University of Leeds
Institute of Communications Studies
Media in Political Decision Making:
An Examination of the SARS Crisis in China
by
Xian Wang
(200218516)
supervised by
Dr. Robin Brown
MA Dissertation (COMM5600)
submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of MA in
International Communications
September 2006
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank above all Dr. Robin Brown who supervised this dissertation and
patiently followed it up from conception to the final draft. I would also like to thank
Deputy Chief Executive of CCTV (China Central Television) International, Mr. Wang Xi,
for his continuous support and guidance throughout my career as well as my stay in the
UK. Finally I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my husband who encouraged me
in every step of the way, and my son who was always there with me as an understanding
and intelligent secondary school boy.
ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an attempt to put forward a consistent version of the relationship
between the media coverage and the government behavior. The analysis of the case study
on the news coverage of the SARS crisis in China in 2003 demonstrates the strategic role
of the media in political decision making processes. The dissertation employs a
combination of rational choice and game theory to formulate a model that integrates the
media in the political decision making process in a systematic manner. The model is
applied to the media coverage and the Chinese governmental decision making process
when both dealing with the crisis of the SARS epidemic. My conclusion is that the
international media have imposed a significant impact on the decision making process,
while the domestic media have been manipulated as the propaganda machine for the
authoritarian government.
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1
The media system in China
2.2
The media as political players
2.3
In defense of the rational choice approach
3. CASE STUDY
3.1
The outbreak of the SARS epidemic in China
3.2
Political Contexualization of the SARS outbreak
3.3
The game model
International media vs. Chinese government: the principal game
Chinese government vs. domestic media: the sub-game
The whole network of games reconsidered
3.4
Research findings
Research Design
The coverage of the SARS outbreak on major world newspapers
The coverage of SARS on Beijing Youth Daily and People’s Daily
4. CONCLUSION
5. REFERENCES
1. INTRODUCTION
China is the most populous country in the world. Being also the country that is probably
changing the fastest, China is becoming a recognized force in world politics and in the
international economy. It is the Chinese and the international media that are reflecting
these changes to the Chinese people and to the rest of the world.
I focus my dissertation on how the international media and the Chinese media
covered the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in China in 2003.
The analysis of the case study on the news coverage of the SARS crisis demonstrates the
systematic and strategic role of the media in political decision making processes. Some
existing theories say that the media facilitate the mobilization of public opinion and thus
affect policy making. According to rational choice theory, political decision makers place
the emphasis on the outcomes and payoffs of decisions (Schultz, 1998) and how these can
be seen as the consequence of the interaction between political and media arenas. In this
dissertation, I employ a combination of rational choice and game theory to establish a
model that integrates the media in the political decision making process in a systematic
manner. The model is applied to the media coverage and the Chinese governmental
decision making process when both dealing with the crisis of the SARS epidemic. By
examining the different interactions that the international media and the domestic media
respectively have with the Chinese government, I have found that the international media
and the domestic media reacted to the crisis management of the Chinese government very
differently from each other. The international media have imposed a significant impact on
the decision making process, while the domestic media have been manipulated as the
propaganda machine for the authoritarian government.
This dissertation comprises two main parts. The first part offers a theoretical
framework on the media system in China, the media’s role as political actors, and rational
choice and game theory. This part focuses on an explanation of rational choice and game
theory to justify why a rational choice approach is adopted to examine the media’s role in
the political decision making process. The second part provides a comprehensive analysis
of the case study on the SARS crisis, with a focus on the relationship between the media
coverage and the Chinese government actions. In this part, I set up a game model for the
interactions of the Chinese government with the international media and the domestic
media; then I apply the model to the research on the coverage of major world newspapers
which represent the international media, and on the coverage of Beijing Youth Daily and
People’s Daily as representatives of the domestic media. The dissertation concludes with
a discussion of the findings on the interrelation between the media coverage and the
Chinese government decision making process.
2. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The media system in China
Traditionally, the news media in China have been perceived as the arena of politics, and
have been exploited by the Chinese Communist Party as ‘the mouthpiece of both the
party and the people’. On the one hand, the Chinese Communist Party, the only ruling
party of the country, has been using its strength to dominate the media with propaganda.
On the other hand, Chinese journalists see themselves as representing the interests of the
people. They aim at providing people with accurate and timely information, being in
touch with people’s concerns, and exposing the wrongdoings of officials or exploiters,
thus fulfilling their role of ‘public scrutiny’. Now, more and more Chinese journalists
prefer the ‘public scrutiny’ role over the ‘mouthpiece of the party’ role, and they believe
that they are now working for the people much more than for the party.
According to Yuezhi Zhao (1998), the media system in China is now in a state of
great flux. It is far from a monolithic and unified propaganda machine. In a way, it can be
characterized as a multi-faceted creature undergoing a process of rapid transformation,
with different parts of the body straining in different, even opposite, directions.
For the Chinese policy leadership in the management of media systems, the favoured
model is a hybrid form of governance that has been termed as ‘authoritarian liberalism’
(Donald and Keane, 2002), a combination of economic liberalism and political
illiberalism. The authoritarian liberalism model has increasing leverage in China, which
has long operated a pragmatic politics of communication. Since its entry into WTO in
2001, China has been embracing a more lively market economy, which has resulted in the
commercialization of the press. Unfortunately, China’s media ‘reflect the deep
contradictions in Chinese society as a whole, where market individualism coexists with
political
authoritarianism’ (De
Burgh,
2003:
192),
characterized
as
having
commercialization without independence. Nevertheless, Daniel Lynch foresees that the
control of ‘thought work’ (Lynch, 1999) is no longer monopolized by the central
leadership due to the impacts of globalization and commercialization. The Chinese media
system is a fiddler juggling ‘between the party line and the bottom line’ (Zhao, 1998).
And hopefully, the interlocking of the party control and market forces in the Chinese
news media forms a framework for the democratization of the Chinese news media that
will speak with a plurality of voices.
China’s media reforms are now under way. Although the basic principles of the party
state press system remains heavily guarded, the reforms have enabled different discourses
to be available, including those of the market economy and professionalism. While the
party state authority maintains a tight control of the news media, the introduction of
advertising and the reduction of state subsidies to the media brought cracks to the party
press system. In other words, ‘the media are a capitalist body wearing a socialist face’
(Lee, 2003: 18). However, by blending the principles of the party press system, market
economy and journalistic professionalism, the media reforms ‘are not moving linearly
toward a democratic media system’ (Pan, 2005: 106), because the democratic principles
that should gird a market based media system are ignored. Given the coexistence of the
party state command and fresh market drive, partial liberalization of the press is
happening in China, and the effect of this partial liberalization may eventually spill over
into the political arena.
2.2 The media as political actors
The media’s function as political actors is most evident in the way that governmental
officials must use the media in order to have their policies and messages known to the
desired audience and the rest of the public. The central role of the media in the political
process is to relay and interpret objective happenings in the political sphere, and to
facilitate subjective perceptions of them in the wider public sphere (McNair, 2003: 13).
