- Journal of Humanitarian Assistance - http://jha.ac -
Political Complexities of
Humanitarian Intervention in
the Pakistan Earthquake
By Thomas Bamforth
Published on January 16, 2007
Aims and structure of this report
The aim of this paper is to provide a socio-political
introduction to the main issues that have been or may be
encountered by international agencies working in Pakistan
for earthquake relief post the October 8 earthquake in
Northern Pakistan. The report argues that humanitarian
agencies, despite pretences to neutrality, have fed into
existing political fault-lines and seeks to provide an overview
of how this has happened and to make recommendations on
how agencies might better navigate the political dimensions
of humanitarian relief in a sovereign nation under military
rule.
The report is divided into the following sections:
Introduction – humanitarian intervention in a sovereign state under
a military government
The military in Pakistan – a brief history
Sources of ethno-regional conflict in contemporary Pakistan
Political parties and the marginalization of civil society under military
rule
United Nations, the international community and military
government
Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction – humanitarian
intervention in a sovereign state
A common and noticeable theme that emerges in
discussions with humanitarian relief workers is the
observation that Pakistan is a sovereign state. For many
workers, their previous experiences have to a large extent
been limited to ‘complex’ situations (where humanitarian
emergencies are the result directly or indirectly of armed
conflict) rather than natural disasters which are merely
‘complicated’. The typical CV of a relief worker includes
stints in Darfur, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor in which the
areas’ respective juridical status is undefined and which are
marked by the absence of a recognized or enforceable state
structure. In such situations, relief agencies can act under
the principle of an a-political humanitarian imperative with
comparatively little concern for state structures or the
political impacts of humanitarian intervention.
This is not the case in Pakistan. The October 8 2005
earthquake, while causing substantial damage and loss of
life across NWFP and PAK (including the loss of an estimated
10,000 military personnel) , has not significantly threatened
the government, state structure or the national economy.
International agencies have consequently found themselves
working with, and at the invitation of, the military-led
government. Overall coordination of the relief effort formally
lies with the Federal Relief Commission (FRC). Some
agencies describe their activities as extensions of the
government, while others, such as UNHCR, provide
‘technical advice’ to the government on camp management.
Organisations such as NATO operated under a 90-day
mandate in the form of a personal invitation from General
Musharraf rather than an invitation from the federal
parliament. Under the 1973 Constitution, held in abeyance
since 1999 , only parliament is sovereign and has the power
to extend such invitations. In addition, Pakistan has been
regarded as a ‘frontline state’ since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (and the region has been of extreme political
sensitivity owing to its geopolitical position since the days of
Kipling). Pakistan and India have fought three and a half
wars (1947, 1965, 1971), with the ‘half’ war being a
significant incursion by regular army forces into Kargil in
Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) in 1999. Between 1990
and 2001 Pakistan was under international sanctions as a
result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons and further
‘democratic’ sanctions were imposed as a consequence of
General Musharraf’s military coup d’état in 1999. Since
2001, Pakistan’s ‘frontline’ status has been restored, and its
military regime legitimized internationally, as a key ally in
the overthrow of the Taliban and in the ‘War on Terror’
against al-Qaeda.
Humanitarian agencies consequently find themselves acting
in a highly politicized international and domestic
environment. Despite the importance of emphasizing a depoliticised ‘humanitarian space’, the presence of
humanitarian agencies plays into many of the political faultlines of contemporary Pakistan. These include relations
between the centre and the provinces, the ambivalent
constitutional status of Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK), legitimisation of military rule, sectarianism, civil
conflicts and insurgencies, devolution and the further
alienation of mainstream political parties. The politics of
earthquake relief may have significant future ramifications
for internal power struggles within Pakistan. This may in
turn affect the working environment for many international
agencies, especially those intending to remain in the country
into the reconstruction period. Further, a more politically
informed approach to disaster relief may produce
reconstruction strategies that will be more sustainable in the
longer term.
The military in Pakistan
Since its first military coup d’état in 1958, Pakistan has been
ruled either directly or indirectly by military governments.
Despite recurring elections, on no occasion has the
incumbent political party been voted out of office. Transfer
of power has proceeded by military intervention which, for
Pakistan’s last three elected Prime Ministers – Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif - has resulted in
execution and banishment respectively. In his 1999 speech,
General Musharraf, like previous coup leaders, justified his
actions on the basis of the corruption of the previous
regime. Berating what he termed the “sham democracy”
that had existed in Pakistan, General Musharraf issued a
Proclamation of Emergency in which the country’s 1973
constitution was suspended. In its place, clause (f) of the
Proclamation disposed that: “the whole of Pakistan come
under the control of the armed forces”. On the same day,
the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) No. 1 was issued
which provided that presidential orders would supersede all
other legislation, including the constitution. In 2002, seeking
to formalise a role for the military in the state, Musharraf
introduced the Legal Framework Order (LFO). The LFO
sought to undermine the position of Prime Minister and
move power away from the head of government to
strengthen the powers of the head of state. The substantial
powers that accrued to the President further undermined the
autonomy of the provinces. Under the LFO, the President
could: dismiss the National Assembly , approve senior court
appointments, and appoint provincial governors (with similar
powers at state level to those of the president). The role of
the military was given constitutional power through the
LFO’s establishment of the National Security Council (NSC),
a military steering committee, whose limited remit covers
“strategic matters pertaining to sovereignty, integrity and
national security of the state; and matters relating to
democracy, governance, and inter-provincial harmony”. In
addition, the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)
stipulates that presidential orders override all other
legislation, including suspending the constitution, and that
the actions of the military government are not subject to
legal challenge or review. The combined effect of the LFO,
PCO and NSC is to enure the centralisation of political power
and the dominance of the military over state and civilian
parliamentary structures.
