West Fork Fire Complex Fire
Programmatic/Cost Fire Review San Juan
and Rio Grande National Forest, U.S.
Forest Service
National Oversight Review
National Incident Management Organization
5/1/2014
West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose............................................................................................................................................ 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Fire Chronology .............................................................................................................................. 3
Fire Costs ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Observation by Objective ............................................................................................................. 16
Actions taken to meet Chief’s Letter of Intent: ............................................................................ 16
Social and Political Issues ............................................................................................................. 17
Procedures That Can Be Enhanced or Expanded ......................................................................... 17
Improvements in Sharing and Clarifying Expectations: ............................................................... 17
Lessons Learned / Observations and Recommendations: ............................................................. 18
West Fork Complex Strategic Planning ........................................................................................ 19
West Fork Complex List of Interviewees ..................................................................................... 20
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document
risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect
effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management
for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive
analysis of incident documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and
facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an
opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the
effectiveness of implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning
environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
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Review Objectives:
Objectively look at actions
taken by the IMT and local
Agency Administrators to
meet direction provided by
the Chief’s Letter of Intent
Asses the consideration
and effectiveness of
applying risk management
concepts to incident cost
through the associated
decisions and expenditures
as an outcome
Identify Best Business
Practices Used on Fires
This Past Season
Identify How Social and
Political Issues Factored
Into Our Decision Making
Identify Which Current
Procedures Can Be
Enhanced or Expanded
Identify Improvements
That Can Be Made In
Sharing and Clarifying
Expectations
Review Team Members
George Custer, Team Lead,
Incident Commander
(retired)
James Meredith, Incident
Business Advisor (retired)
Jessica Haas, Research
Forester, RMRS
Purpose
The purpose of the large fire review is to objectively review strategies
and actions taken by Incident Management Teams (IMTs) and Agency
Administrators (AAs) responsible for managing the West Fork Complex
Fire on the San Juan and Rio Grande National Forests. A particular focus
of this review is to examine whether decisions made were consistent
with the Forest Service Chief’s letter of intent for management of the
2013 wildfire season. In Chief Tidwell’s letter of intent, success was
defined as “safely achieving reasonable objectives with the least firefighter
exposure necessary, while enhancing stakeholder support for our
management.” Specific principles highlighted in the letter of intent
relevant to this review include:





Emphasize firefighter safety through all aspects of events.
Analyze, communicate, and share risk before, during, and after
incidents.
Do not accept unnecessary risk or transfer it to Forest Service
partners.
Meet reasonable objectives, in a safe, effective, and efficient way.
Derive strategic and tactical decisions based on the probability of
success in meeting reasonable objectives.
Background
This review is part of the 2013 large fire reviews and was conducted by
George Custer, retired NIMO Incident Commander; Jessica Haas, Data
Service Specialist, Rocky Mountain Research Station; and James
Meredith, retired NIMO finance section chief, at the direction of Tom
Harbor, Director of Fire and Aviation Management.
From March 13 through March 19, 2014 the large fire review team
visited the Rio Grande and San Juan National Forests. The review team
conducted face-to-face interviews with Agency Administrators (AAs),
District and Forest Fire Management Officers, and regional fire managers.
Additionally, the review team conducted interviews via teleconference
on March 14 and March 19, 2014 with the Incident Management Teams
(IMTs) Incident Commanders (ICs) and March 24, with the Deputy
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Regional Forester. The review team also researched the documentation “boxes” and
electronic data files that are part of the documentation package left behind by the IMTs.
Fire Chronology
The West Fork Complex began as a series of lightning strikes on the San Juan National
Forest (SJNF), starting with the West Fork and Wolf Creek Fires on June 5, 2013. On June
13, 2013 the Windy Pass fire was detected, and on June 20, 2013 the Papoose Fire ignited
on the neighboring Rio Grande National Forest (RGNF). At this time the West Fork
Complex breached the continental divide and was also burning on the RGNF. While the
Wolf Creek Fire was suppressed early on, the remaining three fires were long-term events
and were managed under a common command structure known as the West Fork Complex.