The reliance of both officials and the public on the media for communication renders the
media integral parts in structuring the actions of political constituents. Moreover, there is
a high degree of media dependency on politicians due to officials being well organized to
help subsidize the news, and their authority also allows reporters to compose defensible
accounts (Cook, 1998: 97). The relationship of the two sides is ‘a clear give-and-take as
politicians need reporters and news organizations to publicize their appeals to interested
parties’ (Sparrow, 1999: 15); and this is as much as journalists need politicians to do their
job as well.
The dependence of the media on official sources, however, remains partial since the
final colouring of the news is a result of the media’s interests and production values. The
power of the journalistic belief and pursuit in informing the public from different
perspectives from the policy makers or established authorities should not be ignored. At
the same time, there is a tendency of the media to adopt a critical view of political news,
as a result of journalists being in the position to interpret political activities and not just to
describe them. Sparrow portrays them as attack dogs that employ negative reporting as a
way to maintain a constant position that protects them from the machination of politicians
and allows them to signal to the mass audience about what is really going on in the
political domain (Sparrow, 1999: 49-50). The procedure of news construction and the
interrelation of the media with the government and other official actors reflect their actual
political quality.
The media has the power to exert influence on public opinion. The relationship
between the media and the public becomes critical here. Several studies have looked into
the media as a link from policymakers to the public (Cohen, 1986; Kennamer, 1992). The
absence of direct measures of the public’s views has made it difficult to reach a consensus
regarding an accurate definition of public opinion and its role in policy making. It is,
however, hard to ignore the audience’s role in this process of decision making. The focus
of attention here is the role of public opinion as a channel through which the media have
their impact on policy decisions. On this basis, the media bring additional actors in the
policy making process forcing officials to deal with them. Entman conceptualises the role
of the audience as what he calls, ‘perceived public opinion’. That is to say, ‘a general
sense of the public’s opinions…a convenient fiction observers use to characterise the
comprehensive preferences of a majority of citizens…’ (Entman, 2000: 21). What is
important about this definition is the perception that policy makers have of the public,
and it creates scope for the media’s influences on politicians under the pressure imposed
by the expected public reaction to a certain policy decision. The critical role of the
audience in the media’s impact on policy makers is enhanced when one considers that
public opinion ‘depends heavily on media frames, on what is emphasised and what is left
out of the picture’, (Entman, 2000: 13). This increases the public’s dependency on media
frames to form its own judgements and, it also increases the government’s reliance on the
media to convey messages to the public and receive feedback.
A consistent attempt to measure and demonstrate the media’s power in changing
policy is made by the theory of the CNN Effect. The media’s power derives to a large
extent from the impact of advanced communications technologies on the flow of
information. The CNN Effect concerns mainly situations of the media’s influence on
third-party humanitarian interventions in distant crises and has focused on military
operations conducted by USA and NATO for the resolution of crises that have arisen
abroad and have attracted media attention. Although the CNN Effect has systematised a
central role for the media in foreign policy making, it is not as wide-ranging as it is often
claimed, since it recognises a considerable level of power to compel officials to certain
decisions. The media’s power lies in facilitating Western responses to war, which are
limited to humanitarian intervention objectives, rather than attempts to resolve a conflict
(Robinson, 2001: 189). In times of national crises, however, the rallying effect of the
media occurs when ‘people rally behind a leader such as the president’ (Bryant and
Thompson, 2002: 238). The rallying effect is accompanied by the function of solidarity
building.
‘Solidarity building is functional for society in times of crisis. Media highlight the
wisdom of leaders and the bravery of rescue workers or soldiers to reassure society
that “we are all in this together” and that everything possible is being done for
survival. So, although the media may be unable to fulfil surveillance and correlation
needs, they are able to offer assurance and tension reduction.’ (Perse as quoted in
Bryant and Thompson, 2002: 239)
Although the conclusion of the news media as a political institution has been drawn by
Western scholars concerning Western countries, it can be translated into the Chinese
context. Since China’s accession to the World Trade organization (WTO) in 2001, the
Chinese news media have been undergoing rapid reform. China’s media reforms are
characterized by a process of institutional change, in which a profit-making ethic is being
emphasized, as well as ideological responsibilities. In other words, although the
Communist Party press system remains heavily guarded, the reforms have enabled
different discourses to be available, including those of the market economy and
professionalism. Under such a condition, Chinese media practitioners have to manage a
balance between market forces and the party press system, in order to reduce political as
well as commercial pressures in media change. Therefore, the media’s role as political
actors in the Chinese context is as significant as that in the Western society. Nevertheless,
a certain degree of ambiguity maintains in the media’s potential to influence policy
formation and is further enhanced when the exploitation of the media by officials for
political purposes is taken into account. It is the degree of this ambiguity that the present
study on the SARS crisis in China attempts to tackle, with the employment of the rational
choice approach.
2.3 In defense of the rational choice approach
‘The essence of rational choice theory is that when faced with several courses of action,
people usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome’ (Ward,
2002: 65). According to Little, ‘rational choice theory takes individuals’ preferences,
beliefs and feasible strategies as causes of the actions they take’ (Little as quoted in Ward,
2002: 70). Two of the core assumptions of rational choice theory is that individuals are
rational and self-interested. It is assumed that human behavior is goal oriented and that
individuals always try to maximize their goal achievements. Although it is an
individualistic methodology, rational choice theory is not only applied to individual
human actors, but also to such collective entities as national governments and
corporations. Therefore, rationality in individual human actions is likely to allow for an
easier understanding of complex social interactions. George Tsebelis describes rationality
as nothing more than an optimal correspondence between ends and means (1990: 18);
that is to say, individuals always choose what they believe to be the best means to achieve
their given ends. It is a definition that appears to capture the essence of politics, since as
Tsebelis also notes, the relationship between means and ends is inherent in all political
processes. However self-evident this view might seem, rationality as a theory is
demanding to such an extent that it could even be described as unrealistic. The purpose of
this section is to defend the aptness of rational choice theory not as the ideal theory for
political analysis but as one that can offer a more systematic approach to the relationship
between the media and politicians.
The theory is often charged for being too idealistic, as it tends to exaggerate both the
degree of control and information available to policy makers or decision makers.
Although it is an efficient tool in explaining decision making processes in a consistent
way, what also needs to be considered is that the behaviour of human actors is not always
as consistent as the theory requires. This section of the dissertation does not overlook or
underrate the theory’s deficiencies. However, it defends its effectiveness as an instrument
that can serve the purposes of this study.
Rational choice theory recognises a certain degree of consistency in human
behaviour, particularly for the achievement of goals. Elster describes rationality as a
‘normative’ concept, which indicates what actions individuals should take in order to
achieve their objectives. However, he recognises important non-normative applications in
the use of rationality, particularly for explanation, prediction and description of the
human behaviour (1986: 83). It is those aspects of the theory that this study endeavours to
exploit in an effort to explicate the media’s role in political decision making processes in
a consistent manner. If the rational choice approach focuses on the political process as an
interaction between social and political institutions and these institutions determine the
behaviour of the political actors, then seeing the media as part of this institutional
environment will ultimately entail a certain degree of influence on the production of
political outcomes. What is implied is that the media have a strategic role in political
decision making processes. The media’s own incentives and motivations are driving
forces for their actions. The objective of this discussion is to illustrate this strategic nature
of the media’s role in interactions with political decision makers, focusing particularly on
the degree of uncertainty they can cause and the impact this can have on the actors’
preferences and payoffs. It is an attempt for a rigorous investigation of the media’s
influence on political decision making, and rational choice theory is an apt theory to
achieve it.
