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Biological Psychology 27 (1988) 191-194
Towards_ev88.doc
TOWARDS EVIDENTIALLY BASED, NON-CIRCULAR
EMANATIONS OF HUMAN PAVLOVIAN AUTONOMIC
CONDITIONING AS A GENUINE PHENOMENON A
REALIST PERSPECTIVE
John J. FUREDY *
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S
IA1
Reflecting on the papers of my fellow participants has suggested the following
five prescriptions that would, in my view, facilitate our making genuine progress
towards more scientifically-based explanations of human Pavlovian autonomic
conditioning.
1. Test basic assumptions of models rather than models themselves
Models themselves cannot really be tested, because they do not assert anything,
being mere analogies or metaphors that are useful only for generating hypotheses.
However, there are basic assumptions that underlie each model. These assumption
are genuine assertions about the world, and are therefore open to test, even though
the proponents of the model themselves may not welcome such tests, especially
when the tests turn out to be disconfirmatory. The paper by Kimmel and Lachnit is
the best example of this sort of basic-assumption testing, where the assumption
under examination is that background tonic and phasic CSs are functionally
equivalent. As shown by Kimmel and Lachnit, this is a basic assumption of the
Rescorla-Wagner model in the sense that it can be derived from their formulation. It
is also a genuine, testable assertion about conditioning, as is indicated by the fact
that it can be stated in terms that are independent of the model's terminology. The
assumption is tested and falsified (though not disproved, because no experimental
evidence is ever known to be certainly true) in the experiments reported by Kimmel
and Lachnit. My added interpretative suggestion is that Kimmel and Lachnit's
evidence shows that conditioning is not just a purely cognitive, S-S process, but also
involves response-learning processes, in this case the interaction between phasic and
tonic CRs (my emphasis) as suggested by Kimmel and Lachnit (p. 96) following
Asratyan (1965).
Siddle and Bond deal with broader issues than do Kimmel and Lachnit, but their
approach is similar in as much as they attempt to bring evidence to bear
* I am indebted to Maria Gurevich for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
0301-0511/88/$3.50 0 1988, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
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J.J. Furedy / Non-circular explanations of Pavlovian conditioning
on genuine assertions such as the claim that avoidance involves both classical
(Pavlovian) and instrumental conditioning, or that "Pavlovian conditioning plays
only a minor role in the development of human phobias." (p. 175). With regard to
the latter issue, my comment would be that it matters crucially whether one accepts
the currently dominant cognitive accounts of Pavlovian conditioning. If one views
Pavlovian conditioning as simply a contingency-registration process, then the
experiments one designs tend to reflect this, and they may not provide a sufficiently
effective US to generate fear (which, in S-R terms, is the conditionable component
of the unconditional pain response).
2. Treat human Pavlovian autonomic conditioning (HPAC) as a specifiable
phenomenon in its own right
This prescription runs contrary to viewing HPAC as a mere index of some other
underlying process. The nature of the underlying process is typically determined by
whatever the current theoretical predilection happens to be, which was S-R oriented
several decades ago and is "cognitively" oriented nowadays. So I oppose any
assignment to HPAC of a mere "role" (Öhman) in the pantheon of current cognitive
constructs, but rather would advocate studying HPAC to determine, empirically, the
extent to which it is influenced by cognitive and non-cognitive processes.
A more subtle form of selective treatment of HPAC as a subsidiary rather than
genuine phenomenon is one where only those forms are recognized as genuine
conditioning phenomena which fit in with the current cognitive framework. A good
example of this in HPAC is long-interval skin-conductance-conditioning
conditioning, where the second-interval response (SIR) is considered to be a clearer
case of conditioning than the first-interval response (FIR) on the (often implicit)
grounds that the SIR more clearly reflects (cognitive) CS-US predictive processes.
But the brute fact that is usually ignored is that, in terms of the basic, neutral,
atheoretical criterion of conditioning (i.e., CS + performance exceeding CSperformance), it is the FIR rather than the SIR which is far more reliable in SCR
conditioning.
Again, when Lovibond argues against the (mostly) FIR-based counter-cognitive
evidence from the Toronto laboratory (pp. 84485) he ignores the fact that the
autonomic/cognitive correlation required by the cognitive position failed to emerge
in one experiment which did measure SIRS (Schiffman & Furedy, 1972). More
importantly, I suggest that examination of the second half of his paragraph indicates
that he has erected a number of arbitrary and over-rigorous methodological
requirements that would, if applied to any other HPAC conditioning experiment,
disqualify it from being considered as methodologically adequate. So, for example,
given that in all the Toronto experiments, the difference between negative- and zerocontingency CSs was clearly
J.J. Furedy / Non-circular explanations of Pavlovian conditioning
193
reflected in expectancy ratings, what does one do with the criticism that the
"negative contingency programmed in the explicitly unpaired group was relatively
weak" (p. 84)?
