G. Peeters / Causality in Verbs and Cognitive Programs
IMPLICIT CAUSALITY IN VERBS: THE ROLE OF
COGNITIVE PROGRAMS
Guido Peeters
Catholic University of Leuven
Center for Social and Cultural Psychology (CSCP)
Technical Report
August 2011
Abstract. Some students of causality in verbs have concluded that ES (ExperiencerStimulus) verbs such as "liking" and "admiring" involve perceived causality in the object
(e.g., Rudolph & Försterling, 1994).. However, students of person perception have observed
that personality inferences from ES verbs are attributed to the subject and regarded as causal
dispositions accounting for the verbs. In this respect Semin & Marsman (1994) have
distinguished between instigating causes (in the object) and dispositions (in the subject). In
the present study, both types of perceived causality are shown to reflect the operation of two
clearly distinct cognitive programs for the processing of relational information including
interpersonal verbs. Experimental evidence is derived from previous research completed with
a new study showing that inferences regarding personality and instigating causes differ in a
way consistent with the operation of distinct cognitive programs.
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"Mary likes Joan because of the kind of person she is."
Brown & Fish (1983) observed that when people are presented with similar sentences and
asked who is referred to by "she", most of them answer "Joan" rather than "Mary."
Apparently, given the sentence: "Subject likes Object", people are inclined to localize the
cause of the "liking" in the object rather than the subject. Other verbs, however, elicit
causality localized in the subject. For instance, presented with the sentence: "Mary dominates
Joan because of the kind of person she is", people tend to identify "she" with "Mary." This
phenomenon has been called "implicit causality in verbs." Subsequent research has involved
the establishment of models such as the "Linguistic Category Model" (Semin & Fiedler,
1991) and the related "Action State differentiation Model" (Rudolph & Försterling, 1997). For
instance, the latter model distinguishes four relevant verb categories based on semantic roles:
(1) ES (Experiencer Stimulus) verbs. Examples are: "A likes B" and "A admires B." The
object (B) is perceived as the stimulus that elicits the experience (liking) of the subject (A).
Hence causality is localized in the object (B). This verb category corresponds to the State
Verbs (SV) of the Linguistic Category Model.
(2) SE (Stimulus Experiencer) verbs. For instance: "A impresses B." The subject (A) is the
stimulus that produces the experience (being impressed) in the object (B). This verb category
corresponds to the State Action Verbs (SAV) of the Linguistic Category Model.
(3) AP (Agent Patient) verbs. Examples are: "A (agent) kicks B (patient)" and "A (agent)
helps B (patient)." Causality is attributed to the agentic subject (A).
(4) AE (Agent Evocator) verbs. For instance: A (agent) punishes B (evocator of the
punishment). Causality is attributed to the object (B).
AP verbs and AE verbs are "Action Verbs". Also the Linguistic Category Model considers
"Action Verbs" (AV) but they are subdivided differently into "Interpretative Action Verbs"
(IAV, e.g.: A helps B) and "Descriptive Action Verbs" (DAV, e.g.: A kicks B). However, this
discrepancy between models is ignored in the present study that deals exclusively with the
first of the above categories: ES verbs (or SV "State Verbs") such as liking and admiring. As
already mentioned, ES verbs elicit attribution of causality in the object. Given that A "likes"
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or "admires" B because of the kind of person he is, perceivers associate 'he" with B assuming
that B has done something good or admirable that triggers positive feelings in A. Referring to
evidence of that sort, Rudolph & Försterling (1997) developed an explanation in terms of the
classic covariation principle of causal attribution (Kelley, 1967). However, that interpretation
was problematic. Semin & Marsman (1994) observed that ES verbs could elicit causal
attributions to the subject/experiencer as well. Those attributions concern predominantly the
personality of the subject as a cause of the state communicated by the verb (for a review and
additional evidence, see: Hoorens, Maier & Maris, 2011). Beyond the field of causality in
verbs, the subject-verb-object approach to social cognition (Gollob, 1974; see also Wyer,
1974) and impression formation research on the role of relational stimulus information
(Peeters, 1983, 2010) have yielded overwhelming evidence that, for instance, sentences such
as "A likes B" elicit inferences of likable personality traits in the subject A (Peeters, 1983,
2010). Meanwhile, it has been shown that also the attributions to the subject fit the covariation
principle if it is taken into account that perceivers go beyond the information given consistent
with well-established cognitive schemata and related propensities such as balance repair
(Hoorens, et al., 2011; Peeters, 2010; Rudolph & von Hecker, 2006).