Two of the three complex fires, the Papoose and the West Fork Fires, ignited and were
burning in the Weminuche Wilderness (Figure 1, page 8). The Windy Pass Fire was located
just east of US Highway 160, and north of Pagosa Springs on the Pagosa Ranger District of
the SJNF. The complex area is characterized by remote, steep, and broken terrain. The
Weminuche Wilderness and the surrounding lands are geographically split by the
continental divide. On the west side of the divide is the SJNF, and on the east side of the
divide is the RGNF. Both the Rio Grande and the San Juan NF have substantial private
inholding on their administrative lands. The Weminuche Wilderness is unique in some
regards in that it is located in close proximity to private lands. In particular, portions of the
northern boundary on the RGNF are immediately adjacent to private lands with residential
structures located on them. US Highway 160 runs through the area, just south of the
Weminuche Wilderness boundary (Figure 1, page 8). US Highway 160 is a major road for
through traffic and one of the only ways to access Mesa Verde National Park from the east,
as well as other major tourist destinations in the area. The highway provides a large source
of revenue to the local communities, which rely heavily on summer tourist traffic for
income. A primary concern for state and local officials was the potential for closure of this
highway. The highway crosses the continental divide at Wolf Creek Pass, where the Wolf
Creek ski resort is operated on a special use permit from the RGNF.
There are a limited amount of historical fire scars on the landscape. In the last 30 years,
the San Juan NF has had 14 large fires (greater than 1000 acres), five of which were in the
vicinity of the West Fork Complex, including the Little Sands Fire in 2012 and the
Missionary Ridge Fire in 2002. However, the RGNF has only had four large fires in the past
30 years, and only one within the vicinity of the West Fork Complex. The Million Fire, was
just south of the town of South Fork, and burned 7000+ acres in 2002. In fact, this forest
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has historically been known as the ‘asbestos forest’ by locals due to the lack of fire on the
landscape.
The vegetation in the area consists of dense spruce/fir forest types, with large stands of
beetle kill. In some stands, the kill encompasses up to 80% of the trees (Figure 1, page 8).
Unlike other forest types, such as Lodgepole (Pinus contorta) forests, which may experience
a reduction in fire behavior once the needles drop off the dead trees, the structure of
spruce trees (Picea engelmannii) is such that a dense network of ladder fuel remains long
after the tree dies. These ladder fuels are conducive to crown fires and extreme fire
behavior, even after the needles have dropped from the trees, given the right fire weather.
On June 5, 2013 the first two of the complex fires were discovered – the Wolf Creek Fire
and the West Fork fire – both on the SJNF. Initial attack efforts were concentrated on the
Wolf Creek Fire, due to its proximity to high values at risk, namely the Wolf Creek Pass ski
resort and the major traffic corridor US Highway 160. Local fire resources successfully
suppressed the Wolf Creek Fire shortly after detection. The West Fork Fire ignited within
the Weminuche Wilderness boundary. Due to the steep terrain, limited remote access, and
large percentage of beetle-killed trees in the area posing a high safety hazard to ground
crews, this fire was being monitored by air. Over the next week no signs of fire activity
were reported by aerial attack resources, until June 13, 2013. At this time the fire became
active once again, and grew to 20+ acres by the evening. On the same day a new fire, the
Windy Pass Fire, was detected on the east side of US Highway 160, just down slope from
the Wolf Creek ski resort. Again due to the proximity of the Windy Pass Fire to values at
risk, this fire became the priority for local suppression efforts.
After performing preliminary complexity analysis in Wildland Fire Decision Support
System (WFDSS), the SJNF Agency Administrators (AAs) determined that they would be
managing a long term fire event. They therefore ordered a National Incident Management
Organization (NIMO) Team, initially under Incident Commander Curtis Heaton (IC- Type 2),
and then under Incident Commander Dan Kleinman (IC-Type 1) to facilitate the transitions
between IMTs. Discussions were underway with the AAs of the neighboring RGNF, of the
possibility of either of the fires crossing the continental divide and spreading onto the
RGNF.
Early on, the Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control, the Wolf Creek Pass Ski
Area manager and local county officials, were contacted to discuss leadership’s intent for
the fire. These stakeholders were onboard with the chosen strategy to not take direct
action on the fire within the wilderness. Stakeholders understood the complex terrain,
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access limited to foot travel only, and the large number of snags in the area would not
provide a safe working environment for firefighters. A point protection and perimeter
control strategy was employed that maximized the likelihood of successful suppression and
minimized the likelihood of damage to the values at risk.
A series of red flag warnings, starting on June 20, 2013, were issued for strong winds and
low relative humidity over the fire’s area. These weather conditions led to extreme fire
behavior and growth as the winds pushed the fires into the crowns of the dead stands of
spruce, and caused long range spotting up to two miles ahead of the fires. The spots were
easily established after landing in the low moisture fuels. The fire showed unprecedented
extreme fire behavior with smoke plumes visible from over a hundred miles away.