3. Define basic terms with precision and avoid metaphysical distinctions
Currently it is the term "cognitive" that is the main instance of a term that is used
without sufficient precision, and without pointing to specific authors, I think it is
fair to say that many papers in a number of places follow the prevalent practice of
using an almost infinite extension for this term, so that it can apply to all
psychological processes.
By metaphysical distinctions, I mean those that are not grounded in empirically
specifiable aspects, but rather refer to differing pre-theoretical predilections. The
most ubiquitous such distinction which runs through a number of papers is that
between animal and human processes, where this refers not to the (empirically
specifiable) difference in subjects, but to some metaphysical difference in purported
level of complexity, as in the contrast between "animal conditioning and learning"
and "human memory". Unless one subscribes to the Cartesian view of there being a
fundamental difference between human and animal processes, dividing areas along
human/animal lines makes no sense. And although it may be administratively
convenient for reasons of subject maintenance to separate animal from human
researchers, that cannot constitute an epistemological basis of distinction. In
epistemological terms, it is the processes being investigated rather than the subjects
used that determine the content of scientific areas.
Another such distinction, which is specifically referred to by Öhman, is that
between the following set of terms on the one hand-automatic, dumb, unconscious,
and primitive-and the opposite terms on the other hand-controlled, intelligent,
conscious, and advanced. Although these opposites can be used in a scientific sense,
provided one specifies how the distinctions referred to can be tested, they can also
be used in a literary, global sense which refers to metaphysical, non-empiricallyspecifiable distinctions. In the latter case, one is involved more in literature than in
science, no matter how effective that involvement may be. An instance of that
effectiveness, at least for me, is Öhman's choice of his initial quote from Clive
James, of whom I am a great fan as a literary figure, but not as a scientifically
accurate describer of experimental psychological positions.
4. Fight narrowness of conception with facts not fads
I agree that it is overly narrow to: not measure human CS-US expectancy directly
in conditioning experiments (Lovibond); not pay attention to affective and
individual-difference factors (Martin & Levey); view HPAC as "mindless
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J.J. Furedy / Non-circular explanations of Pavlovian conditioning
and mechanic" (Öhman). However, narrowness of this sort is, in the end, not well
repaired by noting that the current fashion is now against these views. It is better to
point to evidence that is logically relevant to the view, and/or to suggest tests that
would assess whether these narrow conceptions are correct.
5. Avoid gross mischaracterizations of the literature
Compared to professions such as the law, scholarship in experimental psychology
is notoriously poor. Each of us knows only the mis-citations of our own papers, so I
shall take the Dawson and Furedy (1976) and Furedy and Riley (1987) papers as my
examples. The former is mischaracterized by Öhman, when he groups it with other
papers that "endorse strong statements" (p. 114) about awareness underlying
conditioning, whereas much of the Dawson and Furedy (1976) data show that
awareness is not even correlated with conditioning. The Furedy and Riley (1987)
paper is mischaracterized by Martin and Levey when they cite it to support the
(cognitive) view that, in conditioning, the "subject is learning something about the
probability of reinforcement, the signalling properties of the paradigm, and is
forming expectancies (my emphasis) about them" (p. 162). This thoroughly
cognitive characterization of Furedy and Riley (1987) is inaccurate. Recent reviews
characterise this chapter as providing "caution against ill-defined and uncritical
'cognitive imperialism”’ (Thomas, 1988. p. 187) and proposing a "two-process
theory in which response learning... and cognitive learning... can [both] be tested in
dual paradigm experiments" (O'Gorman, 1988, p. 372).
References
Asratyan. EA. (1965). Compensator adaptation, reflex activity, and the brain (S.A. Carson.
Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Dawson, M.E. & Furedy, J.J. (1976). The role of awareness in human differential autonomic
classical conditioning: The necessary-gate hypothesis. Psychophysiology, 13. 50-53.
Furedy, J.J. & Riley, D.M. (1987). Human Pavlovian autonomic conditioning and the
cognitive paradigm. In G. Davey (Ed.), Conditioning in humans (pp. l-25). Chichester:
Wiley.
O'Gorman, J.G. (1988). Review of Cognitive Processes and Pavlovian Conditioning in
Humans. Psychophysiology, 25, 370-371.
Popper, K.R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
Prokasy, W.F. (Ed.) (1965). Classical conditioning: A symposium. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts.
Schiffmann, K. & Furedy, J.J. (1972) Failures of contingency and cognitive factors to affect
long-interval differential Pavlovian autonomic conditioning. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 96, 215-218.
Siddle, D.A.T., & Remington, B. (1978). A comment on Furedy & Paulos (1977).
Psychophysiology, 15, 609-610.
Thomas. G.V. (198X). Review of Cognitive Processes and Pavlovian Conditioning in
Humans. Biological Psychology, 25. 1X7-8.