To summarize, evidence on classic verb causality effects seems inconsistent with evidence
on trait inferences from verbs and interpersonal relations. Specifically, trait inferences from
verbs seem to affect sentence subjects more than sentence objects, even when verbs are used
that in classic verb causality studies yield strong causality inferences in the object. In search
for an explanation, Semin & Marsman (1994) suggested that two sorts of perceived causality
are involved. The classic verb causality effect would be limited to inferences of immediate
event instigating causes and would not extend to deep lasting dispositional properties such as
personality traits. In the same way, an apple falling from a tree involves immediate
instigating causes such as a gust of wind, and lasting dispositional causes such as gravity that,
like personality, is a deep or distal property, a conceptual matter that is not directly
observable.
The idea that traits inferred from verbs are perceived as causal factors has not only face
validity. It has been supported by experimental evidence showing that personality inferences
from verbs are drawn in a way as if participants would be instructed to handle personality as
the cause of the states communicated by the verbs (Peeters, 1976). More indirect evidence
may be found in some ancillary effects reported by Hoorens et al. (2011, Study 1 and 2).
Participants were asked to draw subject inferences and object inferences (target conditions).
Two "inference conditions" were manipulated between participants: some participants were
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asked to rate how much the verb would "say about the personality" of the subject/object
(personality inference), and other participants were asked to rate how much what the verb
communicated would be "caused by" the subject/object (causality inference). The experiment
(study 1) was replicated (study 2) and both studies yielded a main effect of inference
indicating that causality inference was rated higher than personality inference. This could
mean that the when making causality ratings participants considered both personality traits
and instigating causes as causal factors that, added together, scored higher than personality
alone. The main effect of inference was qualified by an interaction with target represented in
fig.1 of Hoorens et al.'s paper. It shows that personality inference ratings regarding the object
are prominently lower than personality ratings regarding the subject and also lower than
causality ratings regarding both the subject and the object. This pattern can be interpreted as
the combined effect of two tendencies established in the literature reviewed above: (1) a
tendency to deal with personality as a causal factor in the subject rather than in the object, and
(2) a tendency to deal with instigating cause as a causal factor in the object rather than in the
subject. The highest score was obtained for causality attributions to the subject. However the
score for personality attributions to the subject was almost as high, which indicates that
participants may have conceived causality in the subject as a matter of the subject's
personality. The negligibly small difference between causality and personality attributions
might either be neglected or be accepted as a possible indicator of some minimal attribution of
instigating causality to the subject as well. The lowest score was obtained for personality
attributions to the object. However, causality attributions to the object scored much higher,
which suggests that causality attributed to the object may not be limited to personality but
includes instigating causes that boosted the score.
Provided that causal inferences from verbs involve two sorts of causalities--dispositions and
instigating causes-- it may surprise that it took so long before researchers arrived at dealing
with both together, as if researchers dealing with one type were blind for the other. A possible
explanation may be that the two sorts of causality are processed, by what we may call,
different cognitive programs. There is dramatic anecdotic evidence that even experienced
researchers (Robert Wyer and myself) who were fully aware of the distinct cognitive
programs, ran into a failed experiment because they did not realize that participants would
interpret the instructions using a different cognitive program than the program they had in
mind (Peeters & Wyer, 1985). The cognitive programs in question are the SO-program (SelfOther program) and the 3P-program (Third-Person program). They have been derived from
linguistic and related cognitive universals (Peeters, 1983) and they have been shown to
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account for a wide variety of psychological and even philosophical observations. As an
extensive review is available elsewhere (Peeters, 2004, and Peeters & Hendricks, 2007), I
shall restrict to a striking example (Peeters, 1987) that clearly illustrates the selective use of
the cognitive SO- and 3P-programs.