On June 20, 2013 the West Fork fire spotted and established itself over the continental
divide on the RGNF. The fire more than doubled in size from approximately 12,000 acres
to over 29,000 acres. The Windy Pass Fire also made significant runs that day. Trigger
points that the AAs on both forests had established were crossed, and the focus shifted to
evacuation of campgrounds and the protection of numerous residences along US Highway
160, as well as the closure of US Highway 160 to public travel. On June 21, 2013 the town
of South Fork was also evacuated. Picture 1 (below) shows the extreme fire behavior and
smoke column as seen by the town of South Fork on June 21, 2013.
Picture 1: West Fork Fire as seen from South Fork
Additionally, on June 21, 2013 the Papoose Fire, which was detected the day before,
became active and grew to 1600 acres. This fire is located within the Weminuche
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Wilderness approximately 6 miles northeast of the West Fork Fire. Limited access and bugkilled spruce again limited suppression activities due to safety concerns and the low
probability of success. The prevailing winds had potential to impact several communities
and numerous private dwellings as well as the Rio Grande Reservoir, as the fire moved
north.
On June 22, 2013 a decision was made by the AAs to “zone” the fires along the continental
divide. The Papoose Fire and the portion of the West Fork Fire east of the continental
divide were designated as the east zone of the West Fork Complex, under the command of
the IC Pete Blume of the Rocky Basin Type 1 IMT. The Windy Pass Fire and the west
portion of the West Fork Fire were designated as the west zone, under the command of IC
Dan Kleinman of the Phoenix NIMO team. While the incident structure was to manage the
fires as one complex, a team was kept in place on both zones due to the distance between
the zones and the difficulty in managing the fires across the continental divide.
Additionally, an Incident Command Post was kept on both zones of the fires, and a third
base camp was maintained in the remote Papoose Fire area. This base camp was used to
minimize the hazards and risks associated with driving between the two fires of the east
zone. An area command was put in place by the Regional Office, to facilitate logistics across
the two zones and the various IMTs.
The two IMTs, under the direction of the AAs from the San Juan and Rio Grande NF’s,
employed a point protection and perimeter control strategy. Resources were focused on
protecting communities and residences, and very little direct action was taken on the fire
edge. One notable exception to this was the area around the Rio Grande Reservoir, where
direct air attack was used to suppress the fireline. Considerable effort was put into
defending not only the ground above the reservoir, but also the dam face itself. During this
time the dam was undergoing a critical refurbishment as the face of the dam had
deteriorated and was under repair. If the fire caused further delays, there was a real
potential for dam failure. Additionally, there was a concern that if the fire burned the land
above the dam, silting would become a major issue. This strategy showed sound riskmanagement decision making and collaboration between AAs and ICs. Based on values at
risk and probability of success, suppression resources were deployed on suitable ground
and away from the volatile bug killed spruce stands that were fueling extreme fire
behavior.
By June 26, 2013 the weather pattern produced higher moisture levels; however, there was
also increasing thunderstorm activity in the area. Continuing into July, thunderstorms
produced local winds that fueled fire growth; however, much of this was interior growth
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and did not threaten firelines. The West Fork Fire remained relatively calm with some
interior growth. As the fires spread into live fuels and out of the dead spruce, the fire
behavior became less extreme. However, on July 3, 2013 the Papoose Fire made a major
run back toward the continental divide, again through heavy beetle kill. By July 4, 2013
monsoonal moisture moved into the region and wetting rains were expected in the area.
Starting July 5, 2013 several rain events occurred. By July 14, 2013 the fires were turned
back over to local resources.
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U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Figure 1: West Fork Complex fire perimeters with spruce mortality
West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Risk Management & Values at Risk
From the onset of the fire, stakeholders were engaged and informed by the AAs, including
the State of Colorado Office of Emergency Services, Department of Public Health and
Environment, Parks and Wildlife, as well as the various county commissioners, local
officials, local fire departments, utility companies and the San Luis Valley Irrigation District.