Nonetheless, Pakistan retains a democratic façade. A
referendum on Musharraf’s continued rule and Parliamentary
elections were held in 2002 and supposedly non-party ‘local
bodies’ elections were held in 2005 for Union Council (town
councils) and District, Tehsil (sun-district) and city Nazim
(Mayor) and Naib Nazim (Vice-Mayor) positions.
Paradoxically, the stated aim of Musharraf’s military coup
was the re-establishment of ‘genuine’ democracy. In his first
address to the nation on assuming power, he stated: “this is
not martial law, but only another path to democracy. The
armed forces have no intention of staying in charge any
longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true
democracy to flourish in Pakistan”.
While the 1999 coup caught the crest of a wave of
disaffection with Nawaz Sharif’s corrupt and increasingly
authoritarian government, the trigger was political
maneuvering over Kargil. In response to stated government
policy of engaging in confidence-building measures (CBMs)
over Kashmir with India’s BJP government Musharraf, whom
Sharif had promoted over the heads of several more senior
generals to be Chief of Army Staff, authorized an incursion
into Kargil and Drass in Indian Administered Kashmir by
militants backed by regular forces. The ensuing military
disaster led to a face-off between the Prime Minister and
Musharraf over whether the affair had been militarily or
politically mishandled. While the Kargil affair may have
triggered military intervention, the basic fault line between
civil and military authorities had existed for some time with
growing concern in the army about negotiations over
Kashmir and the subordinate role for the military enshrined
in the 1973 Constitution, as evidenced by Prime Ministerial
interference in the choice of Musharraf as army chief.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the strategy of military
cooperation with elected governments came to and end as
the high command believed “that the coup would best serve
their personal interests and the corporate interests of the
armed forces”.
To achieve dominance over the domestic political landscape
and to demonstrate the regime’s democratic credentials
internationally, Musharraf followed the example set by
previous military rules in Pakistan: Generals Ayub Khan and
Zia-ul-Haq both of whom used the concept of plebiscitary
democracy to bypass established constitutional procedures
for the election of the heads of state and government. Ayub
Khan’s techniques of regime legitimization are in many ways
the model for Musharraf. The One Unit system sought to
undermine alternative power bases by dissolving the
separate provinces and creating a single province in
Pakistan’s Western Wing (the Eastern wing, now
Bangladesh, being more populous and separated by 900
miles of Indian territory). It also provided that the country’s
two wings would have legal parity, despite the fact that a
majority of Pakistan’s population lay in the East and
undermined the federal principal outlined in Pakistan’s
previous governing documents: the Government of India Act
1935 and the 1956 Constitution. Further, the One Unit
system sought to remove the apparently centrifugal forces
of provincial constituencies and political party power bases.
The ‘Basic Democracies’ system was introduced in 1958 and
provided for non-party elections in 80,000 constituencies
which would then form the grass roots component for more
easily malleable indirect elections to higher government
tiers. In this way, Ayub Khan, like Musharraf, sought to
remove the power of provincial governments and to
undercut the electoral basis for political party opposition to
military rule.
Musharraf’s devolution plan, introduced in 2000, sought to
achieve exactly the same ends as Ayub Khan’s Basic
Democracies – the political application of the military
principle of ‘unity of command’. The introduction of ‘grass
roots’ democracy was a substitute for democratization at
national and provincial levels. The purpose of devolution to
local government was to: depoliticize governance, create a
new political elite that would undermine established political
opposition, demonstrate democratic legitimacy to internal
and external audiences, and undermine the federal principle
in which the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy of
the provinces was constitutionally guaranteed. Further, while
the plan sought to emasculate the basis for electoral
opposition to the regime, it also provided for military control
of the administrative apparatus. The National Reconstruction
Bureau, the agency responsible for the design and
implementation of the devolution plan, replaced the posts of
District Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner with that of
the District Coordination Officer (DCO). While the former
traditionally controlled the executive, judicial, and revenue
functions of the district, under the new system the DCO
became subordinate to the elected District Nazim who
accrued judicial and revenue responsibilities. In this way the
administrative functions of local government have become
politicized and are part of a strategy to extend military
influence into the bureaucracy. In its own analysis of
devolution, the National Reconstruction Bureau noted that
“the end of the domination of the bureaucracy by one group
is a necessary pre-condition for the attainment of
administrative power by the Army and the creation of
conditions for national reconstruction”.
