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Women and Electoral Success in Chicago, 1971-2007:
A Draft for an Organizational Analysis
Zohar Lechtman, PhD.
Draft Presented at Departmental Seminary
Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya
Introduction
In the last decades, more and more women compete over and win elected office. Much of
the literature on women and representation examines women’s under representation in elected
office. This paper examines the opposite: the mechanisms that result in women gaining access to
elected positions of power. It suggests that representation as access to elected positions of power
begins with inclusion, or incorporation of women as political actors and members in the formal
and informal structures and alliances in the political arena. Prevailing gender ideology associates
leadership with masculinity, leading to their exclusion by gatekeepers and political players as
outsiders to the pursuit of power (Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). Even many of the
prevailing discussions on women and politics construct them as outsiders, absent actors, with
little political motivation required in politics (Fox and Lawless, 2004). This paper suggests that
availability of niches open for women to act politically and gain access to the complex networks,
alliances and rivalries in the political arena, is an important factor in women’s electoral
participation and success. If gender shaping the relations between the masculine political actor
and the apolitical unmotivated female outsider, then they are gendered patterns of incorporation
into politics that shape women’s activity as “insiders”.
A question of incorporation requires a concept of the structures to which persons are
incorporated and where politics is practiced, and a concept of gender that is integral to these
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Please Send Comments to zoharl@uchicago.edu or zoharlechtman@012.net.il
structures. This paper suggests that an organizational framework of analysis is an appropriate
approach to address this issue. The political arena is an organizational environment made of
organizational alliances and rivalries, interacting and competing over control and support of
constituents and other players (Burt, 1992). They provide members with different routes,
niches, or structural arrangements, for the exchange and acquiring of power and in the process,
create political actors (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004). Furthermore, this organizational
environment and available routes inside the political arena and the organization of corporate
actors in their institutional environment, follows gendered patterns.
In this paper, I explore politics as a gendered organizational process, using rich data on
candidates’ background and activism, collected as part of a larger research project in Chicago. In
the investigative process, I engage with Acker’s theory of gendered organization as an analytical
strategy (Acker, 1990). I apply to the organizational environment, and move to suggest that
gendering processes can result in meaningful political gains for women. I do so by integrating
the political context in Chicago into the analysis, a broad view of organizations and various
forms of political positions across the arena. I illustrate gendered incorporation to political
organizations on two dimensions: location in the organizational environment, and type of
positions available for women in the organizations constituting the political arena. Finally, I
examine political gains for women in gendered positions as reflected in political backing by
powerbrokers and implications for electoral success.
Theoretical Review
Since the 1970s, more and more women compete over and win elected office. In 1971,
women constituted about 4.5% of state legislators across the United States, and by 2003, their
proportion quadrupled to 22.4%. Among decision makers in city government the numbers are
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even higher.1Available work on women and representation examines for the most part, causes for
under representation. This work examines the opposite: increased representation in elected
office. Traditionally the subject of control, women were excluded from the modern political
sphere, to the private sphere. Femininity has not, and in many ways is still not, associated with
power and control, or the pursuit of power and control (Brown, 1995; Niven, 1998; Okin, 1979;
Pateman, 1988). Women’s pursuit of elected office is therefore more than a change in the
demographic composition of leadership. It is the change in actors included in the political arena,
and the actors with legitimacy and popular support to hold power.
Available Approaches to Conceptualize Women as Political Actors
Outside the Political Arena: Supply of Female Politicians
Because women were, and in many cases still are, invisible in the electoral competition, a
body of work is dedicated to examine the supply of women for the pool of political actors (Clark,
1991; Carroll, 1994; Carroll, 2003; Githens, 2003; Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2006).2 Limited
supply of political women is attributed to gender inequality outside the political arena. The
result is limited access to needed resources and appropriate preparation, ending with few women
1
Source:
CAWP (Center for the American Woman and Politics). 2002. Women in the 50 Largest Cities. New Brunswick, NJ:
National Informatiom Bank on Women in Public Office, Eaglton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.