On the east zone of the fire, a public community meeting was held each day of the fire. As
noted above, the RGNF has not had many large fires in the past, and with evacuations in
effect for the town of South Fork, citizens were eager to get information at these meetings
(which continued after the evacuations were lifted). These meetings helped strengthen the
relationships between the Agency and the stakeholders. For the Papoose Fire community
meetings, the private landowners agreed that the best strategy for the fire was to try to
suppress the fire on more favorable lands, which happened to be very close to the private
land. Even though the pre-season planning of values at risk did not happen on this
incident, various stakeholders became aware of the threats wildland fires posed to the
communities treasured resources. Of particular concern was the watershed health of
reservoirs and dams on National Forest lands. This prompted the formation of the Rio
Grande Emergency Action Committee to address potential fuel treatments/mitigations for
values at risk from future fires in the area.
Early on the National Forest AAs were in contact with the regional representative for the
Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control (DFPC). As the fire progressed, the DFPC
became a signatory for Delegations of Authority, and in conjunction with Forest AAs,
shared the risk decisions and objectives in managing the fires. The State’s input was
important in understanding the financial values associated with local commerce and
protection of the reservoir. The State also brought multiple resources to bear in the way of
structure protection engines and local fire department response. It is important to note
that the cost share agreements, while completed, have not yet been signed. The original
agreements put in place at the local level were elevated to the state level and apparently
some issues were not resolved. It is our understanding that the cost apportionment is now
in the Forest Service (FS) Washington Office (WO) awaiting finalization. AAs discussed
with the review team the impact this is having on local resources as they are still awaiting
payment. Two primary stakeholders were analyzed for risk sharing: the Rio Grande River
special use permit holder, and the local counties and private land owners.
The Rio Grande Reservoir supplies drinking and irrigation water to people downstream, as
far as New Mexico. The reservoir is located in a tight, steep canyon abutting the western
flank of the Papoose Fire final perimeter, adjacent to the wilderness boundary. Even
though the terrain made direct suppression of this flank of the fire difficult, the decision
was made to use suppression tactics including helicopter drops in this area to slow the fires
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progression towards the reservoir. The assessment of expenditures on rehabilitation and
adverse future impacts to the water supply verses current expenditures on fire
suppression determined the most cost effective strategy was to try and limit fire spread in
this area. In addition, the dam was under repairs, and was in a condition where very little
exposure to fire or increased sediment loads, would have caused a high amount of
structural damage. This is an example of a transfer of risk to the Agency from the
permittee, had the reservoir not been of concern to the stakeholder; the AA would have
implemented less extensive suppression efforts in this area. The permittee did accept
some of the risk during the fire event and initiated the formation of Rio Grande Watershed
Emergency Action Coordination Team (RWEACT). This interagency coordination team
consists of Hinsdale, Rio Grande, Mineral County, and the Colorado Water Conservation
Board. Initially RWEACT procured a grant from the State of Colorado for $2.5 million to
assist in efforts to mitigate hazards to life and safety during the fire event. After the event
had died down, efforts were turned to rehabilitation and restoration in cooperation with
the local BAER assessment teams. This group continues to be active in the area, and was
holding a stakeholder pre-fire season meeting at the Monte Vista public lands office while
we were conducting this review, to discuss strategies and tactics for the upcoming season.
A specific focus of the review was to examine the application of risk management concepts
to strategic wildfire management. Over the last several years, the Agency has emphasized
risk management as the appropriate decision framework for wildfire management.
Through our observations it was abundantly clear that AAs have embraced and
implemented risk management concepts in their fire-management decision making. From
the onset of the fire, the identification of steep terrain with a high percentage of insectkilled forest convinced AAs on both forests that direct suppression was not an option due
to the high risks it posed to firefighter safety, and the low probability of success in
suppressing the fire under these conditions. Instead a strategy was adopted that allowed
for firefighters to provide point protection around the values at risk, and engage the fire
directly when safe to do so. Often this meant that the firefighters had to wait for the fire to
come out of the high country, and down into the flatter lands, proximate to private
property, where the probability of success was high and exposure was lower.
From our observations, firefighter hazard mitigation (quality of exposure) was strongly
emphasized throughout the incident organization. Early on the AAs realized that a change
in the weather and the arrival of monsoonal moisture was the only way these fires could be
contained. The Rio Grande AA gave specific direction to limit retardant and air tankers
(quantity of exposure) without ground resources to back it up, and to keep the air tankers
and helicopters out of the wilderness except for matters of life and safety. The risks
associated with flying at high elevation, in steep terrain, with limited ground
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reinforcement, and no values at risk was the rationale for this decision. Additionally, the
AAs decided to use a point protection strategy on and around the values at risk, rather than
going direct in an area with steep, snag-filled terrain and heavy fuels, with little likelihood
of success. Aircrafts were used to put retardant lines between the fire and the values at
risk in terrain where it could be reinforced by ground crews. This was done primarily
north of the town of South Fork, near the Rio Grande Reservoir and the residential
communities north of the Papoose Fire.