A scene from the Benny Hill show goes as follows. At a reception, Benny and his friend are
offered a piece of cake. Actually two pieces are left: a small one and a big one. The friend
politely lets Benny go first and Benny takes a piece: the bigger one. The friend is upset and
yells: "If you had let me go first, I would have taken the smaller piece!" Whereupon Benny
puts on an aggrieved expression and says: "You got it!" The pun of the joke is based on a
switch between cognitive programs. Benny's friend, and most of us who find the scene funny,
use the SO-program. For instance, when asked why Benny's friend would have taken the
smaller piece, the common answer would be: "Because one should take the smaller piece for
the self and leave the bigger piece to the other out of politeness" However, Benny suddenly
makes us aware of the alternative 3P-program that ignores the distinction between self and
other looking exclusively at "Who does what to whom". Benny leaves the small piece to him
labelled "the friend", and "the friend" says that he would have taken it anyway. So what?
There is strong evidence that perceivers are biased to process personality inferences in the
way of Benny's friend, which means: consistent with the SO-program (Peeters, 1983, 1991,
2011). In the same way as the audience of the Benny Hill show did not realize Benny's 3Pshaped view as an alternative of the common SO-shaped view of his friend, students of
personality inferences may not have realized the role of instigating causes because
information concerning personality would be processed consistent with the SO-program and
instigating causality consistent with the 3P-program. The other way around, students of
causality in verbs may have been blind for the role of personality as a causal factor because
they were locked in by the 3P-program. The aim of the present paper is to test the validity of
that explanation by demonstrating that personality inferences from ES verbs are processed
consistent with the SO-program while inferences of an instigating cause consistent with the
3P-program. Thereby I was fortunate to find serendipitous evidence in a former paper
(Peeters, 1991, experiment 1) of which an extended and updated version has been made
available recently (Peeters, 2011, experiment 1). In the following I review the old
serendipitous evidence and then report a more recent experiment that was explicitly designed
to test the hypothesis that deep personality inferences tend to be processed consistent with the
SO-program, and inferences about event instigating causes consistent with the 3P-program.
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.
Serendipitous Evidence: The 1991 Study
The Benny Hill scenario gives scope for highlighting the role of the 3P-program in the
processing of instigating causes. Let us return to Benny and his friend at the reception and
assume that the friend grows rigid with fear when he notices the hostess approaching with her
self-baked cakes that he detests. He knows the hostess is quick to take offence of any sign of
depreciation regarding her culinary achievements. Hence he feels obliged to take a piece.
Fortunately, there's Benny who likes the cake and knows about his friend's distaste. So he
decides to relieve his friend's pain by taking the big piece. The friend has a sigh of relief and
as soon as the hostess has disappeared from view, he exclaims: "If you had let me go first, I
would have taken the smaller piece!" Whereupon Benny winks at his friend and whispers:
"You got it!" This version of the story may be a pleasant anecdote but not exactly our idea of
great fun worth to be performed as a farce. The reason is that the surprising effect of the
switch from SO- to 3P-program is absent because additional information has been provided
that sets the audience for the 3P-program from the beginning on. When asked why Benny's
friend would have taken the smaller piece, the common answer may not be "Because he wants
to be polite" but "Because he dislikes the cake and knows that Benny does not care about
getting the bigger piece." Notice that the conceptual distinction between self and other is no
longer required as it is for the right understanding of particular rules of etiquette. What
matters is not that the big piece goes to the other and the small piece to the self, or vice versa,
but that the big piece goes to him or her who likes the cake and small piece to him or her who
dislikes the cake.