A common question is whether rational choice theory can be realistic. To adequately
answer this is not an easy task. However, there are certain features in the interaction
between media and politicians that render a rational choice approach suitable for the
pursuit of a more systematic theoretical model of this relationship. In most cases the
incentives, the interests and the payoffs of the two actors are known to the observer or the
analyst; and this constitutes crucial information that facilitates the approximation of the
calculations required by rational choice (Tsebelis, 1990: 33). One of the advantages of
rational choice as a theoretical basis is the focus on the socio-political constraints
imposed on actors, which affect the outcomes and payoffs of their decisions. Considering
political decision making as the resultant of the interaction of the actor with such external
factors, encourages the approach of each decision not as a mistake but as a deliberate
choice (Tsebelis, 1990:39-40). My discussion particularly focuses on the media being
among those externalities that influence decision-making and how they assist in justifying
why certain decisions are made.
This study will attempt to create the relevant theoretical framework by modelling the
political interaction between the Chinese government and the media on the basis of
Tsebelis’ ‘nested game’.
The main idea of the game is to organise the actions and the
decisions made by the involved participants in multiple arenas. That is to say, each
decision the involved player makes is then evaluated not just in terms of its effects on one
arena, i.e. the main game between the Chinese government and the international media,
but considering the effects it has on another background arena in which the Chinese
government and the domestic Chinese media interact with each other. Similarly, the same
decision is also an outcome of the effect of actors from the background arena. There are
two key issues in this study. Firstly, approaching the interactions between the Chinese
government and the media as a game in multiple arenas, we should consider the
international media and the Chinese domestic media to be two independent players,
allowing the Chinese government to be involved in interactions with each of them
respectively. In that case, it is easier for us to see that the media are likely to influence the
decision-making process and to be influenced as well. The second point is what Tsebelis
calls the logic of the apparently suboptimal choice (1990: 5). The essence of this concept
lies in providing a tool for the explanation and justification of what might appear as
irrational political decisions to the observer. When we take into account that the decision
making process takes place not in isolation but within an area of interrelated arenas and
actors, a certain decision that appears as suboptimal is possible to justify, when the
contextual actors and influences from other arenas are taken into consideration. It is the
objective of this study to compose a model that illustrates and systematizes the political
character for the media through the norms of game theory.
3. CASE STUDY
3.1 The outbreak of the SARS epidemic in China
On November 16, 2002, a man was admitted to a hospital in Foshan City in China’s
southern province of Guangdong, with symptoms of cough and fever. He was later
identified as the first patient of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (WHO, 2003a). On
December 15, two patients showing similar symptoms were admitted to a hospital in
Heyuan City in the same province, causing such alarm that some doctors and nurses were
sent from several major hospitals in the provincial capital, Guangzhou, on January 2,
2003 (South China Morning Post, 2003). On February 11, the Chinese Ministry of Health
reported the strange new epidemic to the World Health Organization (WHO). By that
time, there had been more than 300 cases of what would become known as Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Guangdong Province. Although a few Chinese media
reports of the illness appeared in February, a news blackout on further reporting
hampered the spread of information and efforts to curtail the disease until early April,
allowing the killer virus to spread to Beijing and several other provinces, and even around
the world. During this period, a nationwide ban on negative news was imposed, in order
to ensure stability as the nation’s two annual legislative assemblies got under way. Only
on April 8 did Chinese medical workers - particularly Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a retired chief
of surgery at a Beijing military hospital - alert Time magazine to the extent of the
cover-up. Almost immediately, the story was picked up by media all over the world
(Greenfeld, 2006).
Under mounting international pressure and the globalization of the disease, Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao called an emergency meeting of the State council on April 13. This
was followed by the President and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of
China (CPC), Hu Jintao, who chaired an extraordinary session of the Standing Committee
of the Party’s Politburo on April 17. The Politburo meeting issued a statement on state
television, ordering officials at all levels to faithfully report the extent of the epidemic to
the public regularly and without delay. On April 20, Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang
and Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong were sacked, and an international press conference
was held by the State Council Information Office, announcing the true figures of the
SARS cases to the public for the first time. From then on, the Ministry of Health
announced the SARS figures everyday, opening the channel for information flow. In the
weeks that followed, the Chinese government removed more officials who had failed in
their duty to contain SARS under their areas of jurisdiction, and mobilized all national
resources to deal with the SARS outbreak. A National Task Force to combat SARS was
set up, with Vice Premier Wu Yi appointed Commander-in-chief (Sun, 2005). In the
combat with SARS under the leadership of Wu Yi, there was much closer cooperation
between the Chinese government and the international community, including WHO
officials, in terms of the daily reporting of SARS figures and accessibility to SARS
affected areas in China. Thanks to the effective measures of the Chinese government and
joint efforts from various sides, WHO, on June 24, lifted the travel advisory it issued
against Beijing on April 23. By early July, all the known cases of SARS had been
eliminated. Finally, the SARS epidemic was effectively contained.
3.2 Political contextualization of the SARS outbreak
The period from November 2002 to March 2003 was the high season of China’s politics.
In November 2002, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held its 16th National Congress,
the most important CPC’s event once every five years. The Congress was concluded with
the Party’s central leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. The fourth
generation leaders led by Hu Jintao took over the helm of the party, after the first three
generations of leadership led respectively by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang
Zemin. Then in March 2003, China held its 10th National People's Congress (NPC),
during which a new government leadership under Premier Wen Jiabao was formed.
The authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system holds high praise of the
prevalent culture of being ‘politically correct’. The practice of political correctness in
China emphasizes that ‘all party and government organizations as well as related
organizations should constantly bear in mind the big picture, and not behave in a manner
that would jeopardize the interest of the party or government’ (Zheng and Lye, 2004: 49).
‘Never report a bad thing during seasons of high politics’ has become a norm and is part
of the mind-set of Chinese party and government officials. As a result, during these two
important events in China’s political scene, the emphasis was on creating a favourable
environment, and there was a strong desire to maintain stability and to ensure minimal
disruption to preparations for and progressions of the two events, when the transition of
top leaders was to be fulfilled.
Another defect of the Chinese political system has been the lack of accountability.
When a disaster breaks out, the traditional way for the government to deal with the crisis
is to keep a tight lid on news about the outbreak of the disaster and to make it as less
known as possible, so as to prevent mass panic from causing social disorder. In this way,
it is believed that ‘a serious matter can be reduced in scale whereas a small matter can be
reduced to nothing’ (ibid.: 52). Again, maintaining social stability has been the guiding
principle that should dictate the government’s response to disasters. This is a big
hindrance for effective measures to be taken in a timely fashion, and it results in a very
limited degree of social and political transparency.
One more weakness of China’s political system is the structural flaws in
central-local arrangement. The central government puts a great emphasis on economic
growth in promoting local officials. In most cases, provincial government officials may
only provide the central government with selected information either based on the
considerations of their own political careers, or on local interests. The concern of local
officials is that information on chaos and social instability will affect the flow of
investments and have a negative impact on the maintenance of local economic prosperity.