One key important component of a risk management framework is to assess the likelihood
and the acceptability of the outcome. For these fires, the possibility that fire could overrun
the town of South Fork or cross the Rio Grande and threaten the dam structure as well as
numerous residences and communities to the north was an unacceptable risk. Therefore, a
major portion of the suppression effort went into securing these areas. The use of
helicopters and airtankers in conjunction with ground forces is credited with stopping the
Papoose Fire from damaging the dam and stopping its spread toward the north. Near the
town of South Fork, considerable effort with airtankers and miles of pre-treated retardant
lines were part of the tactics. However, the fire never reached the retardant lines once it
burned out of the bug-killed spruce. Weighing outcomes under these extreme conditions
are difficult at best, but with a better fire behavior fuel model (one for bug-killed timber),
perhaps some airtanker exposure and costs could have been limited.
Fire Costs
Comparison with historical fire costs
Wildfire management costs are highly variable due to the unique nature of each event.
Management strategies determine the number and timing of resources used on a wildfire
event which influences spread, duration, and resource damage. Weather plays a critical
role in determining the behavior (intensity and spread rate) of the fires which has a strong
influence on the ability to suppress fires, thus determining fire duration.
The FS uses a model that predicts the expected cost per acre of large wildfires based on the
characteristics of the fire conditions, geographic environment at ignition, FS administrative
region, and fire size. Actual fire cost is then compared to the modeled Stratified Cost Index
(SCI) for all Forest Service and Department of the Interior large fires, following the
conclusion of the fiscal year. The number of fires that exceed expected cost per acre by
more than one standard deviation are reported to Congress as one of the Agency’s wildfire
suppression performance measures. From a management perspective, the SCI is best
evaluated as a coarse filter. Expenditures well above the SCI do not suggest fires have been
managed in an overly expensive way, since many of the factors that have a strong influence
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on final fire cost are not considered in the SCI nor incorporated using coarse proxies. When
examining fire cost relative to the SCI, it is critical to evaluate those conditions that lead to
costs exceeding expectation such as very high values at risk, fire duration, and challenging
socio-political environments. The West Fork Complex was managed under one p-code,
making it difficult to determine the costs of individual fires. However, considerable time
and effort was put in by the IMTs and local resources to attempt to separate the costs. The
West Fork Complex total reported costs, as well as individual fire costs, are compared to
SCI estimates.
Results suggest that average costs for the West Fork Complex appear to be higher than
historical averages. The Papoose Fire is more than 6 times as expensive as the historical
average, while the West Fork Fire is only 1.7 times as high. None of these fires are above
one standard deviation (84th percentile) of the SCI, the performance criteria established for
reporting to Congress and the total costs of these fires appear to be commensurate with
values at risk.
Fire Name
Acres
Cost
$ / acre
SCI (50%)
Papoose
49,465
$16,800,000
$336
$56
West Fork
Windy Pass
Total
Complex
58,750
1,417
$13,250,000
$1,383,000
$226
$1,470
$130
$403
109,632
$31,433,000
$286
NA
Table 1: Cost comparison with historical average fire costs per acre for fires igniting in areas with
similar characteristics (SCI).
The most expensive fire (per acre) was the Windy Pass Fire, which had the potential to
burn the Wolf Creek Ski Area and breach the continental divide, ultimately threatening
more values at risk. The cost of $1470 per acre is just above the 75th percentile from SCI
data. This cost seems appropriate based on the potential for loss.
The next most expensive fire (per acre) was the Papoose Fire, with $16,800,000 spent on a
49,465 acre fire which is about $336 per acre. This is above the 80th percentile from SCI
data, and can be attributed to the use of aircraft and other resources to protect the
watershed around the Rio Grande Reservoir. This was a reasonable decision given that the
reservoir is a primary source of water for a vast portion of the area’s population, as well as
the surrounding areas. Future costs associated with sedimentation and damage to the
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water infrastructure could easily surpass those expended on the fire, as demonstrated by
post-fire water effects from the Hayman Fire of 2002, which also occurred in Colorado.