CAWP (Center for the American Woman and Politics). Women in the US Congress 2004. 2004a. New Brunswick,
NJ: National Informatiom Bank on Women in Public Office, Eaglton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.
CAWP (Center for the American Woman and Politics). 2004b. Women in the US Senate 1922-2004. New
Brunswick, NJ: National Informatiom Bank on Women in Public Office, Eaglton Institute of Politics, Rutgers
University.
CAWP (Center for the American Woman and Politics). 2004c. Women state Legislatures 2003. New Brunswick,
NJ: National Informatiom Bank on Women in Public Office, Eaglton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.
There is a large body of literature on female and male legislators’ socioeconomic background, on sex role
and socialization. Here I use a few known examples. For comprehensive reviews, see: Clark, 1991; Carroll, 1994;
Carroll, 2003; Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2006.
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who can compete in elections. Disparity in professional experience, familial obligations,
disadvantages in the labor market that in return limit access to finance, experience, and ties are
among the causes explored (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001; Carroll, 1994; Clark, 1991;
Darcy, Welch and Clark, 1994; Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Welch, 1978). Women’s political
predisposition may also become a potential obstacle. Socialization to femininity and women’s
limited experience with power are suggested as causes for limited political ambition, avoidance
of confrontation, or novice attitude to political practices (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001;
Carroll, 1994; Clark, 1991; Costantini, 1990; Eagly, Karau, Miner, and Johnson, 1994; EtzioniHalevi, 1993; Fox and Lawless, 2004; Niven, 1998; Sorenson, Hawkins, and Sorenson, 1995).
There is evidence to rethink women’s political naivety. Research shows more similarity
then difference between men and women in position of power, as well as willingness on
women’s part to confront rivals or engage in competitive behavior (Craig and Pitts, 1990;
Johnson, 1993; Mott and Petrie, 1995; Simon Rosenthal, 2000; Walker, Ilardi, McMahon and
Fennell, 1996; Watson and Hoffman, 1996). In addition, familial responsibilities are still
women’s terrain, regardless of increased participation in the labor market. Comparisons of
women’s human capital and political representation show few conclusive results as to a direct
relation between women’s education or share in the labor force, and access to political power
(Niven, 1998; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). More importantly, it is possible
that what defined here as cause and effect is simply the same order in different fields of activity:
women face barriers to power across the board, both politics and in the labor market.
Inside the Political Arena: Selection Procedures
An alternative perspective examines electoral systems and selection procedures, as gate
keeping strategies (Norris, 1997). Newcomers like women, other minorities or younger persons,
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may face entrenched leadership less inclined to allow others in the system. Decentralization of
selection processes limits the power of incumbent leadership to block new actors, considered
therefore a factor in creating a more diverse body of candidates and leaders (Lovenduski And
Norris, 1993; Lovenduski, 1996; Norris, 1997). Cross-national comparisons show that
proportional representation in multi-candidate list systems, are more favorable for women and
newcomers compared with simple majority systems (Gelb, 1990; Bullock and McManus, 1991;
Mutland and Studlar, 1996; Norris, 1993; Norris, 1997; Perrigo, 1995; Sanbonmatsu, 2006).
They provide more seats to compete over, compared with the “winner-takes-all” electoral
systems. Candidates may not win the top position, but are still able to get in lower slates, and
depending on a party’s success, into the legislature.
Implications and Directions for Theorizing about Women and Politics
Existing explanations illuminate the context and potential obstacles that women face in a
society organized around gender differences. At the same time, some aspects need more
attention, especially when it comes to an analysis of women’s political activity. One of the main
fields in need of more attention is the political process. The alliances, coalitions, and rivalries
constituting political relations, the political context, interests and dynamics of political
bargaining are absent. Representation in the prevailing discussion is a matter of general societal
conditions or procedures applying to individuals who are generally absent from politics, or at
least to the point of elections. Practically speaking, there are little analytical tools to discuss and
examine how women do engage in politic. It seems as if women and their political representation
is not necessarily a political question. It is external to politics, and has to do with the general
societal conditions that shape individual abilities, motivations, and inclinations.