In turn, their poor economic performances will result in such social problems as
unemployment and further social instability, which might stop them from getting further
promoted. The central government has to rely heavily on the incomplete information
provided by provincial leaders. As a result, it is difficult for the central government to
arrive at an informed decision based on the information provided, and to take effective
measures in overall crisis management.
It is in this context of an incremental search for better governance – complicated as
always by leadership transitions, the lack of accountability of the government, and the
peculiarity of central-local relations – that China’s SARS crisis ought to be viewed
(Fewsmith, 2003). With the help of an understanding of the political context in which the
SARS outbreak took place, it is likely to obtain a clear picture of the correlation of the
media coverage on the SARS epidemic and the Chinese government decision making
processes.
3.3 The game model
There are three players involved in the game between the Chinese government actions
and the media coverage of the SARS epidemic in China. They are the Chinese
government, the international media, and the domestic media. The game consists of two
levels, or to put it differently, is played on two separate arenas. The description of the
game model will begin with the principal arena, where the Chinese government and the
international media confront each other. The concept of the principal game lies in the
decisions available to the Chinese government being framed by the international media.
The fundamental issue here is the impact of this framing on the governmental decision
and the outcome of the crisis. The second level of the game is the other arena where the
Chinese government and the domestic media interact with each other. This sub-game is
nested inside the principal game, and the outcomes of the principal game will be analyzed
with regard to the sub-game.
International media vs. Chinese government: the principal game
The essence in the investigation of the principle game is to systematise the media’s
reaction to the Chinese government’s behaviour in dealing with the SARS crisis and
capture the impact the international media coverage can ultimately have on the decision
making process of the Chinese government leaders. It is likely that approaching the
decision-making process in the game in the principal arena, with the international media
coverage as a constituent, can shed light upon the motivations that led to one decision and
not the other. The specific process represents a systematic integration of the international
media in political decision making and justifies their behavior as political actors in a
rigorous way.
For the analysis of the game, it is important to identify the preferences of the two
involved actors and their payoffs in this crisis situation. Given that their action is
approached as a purposeful one, it is then directed by their preferences over certain
outcomes of the game. In the case of the international media, one can identify various
incentives embodied in their action, including incentives of commercial and ideological
nature or the incentive of their correspondents in China to maintain a cooperative
relationship with the Chinese government official sources. Ultimately, what one notes is
how their preferences may cancel out one another. To pursue a commercial benefit might
inevitably put their relationship with the official sources at risk, when it is translated into
the construction of news stories that oppose the Chinese government’s interests. So is the
case with critical coverage towards the Chinese government, since the coverage places
the foreign correspondents’ relationship with Chinese press officers on a ground of
uncertainty, while allowing the international media to fulfill their role as protectors of
public interest.
For reasons of simplicity, the dissertation focuses on the potential preferences of the
international media during the SARS crisis. It is clear that when the Chinese government
was involved in the national disaster, the prevalent preference of the international media
was the one over the exposure of the disaster itself and the drastic governmental
performance of a cover-up, rather than the incentive to cooperate with the Chinese
government. One reason for that is the international media’s approach of the issue as a
news story to ‘sell’, subject to their commercial incentives. The editorial values and
required drama inherent in the construction of news justifies why dramatic bad news such
as the crisis of the SARS epidemic and the cover-up of the Chinese government could
produce a doubly attractive story that met the media’s rating needs in competition with
other newspapers, magazines or broadcasters. Moreover, the international media were
more likely to portray themselves as guardians of public interest. On the other hand, if
their correspondents in China had stayed in good cooperative relation with the Chinese
government and remained silent as was hoped, they would have acquired nothing for
their professional considerations but a seemingly safer position for their stay in China.
With regard to the Chinese governmental preferences, it is reasonable to assume that
the Chinese government had preferred to bring the SARS crisis ‘secretly’ under control
without making it known to the public so as to prevent public panic. When the
government officials found later that it became difficult to continue to cover up the news,
they decided to release the information on the SARS epidemic and took actions to
effectively stop the fatal epidemic from spreading, and as an extension, they enjoyed the
international media coverage to seek public support for their decisions and to rebuild the
Chinese government’s international image that had been damaged. The international
media coverage and the amount of criticism exerted on the governmental cover-up
constituted crucial information that the Chinese government was aware of and made
affected decisions.
The principal game between the international media and the Chinese government is
depicted in Figure 1. For the Chinese government, the two alternative strategies were to
cover up the true story of the fatal epidemic and to publicize what was going on with the
crisis. The international media could choose between cooperatively echoing the
covered-up illustrations of the story, and criticizing the government for the cover-up and
publicizing the truth they found for themselves. Based on the different preferences of the
two opponent players in the game, each player chose their own dominant strategy.
Following the dominant strategy ‘leaves each player better off no matter what the
opponent does’ (Tsebelis, 1990: 62). The payoffs are ranked from 1, as the lowest, to 4 as
the highest.
Figure 1: Principal game
Chinese government
Cover up
Cooperate
Publicize
2, 1
4, 3
4, 3
impossible
International media
Criticize
The dominant strategy for the international media in its game with the Chinese
government during the SARS crisis was to criticize the government and to publicize what
the truth they found was. By publicizing the true story and criticizing the Chinese
government for its cover-up, the international media received the highest payoff, as this
would give them an attractively dramatic news story and at the same time would
strengthen their position as integral parts of the governmental decision making process
(4), if the government then complied and stopped the cover-up. They would also receive
the second highest payoff if the government ignores the coverage, because they
succeeded in fulfilling their professional pursuits and competing with other newspapers
and broadcasters, without suffering any particular punishment (3). On the contrary, to
echoing the government press releases of the SARS crisis and remaining silent about the
cover-up could only yield the second lowest payoff: a cooperative relationship with the
Chinese government and a safer stay in China (2), and the lowest one: boring stories not
of the public interest (1). Echoing the governmental press releases is not a preferred
strategy since it would only pay off if the government continues its cover-up, and the
payoffs the media receives (2,1) are lower than to publicize the truth (4, 3). This provides
strong incentives for the international media to adopt the dominant strategy, by finding
out the true story and publicizing it.
For the Chinese government, the dominant strategy was to publicize the true story of
the SARS crisis. If the government had chosen to publicize the true story to the whole
world before it was found out by the international media, the fatal SARS disease would
not have had such a wide spreading as beyond the Chinese borders to other countries, and
countries worldwide might have taken measures to protect their citizens against getting
infected. Accordingly, China would have received public support worldwide and would
have protected its prestige as a responsible country in the international community (4),
which is translated into the highest payoff. If the Chinese government publicized the true
story after the international media found out the truth for themselves and publicized it, the
SARS epidemic would be stopped from further spreading and the international image
would be stopped from being ruined (3), thus receiving the second highest payoff. On the
other hand, to cover up the true story before it was discovered by the international media,
the Chinese government believed public panic would be prevented and thus social
stability was maintained during the high politics of top leadership transition, and local
economic growth would continue in SARS affected provinces (2), which ranks as the
second lowest payoff. If the Chinese government chose to continue to modify the story of
the SARS epidemic after the international media publicized the truth, the government
leadership would lose credibility from both its own people and world citizens (1), and this
is the lowest payoff. The Chinese government’s cover-up of the SARS crisis was stopped
after the international media revealed the true story. Under mounting international
pressure and the rapid spread of the SARS virus, the Chinese top leaders decisively chose
to publicize what was going on, and took effective measures to stop the epidemic from
spreading, without serious damage to the image of the country and the top leadership. To
decisively publicize the true story as the dominant strategy for the Chinese government is
thus justified. But why did the Chinese government choose to publicize the true story
after the international media found out the truth for themselves and publicized it?