The last and largest fire was the West Fork Fire, with $13,250,000 spent on a 58,570 acre
fire which is about $226 per acre. This falls at about the 60th percentile from SCI data. It
would be expected that the cost per acre for this fire would be the lowest since a large
portion is within the wilderness, and most of the cost can be primarily attributed to the
effort taken once it made a run toward the town of South Fork and other development
outside the wilderness.
Current cost of supporting large wildland fires
Throughout our review, many individuals identified the increased complexity and demands
of supporting large wildland fires. AAs and IMTs commented on the increased information
demands from affected communities as well as administrative requirements to maintain
agency information systems. In remote areas with limited road access, multiple base
camps and spike camps may be necessary to reduce the time necessary to access the fire
and limit driving exposure. Interviewees felt that the Agency saved cost by having a
remote base camp on the remote Papoose Fire area, and that it limited exposure by
substantially reducing driving times. One of the highest concerns on these remote fires was
a failure of communication causing increased risk to communities and firefighters.
Therefore, the technological needs for this remote camp were high. The area needed
satellites to provide phone and internet communications.
Another significant item of concern is an increase in indirect costs seen on this fire, as well
as noted in other reviews of large fires. While it is difficult to point to one specific item,
several things are involved in the increasing trend in indirect costs. Relevant cost centers
include the use of technology, like video conferencing for briefings in remote camps using a
satellite feed; GIS units for fire mapping; computer networks in fire camp to track
resources and submit financial information to processing centers on a daily basis;
establishing multiple camps to decrease drive times between base camps and the fires; the
use of a large information section to gather and disseminate information to the involved
agencies, as well as the public; and using more line safety officers due to an increased
emphasis on firefighter safety. Based on current policy and direction, these items are
necessary business practices, which significantly increase costs.
Individually, these resources may not add significantly to incident cost; however,
collectively they represent a large and increasing cost center. The indirect cost on the west
side of the fire was about 59% of total ($4,146,635 of $7,022,051). The east side was about
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37% of total ($8,791,227 of $23,622,501), and the total was about 42% ($12,937,862 of
$30,644,582). Some of the indirect cost for the west side of the fire can be attributed to the
way the fire was managed initially, with indirect costs handled by the west side for most of
the resources. These costs were moved to the west side when the database was split on
June 22, 2013, thus potentially skewing the data somewhat. Figure 2 (page 14 ) shows the
costs broken down by type. While this is in line with other recent reviews, we continue to
see an upward trend.
Another item that warrants consideration is that the percentages of indirect costs may be
increasing as a result of the application of risk management and consideration of firefighter
safety, by using fewer resources in the direct operations with a somewhat fixed cost for
support. This would require more research to determine validity, but could explain some
of the increase.
Figure 2. Total daily fire cost summaries from ISuite for the West Fork Complex, broken down by
cost type, (TOP) and partial daily fire cost summaries by cost type (BOTTOM).
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Fire duration and IMT transitions
The duration and complexity of events has a strong influence on final fire cost. When
developing large fire strategies, AAs and IMTs must weigh the benefits of attempting to
reduce time needed to contain large fires against the costs of allowing additional acres
burned on the landscape. These costs include such things as: economic loses to the
communities, increased resource damage, and unexpected weather events that result in
increased fire size. In the case of the West Fork Complex, taking direct action to reduce fire
size was not a viable alternative due to the risks involved for firefighters.
AAs planned for the long term by bringing in the NIMO and looking to have one
management structure, with other IMTs working under the NIMO. Escalating fire behavior
and rapid fire spread made this concept difficult to manage. Once the complex was split
east and west along administrative boundaries, multiple IMTs received their own
delegations and became somewhat entrenched in working for their particular AA.
Transfers of command continued throughout the event based on 14 day rotations and the
need that both forests felt to have IMTs on their units to finish out the incident. Once
weather improved fire conditions, there may have been opportunities to limit rotations or
have one IMT take over the whole complex. Table 2 (below) shows a list of the transitions
that occurred on the complex.
Assumed
Command
IMT
Fire or Zone
Released
6/18/13
NIMO (Heaton)
West Fork Complex
6/21/13
6/21/13
NIMO (Kleinman)
West Fork Complex
7/4/13
6/23/13
Rocky Basin T1
(Blume)
East Zone
7/6/13
6/27/13
Area Command
(Loach)
West Fork Complex (all)
7/7/13
7/4/13
R5 T2 (Nunez)
West Zone
7/11/13
7/6/13
Rocky Basin T1
(Lund)
East Zone
7/14/13
7/11/13
Rocky Basin T1
(Lund)
West Fork Complex (all)
7/14/13
Table 2: A list of transitions between IMTs
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West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
When it is apparent that fire duration will likely exceed 14 days, it may be advantageous to
negotiate longer assignments to reduce the financial and productivity costs associated with
long term events, especially when trying to consolidate camps and zones. This was
apparent on this fire, when indirect costs start to overcome direct costs as the fire died
down in early July. The influence of fire event duration can be seen by examining the total
daily cost trends of the reviewed complex.