In large part, this drive to obtain and retain political control
is a product of economic imbalance as a result of military
spending. The prominence of the military’s role in Pakistan is
because of the threat – real, perceived and invented – of
Indian military strength and the dispute over Kashmir. As a
consequence, the country has the ninth largest military in
the world amounting to 620,000 people and a defence
budget of approximately 7% of GDP (this is educated
guesswork as the annual budget contains only one line on
defence expenditure, defence salaries are often entered
under the civil administration costs, and defence expenditure
is not open to parliamentary scrutiny). Combined
expenditure on health and education amounts to less than
3% of GDP. Major theatres of military operations are against
the Baloch tribal and sub-nationalist insurgents in
Balochistan, Kashmir where 250,000 army personnel are
stationed, and Wazirstan where 70,000 troops are deployed.
The army possesses, inter alia, 114 helicopters (sufficient to
provide the majority of logistical support for earthquake
relief operations) however approximately 80 of these remain
in Waziristan where it is thought that Osama bin Laden and
remnants of al-Qaeda may be hiding. The commanding
heights occupied by defence in the division of national
resources is further shown by the governments’ continued
decision to purchase US$1.1 billion worth of F-16 fighter
planes from the US, temporarily put on hold owing to the
earthquake.
The socio-economic ramifications of such high spending are
enormous. Pakistan’s human development indicators place it
behind other countries in the region such as India and Sri
Lanka. 28 million people live below the poverty line, twothirds of the adult population is illiterate, one quarter of
infants are underweight and malnourished. With the highest
population growth in the region, at 3.6% per annum,
Pakistan’s population growth outweighs its economic
performance. An estimated growth rate of 6.6% (revised
down to 6% as a result of the earthquake) is frequently
cited as an example of the government’s successful
economic management, along with its apparent control of
the current account deficit. However, were it not for the
economic boom in investment and soft loans that came after
September 11, and augmented by donor pledges for
earthquake reconstruction, it is thought that Pakistan’s
military-incurred debt burden would be economically
unviable. Further, Pakistan’s recent high growth rate and
rise in per capita income fails to address issues of
distribution. With a limited manufacturing sector, the
country’s source of export income is industrial agriculture
based in the Punjab (where the overwhelming majority of
the armed forces come from, and are compensated with
agricultural land). Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) and
the North West Frontier Province are less economically
developed and play a comparatively small role in the
national economy. It is significant that despite increasing
growth rates unemployment, particularly in urban areas,
also remains high.
A further consideration in the economic disequilibrium
caused by the state’s burden of military expenditure is the
stifling of the private sector. Property ownership and
possession of agricultural lands lies with both retired soldiers
and Pakistan’s traditional landed aristocracy. Economic and
investment planning is run largely by army backed
corporations who have monopoly rights in sections of the
economy that will be fundamental to reconstruction. The
Army Welfare Trust, Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen
Foundation (Air Force), and Bahria Foundation (Navy) have
expanded operations into the banking, airline, insurance,
real-estate, and manufacturing sectors. In transport and
construction, monopolization has forced out the private
sector and further concentrated economic control in army
hands. As Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan’s leading scholar of
defence economics, writes: “The military planners hope that
an economic revival would reduce external pressures to
decrease military expenditure. What must be realized is that
the military’s prolonged intervention in politics is detrimental
to economic progress and development”.
While the government’s stated objectives may be the
restoration of ‘genuine’ democratic government, the
establishment of extra-constitutional and parliamentary
bodies such as National Security Council (NSC) and the
manipulation of electoral and administrative systems would
suggest a serious attempt by the military to centralize and
consolidate political power. To some extent, this has
occurred before under Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. However,
international agencies working in this environment may find
themselves participants in an ongoing process of political
realignment aimed less at the establishment of transparent
democratic government than at the army’s quest for
complete political, administrative and economic control.
Sources of ethno-regional conflict
Despite concerted attempts to create a sense of overarching
national identity, Pakistan is marked by its ethno-linguistic
and ethno-regional diversity in which bargaining for political
power and the distribution of resources is based on
perceived communal interests. Communal divisions between
the major ethnic groups, Bengalis (up till 1971), Punjabis,
Sindhis, Urdu-speaking immigrants , Pashtuns, and Baloch,
and between these groups and the state have played a
significant role in the development of Pakistan (which is
itself is a product of the partition of British India along
ethno-religious lines in 1947). An “integrationist” approach
to national identity, combined with attempts to centralise
state political and economic power, led to a further
ethnically based partition of Pakistan in 1971.
Pakistan in 1947 was a composite of two wings separated by
900 miles of Indian territory – an ethnically and linguistically
homogeneous East Pakistan made up of Bengalis, and West
Pakistan dominated by the Punjab. Despite representing
54.2 percent of the entire population, East Pakistan was
subservient to the political and economic domination of the
West which derived much of its income and funds for
industrial development from the exploitation of Bengali (East
Pakistani) jute. Constitutional manipulation by both military
and military-guided civilian governments sought to
institutionalise the West’s dominance and the underlying
motivation for General Ayub Khan’s 1958 military coup was
to prevent the prospect of a Bengali majority in the National
Assembly. With the introduction of democratic elections and
the abolition of the One Unit system in 1970, the Bengali
Awami League gained a healthy majority of seats in the
central government to govern both West and East Pakistan.