The payoffs of the game in the principal arena between the international media and
the Chinese government are influenced by the situation prevailing in the game in the
other arena. That is the sub-game between the Chinese government and the domestic
media, which is nested inside the interaction between the international media and the
Chinese government. Contexual factors in the sub-game determine the payoffs of the
players in the principal arena, and justify why the Chinese government adopted the
dominant strategy of publicizing the true story only after the international media had
found the truth for themselves.
Chinese government vs. domestic media: the sub-game
The game that the Chinese government and the domestic media play represents the
second arena of the nested game. In other words, this sub-game is nested inside the game
in the principal arena between the international media and the Chinese government. The
sub-game is very different from the principal game, in the way that the Chinese
authoritarian regime dominates the domestic media and so the domestic media are under
strict censorship of governmental monopoly and a system of self censorship is highly
encouraged. Hardly had the war in Iraq ended when Chinese media outlets found
themselves swept up by a far less controversial and more immediate war at home: the
battle against a new and lethal virus that has quickly reached epidemic proportions
around the globe. Until April in the year of 2003, the SARS epidemic, which originated
in southern China’s Guangdong Province in November 2002 and then spread to Beijing
and several other provinces, was hardly mentioned in the Chinese media. How could the
Chinese media remain dumb and deaf in front of the fatal disease for so long? The answer
to this question lies in the domestic media’s considerations of their payoffs in the game
with their opponent, the government. Figure 2 illustrates the sub-game between the
Chinese media and the Chinese government.
Figure 2: Sub-game
Chinese government
Cover up
Agree
Publicize
4
3, 2, 1
3, 2, 1
(impossible)
impossible
Chinese media
Disagree
The prime concern of the Chinese domestic media was that at such sensitive times as
the SARS crisis, they had to be ‘politically correct’. What they had to do was only to
copy the official lines in their reports and broadcasts, although what they had found for
themselves might be different from the official stories. Otherwise, their reports would not
be able to get published or to go on air. For fear that they might irritate the government
and get politically punished, they had no incentive to do anything but being ‘politically
correct’, which is translated into the highest payoff (4). On the other hand, if they chose
to disagree with the government, the dramatic stories would pay them off with a wide
circulation and accordingly great commercial benefits (3). This was impossible to happen
since no media were allowed to do so. That is why a wide circulation and great profits
come only as the second highest payoff after being ‘politically correct’. Moreover, in
their journalist pursuit of functioning as public service, the domestic media had the
incentive to disagree with the government and inform the public of the truth of the crisis.
In that case, they would gain a stronger credibility from the public, which ranks as the
second lowest payoff (2). Finally, if they had dared to tell the truth before their
international counterparts did, they would have won the professional competition by
getting the scoop (1). Although this could only be considered to be the lowest payoff in
the Chinese political context, it would certainly be an exciting moment for the Chinese
journalists as those in anywhere else in the world.
With regard to the Chinese government, the other opponent in the sub-game, the
most preferred incentive was social stability in seasons of high politics, as the nation’s
top leadership transition got under way from November, 2002 to March, 2003. So not
informing the public of the fatal disease so as to prevent public panic and ensure social
stability and continuous economic growth (4) was considered to be the highest of all the
payoffs by central and provincial government leaders. This consideration was even prior
to publicizing the information in time so that people would be warned and be able to
guard themselves against the epidemic. So to inform the public in time would mean that
less people would get infected and more deaths would be stopped (3). But this was
regarded only as the second highest payoff. If the Chinese government chose to tell the
true story of the epidemic to its people, its image of a responsible government would be
strengthened and public support would be won (2), which is translated into the second
lowest payoff. If the government publicized the crisis rather than covered it up, a sense of
accountability in the Chinese political system would be strengthened, and political
transparency would be enhanced (1). This is the lowest payoff understood by the
government.
It is clear from the above discussions that the two strategic options for the Chinese
government in the sub-game were to suppress the release of the true situation of the
SARS epidemic, and to permit the domestic media to publicize it. And the domestic
media could choose between agreeing with the government by copying the official
interpretation of the story, and disagreeing with the government by telling the truth.
During the period of the top leadership transition, the dominant strategy for the
government was to cover up the truth of the epidemic, receiving the highest payoff (4).
After seasons of high politics, the dominant strategy of the Chinese government was to
publicize the true story of the SARS crisis, receiving lower payoffs (3, 2, 1). However,
the domestic media’s dominant strategy to agree with the government remained the same
throughout the whole period of the SARS epidemic, with the highest payoff (4) received.
In the sub-game between the Chinese government and the domestic media, the latter was
exploited as the propaganda machine and the ‘mouthpiece’ of the former.
The whole network of games reconsidered
The sub-game between the Chinese government and the domestic media began in early
January 2003, when the local media in China’s southern province of Guangdong reported
the early cases of SARS in Heyuan, a city of Guangdong (Yip, 2005). The game was over
in early July 2003, when all the known SARS cases were eliminated, shortly after the
World Health Organization (WHO) lifted the travel advisory it had issued against Beijing
on June 24, 2003. The sub-game was played in two separate stages. The first stage was
from January 2003 to Mid April, when both the two players responded to the SARS
epidemic with secrecy, denial and cover-up. The second stage was from April 20 to early
July, when the government stopped suppression of the dissemination of the news on the
crisis, and permitted the domestic media to give excessive reports on the crisis. The
dominant strategy of the domestic media remained the same throughout the two stages of
the sub-game, which was to echo the governmental interpretations of the story, because
the news media in China were under tight control of the authoritarian government.
Although the domestic media later publicized the true story of the SARS crisis as they
were instructed by the government, their coverage was exploited as propaganda to meet
the governmental demands to stop public panic and to strengthen public confidence in
combating the epidemic. On the other hand, the dominant strategy of the Chinese
government changed from covering up in the first stage of the game to releasing the true
information in the second stage. Why did the Chinese government adopt two different
strategies in the two stages of the same sub-game with the same opponent? It was because
the Chinese government was involved in another game in the principal arena, the game
with another player, the international media.
The international media joined the principal game with the Chinese government in
March, and the former became critical of the latter when the Time magazine released the
true information of SARS as told by Doctor Jiang Yanyong from a military hospital, on
April 8, 2003 (Jakes, 2003). Like the Chinese media, the international media had not
heard the true story of the SARS crisis from official sources. But unlike the Chinese
media, they were beyond control of the Chinese government and free from its censorship.