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Without dealing with the political as part of a discussion about representation, implied is
a political arena and actors that are abstract and universal. In the “supply” approach, actors are
individuals with a set of pre-determined characteristics and predispositions measurable by a
standard model of merit and skill. In the “procedural” framework, the arena is the sum of abstract
rules of selection. Granted, they serve political purposes, but abstract still. The universality
implied in the “supply” or the “procedural” approaches, corresponds to the liberal ideal of
politics. Liberalism prescribes a neutral political arena where individuals interact and compete
according to universal standards of behavior. Liberalism instructs us to expect an arena that is
open for all, where evaluation of aspiring leaders, should be, and is, based on universal principles
of merit and skill. Gender, race, ethnicity, or family origin are external burdens that should not
matter when it comes to the selection or evaluation of leaders, or in terms of the demands or
concerns that political actors may have (Young, 1990).
One important implication of the assumption of universality is that an existing state of
affairs becomes a normative model rather then an example of a specific case. Thus, a seemingly
universal is shaped in the image of those already controlling positions of power, and serves to
exclude any diversions from the standard rule. In this case, the standard is shaped by and after
the image of men (Brown, 1995; Ferguson, 1984; Young, 1991). Feminist work shows how
gender, through the division between public and private, power and subjugation, masculine and
feminine, creates masculine political actors and feminine apolitical actors. The modern
Democratic and universal political arena, where policy is made and resources distributed,
depends on the existence of a subjugated private sphere of the family, where ascribed status and
birthright remain basis for hierarchy. In the division of labor between actors, the masculine
becomes the modern universal standard a modern masculine political actor, and women remain
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assigned to the private sphere, rendered apolitical. (Baker, 1984; Elshtain, 1981; Okin, 1979;
Pateman, 1988; Young, 1990).
Here feminist analytical work and research offers a political concept of women and
representation. Women are not necessarily absent or apolitical, but excluded. Instead of absent,
women are actors whose participation and therefore potential gains are blocked by an ideology of
masculinity and male dominated political arena. Empirical evidence shows that the masculine
model serves a real barrier for women in politics. It shapes recruitment preferences, politicians’
inclinations in forming alliances or choosing protégés, and party members’ voting preferences
(Brown, Heighberger, and Shocket, 1993; Koch, 1999; Kurtz, 1995; Lovenduski and Norris,
1989; Lovenduski, 1996; Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Simrell-King, 1995).
The feminist approach women’s electoral success into a political question and turns the
focus of analysis to the political arena. Following this logic, the direction of change that leads for
electoral success, or representation, is the inclusion of women as political actors. The question is
where and how. While illuminating the direction for thinking and investigating, implied notion
of hegemonic masculinity in the feminist framework limits the span of investigative or analytical
possibilities. The effort to expose the masculine underlying the neutral universal standard also
requires a way to solve the problem, for women to overcome this obstacle. Otherwise, women, if
feminine, will never be able to measure up to a masculine standard, as women. An implied
masculine hegemony may not be sufficient, because it means that the only possible solution is
the abolition of political institutions and structures based on some hierarchical form, or power all
together. In a strange twist, it may even mean that when women pursue power they succumb to
their oppressor – the masculine ideology – thus making it less legitimate for women to engage in
existing political structures. Dealing with change, therefore, requires a concept of gendered
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actors that may capture heterogeneity rather than universality, be it abstract or masculine that
allows for the possibility of multiple expressions of gender and ways to do power (Scott, 1988).
Asking about representation instead of under representation is a question about women
gaining access, in the first place, to niches in the political arena for the pursuit and exchange of
power. The discussion is not so much about electoral victory as it is about the available paths that
lead one to participate in the process, and in return, making political gains that lead to electoral
power. It is a question of the incorporation of women into the political arena as legitimate,
participant political actors. This requires a concept that enables capturing the locations where
women and men do politics and what they do there.