The victory of a Bengali political party in a system of
government whose military, bureaucratic and economic
power was predicated on the dominance of the Punjab
meant that the military postponed the transfer of power. The
resulting civil unrest in Bengal and the attempt to suppress
opposition with the use of force led to a declaration of
Bengali independence which was achieved following the
India-Pakistan War in 1971. In the division of Pakistan and
the creation of Bangladesh, attempts to centralise power
through the manipulation of constitutional arrangements,
the neglect of both ethnic and provincial demands, and the
attempt to maintain the position of the military at the
expense of democratic and civilian decision-making
exacerbated ethnic divisions and led to a further state
partition along ethnic lines.
Similar forces are currently at play in Pakistan’s internal
politics. The Punjab dominates the military and represents
the wealthiest and most populous part of the country with
approximately 60% of the population. Its prosperity is based
on industrial agriculture which in turn is based on a constant
supply of water from the Pakistan’s only water source - the
Indus River system. Significantly, since the earthquake
discussion of the construction of the Kalabagh Dam and
Bhasha Dams in NWFP has intensified with reports that
funding for the mega-project has now been approved.
Recent reports that the government has abandoned the
Kalabagh Dam project in favour of the smaller and
comparatively less controversial Bhasha Dam indicate a
strategic retreat rather than a fundamental change in policy.
It is no coincidence that the approval came shortly after the
November 2005 donor’s conference in which US $6.2 billion
were pledged for reconstruction of the earthquake affected
region. Similarly, funding of Balochistan’s controversial
Gwadar Port project has also increased. At the same time,
however, there has been an intensification of military
activity in Balochistan, where the Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan’s representative, Asma Jahangir, was fired upon
by members of the Frontier Corps when she went to
investigate deaths as a result of military action near the Sui
gas plant. In addition, almost 300 people have died as a
result of renewed military action in North Waziristan since
January 2006. These conflicts are ongoing, but their recent
intensification shows the extent to which the centre’s
appropriation of political and economic power, especially
through natural resource management, fuels ethno-regional
conflict in Pakistan.
With the bypassing of the National Assembly, the suspension
of the 1973 Constitution which established a Council of
Common Interests for the resolution of inter-provincial
issues, and the emasculation of provincial legislatures
through the devolution plan, there is no political mechanism
for the resolution of disputes between the provinces and
between the provinces and the centre. Consequently, as the
opposition Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz’s (PML-N’s)
spokesperson Siddiq ul Farooq has stated, in the context of
Pakistan’s water crisis the country should be on a “war
footing” and that the proposed Kalabagh Dam would
“endanger the federation”.
In a similar vain, the academic Kaiser Bengali has written
“water shortage is not just an issue of natural scarcity; it is
a socially generated scarcity as well, created as a result of
social and economic policies … Water scarcity is, thus, a
function of politics”. Pakistan is one of the most irrigated
countries on earth with 19 dams, 43 main canals with a
conveyance length of 57,000km all of which are dependent
upon the seasonal flows of the Indus. The centrality of this
irrigation system to Pakistan’s economy and society is
evident in that the country uses 80% of all water resources;
agriculture produces 22% of GDP, employs 50% of labour
force and represents 55% of exports. With a growing
economy combined with a rapidly growing population, it is
argued by some analysts that large-scale hydro-projects are
the best means of controlling the water supply in order to
increase agricultural production.
The complications, however, go to the heart of Pakistan’s
political and ethno-regional tensions. In Balochistan, whose
capital Quetta will run out of potable water within the next
20 years, the potential diversion of water resources is a
matter of both economic and personal survival. In Sindh, the
lower riparian province, the economy has already been
damaged by reduced water flow into the Indus Delta, which
has allowed the incursion of sea water and has caused the
salination of agricultural land. This has produced adverse
effects on coastal ecosystems causing desertification, soil
erosion and a deterioration in the quantity and quality of the
water supply to Karachi. In NWFP, the location of both the
Kalabagh and Bhasha Dams, serious concerns exist about
building such projects in an earthquake zone near to major
towns such as Nowshera. The three provinces (Sindh,
Balochistan and NWFP) further oppose the plan on the
grounds that it would contravene the 1991 Water
Apportionment Accord and give increase water resources
and the benefits of hydro-electricity to the Punjab. The drive
toward the construction of major hydro-projects feeds into
competition between provinces, each of which represents a
dominant ethno-linguistic group, and between the provinces
and the centre. It further contains similarities with the twin
props of the Bengali separatist movement: economic
exploitation and political under-representation.
The scarcity of water raises the potentials for conflict in
Pakistan due to its scarcity, inter-provincial tensions on
water-sharing and the issue of bilateral water sharing
between India and Pakistan (especially since the expiration
of the Indus Water Treaty between the two nations).
Furthermore, there are existing ethnic and regional tensions
that are drawing Pakistan into a state of civil conflict with
insurgencies expanding especially in the largest though least
developed province of Balochistan.
The province of Balochistan was forcibly amalgamated into
the Pakistani federation in 1948 and has been the venue for
five successive armed operations by the Pakistani army and
in response an equal number of insurgencies. The current
insurgency has spread to almost all the districts in the
province and erupted in response to the decades of
provincial marginalisation. The core issues of the Balochistan
conflict are lack of provincial autonomy and central control
of Baloch economic and natural resources. The conflict has
affected the industrial development in the region since the
populace is demanding social, health and educational
development before the pursuit of mega-projects. The
heavy-handed military crackdown of the Pakistani army in
Balochistan has displaced numerous people and swelled the
feelings of alienation amongst the Baloch people from the
Pakistani state. The conflict seems no sign of abating and if
anything is bound to spill into other provinces.