In pursuit of their journalistic ideals, they had a strong incentive to go and find out the
truth for themselves. The independence of the international media from the Chinese
government made the true story of the epidemic known throughout the globe, especially
to the Chinese people who were threatened most severely by the spread of the epidemic.
Moreover, the public was informed of another important fact – the Chinese government
had covered up the true story. Following the Time magazine, other major world media
companies, whether their countries were affected by the SARS virus or not, covered the
same story with a variety of perspectives. Besides the rapid spread of the SARS epidemic,
mounting international pressure formed by international media coverage forcefully made
the Chinese top leaders decide to be transparent with the information on SARS and to
mobilize national resources to contain SARS. Once the decisions were made as a result of
the disclosure of the true story of SARS on the international media, the Chinese
government took much more active interest in combating the crisis and displayed greater
transparency. The international community and media reacted by making positive
comments about China’s efforts in combating SARS (Zheng and Lye, 2004). Eventually,
the Chinese government was paid off with an improvement of the international image
after being damaged, in the game with the international media. It is very clear therefore
that the international media played a significant role in the Chinese government’s
decision making process.
The change of strategy by the Chinese government in the sub-game with the
domestic media happened after the former was involved in the principal game with the
international media. As a result, the Chinese government was no longer able to continue
the cover-up in the second stage of the sub-game. Forced by the international media to
publicize the true story of SARS, the Chinese government, in the second stage of its
sub-game with the domestic media, allowed the latter to publicize the information on
SARS to its Chinese citizens. However, the domestic media were again manipulated as
propaganda to set up a tone to inspire public emotion, to reconstruct the image of the
government as being responsible and capable, and to influence public opinion so as to
stabilize the society and maintain social order (He, 2004). With consideration of the
above payoffs, the Chinese government changed its strategy from covering up in the first
stage to permission of the release of the true story of SARS in the second stage of the
sub-game.
3.4 Research findings
Research Design
How did the media coverage interrelate with the Chinese governmental decision making
process? Did the media coverage have an impact on the political decision making process?
If yes, what implications does the impact have for the Chinese government to deal with
future national or international crises, in the era of the highly developed information and
communications technologies? Based on the game model proposed above, this section is
an attempt to seek answers to these questions by investigating the media coverage of the
SARS epidemic in China in 2003. SARS was an exemplary news event in which one
news source – the government – possessed the most information. It thus offered a
scenario which magnified the close correlation of the Chinese government with the news
media.
I conduct the research into the media coverage of the SARS epidemic in China
during the period from November 16, 2002, when the SARS virus attacked its first
patient, to July 10, 2003, when the virus was finally stopped from spreading. But the
focus is on news reports in the key period from February to April 2003 when the SARS
epidemic spread from the province of Guangdong to other provinces, and even further to
other countries. The discussion of China is limited to the Chinese mainland. So when I
speak of the SARS outbreak, I refer to the crisis situation on the Chinese mainland; when
I speak of the domestic media, I refer to those media organizations on the Chinese
mainland.
The research is conducted using a combination of quantitative and qualitative
approaches. I divide the media coverage into two different categories, the international
media coverage and the domestic media coverage. For the research into the international
media coverage, news reports archived in the Lexis-Nexis database form the main source
of data. Using a quantitative approach, I count the volume of news reports on the SARS
epidemic in China on major world newspapers, on a day to day basis. And I restrict the
search to major stories on these newspapers. When there is an incremental change in the
volumes of international media coverage, there is a possibility for the Chinese
government to make a new decision to deal with the crisis and to manage the information
flow about the crisis. When the aggregate volume of news reports does not change at an
incremental level, the search will be narrowed down, into a period of coverage when a
significant change in volume appears. For reasons of clarity and directness, I will not
examine the texts of the news reports. What I will do instead is to distinguish the tones of
the news reports among neutral, critical and positive. For the research into the Chinese
domestic media coverage, I adopt the qualitative approach, focusing on two major
newspapers in China - Beijing Youth Daily and People’s Daily. Beijing Youth Daily is a
government-owned newspaper which is popular with Chinese adults of all ages and has a
wide circulation all over the country. The other one, People’s Daily, is the country’s
leading newspaper as the mouthpiece of the CPC’s central committee. The news reports
on the SARS epidemic from these two news organizations are tackled in a similar way as
those in major world newspapers. The research includes counting the volumes of
coverage and assessing the tones of the stories. In addition, some of the texts of the major
stories are examined.
There are other sources of information on the SARS epidemic. The Chinese
government administers the major hospitals, and therefore should have been in a position
to have the best knowledge about the extent of the SARS epidemic. The information was
issued by the Ministry of Health (MOH), or occasionally the Foreign Ministry when the
international community was targeted to be the information recipient. Apart from the
Chinese government, another important source of news was the World Health
Organization (WHO), which, after the initial outbreak, had taken up a coordinating role
in monitoring the spread, research and cure of the virus.
The coverage of the SARS outbreak on major world newspapers
According to my search in the Lexis-Nexis database, the earliest coverage of major world
newspapers on the SASRS outbreak in China was a story entitled ‘Mysterious
Respiratory Illness Afflicts Hundreds Globally’ on New York Times on March 15, 2003.
The tone of the story was neutral, saying that a mysterious lethal illness had attacked
Vietnam, China, and Canada. The coverage of the same tone, without any comment on
the Chinese government’s management of the crisis, continued on other major world
newspapers as well until April 7. The volume of coverage had kept rising day after day
since the first story on New York Times in mid-March, and on April 5, the volume
reached a peak, with a total of 133 stories. This shows that the mysterious illness had
been attracting more and more worldwide attention.
The change in the tone of coverage began on April 8, 2003. Of the ninety stories on
that day, twenty two were critical of the Chinese government’s possible cover-up. The
percentage of critical stories kept rising in the week that followed. ‘China not reporting
all SARS cases’ (Dickie and Leahy, 2003), ‘China lying over virus’ (Spencer, 2003) and
‘China is covering up SARS deaths’ (Bodeen, 2003) were typical headlines on major
world newspapers in that week. The percentage of critical stories reached its peak on
April 15, when 64 out of 100 stories were critical of the Chinese government. According
to the news reports published on major world newspapers in this critical week, WHO
officials appealed to the Chinese government for greater clarity on the SARS outbreak,
after Jiang Yanyong, a senior Chinese military surgeon, said that the government had
understated the spread of the disease in Beijing. From April 16 to April 20, the volumes
of stories each day were much smaller, since Jiang Yanyong’s story had widely been told;
but the percentage of critical stories remained more or less the same as that at its peak.
The biggest increase in the volume of coverage of the SARS epidemic on major
world newspapers occurred on April 21. On that day, there were a total of 106 stories
about the crisis in China, as compared to 56 stories the previous day. All the major world
newspapers made quick responses to the press conference held by the Information Office
of the State Council on April 20. The International Herald Tribune said ‘Beijing
discloses hidden SARS cases’. The Guardian said ‘China says SARS outbreak is 10
times worse than expected’. The Washington Post said ‘SARS cover-up spurs a shake-up
in Beijing’. The Times said ‘new leaders struggle to restore credibility’. Fifty nine out of
the 106 stories published on the major world newspapers were in a positive tone. In their
positive stories, these major world newspapers applauded the actions the Chinese
government took. At the press conference, Vice Minister of Health Gao Qiang admitted
the ministry’s previous cover-up of the true scale of the SARS outbreak, and he told the
press that the Ministry of Health was going to release SARS-related statistics daily. The
same day the Chinese government sacked Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang and
Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong for their holding back information relating to the spread of
the epidemic, and decided to remove a number of local officials from their posts because
of their failure to perform their duties to contain SARS.