Organizational Actors: An Alternative Framework of Analysis
An alternative that can prove useful to address issues of incorporation to politics is an
organizational framework of analysis, where gender is an integral part of organizational
processes and relations in the organizational environment. The point of departure is politics as a
dynamic arena of organizations constituted of coalitions and alliances, located in different, yet
interacting, positions in the institutional environment, with differential access to power, that
serve as a corporate actor, competing over control and influence over policymaking (Laumann
and Knocke, 1987). They compete over control over the political arena and the ability to
influence policymaking. At the core of the arena are political parties, exerting direct influence by
“sending” their representatives to decision-making positions. For social movements, nonprofits,
or civic associations, it is an indirect effort in lobbying, negotiating, or demand making. They
compete over the support of constituents and other organizations, recruit potential supporters, coopt, or exclude challengers. They may join forces and share recruits and constituents. Elections
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are simply the culmination of this ongoing organizational effort, where parties are the main
player, but other organizations may provide activists, endorsement, or candidates when needed.
To integrate gender in the analysis I engage with Acker’s theory of gendered
organizations (1990). Acker identifies five processes through which the distinction between man
and woman works to organize relations in organizations. They include divisions of labor, time,
or space, and assumptions and practices that make the organization’s everyday life, interactions
between members, symbols, and identities. “To say that an organization, or any other analytic
unit, is gendered, means that advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and
emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male
and female, masculine and feminine.” (1990: 146). I use here the first category in Acker’s
gendering processes, looking at the division of labor between men and women in the
organizational environment. Yet I make the move to suggest that gendering processes can result
in political gains for women.
The theory of gendered organizations joins the larger feminist project to bring gender as a
category of analysis (Scott, 1988) and expose gendered assumptions in seemingly neutral arenas
of activity, such as politics or work organizations. Acker exposes assumptions of masculinity in
the formal job evaluation process (Acker, 1990). Yet her analysis implies that gendering always
reinforces masculine assumptions, and is always organized around men and their interests, thus
“gendered” equals “masculinized” (Britton, 2000). The inherent masculinity Acker associated
with the organization creates the same difficulties of capturing or identifying actual change that
does not include the abolition of organizations all together (Acker, 1991; Britton, 2000). An
addition that opens the way to conceptualize gendering that is beneficial for women could work
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for the concept. By applying organizational models that emphasize their dynamics as sites for
negotiation of power, I attempt to add a possibility for change in gendering processes.
Gender is a dichotomous mechanism, based on assumption of essential difference,
signifying identities, prescriptions for behavior and practices, structural arrangements and
meanings, and hierarchical relations (Lorber, 1994). The assumption of difference creates an
image of inevitability and stability. Yet gender and gendered structures are always the result of
ongoing negotiation over arrangements, behavioral prescriptions, and public expressions of
assigned gender categories (Butler, 1990; Scott, 1988; West and Zimmerman, 1987). Gender as a
mechanism that signifies relations may not disappear, but it may take alternative political
expressions. Instead of one masculine standard that underlies positions, there will be several
possibilities for political “masculine” and political “feminine”. The direction of change therefore
may not be the opening of masculine positions to women, such as in feminization of former
masculine occupations, but the opening more paths, more positions. If women are the alternative
or “other” actor, this may mean that instead of “masculine” positions opened for women, there
are simply “feminine” positions that become political.
I turn the focus to an organizational environment constituted of competing alliances
between organizations and inside organizations. I look at persons’ positions and activities as
available paths for men and women across the arena and use a relational concept of power that
can be exchange, divided, and allocated to a variety of actors. I suggest and then illustrate two
gendered dimensions in the process of organized incorporation to the political arena. One is the
gendered structure of the organizational environment and location in relation to power. Another
is positions available for female and male actors, distinguished in their “political” nature, that is,
the type of ties they provide for male and female actors.
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Working with an organizational analytical framework, I look at organizations as
corporate actors actively engaged in seeking influence and control in a complex environment. I
draw on several approaches in that may not necessarily share agreement on all aspects of the
organization, but all combine to provide a dynamic concept of organizations, especially as it
applies to a political arena. First, organizations are corporate actors actively engaged and interact
in an environment organized to sectors, fields, or domains, distinguished by the type of actors
interacting in section of the environment and their distance from power and influence over
policymaking (Laumann and Knocke, 1987). There are various approaches and definitions, some
focused on institutional environments, others on populations (see for example, DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). My purpose in this paper is less a distinct notion of environment as much as to
call attention to organizations as dynamic structures and the way gender constructs
organizational environments. Organizations are engaged in constant bargaining with actors in the
environment, including other organizations and the constituents. Organizations compete over
support and recruits that can turn loyal members and representatives, protégés and liaison with
the constituency.