Another conflict that is increasingly engulfing the Pakistani
army and creating instability across in the country is the
presence of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the northern
tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan (North and South
Waziristan). These militant forces have been thwarting
military campaigns by the Pakistan army but these constant
clashes have displaced hundreds of people from the region.
In pursuit of eliminating these militants, the Pakistani army
has gone into the region is full force but the ensuing clashes
have primarily affected the local populace rather than
rooting out the militants.
With General Musharraf’s seizure of power in 1999, and in
the military’s attempts to gain a measure of political
legitimacy for itself, while undermining both provincial
autonomy and political parties (other than those sponsored
by the government), the military government is
manipulating precisely the same forces that have previously
threatened the stability of the state and repeating the same
mistakes that led to the break up of the country in 1971.
NWFP and Kashmir
Though not an immediate concern, there is likelihood that
dissatisfaction with the Pakistani government especially their
lacklustre performance in rescue and relief operations could
be the catalyst for a political agitation. There have already
been protests and violence in Muzaffarabad and Chikoti over
the forced removal of the affectees. Already there is
increased support for political and separatist groups that
advocate the rejoining of Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) with its Indian sister territory into a separate nation.
In NWFP, where the MMA government is increasingly
becoming estranged from the federal government and there
has always been groundswell support for Pashtun
nationalism, the Pakistani army’s performance should be
closely watched. Further, despite complaints from the army
about the effectiveness of the NWFP Government in
providing relief, much of this aid has been directed through
NGOs sponsored directly by the Islamist political parties that
make up the governing MMA coalition. Islamist relief
organisations have a free reign in relief work in NWFP,
which, as opposition representatives, is of concern to the
federal government. Should the government take concrete
steps to address the issue it could galvanize support for the
MMA and send its cadres out onto the streets.
In Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK), there is the
highest likelihood of political agitation and small-scale
violent outbreaks. With the Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) government sidelined especially after the earthquake,
no attempt to rebuild the civilian administration and a
complete lack of local control in the affairs of the state, the
sense of alienation and distance from Islamabad has been
compounded. Significant and controversial political issues of
immediate concern in Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK)
are: moving the capital to Mirpur or rebuilding
Muzaffarabad, forming a national government in Pakistaniadministered Kashmir (PaK), holding elections, agitation by
opposition members of the Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) Assembly and the rebuilding of the district
governments. The World Bank/Asian Development Bank for
NWFP was directed towards Peshawar whereas the aid for
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) had to be channelled
through Islamabad since Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK) is constitutionally barred from directly conducting
foreign trade or foreign aid negotiations unlike Pakistan’s
four other federating units (the provinces). This client
relationship that Muzaffarabad has with Islamabad will be
further played out when large sums of money for
reconstruction are spent without any real input from
Kashmiri politicians.
One of the possible concerns stemming out of Pakistaniadministered Kashmir (PaK) is the extension of an
insurgency in the region for complete independence from
Pakistan due to the client relationship and the lacklustre
performance of the Pakistani army and government in
earthquake relief and reconstruction operations. Most
Kashmiris on both sides of the border would prefer an
independent state in treaty agreements with India and
Pakistan but Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) over the
decades has been fractured into smaller administrative
regions for complete control from Islamabad. Balitistan and
the Gilgit Agency, both traditionally part of the Kashmir
region, have a separate status in Pakistan than the adjacent
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK). This decades long
process of political, economically and socially controlling
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) might have been
welcomed by the local citizenry were it not for the
constitutionally ambivalent status of the region that has
resulted in its neglect.
Political parties and the
marginalization of civil society
The main obstacle to internal state stability in Pakistan is the
absence of an empowered mechanism, such as the National
Assembly (parliament), which can be used as a means for
establishing negotiated resolutions to political and provincial
disputes. As Nasim Zehra, of Harvard University’s Asia
Centre, writes: “Pakistan’s repeated experience with [cyclical
crises] only point to one fundamental truth: that without a
credible state system and genuine democracy functioning
with an independent judiciary and an independent Election
Commission, Pakistan is unlikely to experience lasting
stability and internal harmony”. The 1973 Constitution
provided for a political mechanism for the resolution of
provincial disputes in particular. However, the National
Economic Council (NEC), which promised consultation with
the provinces in respect of financial, commercial, social and
economic policies, and the Council of Common Interests,
which had jurisdiction over complaints about natural
resource usage, including the use, distribution, and control
of water supply, have never been convened. Instead, the
changeover of political power proceeds by crisis of military
legitimacy (such as defeat in the Indo-Pakistan war in
1971), or military coups or dissolution of democraticallyelected governments in the case of Pakistan’s previous
Prime Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz
Sharif.