From April 22 to April 26, the news reports of the major world newspapers were all
about the Chinese government’s further efforts to fight against SARS and to establish
credibility for its handling of the crisis. These efforts included the cancellation of the
week-long May Day Holiday and the setting up of the National Task Force headed by
Vice Premier and newly appointed Minister of Health Wu Yi. The volume of coverage
reached its highest peak of 193 stories on both April 25 and April 26, and the percentage
of positive stories was above sixty. Until April 30, the percentage of positive stories
about the new decisions made by the Chinese government to combat SARS remained
more or less the same, although the volume of coverage decreased.
To sum up, the major world newspapers’ coverage of the SARS epidemic falls into
three stages. First of all, from March 15 until April 7, the coverage was totally neutral,
describing SARS as a mysterious disease. Secondly, from April 8 to April 20, the
coverage became very critical, exposing the massive cover-up of the Chinese government
in handling the crisis. Under the mounting pressure from the international community
during this period, the CPC top leaders held a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on
April 17, which issued a report concluded by warning officials to provide information
periodically to the public, not to delay issuing updates, and not to cover up developments.
On April 20, a press conference was held to release the government’s new decisions. It
was the international news media that first published the dissenting picture portrayed by
Doctor Jiang Yanyong, which prompted WHO to demand investigations, which in turn
eventually forced the Chinese government to report the true scale of the outbreak and to
take the above actions. The last stage was from April 21 until April 30, when the major
world newspapers made positive responses to the actions taken by the Chinese
government. All these findings are illustrated in Figure 3, Figure 4-1, Figure 4-2, and
Figure 4-3.
Figure 3
Volume of coverage of major world newspapers
Figure 4-1
Tone of coverage of major world newspapers
Figure 4-2
Tone of coverage of major world newspapers
Figure 4-3
Tone of coverage of major world newspapers
In the game between the Chinese government and the international media, the
international community holds a key position for both the government’s and the media’s
payoffs. What is important to note is that the payoff derives from the pressure that is
exerted on the Chinese government both directly from the international media and
indirectly through the impact the international media have on the audience, public
opinion and the international community. That is why the Chinese government began to
put its act together only when the SARS epidemic made its presence felt in other parts of
the world and international pressures mounted. What is also important to note is how the
audience as a key factor brings the media’s incentives and motivations in the game. The
editorial values and required drama inherent in the construction of news justifies why the
SARS crisis could produce an attractive story to the audience. To sum up, the Chinese
government leaders underwent a learning process (shown in Figure 5) through which they
made their decisions to stop covering up information on SARS and to take resolute
actions to contain the epidemic, principally because of the international media coverage.
Figure 5
Cooperate
International
media
Cover up
Cover up
Criticize
Chinese
government
Chinese
government
≤40%
Don′ t
cover up
Don′ t
cover up
Non-positive
coverage
International
media
Positive
coverage
≥60%
April 8
April 20
April 30
This diagram illustrates the principal game between the Chinese government and the international media,
in which the Chinese government made its decision as a result of the impact of the international media coverage.
The coverage of SARS on Beijing Youth Daily and People’s Daily
On February 12, 2003, Beijing Youth Daily quoted a piece of news from Xinhua News
Agency, China’s leading wire service, about the outbreak of atypical pneumonia (as
SARS has been commonly called in China) in the country’s southern province of
Guangdong. According to the news report, a press conference was held by the provincial
government of Guangdong the previous day, announcing that 305 people in the province
had been infected by atypical pneumonia and five of them had died, and that the disease
was under initial control (Beijing Youth Daily, 2003a). This was the very first story about
the SARS epidemic covered by Beijing Youth Daily. In the next ten days until February
21, there were only four stories about what was going on with the epidemic in
Guangdong, all of which were positively informing the readers that the disease was being
contained. In the following twenty eight days, nothing about SARS was published on the
newspaper, and the long break lasted until March 20. There were two facts to note behind
the long break. In the first place, local officials had an incentive to suppress negative
information in order to protect their own interests. In this case, the Guangdong provincial
authorities were very concerned about the potential negative media publicity if news
about SARS were made known since this would curtail the domestic spending of the
residents, adversely affecting the economic growth of the province and the careers and
political fortunes of the local officials. Secondly, a nationwide ban on negative news was
imposed in early March to ensure that no negative news distracted the nation’s attention
from the legislative session of China’s national legislature, the National People’s
Congress, when the country’s top leadership transition would be finished.
On March 20, a few days after the National People’s Congress ended, another story
about SARS appeared after the month-long break. According to the story, Minister of
Health Zhang Wenkang met the WHO representatives in China, and told them that SARS
broke out in Guangdong in November 2002 and that the disease was already under
effective control (Beijing Youth Daily, 2003b). The next story appeared on March 27,
saying that infected cases of SARS were founded in the capital city of Beijing and these
cases were under control (Beijing Youth Daily, 2003c). The silence continued until the
State Council Information Office held an international news conference on April 3. At the
conference, the Health Minister Zhang Wenkang assured that China was safe for visitors
while reporting 1,190 SARS cases up to March 31 (Beijing Youth Daily, 2003d). Beijing
Youth Daily had to wait until then to report heavily on the disease. From April 3 to April
20, the newspaper published 112 stories related with SARS, all positively on China’s
cooperation with WHO investigations and the efforts and the risks of doctors and nurses
in fighting the disease. What is important to note is that WHO issued a specific travel
advisory on April 2 against non-essential travel to Guangdong and Hong Kong, which
was the most stringent travel advisory issued by WHO in its fifty-five-year-long history
(WHO, 2003b), but it was not reported by Beijing Youth Daily.
From April 21, an avalanche of news reports about SARS began to flood Beijing
Youth Daily. The lead story on April 21 was about another international press conference
held the previous day by the State Council Information Office, which was chaired this
time by Vice Minister of Health Gao Qiang. The Health Minister Zhang Wenkang and
Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong were fired from their posts the same day. At the
conference, the central government warned against the covering up of SARS cases and
demanded the accurate, timely, and honest reporting of the SARS situation. According to
the Vice Minister Gao Qiang, by April 18 confirmed SARS cases had totaled 1,807
nationwide and Beijing figures had jumped to 339, and SARS figures were to be
announced every day (Beijing Youth Daily, 2003e). From April 21 to April 30, a total of
184 stories were published on Beijing Youth Daily, with an average of 18 stories per day.
