Coffman, Edward M. The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World
War I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
When Coffman set out to write a history of the American military experience in World
War One, he had two major goals in mind: to be more comprehensive than previous accounts of
the U.S. in the war, and to include what he calls “the human element” in his analysis of the
battles of the Great War—modeling John Keegan’s accounts of WWII and including not just a
“headquarters” view of campaigns but also narratives of real Americans in the war. In both
respects this is a remarkable book, and because Coffman has dug so deeply into various firstperson narratives this study provides a solid overview of the American soldiers’ role between
1917 and 1918, as well as the broad political decision-making that was necessary for such an
undertaking.
He begins in early 1917 with an essentially unprepared America, and relates how initial
confusion, militarily and politically, made an efficient American army an unlikely proposition.
Because the U.S. accepted significant allied help, they moved ahead in spite of severe limitations
and Coffman walks the reader through the resulting training camps, including accounts of
psychological testing, shortages of weaponry (some soldiers did not actually see particular
weapons until arrival in France!), the realities of racism, entertainment, and the impact of
sickness. He notes that 31% of all American soldiers in WWI who died, did so in training
camps. The navy faced similar unpreparedness issues, but thanks in large part to the efficiency
of Rear Admiral William Sims, the U.S. was able to coordinate its naval efforts and hinder
severely the effectiveness of the German U-boats. America’s air force was also ill-equipped to
fight a war, but that military branch also responded quickly and Coffman tells of their eventual
success, including the exciting exploits of Billy Mitchell and Eddie Rickenbacker.
The bulk of Coffman’s study concentrates on the efforts of General John Pershing to
build an American army and the ensuing battles he fought with that army, both politically and on
the actual fighting fronts in France. Two major, ongoing obstacles to allowing U.S. soldiers to
fight physically, were the equally important battles of equipment supply and avoiding
amalgamation—both of which required tremendous political/diplomatic maneuvering and
resulted in some key compromises. Coffman notes that into the spring of 1918, as the allied
situation continued to be desperate, “Both the British and the French thought in terms of the
battle and their desperate need for reinforcements, while Pershing considered their appeals as
efforts to thwart the formation of an independent American army.” (172)
Undoubtedly the most gripping parts of this study are when Coffman turns his attention
to the actual battles, including the offensives of 2nd Marne, Soissons, St. Mihiel, and the MeuseArgonne. One can almost feel the nearby explosions and the sounds and smell of the gas, as the
author describes the battles and the attendant confusion that came with coordinating tens of
thousands of men across hundreds miles of territory. Ultimately it was the energy and sheer
numbers of American soldiers who forced the Germans into retreat, though the skill of the
enemy’s retreat continued to make the summer and fall of 1918 extremely dangerous. Even
more importantly, WWI gave American leaders key experience in a “modern” war. Coffman
notes, “Closest to the hearts of the American commanders and staff officers, however, was the
proof that they could successfully plan and conduct an indepenent operation of this magnitude.”
(283)
As many contend still, this is probably the best single volume on the American
experience in the First World War.