In the latter example, the sizes of the pieces of cake combined with the actors' tastes or
preferences may be perceived as the instigating causes that bring about Benny's choice of the
larger piece and his friend's remark that he would have taken the smaller piece. And these
instigating causes are handled by the 3P-program. Beyond the present thought experiment,
more convincing evidence may be found in the results of a full-fledged experiment that was
designed to investigate possible conditions that would make perceivers to switch from the SOprogram to the 3P-program (Peeters, 1991, experiment 1, resumed in Peeters, 2011). It is
henceforth referred to as the 1991 Study.
In the 1991 study, cognitive programs were diagnosed using the method of the relation
pattern model. Participants were presented with items describing how two target persons (A
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and B) were relating to each other and to themselves. Each description involved four
relations: (1) AB or how A related to B, (2) BA or how B related to A, (3) AA or how A
related to him/her-self, and (4) BB or how B related to him/her-self. Each relation could be
either positive or negative, which enabled for 16 (two raised to the fourth power) descriptions.
Participants were asked to provide similarity ratings of A and B across the 16 descriptions.
The 16 similarity ratings of a participant enabled to compute the exact amounts of rating
variance that were consistent with particular cognitive programs such as the above SO- and
3P-programs. The following example offers a simplified demonstration of the suitability of
the AB similarity ratings to discriminate between cognitive programs.
Let us consider the following descriptions of items:
(1) A and B like each other and also themselves
(2) A and B dislike each other but they like themselves
(3) A and B like each other but they dislike themselves
In description (1) all four of the relations (AB, BA, AA and BB) are positive. According to
the SO-program, this implies high similarity of A and B. Indeed both A and B are similar in
that both like the other person and both like the self. However, also according to the 3Pprogram, A and B are alike in that both like the same people and both are liked by the same
people. Indeed both like (and are liked by) A, and both like (and are liked by) B. Hence, high
AB similarity ratings are expected, both the SO- and the 3P-programs predicting high
similarity, and high similarity has effectively been found in experimental studies.
Description (2) is composed of two negative relations (AB and BA), and two positive
relations (AA and BB). As in description (1), the information provided about A is similar to
that provided about B according to the SO-program: both A and B dislike the other and like
the self. However, according to the 3P-program the information provided about A is the
complete opposite of the information provided about B. The information about A tells that he
or she likes A and dislikes B; however the information about B tells that he or she dislikes A
and likes B. Thus the one likes a person the other dislikes, and vice versa. Hence participants
who rate A and B as more different from each other in description (2) than in description (1)
can be assumed to interpret the descriptions using the 3P-program. It could be objected that
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the difference attributed to A and B in description (2) may not be due to the use of the 3Pprogram. It may just follow from a simple rule of thumb associating liking with similarity and
disliking with dissimilarity, as suggested by the proverb: "Birds of a feather flock together."
The application of that proverb might be considered as a third possible cognitive program
accounting for inferences of similarities and dissimilarities from relations between A and B.
Similar alternative cognitive programs could be checked for by obtaining similarity ratings for
additional relational patterns such as the one implemented by description (3). If participants
apply the rule "birds of a feather flock together", then they should attribute more similarity to
A and B in description (3) than in description (2). However, if they use the 3P-program they
should rate A and B in description (3) as different from each other as in description (2), and,
of course, less different from each other in description (1) than in descriptions (2) and (3).
Using the above method it was generally found that personality inferences from liking
relations were drawn almost exclusively consistent with the SO-program. A small amount of
variance was accounted for by the birds-of- a-feather-flock-together rule, but the 3P-program
seemed switched off completely. Participants assigned high similarity to the personalities of A
and B in descriptions (1) and (3), and some less similarity in description (2). The same
outcomes were obtained when participants were not asked to compare personalities of A and
B, but attitudes of A and B. For instance, being asked to provide similarity ratings of A and
B's "tastes and preferences", the dominance of the SO-program persisted. It persisted also for
similarity ratings of A and B's personalities in a condition where A and B were presented as
musicians and the liking and disliking relations were specified as evaluations of the music
they produced. Thus in description (1bis) A and B were presented as musicians who liked
their own music and each other's music as well. In description (2bis) they were presented as
musicians who liked their own music but disliked each other's music. In description (3bis)
they were said not to like their own music but to like each other's music, and so forth.