Gender signifies the location of organizations assigned for women and men, and distance
from power. Gender distinguishes between the dominantly “masculine” partisan politics,
movements and unions, and the more “feminine” margins of local voluntary groups and
associations. Civic and voluntary associations have traditionally been an alternative venue for
women. Providing a variety of services for the community and concerned with the community’s
welfare, they function as a public extension of women’s domestic responsibilities (Koven and
Michel, 1990). Posing little threat on centers of power, they provide therefore an alternative form
for political actors with limited access to power at the center of the political arena. Women do
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not dominate voluntary or “semi-political” organizations (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001;
Einwohner, Hollander, and Olson; 2000). However, traditionally, it has served as a normative
venue for women, compared with partisan politics, and one where women do participate in larger
number, compared with partisan politics.
Organizations are best understood as sites for the negotiation of power, constituted of
alliances and rivalries, where power, best understood as publicly acknowledged social capital is
built, expanded, and negotiated (Burt, 1992; Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Diverse
networks of allies, especially for leaders, and direct ties to potential sponsors, for potential
protégés, are two aspects of a social capital that can translate to political. For power brokers or
leaders, diverse networks of allies and supporters provide opportunities to exchange favors. In
work organizations, diverse networks provide managers with opportunities to improve their
status and access to higher positions in the market (Burt, 1992). Direct ties between sponsors and
protégés expand the potential span of control for power brokers. For potential protégés, leaders
act as sponsors make careers by providing them access to their alliances of power, or as
gatekeepers excluding them from access to social capital (Kanter, 1977). The second dimension
for gendering process therefore, is gender as a signifier of the social capital attached to positions.
Research suggests that women’s opportunities to develop diverse networks are usually limited,
but that direct sponsorships work for their benefit (Hertsog, 1999; Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1997).
Gender may distinguish, therefore between sponsorship attached to positions available for
women, and access to complex alliances attached to positions available for men.
The final test of political capital is public backing in junctions of allocation of power,
such as nomination cycles or elections. Elections are the culmination of organizational effort to
amass power and the test for power of corporate actors and power brokers. Elections are a test
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for one’s status in the organization, whether the organization is willing to run her or him or
provide them with backing, endorsements given, and the degree to which these are useful.
Running as a candidate endorsed and supported by their organization or sponsors, is already a
stamp of approval of one’s “insider”, or political, status. Winning is the final step on the way.
When gendering serves only to reinforce the advantages of men, gendered sectors and positions
do not translate to participation in elections. Actors remain in their niche and away from the
competition. Gendering processes may result political gains when organizations or patrons run
and back women assigned to “feminine” niches.
Using an organizational model for political exchange enables capturing the complexities
of the political arena, and potential points for change. Actors are no longer abstract, but part of
the structure of power relations, defined in terms of the alliances they are of, positions and status
they hold, or interests they represent. Using gender as an integral mechanism enables examining
how exactly female and male actors are incorporated to the system. I illustrate the process by
testing three hypotheses reflecting dimensions of environment, positions, and political gains:
1. on the level of the organizational environment: women and men are likely to arrive at the
electoral competition from different organizational sectors. Men are more likely to arrive to the
electoral arena from partisan organizations and women from civic organizations.
2. Partisan organizations open specific niches for women.
3. Backing patterns vary in terms of the actors providing backing, based on ties attached to the
gendered positions available for men and women.
The exact activity and nature of positions, identity of corporate actors participating,
depends on the political context in a specific arena, main issues, interests, and concerns in a
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specific arena, constraints and organizational structure, constituents, and relations between
organizations and constituents.