Observation by Objective
Actions taken to meet Chief’s Letter of Intent:
Both Forests work diligently with local politicians, stakeholders and the community in
general. Preseason engagements included holding local fire training for Volunteer Fire
Departments (VFDs) and others wanting a Red Card, as well as public meetings to discuss
fire ecology and the difficulty in suppressing fires in the new landscape of millions of acres
of bug killed trees. Cooperators, such as the Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and
Control (DFPC), were consulted earlier on in the incident and later became signatories of
the delegations of authority. The sound working relationships with DFPC and other
stakeholders such as the San Luis Valley Irrigation District, county commissioners and
utility companies allowed for a mutual understanding of the values at risk and the risk to
firefighters. During the incident, numerous public meetings and daily updates with
stakeholders enhanced relationships and promoted the formation of a stakeholder group
REACT (Rio Grande Emergency Action Committee) that is now looking to address fuel
buildups and start mitigation projects locally.
Application of Risk Management Concepts
It became apparent throughout the interviews that the AAs and IMTs were thinking about
risk management not just from a safety mitigation view, but from a larger strategic view.
Given the difficulty of access and the unsafe terrain, the AAs adopted a point protection,
perimeter control strategy that maximized the likelihood of successful suppression and
minimized the exposure to firefighters and the likelihood of damage to the values at risk.
The risk management principles established by the Agency were applied throughout the
incident by the AAs, and sound objectives and strategies were adopted.
However, when it came to translating this to on-the-ground fire crews, the message was at
times getting lost, and steps had to be taken to ensure the ground crews were not putting
themselves at unnecessary risk. While these crews were comfortable taking steps to
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West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
mitigate hazards with their safety out on the line, they still were not considering the
alternative of not being there in the first place.
Social and Political Issues
Social and political issues factored very little in the AAs decision making. Issues were
limited in this complex due to an understanding by all of the extremely dangerous terrain,
lack of access and vegetative conditions on these fires. Strong relationships, preseason
interaction and constant communications with stakeholders made for a clear view of the
objectives and strategies and what actions would be taken to suppress these fires.
Procedures That Can Be Enhanced or Expanded:
Using the NIMO as a long term fire manager and strategic planner for long duration fires
can be advantageous from several points of view. Having the NIMO assume command for
the overall incident and using other IMTs under NIMO command to carry out the strategies
and tactics is beneficial to the AA in that a sense of continuity is maintained. In some
instances NIMO has built strong relationships with AAs and this helps in applying risk
management concepts and collaboration in risk based decision making. However, as was
noted in several interviews, this concept of NIMO as the one in charge still presents
challenges in understanding the roles of all involved, especially other IMTs. In order to
expand this concept several interviewees suggested that during preseason the concept
should be communicated with expectations explained and then trained upon.
Improvements in Sharing and Clarifying Expectations:
One important comment the review team received was “the FS is evolving ahead of our
partners” when it comes to risk management.
The FS should engage their
cooperators/partners in the risk management arena and better explain the concepts and
more importantly the expectation the FS has of its Line Officers to base objectives and
strategies on sound risk making decisions. In this light there was concern that risk based
decisions were another way of justifying resource benefit fires. Clearly more work is
needed here to clarify expectations and to bring our partners onboard in sharing risks.
The local FS fire staff had developed strong relationships with the communities proximate
to NF lands and FireSafe councils were generally well established and active throughout
the area. Despite the activity of the councils, AAs and IMTs generally agreed that most of
the residences adjacent to the reviewed fires were not in a defensible condition. Locally
and nationally, expectations continue to be that we will save every house and that we will
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West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
suppress fires before they get close to homes. Preseason efforts should be undertaken to
clarify what defines defensible space, and enlist more communities and landowners in
establishing fire safe lands. Locally, the public should be educated as to the conditions of
the forests and the probable strategies that would be used to suppress fire, especially in
large bug killed or severe fire situations.