Similarity ratings of A and B's personalities yielded once more SO-program dominated
outcomes. However a dramatic shifts towards the 3P-program was observed for the similarity
ratings of A and B's tastes and preferences. For instance, in description (3bis) A and B were
assumed to have contrasting tastes and preferences. For instance, A might feel sick of the light
traditional compositions that are the best he can, and admire the sophisticated avant-garde
compositions of B. At the same time B would feel disappointed with his technical avant-garde
tours de force that lack the spontaneity he thinks to recognize in A's naive compositions.
In the latter condition, A and B's musical compositions function as instigating causes
eliciting A and B's liking. It's true that participants did not provide similarity ratings of A and
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B's music. However they provided similarity ratings of A and B's musical "tastes and
preferences", which may be regarded as correlates of A and B's music. If two people have
different musical tastes and preferences, then they are assumed to like different music, and so
be appealed to by different music.
Apparently the 1991 experiment provides evidence that instigating causes are inferred
consistent with the 3P-program, while dispositional "personality" inferences are drawn
consistent with the SO-program. In addition, the interpretation of the results seems to reveal
an aspect of instigating causality that may deserve some attention. It concerns the observation
that instigating causes attributed to the object may involve correlates in the subject. For
instance, if A likes B because of his music (instigating cause in the object), it is implied that
B's music fits A's musical taste (correlate in the subject). If A likes B because B helps him out
of his problems (instigating cause in the object), it is implied that A has problems (correlate in
the subject). In this way, instigating causes in the object may imply a certain state of readiness
in the subject that is complementary to the cause in the object. That state of readiness is part
and parcel of the perceived causal instigation process associated with the verb. Hence
presumed causality in the object may be a more complex phenomenon involving also a
complementary causal factor in the subject such as a certain readiness. Anyway, this
complication of the instigating cause in the object may be interesting for its own sake and
deserve attention. At present it is only important to note that this complication does not
detract from the finding that instigating causality is processed consistent with the cognitive
3P-program. It could be objected only that the present evidence is still very limited, only one
verb pair (like/dislike) and one instigating cause (music) being investigated. Hence the
following experiment was set up to have an additional check of the hypothesis that implicit
causality in an ES verb (admiring) involves dispositional personality inferences processed
consistent with the SO-program, and instigating causality consistent with the 3P-program.
The New Study
General Overview, Design, and Predictions
Participants were asked to provide difference ratings of two target persons, A and B, who
were said to admire each other's achievements. Two within-subjects conditions were realized
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by manipulating information about the ways A and B were relating to the self (self-relation
conditions).
(a) In the positive self-relation condition A and B were said to admire their own
achievements as well, which resulted in a description of A and B analogous to the above
description (1), the only difference being that "admiring" was substituted for "liking."
(b) In the negative self-relation condition A and B were said not to admire themselves,
which resulted in a condition analogous to the above description (3).
Two other within-subjects conditions concerned the nature of the AB differences to be
rated, which was specified in a way as to provide a potential cause of the admiration..
(a) In the personality condition participants rated how different they expected A and B's
personalities would be.
(b) In the achievement condition participants rated how different they expected the nature of
A and B's achievements would be, "achievement" being regarded as an instigating cause of
admiration.
Notice that the above self-relation and cause conditions were presented to all of the
participants but counterbalanced across participants. Finally, the experiment was replicated
across four groups of participants, which constituted four between-subjects "replication"
conditions. Expecting that judgments about personality would be underlain by the SOprogram, and judgments about achievement by the 3P-program, it was predicted that in the
negative self-relation condition more difference would be attributed to A and B than in the
positive self-relation condition and that this effect would be obtained only, or at least most
prominently, when attributed differences concern the nature of A and B's achievements rather
than A and B's personalities.