The Case Study
This paper is based on a project on a larger scale that examined electoral participation
and recruitment patterns in Chicago, using multiple methods of data collection and analysis,
including electoral returns, media coverage, in-depth interviews, and participant observation.
Chicago combines nonpartisan elections to the city council, with few limitations on number of
candidates and requirements, with an almost hegemonic control of the Democratic Party in the
city. It combines this seemingly homogenous “one party” arena, with divisions along ethnic and
racial lines, creating separate political contexts. Women’s representation increased to a third of
the council since the 1990s, and at least statistically, women and men are equally likely to win
elections, with 13.5% of candidates in each gender group win at their first attempt at office.3
Politics in the city, however, is more complex. The organization of city wards, the
Democratic Party’s control over the city, and race and ethnicity, constitute three important
aspects that organize political relations in the city. The city of Chicago is divided to fifty wards,
each represented by one alderman on the city council. Wards serve as electoral districts in the
municipal elections, municipal units for city services, and units in the organizational structure of
the Democratic and Republican parties. Each party has a local ward organization that coordinates
activities, fund raising, campaigns, recruits members, activists and campaign workers, and in
many cases, “provides” political backing or “sends” candidates to elections. Women’s political
aspirations and electoral success, varies by ward’s political and ethnic structure.
This review of Chicago’s political history is an integrative endeavor based on several major books and
texts on the history of the city’s political arena and particular events in the process, and social relations in the city.
The complete list of sources is included in the bibliography list.
3
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The Democratic Party has almost hegemonic power in Chicago. The party has governed
the city for the better part of the 20th century and since, using its famed political machine, based
on patronage and the cultivation of a clientalistic political culture, where services, jobs, careers,
contracts, and other favors exchanged in return for political support. The Democratic ward
organization served as the basic unit in the operation of the machine. The ward organization
recruited members, mobilized voters, and was the main unit for the recruitment of city workers.
A pool of city jobs was allocated to the organization, to be distributed among loyal members and
locals. The famous or infamous machine faces its share of local organized challenges in different
parts of the city, but none was as strong, or influential as intra-party challenges of the 1980s, and
in the same era, institutional constraints in the form of judicial decree prohibiting political hiring.
Its heritage lives on. It lives in practice, although less official, in some wards of the city, and as a
symbol of all that is bad in Chicago politics in others.
Ethnicity and race as a legitimate basis for political bargaining is another aspect of
Chicago. Residential segregation sustains this system and ward boundaries, made to include a
demographic majority of one racial or ethnic group based on the census, reinforce it. In its
beginning in the 1930s, machine politics was based on bargaining between politicians in
segregated communities of European descent, constituting more than 80% at the time. Machine
leaders bargained with selected politicians in the then small African American minority. The
demographic dominance of the White population declined over the years but they remained a
majority of 67.2% of voting age population well into the late 1960s. The picture changed since
and by 2000 they constituted 40.9%. Replacing White constituency first were African American
residents, increasing from 13.4% in 1950 to 20.2% in 1960, and since the 1980s to about a third
of voting age population. By then, the Hispanic community entered as a third large constituency,
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growing from a small minority of 6.5% in 1970 to a sizeable 20% in 2000. Immigrants from Asia
or of Asian descent make the remaining percent.4
The composition of wards reflects these changes. If in the municipal elections of 1971,
there were 32 wards with a White dominant majority of at least 60%, by 2007, the number of
“White wards” declined to 11. The 15 wards with an African American dominant majority
increased to 20. Hispanic wards were created only in the 1980s, beginning with 4 wards, and
growing to 8 by 2007. Change in the number of wards where neither group constitutes a majority
reflect demographic changes: from 3 in the 1970s to 11 in 2007, several of which are made of
relatively large Hispanic and White communities. For the most part, members of the dominant
majority serve as aldermen, and in the “Mixed” wards all aldermen are White.5 The creation of
the first Hispanic wards in the 1980s is an illustrative case of the link between ethnicity and
political bargaining. Following the 1980 census, mobilized groups and rising local politicians in
the Hispanic community organized to demand wards, as did African Americans when potential
loss of majority in two African American wards meant potential loss of two aldermen. The rather
heated and well covered campaign resulted in a court appeal and a judicial ordinance, in 1986,
the addition of two African American wards, and the creation of four Hispanic wards.5
A variety of partisan organizations and groups attempted challenging the machine and
take control over city wards and mayor’s office. The Republican Party ran candidates, and served
as potential backer for a variety of challengers. It held a few wards in the northern parts of the
city still in the 1950s and 1960s but lost all but one since. Unaffiliated or “independent”
organizations and individuals took over selected city wards. The more successful and famous
organized attempt was the Independent Precinct Organization (IPO), whose founder and leader
4
Source: Lewis, James H., d. Garth Taylor, and Paul Kleppner. 1997. Metro Chicago Political Atlas
1997- 1998. Springfield, IL: University of Illinois at Springfield United States Census Bureau, 2000.