Political change by crisis results from the emasculation of
political parties. Re-writing the political system and electoral
manipulations marked Pakistan’s electoral processes in the
2002 National Elections, the 2002 Referendum on military
rule, and the 2005 Local Bodies Elections. Official figures
state that in the 2002 Referendum a 94.7% yes-vote was
returned in answer to the question: ‘Do you want to elect
President Musharraf for the next five years for the survival
of the local government system, restoration of democracy,
continuity and stability of reforms, eradication of extremism
and sectarianism and for the accomplishment of Jinnah’s
concept?’. The 2005 Local Bodies Elections, in which 60
people died more than 500 were injured, were marred by
gerrymandering, government favouritism, and extensive
rigging including ballot stuffing, intimidation and seizure of
voting stations. Further, Pakistan’s main political opposition
figures, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif remain in exile in
Dubai and Saudi Arabia respectively. While the centre has
attempted to manufacture a replacement national political
party in the form of the Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-eAzam (PML-Q), this suffers from a lack of both internal
cohesion and popular support outside of some quarters in
Punjab. As a consequence, the government has relied upon
minority Islamist parties such as the Muthahida Majlis-eAmal (MMA) coalition and, to a lesser extent the Muttahida
Qaumi Movement (MQM), to prop up its electoral power
base. The military-led government under General Musharraf
has also cajoled, bribed or coopted other regional and
mainstream secular parties to splinter and some of their
members have formed micro-parties of the same name to
join in General Musharraf’s PML-Q coalition at the provincial
and federal level. The ostracisation of alternative political
leadership, the suppression of centrist and secular political
parties, and the attempt to de-politicise local elections have
seen the emergence of religious parties as an electoral force,
especially in NWFP and Balochistan. These manipulated
elections have laid the groundwork for the further
consolidation of political power by the centre in the
upcoming National Elections in 2007. As the Network for
Consumer Protection observes: “the problem confronting
Pakistan through its history is not primarily that of a weak
party system, but the absence of political dispensation
resulting in the denial of space to political parties to function
both in office and in opposition”.
For effective and relevant reconstruction in the earthquake
affected areas, a top down approach where the military
decides and executes reconstruction will result in a
rebuilding process that has no input from local stakeholders
and further marginalizes the role of civilian institutions in the
country. The reconstruction phase has barely begun and
there are almost daily reports of protests against the
dictatorial polices of ERRA, the complete control of the
Pakistani army in the distribution of compensation money
and the favouritism evident in handing out reconstruction
goods to pro-military groups and leaders for the benefit of
these groups members. What the Pakistani military-led
federal government fails to comprehend is that their
complete control of the reconstruction process, when it fails
to rebuild to the desires of the populace, will result in
exacerbated anti-military feelings and will give rise to
extremist forces that would be better suited to nurture this
resentment. Allowing mainstream political parties in
parliament and civil society groups to be involved in the
reconstruction phase will not only brings in broader
representation but also valid suggestions and experience of
these groups/organisations into the reconstruction process.
Political parties
This sub-section intends to convey the presence of
mainstream political parties within Pakistan and their
parliamentary coalitions. It is the below mentioned political
arties that have significant presence in the federal and
provincial assemblies which have been repeatedly
marginalized under the current military government
especially in the wake of October 8 2005 earthquake.
1. Pakistan Muslim League
The two largest Muslim League blocks are the PML – Nawaz
Sharif (PML-N) and the PML - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) both of
which claim direct descent from the All-India Muslim League
that was the political organization instrumental in the
advocacy and creation of Pakistan. Both are centrist parties,
slightly to the right of the Pakistan People’s Party, and
favour generally conservative pro-business platform based
on economic privatisation and deregulation. PML-Q,
however, is a military-created party whose leaders have
primarily defected from PML-N after the 1999 coup and
when bureaucratic, military and corporate patronage
switched to the newly established PML-Q. The popular basis
of the PML-Q lies in the Punjab and consequently it lacks the
national appeal of the PPP or the PML-N. Further, as an
artificial political creation reliant on state patronage and
direction the party has “little sense of common identity or
purpose”. As the ‘King’s Party’, the PML-Q now holds power
in the National Assembly and Punjab’s Provincial Assembly.
It also holds power in alliance with the MQM in Sindh and
the MMA in Balochistan.
There are some one-person only PML wings within the
national parliament but their support is limited to the
charisma of that one leader and that one person is the only
representative within the National Assembly.
2. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
The PPP is a centre-left party that emerged in opposition to
Ayub Khan’s military government in 1967. Its rise to
prominence and power owed much to the charismatic, albeit
somewhat authoritarian, leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
whose populist Islamist socialist political platform included
economic equality, social justice and land redistribution.
While under Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir, the party moved
closer to the political centre and advocated and more socialdemocratic position in an effort to win corporate confidence
alienated by her father’s nationalisation program in the
1970s. The PPP’s 2002 Manifesto maintained that it four
tenets are: democracy, religious tolerance, equal economic
opportunity and what it termed ‘people power’. The PPP is
the largest single opposition party in Sindh, Punjab, and in
the National Assembly. It currently operates in partnership
with the PML-N in the Alliance for the Restoration of
Democracy (ARD) coalition.
The ARD is itself a sixteen-party coalition and is the largest
opposition group in the National Assembly though General
Musharraf did not allow the main constituent party, the PPP
to become the official opposition nor the ARD coalition. Its
political platform argues for the right of elected governments
to govern and for the withdrawal of the military from
political activity. The ARD charter further aims at enhancing
the powers of the Prime Minister, strengthening the
judiciary, and placing the military and intelligence services
under civilian leadership. Despite being the largest
opposition party, the MMA leader Fazlur Rehman was
appointed national opposition leader as a means of ensuring
the MMA continued support for the government.
3. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
The MQM represents mohajirs – primarily Urdu-speaking
Muslim migrants from India who arrived in Pakistan after
1947 – is has its power base among the urban middle and
lower classes in Sindh. The MQM governs in coalition with
the military-created PML-Q and receives government
patronage in opposition to the PPP, whose main voter base
is in rural Sindh. In response to the centre’s favouritism of a
self-confessed immigrant’s party, a number of Sindhi
nationalist parties have emerged calling for a separate state.
As with similar nationalist parties in NWFP and Balochistan,
Sindhi nationalist parties have been able to mobilise support
against the mohajir-Punjabi dominated centre in support of
provincial autonomy – especially with regard to the centre’s
proposals for hydro-projects such as the Kalabagh Dam and
Gwadar.
4. Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)
The MMA is an alliance of six religious parties of which the
dominant forces are the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). JI came to
prominence as the preferred political party of Pakistan’s
conservative military ruler Zia ul Haq during the 1970s and
80s and was supported during the US-sponsored jihad in
Afghanistan. The JUI-F is somewhat more puritanical. It runs
the largest network of madrassahs in Pakistan and the
party’s ideology emphasises the establishment of a panIslamic state along the lines of the seventh century Islamic
caliphate. The party is the largest within the MMA coalition
and its ethnic base is almost exclusively Pashtun. The MMA
itself evolved into a political party from the Pak-Afghan
Defence Council in 2001 in opposition to the US-led military
campaign against the Taliban. Its current prominence in
both NWFP provincial government and in the National
Assembly owes more to military support against the PPP and
PML-N than to inherent popularity. The MMA coalition is also
a fractious one in which smaller parties, emerging from the
now defunct Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (which took up the banner
of political Islam under the British Raj and opposed the
establishment of Pakistan), are sceptical of the ties between
the JUI-F and the government.
United Nations, the international
community and military
government
1. UN/INGOs and the military
The national and international humanitarian response to the
October 2005 earthquake has been profoundly influenced by
the pre-eminence of military men in Pakistan’s political and
administrative set-up. Other than raising issues of aid
accountability and transparency, long-term engagement of
the army will undermine the process of democratisation and
increase the jihadi threat to domestic and regional security.
Already, the role of jihadi and sectarian outfits in
humanitarian activities is a source of concern for people in
the Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) who are far more
moderate in their religion and amongst civil society groups.
As these groups gain legitimacy for doing relief work,
bolstered by the military’s support, religious radicalism that
feeds the jihadi movement and intra-Islam sectarianism will
increase. This is coupled with an almost complete exclusion
of the civilian administration and elected bodies from relief
and rehabilitation schemes especially at the district and
provincial level. Army officers represent the government of
Pakistan at every level of macro and micro decision-making.
As a result, jihadi groups emerged as the most effective
relief force in the quake-fit areas and filled the gap left by
the official institutions. By gaining credentials in the “heart
and minds” battle, the jihadi offshoots may substantially
strengthen their political base in the quake-affected areas of
Kashmir and NWFP. In the case of Pakistani-administered
Kashmir (PaK), the accentuated role of jihadi groups could
further exacerbate the political situation since regional
elections are to be held in June 2006 where secular
mainstream Kashmiri parties could be replaced by political
fronts of jihadi groups.
The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
(ERRA) was appointed for carrying out post-disaster damage
assessment, reconstruction and rehabilitation of quake
affected areas. Led by the Pakistani prime minister and
responsible for undertaking every task linked to
reconstruction, the ERRA will make the military-led
government the key player in reconstruction at the expense
of the federal legislature and provincial assemblies. Instead
of empowering the affected local authorities, the ERRA will
be the perfect tool for weakening them. It is likely to
undermine the legitimacy of local bodies across the region.
The way the government will transfer the tasks to the
civilian authorities remains a concern of its survival strategy.
Strengthening its supremacy in the region by undertaking
every responsibility, the military is willing to control and
sideline any form of civil society in the region.
2. Transparency and accountability
Financial management of relief and reconstruction,
especially under ERRA remains a significant concern. In
Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions
Index of 158 countries, Pakistan rated rather poorly,
standing close to the bottom at 144. There are further
concerns that relief funds are concentrated in a single
account – the President’s relief fund – that is privately held
and not subject to scrutiny by parliament or any other
legally constituted body. This institutionalised secretism
extends to ERRA. Section 11 of ERRA’s funding charter
states that: “No suit, prosecution, other legal proceedings
shall lie against the Authority, the Council, The Board, the
Chairperson, or any member, officer servants, advisers,
experts or consultants in respect of anything done in good
faith”.
3. Compensation
This absence of accountability has impacted the
government’s compensation plans with accusations being
made that compensation is being used to shore up political
support. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
has called for an independent monitoring system given the
weakness of local authorities and the absence of meaningful
accountability standards in the distribution of compensation
payments: “Accusations of corruption in the distribution of
compensation and relief goods, of mismanagement and lack
of clear-cut policies also point to the urgent need for an
independently-controlled system of monitoring”.