Method
Participants. Four groups of Dutch-speaking psychology undergraduate students of the
university of Leuven volunteered in different places and at different points of time to
complete a questionnaire presented as part and parcel of a study on the informational value of
verbs. One group consisted of first-year students who participated in an experimental
questionnaire session as part of a course requirement. The three other groups consisted of
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second-year psychology students who attended working sessions connected with an
introductory course of social psychology. The number of participants amounted to 193 (36
men and 157 women). They were spread about equally over the four groups that were handled
as four replications.
Questionnaire. Participants were presented with a brief questionnaire (two pages) that was
anonymous, only gender being asked for on the top of the first page. The questionnaire
contained only four experimental questions, being four similarity-difference ratings of two
target persons (A and B) presented in the four conditions of the 2 by 2 design that was
obtained by combining the factors cause (personality vs. nature of achievement) and selfrelation (positive vs. negative). The presentation order of conditions was counterbalanced
across participants, about half of the participants getting the positive self-relation condition
before the negative self-relation condition, and about half of the participants rating
personality before nature of achievement. The rating scales ranged from 0 (similar) to 8
(different), higher values indicating more difference. To make it all clear, an English
translation of one questionnaire brochure is presented in APPENDIX. in which the positive
self-relation condition precedes the negative self-relation condition, and the personality as
cause condition precedes the nature of the achievement as cause condition. For the sake of
clarity of the present text, names of conditions have been inserted between brackets in italics.
Results and Discussion of the New Study
The difference ratings were subjected to a 2(Presentation order of self-relation conditions:
positive first vs. negative first) X 2(Presentation order of cause conditions: personality first
vs. nature of achievement first) X 4 (Replications: 1, 2, 3, 4) X 2(Self-relation: positive vs.
negative) X 2(Cause: personality vs. nature of achievement) MANOVA with self-relation
and cause as within subjects variables.
The hypothesis predicts an interaction effect of self-relation and cause: more perceived
difference is expected between positive and negative self-relation conditions when the
difference is about the nature of the achievements of A and B than when the difference is
about the personalities of A and B. The predicted interaction is significant F(1,177) = 4.20
p < .05 MSE = 3.19. The mean difference ratings, presented in Table 1, show that the
interaction is indeed as predicted. The difference ratings of A and B's personalities are nearly
constant irrespective of whether the relations of A and B with the self are positive or negative
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(p > .99 by Tukey HSD for unequal N) while all of the other differences between values
displayed in Table 1 are significant (p < .01 by Tukey HSD for unequal N), and so is the
greater difference attributed to the nature of A and B's achievements when A and B's relations
with the self are negative than when their relations with the self are positive.
Table 1.
Mean difference ratings between A and B in the Cause and Self-relation conditions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Relation with Self
-------------------------------Positive
Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Personality
3.20
3.24
Nature of Achievement
4.62
5.19
Cause
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the predicted effect, there is a significant main effect of cause, overall more
difference being attributed to the nature of A and B's achievements (M = 3.22) than to their
personalities (M = 4.91). Also when relations with the self are positive, achievements are
expected to be more different than personalities, the difference between 3.20 and 4.62 in
Table 1 being significant, as mentioned. Hence the baseline difference of achievement may be
nearer to the psychological ceiling of perceived difference than the baseline difference of
personality, which may have masked the greater expected difference in the negative selfrelation condition to some degree. This may explain why the effect of self-relation, though
significant, is not as overwhelming as we might have wanted.
It is worthwhile that the latter effect of cause is qualified by an interaction with order of
self-relation conditions and order of cause conditions F(1,177) = 7.77 p < .01 MSE = 4.88. It
means that presentation order produced effects, but those effects did not involve the predicted
interaction effect of cause and self-relation. This argues for the robustness of the predicted
effect, and so does the absence of any effect of the replication factor.