Lessons Learned / Observations and Recommendations:
The FS should engage their partners in a more in-depth conversation on risk management
principles and how risk based decisions will affect “traditional” fire suppression. Shared
risks and transferring risks should be part of that conversation.
The application of risk management by AAs and IMTs has taken hold and is becoming a
standard. However at the firefighter/crew level there is still misunderstanding as to how
to implement risk management. Many see risk management as mitigating hazards and few
understand the concept at the strategic level of how or should we even engage.
Indirect costs are becoming a larger portion of the overall large fire costs. One of the
reasons for higher indirect costs is the need to have multiple full service base camps in
order to reduce driving times and exposure to firefighters. In some cases this is
unavoidable due to the lack of travel routes in remote areas or just the distance from one
side of the fire to the other. While managing exposure is paramount, limiting some services
in base camps, or using more of a spike camp approach may save on indirect costs. Cost
share agreements and in general costs associated with fighting fires should be discussed
preseason. This will help in avoiding misunderstandings and allow for prompt payment of
resources and other financial obligations.
Multiple IMT transitions can lead to higher costs. When long term fires are expected
extended assignments for IMTs should be considered. Look for opportunities to manage
“zoned” or multiple IMT fires with one IMT as soon as weather or fire growth allow.
Private land owners are actively interested in good neighbor agreements with the Forest
Service to do effective fuel treatments on both sides of the fence. Further guidance needs
to be provided to both the local Forests, and the private land owners, on how these fuel
treatments should be performed, and under what conditions they can be expected to work.
Homeowners should be made aware that there are no guarantees as to the effectiveness of
fuel treatments and that other mitigation measures, such as building with fire resistant
materials and reinforcing the home ignition zone, are imperative to reduce the likelihood of
home loss.
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West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
Values at risk include economic impacts to local communities, especially when tourism and
travel are their main sources of income. The use of NIMO for long term fire events provides
continuity in command and risk management expertise. However, traditional IMTs and
others not familiar with NIMO lack an understanding of NIMO’s potential role and place in
long term events. Preseason work is needed to explain expectations and gain acceptance of
NIMO’s non-traditional roles in managing fires.
West Fork Complex Strategic Planning
Incident Objectives
1. Demonstrate sound risk management processes that weigh probability of success
against human life exposure and cost-benefit for all management actions. Where
exposure concerns does not allow fire to be contained and no private properties and
structures are threatened, there is no requirement for aggressive suppression action.
However, where fire can be safely, effectively, and efficiently contained, appropriate
suppression actions are to be considered.
2. Utilize strategies and tactics that allow for appropriate risk management considerations
and mitigation of hazards. When and where possible, utilize strategies and tactics that
minimize resource damage.
3. Identify and mitigate risks associated with aviation operations and firefighter exposure
in areas of spruce beetle mortality and other snags. When in doubt, life and safety shall
take priority over acres burned in all strategic and tactical decisions.
4. Reduce the risk of potential fire impacts and provide protection to private values
including primary residences, businesses, outbuildings, electric transmission lines,
natural gas lines, Wolf Creek Ski Area, and Forest Service infrastructure within and
adjacent to National Forest System lands and within the West Fork Complex Planning
Area.
5. All strategic and tactical decisions on the West Fork, Papoose and Windy Pass Fires will
be based on sound risk management principles utilizing the ICS 215a.
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West Fork Complex Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
San Juan and Rio Grande National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, March 2014
West Fork Complex List of Interviewees
Agency Administrators:
Adam Mendonca- Deputy Forest Supervisor, Rio Grande NF
Dan Dallas- Forest Supervisor, Rio Grande NF
Mark Stiles- Forest Supervisor, San Juan NF (retired)
Kevin Khung- Pagosa District Ranger, San Juan NF
Brian Ferebee- Deputy Regional Forester, Rocky Mountain Region
Incident Commanders:
Peter Blume- ICT1, Rocky Mt IMT
Todd Pechota- Deputy IC, Rocky Mt IMT
Curtis Heaton- NIMO, IC T2
Dan Kleinman- NIMO, IC T1
Mark Nunez- unavailable
Beth Lund- IC T1, Rocky Basin IMT
Jim Loach- Area Commander
Support Staff:
Richard Bustamante- Forest FMO, San Juan NF
Paul Duarte– Fire Specialist, Rio Grande NF
Steve Hentschel– East zone FMO, San Juan NF
Jim Jaminet- Forest FMO, Rio Grande NF
Mike Johnson– Staff Officer, San Juan NF
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