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served on the city council in the 1970s. Several “opposition” aldermen, many times Democrats in
ideology and affiliation, but antagonistic to the machine, have served on the council.
The most serious and successful challenge, however, took place from within, not all of it
intended, in the end of the 1970s, creating about a decade of political turbulence. In 1976, the
mayor Richard M. Daley, who ran the city since 1955, died in office. His replacement, Michael
Bilandic, alderman of Daley’s home base in the 11th ward, served as mayor until 1979. In the
1979 elections he was challenged and lost to Jane Byrne, a Daley protégé herself, who ran
against the party’s apparatus in an anti machine campaign, and the support of African American
voters. She served for one term, seen today as a disappointing episode, when she ended up
relying on factions in the machine, instead of implementing her stated anti-machine policy. In
1983, the late Harold Washington, an African American Democratic congressman challenged
Byrne and the machine, winning first the Democratic mayoral primaries against Byrne and the
late Daley’s son Richard, and then the mayoral elections, with a coalition of “outsiders” –
minorities, organized independents, civic groups, and rising politicians in the Hispanic
community. Washington is held high as a symbol for all that is good in government. His first
term constituted of an ongoing political battle against an opposition of twenty-nine aldermen on
the city council. Despite it, Washington won his second term in office in the 1987 elections.
Washington died in the end of 1987. Eugene Sawyer, African American alderman of the
6th ward, who was backed by the twenty nine opposition aldermen, replaced him. In special
mayoral elections held in 1989, he faced the late Daley’s son Richard for whom it was the
second attempt. Richard J. Daley won the elections, and his repeated victory in 1991 marks the
end of that turbulent period. The second Daley has been mayor ever since, with little opposition
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from mayoral challenges. Compared with his predecessors, he has managed, except for specific
policy issues, to win over the support of the city council over the years.
Women and Representation in Chicago
In 1971, the first two female aldermen were elected to Chicago’s fifty-member city
council. It was also the first time more than a handful of female candidates competed, and the
first time a woman ran as the Democratic ward organization’s candidate. By 1987, the number of
female aldermen increased to 6, by 1991 to 9, and since 1995 it has been within a range of 15-16,
making them a third of the city council. The number of female candidates increased too, but not
to the same degree. The number of female candidates in the 1970s was 13-17 and in 1983 it
increased to 34. Since then it remained relatively stable, on a range of 39 (1995) and 52 (1999).
Among male candidates, electoral aspirations were more dynamic, with 107-142 men in the
1970s, 166-222 in 1983-1991, and declined back to 102-157 since 1995. The decline in male
aspirations following the heated 1980s means that proportionally, and in spite of relative stability
in numbers, women’s proportion increased to a third in 2007.
Across Chicago, women and men are as likely to be aldermen, at least in percentage:
female and male aldermen make 13.5% of the candidates in each gender group. However, taking
ethnicity in consideration, there is a great deal of variation. Since 1971, 35 women have served
as aldermen. Of them, 23 are African American, 11 White, and 1 Hispanic. By 2007, women are
aldermen in 11 of the 20 African American wards, all aldermen in Hispanic wards are men, and
five women are aldermen in the remaining wards. An analysis elsewhere showed that political
aspirations provide only partial explanation (Lechtman, 2008). Examining average candidacy
rates, it showed that since the 1980s, many more candidates ran in African American wards
compared to all other wards, but it was true for both men and women. Furthermore, the number
18
of female aspirants in Hispanic wards was higher than in White wards. Analysis of attitudes
measured in the GSS (also in Lechtman, 2008) showed that support of female aspirations among
urban African Americans were not significantly higher among other urban dwellers.
