuss ground rules and procedures for the negotiation.
Negotiators who spent time building rapport reported greater levels of trust, and were
more confident and satisfied with their outcomes. These perceptions were evident even
though outcomes were comparable across conditions. The most negatively perceived
negotiations were those that included rules discussions without the benefit of rapport.
Implications of these findings for theory and practice are discussed.
A Game Theoretical Approach of Price Negotiation and Coordination in an
Innovative Firm-Supplier Context: An Experimental Analysis
JEANNE DUVALLET *
Laboratory G.I.L.C.O (Gestion Industrielle, Logistique et Conception), INPG – ENSGI,
46 Avenue Felix Viallet, 38031 Grenoble Cedex 1, France (Email:
jeanne.duvallet@ensgi.inpg.fr)
ALEXIS GARAPIN ** and DANIEL LLERENA ***
Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (G.A.E.L.), INRA, Université Pierre Mendès
France, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France B.P. 47 (Email: alexis.garapin@upmfgrenoble.fr; daniel.llerena@upmf-grenoble.fr)
STEPHANE ROBIN ****
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (G.A.T.E), CNRS, Université Lyon 2, , 93,
chemin des Mouilles - B.P.16, 69131 ECULLY, France (Email: robin@gate.cnrs.fr)
Abstract. This article analyzes a sequential interaction between a firm and its supplier,
involving negotiation in the first round and coordination between two different
production activities in the second round. The evolution of the vertical relations in the
manufacturing sectors reveals that the performance of the firms increasingly depends on
these two dimensions. Price negotiation determines the share of the profits of the two
actors, while coordination determines the performance of the overall chain. To model this
sequential interaction between the supplier and the firm, we use the tools and concepts of
game theory. While game theory usually considers the coordination problem as an
isolated phenomenon, the originality of our work is that it examines the problem of in a
context where coordination between agents is preceded by a negotiation phase. The
model emphasizes the influence of the price negotiation on the coordination round.
Several theoretical predictions are proposed, derived not only from the strict assumptions
of game theory, but also from assumptions which relax those of game theory. These
predictions are then experimentally tested. The results do not confirm the predictions of
game theory. In fact, they are consistent with the predictions put forth as alternatives to
the predictions of game theory. They show i) a propensity to maximize the performance
of the chain, and ii) a propensity to arrive at an equitable share of the joint profit in the
chain. Finally, though the experiment was not designed to study cross-cultural or
international cases, the results suggest new research directions in this area.
How to Reduce Uncertainty in a Context of Innovation:
The Case of IBM’s Negotiation of its European Works Council
ALICE LE FLANCHEC *
University Paris 1 (Panthéon Sorbonne), Sciences de Gestion (UFR 06), 17, Rue de la
Sorbonne 75231 Paris Cedex 05 France (Email: flanchec@hotmail.com)
Abstract. Uncertainty is one of the natural consequences of innovation. Regardless of the
particular area, innovation leads to unknown situations ranging from the creation of hightech new products to profound modification of economic and social structures.. This
uncertainty creates difficulties for negotiation processes because it becomes almost
impossible to anticipate all the consequences of any agreement. Consequently, innovation
tremendously enhances the uncertainty of a negotiator with regard to his own interests.
Uncertainty about the opponent’s interests and behavior is of course another major
concern and has been dealt with extensively by many authors. This paper deals with the
very different concept of uncertainty regarding one’s own interests. It analyzes the impact
of this form of uncertainty in the negotiation process, examining the 1997-1999
negotiations at IBM over the implementation of a European Works Council. We show
that when a negotiator is uncertain about his own interests, he is less inclined to consider
positions located in his uncertainty zone. This occurs as soon as he discoevers an
acceptable outcome outside of this zone, even when the agreement is little differentthan
the status quo. The negotiator will persist in such a strategy even though alternative
agreements located in the uncertainty zone could be more advantageous for one or even
both parties. In order to enlarge the zone of potential agreements between parties, a
negotiator should undertake one further step: exploration of his own uncertainty zone.
We demonstrate that the adoption of such a strategy, is innovative in and of itself,
requiring a pro-active and creative attitude on the part of negotiators in order to discover
appropriate uncertainty reduction mechanisms..
Innovating Across Cultural Boundaries:
Applying Conflict Theory to Develop a Common Approach
DEAN TJOSVOLD * and ALFRED S. H. WONG **
Department of Management, Lingnan University,
tjosvold@ln.edu.hk; wongsh@ln.edu.hk)
Hong
Kong
(Email:
Abstract. Diversity of people and perspectives can contribute to the ability of teams to
develop and implement innovation in organizations. However, to do so they must manage
their conflicts. Considerable research in the West and recent studies in China have
documented the value of a cooperative approach to conflict for teamwork and innovation
in collectivist as well as individualist cultures. When team members attempt to resolve
their disputes for mutual benefit, they have been found to make high quality decisions to
which they are committed. This article proposes that diverse people can use this theory to
develop common values, norms, and procedures that are accessible and effective for all
cultural groups.
Ethicality in Negotiation: An Analysis of Attitudes, Intentions, and Outcomes
ROGER J. VOLKEMA *
Kogod School of Business, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW,
Washington, DC 20016 USA (Email: volkema@american.edu)
DENISE FLECK **
COPPEAD Graduate School of Business, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro – UFRJ,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Email: denise@coppead.ufrj.br)
AGNES HOFMEISTER-TOTH ***
Marketing Department, Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
(Email: agnes.hofmeister@bkae.hu)
Abstract. The study reported in this article examines the prediction and use of invalid
information (e.g., exaggerated offers, false promises, misrepresented facts) in a twoparty, property leasing negotiation in which participants from different countries
negotiated seven issues via electronic mail. Prior to negotiating, attitudes and intentions
towards questionable or unethical tactics were measured, and perceived behavior was
measured through a post-negotiation questionnaire and compared with actual behavior
and negotiated outcomes (differential and joint). The results suggest that the prenegotiation questionnaire was a modest predictor of actual behavior, with general
attitudes effective in predicting general behavior. Ethical behavior of the negotiator,
ethical behavior of the other party, and perceived honesty of the other party were the best
predictors of performance (perceived and actual), while likely use of unethical tactics and
perceived honesty of the other party predicted whether or not an agreement was reached.