For the rest, no more effects reached statistical significance.
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General Discussion
The results of the new experiment confirm the conclusions drawn from the 1991 study:
causality in ES verbs, such as liking and admiring, is inferred through the SO-program if it
involves personality, and it is inferred through the 3P-program if it involves instigating causes
such as appealing music or the showing of impressive achievements. In this way, the present
data add to the psychological contrast between dispositions and instigating causes stressed by
Semin & Marsman (1994). In addition, they may explain why researchers who focused on
instigating causality have overlooked the role of dispositional causality, and vice versa.
Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, perceivers tend to stick either to the SO-program or
to the 3P-program, without mixing up both programs.
It should be mentioned that neither the 1991 study, nor the new study, enable to determine
whether the inferred causality is located in the subject or in the object. However, as it has
been explained in the introductory section, there's convincing evidence that personality
inferences are drawn to the subject. If A likes B, perceivers infer a disposition in A to like
others in general, which is translated into so-called "other profitable" (Peeters, 1982)
personality traits such as likableness, friendliness, tolerance, etc. In terms of Kelley's (1967)
ANOVA covariation model of causal attribution, it means that personality as a causal factor in
the subject is inferred consistent with the low consensus (combined with low distinctiveness)
rule: A might be assumed to like others in general (low distinctiveness), even nasty others that
are disliked by most people (low consensus).
As to instigating causality in ES verbs, according to the current literature it belongs to the
object. However, as explained in the section on the 1991 study, it may involve a component in
the subject as well. If A likes B's music, the causality accounting for A's liking does not only
involve B's music as an instigating cause, but also a certain susceptibility in A to the sort of
music B produces. This means that, according to Kelley's ANOVA model, instigating
causality would not only be a matter of high distinctiveness (not anybody's music--only B's-is liked) but also of low consensus (not everybody--only people with A's taste--like the
music). It could be objected that in the music case, A's susceptibility can be defined as
"musical taste," which is a well-established concept, indeed, but no such well-established
concept may define susceptibility that sets for admiring a particular achievement. Everybody
may be assumed to admire great achievements, in which case instigating causality may only
be a matter of high distinctiveness (combined with high consensus), limiting causality to the
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object (B) .However, the lack of a well-established concept defining a particular susceptibility
does not exclude the existence of the susceptibility in question. If A admires B's soccer
performances, it may be implied that A shows at least some interest in soccer.
If instigating causality in ES verbs implies some correspondent susceptibility or readiness in
the subject, one could wonder if that readiness should not be regarded as a dispositional
property that is part and parcel of the subject's personality. In this respect we may distinguish
between, at least, two sorts of dispositions: traits and attitudes. The specific readiness that
makes a person susceptible to a specific instigating stimulus may be attitude-like rather than
trait-like. So the question arises if attitudes should be regarded as part and parcel of
personality. Obviously, the answer to that question depends on how personality is defined.
Experts may debate on a definition, but what's at stake here is not the expert's explicit
definition but the implicit definition that underlies the lay's social perception and judgment.
Five revelatory experiments yielded evidence that the implicit personality concept is handled
consistent with the SO-program (Peeters, 1991, and extended version in 2011). In the
experiments no personality "traits" were involved. Participants were only questioned about A
and B's "personalities" without any specification of personality attributes. Taking a purely
logical perspective, the questions could be dealt with equally well using the 3P-program as
using the SO-program. However, participants relied almost exclusively on the SO-program as
if the simple word "personality" raised an insurmountable barrier preventing access to the 3Pprogram. Even hints intended to push them towards the 3P-program failed to open the
participants' eyes for the possibility to draw personality inferences consistent with the 3Pprogram. Instead the hints created only confusion. Only when the experimenter demonstrated
a simple line of reasoning for drawing personality inferences consistent with the 3P-program,
participants were surprised that they had failed to discover that obvious line of reasoning in
spite of the hints they got. Apparently, perceivers handle an SO-program bound implicit
personality concept that, moreover, has been found consistent with a current two-dimensional
model of implicit personality theory. Since Rosenberg's seminal study (Rosenberg, Nelson, &
Vivekanathan, 1968), perceived personality traits have been found organized consistent with
two dimensions (Abele, et al., 2008) that have showed up also in personality trait inferences
based on the SO-program (Peeters, 1983). Considering that the same dimensions have been
found underlying interpersonal language in non-Western cultures where personality trait
labels are not in use (White, 1980), we may conclude that there is an universal implicit socialcognitive structure generated by the SO-program that in modern Western culture has been
made explicit as a person's "character" or "personality."
