psycoloquy.92.3.52.space.10.montello
Thu Sep 10 1992
ISSN 1055-0143
(7 paras, 16 refs, 195 lines)
PSYCOLOQUY is sponsored by the American Psychological Association (APA)
Copyright 1992 Daniel R. Montello
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SPATIAL COGNITION
Commentary on Bryant on Space
Daniel R. Montello
Department of Geography
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA
93106
montello@geog.ucsb.edu
ABSTRACT: Bryant (1992) proposes a unitary spatial representation
system (SRS) constructs spatial knowledge representations based on
input from either linguistic descriptions of environments or
perceptual information acquired while directly experiencing
environments, or both. In this commentary, I discuss some of the
characteristics of the spatial-cognitive system that Bryant has
touched upon, particularly those dealing with large-scale, or
environmental, spaces. Attempts to build a common framework for
understanding both spatial and linguistic cognition are interesting
and laudable, especially if one believes that linguistic cognition
evolved from nonlinguistic cognitive systems such as those
responsible for spatial cognition. In addition to examining the
spatial representations derived from linguistic descriptions, much
of value could be gained by examining the linguistic descriptions
derived from spatial representations, either external or internal.
KEYWORDS: Spacial representation, spacial models, cognitive maps,
linguistic structure.
1.1 Bryant (1992) proposes that a unitary spatial representation
system (SRS) constructs spatial knowledge representations based on
input from either linguistic descriptions of environments or perceptual
information acquired while directly experiencing environments, or both.
To integrate successfully our understanding of both spatial and
linguistic cognition obviously requires a considerable understanding of
the characteristics of each. In this commentary, I discuss some of the
characteristics of the spatial-cognitive system that Bryant has touched
upon, particularly those dealing with large-scale, or environmental,
spaces.
II. FRAMES-OF-REFERENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION
2.1 Quite appropriately, Bryant discusses the reference-frames that
are used to organize spatial knowledge about environments. He invokes
the commonly made distinction between egocentric and allocentric frames
(e.g., Hart & Moore, 1973). The former occurs when locational knowledge
about objects or places is encoded relative to a person's own location
in space ("the mountain is very far from me"); the latter occurs when
locational knowledge is encoded independently of one's own location but
relative to another externally located object or place ("the mountain
is far from the ocean"), or to an external abstract coordinate system
("the mountain is at 32 degrees latitude north"). Bryant also mentions
a third frame which he calls the "external frame." This is based on
"the external spatial framework analysis, which is... based on the body
but projected forward in the field of view" (Bryant, 1992, 2.3). As I
understand Bryant, this frame might be described more parsimoniously as
an egocentric frame based not on individuals' actual locations at a
given time but on some other place at which they are imagining
themselves to be located (see 2.3 below); it is an "imagined egocentric
frame." As Bryant points out, an object-centered frame is probably not
especially relevant to the SRS; its role is in object recognition, not
object localization.
2.2 Bryant maintains that the SRS incorporates both egocentric frames
(actual or imagined) and allocentric frames. I agree that both types of
frames are important to spatial knowledge, but I believe some clarity
on this issue could be gained by a consideration of the distinction
between working memory (WM) and long-term memory (LTM) knowledge.
Evidence suggests that human spatial information about environments is
in fact stored allocentrically in LTM, and in a Cartesian rather than a
polar coordinate system (Montello & Presson, 1992; Rieser, 1989). When
the information is placed in WM in order to perform some spatial task
(e.g., direction-giving, some cases of wayfinding), it is organized
from the perspective of the actual or imagined location of "ego." This
basically suggests that there is no such thing as a spatial image
free of the thinker's real or imagined perspective. I would not
maintain, however, that all spatial knowledge must be displayed as a
spatial image in WM in order to be used (see 4.1 below).
2.3 Working-memory representations of environmental space are always
organized with respect to a viewer's perspective, but this need not be
the normal perspective of an earth-bound traveler. Literature on
cognitive mapping (e.g., Siegel & White, 1975) has commonly made a
distinction between "route maps" and "survey maps." This distinction
refers to much more than just the perspective from which spatial
knowledge is accessed, but it does suggest that people can imagine
environments from a terrain- level perspective or a "bird's-eye view."
I use the term "travel recreation" to refer to a temporally ordered
sequence of environmental images that basically simulates a sequence
of percepts experienced while moving through the environment. The term
"survey-map scanning" refers to simultaneous, maplike spatial imagery
that represents part of an environment more abstractly, from a
bird's-eye view. Palij (1987) has made a similar distinction.
III. ACCESS TO INFERRED VS. EXPERIENCED SPATIAL RELATIONS
3.1 Bryant discusses the fact that not all locations in space relative
to one's body position are equally accessible (i.e., different speed
and accuracy in answering questions about objects in front vs.
behind). However, he claims that "people generally have the same degree
of access to inferred spatial relations as to explicitly described or
observed ones" (Bryant, 1992, 3.7). With respect to experienced
environments, both the theory (Siegel & White, 1975) and the evidence
(Hanley & Levine, 1983; Klatzky et al., 1990; Montello & Pick, 1992;
Sullivan et al., 1992) that I am familiar with clearly contradicts this
notion. These studies have shown that people access knowledge more
quickly or more accurately between places along routes they have
traveled directly than along routes that are only inferred (though
people can certainly infer spatial relationships with nonrandom
accuracy).
IV. AUTOMATICITY OF SPATIAL KNOWLEDGE
4.1 Bryant also claims (and cites evidence) that spatial knowledge is
automatically processed. For the most part, he cites research on
pictorial space in order to buttress this argument. Although
performance on some environmental spatial tasks is apparently
relatively automatic (e.g., updating while walking about), not all
spatial tasks are (e.g., navigation in unfamiliar places, inferring
novel routes in familiar places, direction-giving). The latter may be
expected to show interference effects, developmental differences, and
the effects of instructional set (Book & Garling, 1981; Kozlowski &
Bryant, 1977; Lindberg & Garling, 1983; Smyth & Kennedy, 1982; Sullivan
et al., 1992; and other developmental references too numerous to list).
So I don't think this part of Bryant's argument leads very far:
Undoubtedly some components of both spatial and linguistic cognition
are effortful and some are automatic. I believe that disentangling the
automatic and effortful components of spatial processing is a critical
task to be accomplished, but in any case I don't find this particularly
damaging to the main point Bryant is trying to make.
V. CONCLUSION
5.1 Attempts to build a common framework for understanding both
spatial and linguistic cognition are interesting and laudable,
especially if one believes as I do that linguistic cognition evolved
from nonlinguistic cognitive systems such as those responsible for
spatial cognition (a long-debated issue). A final comment: In addition
to examining the spatial representations (mental models) derived from
linguistic descriptions, much of value could be gained, I would think, by
examining the linguistic descriptions derived from spatial
representations, either external or internal (e.g., direction-giving,
descriptions of places, etc.; cf. Klein, 1982; Linde & Labov, 1975).
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PSYCOLOQUY 3(16) space.1
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