4. Relations with ‘non-humanitarian organisations’
The close relationship between the military-led regime and
the international community on the ground created a bridge
between the international organizations and the Islamic
welfare organizations. By supporting the international relief
operations, the Pakistani government was able to establish
close ties with Islamic NGOs and to articulate the various
humanitarian spaces in regard to its own political agenda.
The confusion between both humanitarian international and
Islamic spaces was substantially encouraged by the militaryled regime. Moreover, it created the conditions to
marginalize effectively the role of the Pakistani civil society
in the operations. Currently under the military umbrella,
international organizations are facing a constant
contradiction on the ground between their traditional
mandate which aims at providing quality aid to every
affectee and the necessity to access survivors who live in the
Islamic-led refugee camps and the distribution of relief
goods.
Most of the Islamic organizations are currently registered by
the government as “non humanitarian organizations”. This
parameter has widely encouraged the international
organizations to set up relations and various forms of
cooperation ranging from assessments, relief and
distribution with the Islamic welfare branches in order to get
access to the affectees the Islamic organizations have in
charge. OXFAM provided various services such as water
sanitation in Jamat-ud-Dawa’s camps in Muzaffarabad in
order to comply with the international standards. UNHCR
provided “camp management training” in Mansehra to
spontaneous camp managers from Islamic branches among
others. IOM supplied Jamat-ud-Dawa (the renamed Islamic
militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba) and Al-Khidmat in Balakot.
After serving Pakistan’s strategic interests in the Kashmir
region for over a decade, the jihadi outfits see themselves
as extensions of the army and have a close working
relationship with local military commanders. The majority of
religious parties and their welfare wings operating in
affected areas are pro-military and receive goods and
assistance from the military-controlled relief operations in
the districts of NWFP and Pakistani-administered Kashmir
(PaK). With upcoming elections in Kashmir in 2006, and
general elections in 2007, the prominence given to nonhumanitarian relief agencies as a result of the earthquake
may translate into greater political power at the polls for
jihadi groups and the Islamist parties whose ‘humanitarian
sub-groups’ are operating in the earthquake affected
regions.
The political use of jihadi groups and the ‘humanitarian
wings’ of Islamist political parties by the Pakistani army is in
line with the ‘axis of authoritarianism’ (Pakistani military,
Jihadi groups and Islamist political parties) that has
stemmed the democratic institution in Pakistan since its
conception. Rather than engaging mainstream secular
political parties; as General Musharraf claims he is doing
with his ‘enlightened moderation’ concept, the Pakistani
military has further nurtured extremist forces especially in
the earthquake-affected region. Pakistani-administered
Kashmir (PaK) is Pakistan’s most literate and politically and
religious moderate region but the earthquake devastated
most schools in the region. Under the watchful eye of the
Pakistani military, Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK)
could very well lose this status as madrassa schools are
spring up under the guidance of banned Islamist outfits and
there is resurgence to Islamisize the region. Pakistaniadministered Kashmir (PaK) is fermented by Islamist groups
as the next region to educate young men into extremist
ideologies to continue the jihad in Indian-administered
Kashmir along with other Muslim regions where these men
can be sent to fight for the rights of Muslims and to establish
an Islamic caliphate.
Conclusions and recommendations
While the idea of the ‘humanitarian imperative’ and apolitical ‘humanitarian space are central to relief operations,
the UN and the international community nonetheless feed
into a complex and changing political environment through
their very presence. Working closely with the military and
jihadi groups only make them political actors whose
resources, wittingly or not, can be used to further domestic
political agendas. This is especially the case as we move
from the rescue and relief operations into the
reconstruction/rehabilitation phases. The following are some
measures that can be used by international organisations
working in Pakistan to counter their existing, if apparently
inadvertent, political partisanship:
Stress local partnerships with secular NGOs and civil society groups,
rather than ideological or missionary groups.
Develop mechanisms to empower locals (residents) and district
governments’ and consult them in the decision-making process
about reconstruction and rehabilitation in the earthquakedevastated areas.
Seek to ensure that elected federal and provincial legislative bodies,
rather than the military, oversee and scrutinise relief and
reconstruction operations.
International Organizations must shift their approach from being
‘embedded’ with the military to one that involves effective
partnership with the civil society.
Demand that the official relief and reconstruction agencies are duly
constituted by parliament and contain civilian and cross-party
representation.
Ensure that there is proper accountability for the earthquake relief
funds by stressing on the Pakistani government to appoint an
independent monitor to review how the funds are disbursed.
Interviews
Much of the information for this report was derived from
more than 20 interviews in early January with
representatives from the following agencies:
ICG, USAID, Editor – Daily Times, European Commission,
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Jammu &
Kashmir Liberation Front, Kashmir PPP, Norwegian
Defense Research Council, Rural Development Policy
Institute, Pakistan Army, PPP – Spokesman for Benazir
Bhutto, ECHO, Sungi Development Foundation,
Network for Consumer Protection.
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Article printed from Journal of Humanitarian Assistance:
http://jha.ac
URL to article: http://jha.ac/2007/01/16/politicalcomplexities-of-humanitarian-intervention-in-the-pakistanearthquake/