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Provided that there exists a universal SO-programmed implicit personality concept
associated with the trait dimensions of implicit personality theory, we are still left with the
question: What about attitudes? If the implicit personality concept does not only involve traits
but also attitudes, then attitudes should be confined to the SO-program as well. Experiments
involving inferences about concrete attitudes (Peeters, 1983) as well as about unspecified
attitudinal concepts such as tastes and preferences in general (Peeters, 1991, resumed in
2011), showed that participants are primarily set to process attitudinal information following
the SO-program, indeed, but switch readily to the 3P-program. For instance, in the above
1991 study, participants used the SO-program to draw inferences about tastes and preferences
from liking relations, but switched readily to the 3P-program when the "liking" was specified
as "liking of music." Hence, attitude seems a somewhat equivocal category that can be
handled either as part and parcel of personality close to the essence of the person, or as a more
superficial feature close to external physical properties. Instigating causality in verbs, then,
may be concluded to belong to the latter, more superficial--more impersonal--realm of social
cognitive content.
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Hoorens, V., Maier, J., & Maris, S. (2011). When words speal louder: The effect of verb
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Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska
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Peeters, G. (1987). The Benny Hill Effect: Switching cognitive programmes underlying
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Peeters, G. (2004). Thinking in the third person: A mark of expertness?. Psychologica
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APPENDIX
Copy of a questionnaire (translated from Dutch) in which the positive self-relation condition
precedes the negative self-relation condition, and the personality as cause condition precedes
the nature of the achievement as cause condition. Note that names of conditions [added
between brackets and in italics] were not present in the original questionnaire.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE INFORMATIONAL VALUE OF VERBS
Look at the following situation:
[positive self-relation condition]
A and B admire each other's achievements. They admire also their own achievements.
We want to how that situation is best imagined. Hence we want to submit two questions
[personality as cause condition]
First, how could the personalities of A and B be imagined? One possibility is that A and B's
personalities are similar. Another possibility is that the one's personality differs from the
other's personality.
Mark your answer on the scale below. If you see A and B as two people with very similar
personalities, then you mark 0. If you think of them as different personalities, then you mark
a higher number. You mark 8 if you think that the personality of the one is very different from
the personality of the other.
PERSONALITIES OF A AND B
SIMILAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 DIFFERENT
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[nature of achievement as cause]
The second question concerns how the nature of the achievements of A and B are imagined.
The nature of their achievements can be very similar. This is the case when both perform, for
instance, as soccer players. Another possibility is that their performances concern very
different activities. For instance, A may perform well as a soccer player, while B may not play
soccer at all but do well as a student.
NATURE OF A AND B's ACHIEVEMENTS
SIMILAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 DIFFERENT
Now still follows another set of similar questions, but now they concern a different situation
involving two other people (called again A and B).
Imagine the following situation:
[negative self-relation condition]
A and B admire each other's achievements, but they do not at all admire their own
achievements.
[personality as cause condition]
How could the personalities of A and B best be imagined in that case?
PERSONALITIES OF A AND B
SIMILAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 DIFFERENT
[nature of achievement as cause]
And how could the nature of A and B's achievements best be imagined?
NATURE OF A AND B's ACHIEVEMENTS
SIMILAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 DIFFERENT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The questionnaire ended with a note of thanks and information about where and how
participants could obtain information about the study they had participated in.
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