The newspaper’s extensive coverage of the SARS epidemic was due to the position of the
central government which opened the gate for news reporting on SARS nationwide from
April 20. However, the main themes of the reports were the work being done by the
government, calls on united efforts to fight the disease, and reports by WHO or other
countries about the spread of SARS. Criticism or questioning of the official efforts was
absent. On April 23, WHO issued a travel advisory to Beijing (WHO, 2003c), and again
it was not mentioned in any story. If Beijing Youth Daily was considered to be a
Beijing-based local newspaper and might not pay enough attention to issues outside
Beijing, it could be an excuse for the newspaper not to cover the travel advisory that
WHO had issued against Guangdong and Hong Kong previously. This time the
newspaper ignored WHO’s travel advisory to Beijing, and this could only be done
intentionally, as a result of censorship. Obviously, negative news continued to be
suppressed by the government.
As the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China (CPC), People’s Daily closely
followed the Party’s guideline in its coverage of the SARS crisis. The newspaper began
its first coverage of SARS on April 10. Until April 17, People’s Daily had published only
35 stories about the SARS outbreak, being much more careful than Beijing Youth Daily,
which had published 77 stories until April 17. The real turning point in the newspaper’s
coverage of SARS came on April 18, following an extraordinary session of the Standing
Committee of the CPC’s Politburo held on April 17. The Politburo meeting chaired by
CPC’s General Secretary Hu Jintao was the first public indication that the top leadership
was getting its act together to combat SARS. On April 18, the volume of coverage of
SARS in the newspaper rose to seventeen stories from nine stories the previous day. One
of the stories was a special editorial, which, on behalf of the Party, called for nationwide
efforts to be united in the fight against SARS and ordered officials of all levels to
faithfully report the extent of the epidemic to the public without delay (People’s Daily,
2003). On the same day People’s Daily began to dedicate one whole page of the
newspaper to the coverage of SARS. The newspaper’s massive coverage of SARS came
even two days earlier than the press conference held by the State Council Information
Office on April 20, which was due to the newspaper’s close relationship with the Party.
Once the Party took the position to open the gate for news reporting on SARS, People’s
Daily began to publish news reports and editorials extensively. Aside from the grim daily
statistics, the coverage ranged from news items on governmental and grassroots efforts to
contain the spread of the disease in various parts of China, to reports on the medical
research into the nature of the virus and the hunt for a vaccine. Stories of heroic medical
workers saving lives also became a common news item.
From the investigations into Beijing Youth Daily and People’s Daily, it is easy to see
the strategy of the Chinese media in dealing with the SARS outbreak: setting up a tone to
inspire public emotion, reconstructing the image of the government as being capable of
managing the crisis, and influencing public opinion so as to stabilize the society and
maintain social order. As for the Chinese government in the sub-game with the domestic
media, the dominant strategy changed from the massive cover-up to disclosure of the
information on the true scale of the SARS crisis. There are several reasons for the
reluctance of the government to release information on SARS. First, the nature of the
authoritarian system of government discouraged officials to reveal information,
particularly negative news, which could result in a severe backlash against the state and
threaten the legitimacy of the ruling party. Second, the cover-up was crucial in ensuring
social stability particularly during a sensitive leadership transition period. Finally, the
local governments were preoccupied with the performance of the local economy and thus
downplayed any negative news. However, the presence of foreign reporters and the
impact of international pressure, which were from the principal game between the
Chinese government and the international media, were making it increasingly difficult for
the Chinese government to control information. In that case, the government had to bear
the reputation cost in mind. As a result, the Chinese government adopted another strategy:
stopping the cover-up and publicizing information on the SARS epidemic. Accordingly,
the government was paid off with a restored image as a responsible and capable
government. In turn, the reliance of the public on the domestic media for information
created conditions for public support and approval, and as a result, it increases the
government’s payoffs.
4. CONCLUSION
The objective of this study is to provide a substantial interpretation of the media’s role as
actors in political decision making processes. The study has attempted to create a
comprehensive game model that could help understand the media’s role as an active
participant in crisis management in the case of the SARS epidemic in China. The
application of rational choice theory to the interactions in the game between the media
and the government demonstrates how certain decisions and policies are determined by
such political factors as the media and how such factors may affect the government’s
preferences and payoffs. Given that the government is interested in building a reputation
towards the media and the public, it appears rational that the government has a greater
incentive to choose its dominant strategy to cooperate with the media, if this increases its
payoffs.
However, if we take a closer look at the three players in the game model separately,
it is clear that the impact of the international media on the Chinese government is very
different from the interaction between the domestic media and the Chinese government.
On the one hand, the international media have been an active player in the policy making
process of the Chinese government. Under mounting pressure from the international
community brought about by the international media, the Chinese government made its
decisions to disclose the true scale of the SARS crisis to the public and to mobilize
national resources to combat the spread of the epidemic. On the other hand, the role that
the domestic media played in this decision making process was far less active. In the
early stages of the SARS outbreak, the Chinese government had been controlling, hiding
and distorting information on the SARS outbreak and the extent of the crisis. It was the
government that decided what sort of information and how and when it should be
released to the public. The government steered the making of news towards a particular
representation of the event. In the later stages of the outbreak, although the domestic
media were allowed to cover the true image of the crisis extensively, they were instructed
to support and advance the powers and policies of the authoritarian government, so as to
build national solidarity. It was the nature of the authoritarian government to control and
manipulate information. Nevertheless, once the international media revealed the truth of
the SARS crisis, the domestic media did become bolder in their coverage.
To recapitulate, it was the international media’s release of the truth of the SARS
crisis that triggered off greater international pressure and eventually forced the top
Chinese leadership to take much more active interest in the SARS outbreak. The impact
of the international media on the Chinese government was not only in its decision making
process. ‘Many political analysts predicted SARS would have the same effect on China
that the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986 had on the Soviet Union, accelerating
political reform’ (Ching, 2003). In both cases, the first response was a massive cover-up.
In both cases, it was the foreign consequences which imposed the truth. In 1986, Mikhail
Gorbachev suddenly had to act and tell the truth. But ‘this glasnost - transparency forced him to perestroika, a renewed structure which led, in 1989 to the fall of the Berlin
wall and in 1991 to the collapse of the Soviet Union’ (Chu and Hromadko, 2003). Since
the SARS epidemic was contained swiftly within a short period of time, the effect of
China’s Chernobyl would seem unlikely to take place. The short-term indications are that,
despite some signs of bolder domestic media, China will fit the SARS response into its
basic political framework and move on.
What needs to be pointed out is that my research on the news coverage of the SAR
epidemic in China focuses only on the mainstream media. However, new information
technologies, such as the internet and mobile phones, should not be ignored. Mobile
phone text messages and internet bulletins disseminated among Chinese people kept pace
with the international media in releasing the truth of the SARS outbreak. The ease in
diffusing information via new information technologies has not only posed a challenge to
the traditional monopoly of the mainstream media in the distribution channels of news,
but has also impacted on the governmental decision making process, together with the
mainstream media. Is the case of the SARS crisis a good illustration of a promotion of
democracy for the authoritarian regime by the use of information communications
technologies? According to Joseph Fewsmith, the Chinese government’s decision to
release the truth of the SARS crisis is, to a large extent, due to the media coverage.
‘Clearly, the transformation of communications technology, the growth of a
contingent of dedicated Chinese journalists, … the presence of foreign reporters, and
the impact of international pressure are making it increasingly difficult to control
information.’ (Fewsmith, 2003: 254)
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