In general, candidates in Chicago run for office in different political contexts, even when
procedures are similar and seemingly open. Candidates in White wards run in communities that
managed to remain relatively homogenous in time of change. Candidates in Hispanic wards run
in communities that have only recently developed internal political structure. Candidates in
African American wards run in a community that has served as Chicago’s neglected minority for
almost a century, and was the source of challengers and support of challengers of city elite.
Patterns of female (and male) electoral aspirations or success also vary by community. In terms
of human capital and opportunities in the labor market, it is in the communities whose members
face relatively more disadvantages in American society, that persons make more attempts to win
elected office. This takes the discussion back to the question of representation as a political
question of incorporation into political structures.
Method: Identifying and Measuring Available Paths in Chicago
The paper uses data collected as part of a larger research project examining electoral
politics in Chicago (Lechtman, 2008). The focus of the paper is the possibility of gendered
patterns in the organizational paths available to men and women in the political arena, and
implications for backing and electoral success. It covers therefore some form or another of
organized effort to influence policymaking, direct or indirect, through partisan organizations and
a broad range of civic organizations that enable the community to express concerns, make
demands and interact with policy makers (Burns, Lehman-Schlozman, and Verba 2001).
19
Population: the population included all persons who ran for office for the first time in one
of the ten regular municipal elections between 1971 and 2007, and won at least two dozen votes.
Names of candidates were collected from canvass sheets of the Chicago Board of Elections, and
statements of election results. Each candidate was counted once at his or her first attempt. In
total, 1199 persons were first time candidates in the ten regular elections since 1971. Elections to
the Chicago’s city council are non-partisan. There is not limit on the number of candidates, and
the official obstacle is the need of notarized nominating petitions. Regular elections take place in
February every four years. Winning requires 50%+1 of the vote, and when no one wins, the two
highest scoring candidates compete in an April runoff.
Data: source of data was media coverage and public information searched in electronic
archives of Chicago’s two leading newspapers: The Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun
Times. Media outlets catering for specific constituencies, and Google were also used for cross
reference. Names of candidates served as keywords, including all combinations and nicknames
to cover all potential mentions, not only around campaign periods. I cross referenced by time and
outlet for all manifestation of names. All the Chicago Tribune’s published articles are accessible
electronically and therefore it served as basis. Chicago Sun Times was available electronically
only for 1986 onwards. They were cross referenced across time and
A variety of factors influence what may or may not appear on the news. Notions of
editors, journalists, and interviewees as to what may constitute relevant or important news are
one. During election periods, journals cover candidates in the wards. Background usually
includes age and employment and in addition, partisan affiliations, family ties, affiliation with
local civic groups and neighborhood association, status and participation in local neighborhood
campaigns and policy issues. Coverage of events outside the electoral period included, in
20
addition to city government, also local neighborhood campaigns, events and policy issues or
controversies. Status is another factor. “Celebrities”, athletes, entertainers, or politicians, may
receive more attention then others. Some individuals have better skills in creating a “buzz”
around their activity or their candidacy. Since the purpose of this study is in fact to capture
organized activity and status individuals held, it worked in this case.
On the other hand, there were cases where journalists reported that a candidate did not
respond. In this case, the working assumption was that absence of any report of activity, even
during campaigns when candidates have the opportunities to interact with the media, meant that
there was none. For quite a few candidates, approximately 400 individuals, no information of
any kind was available. It is possible that as a result, the analysis underestimates the involvement
of candidates, but in this case, it is preferable over overestimating organized involvement. It was
especially important to distinguish between organized alliances and established organizations,
and a variety of personal initiatives or crusades. Cross references and multiple searches ensured
some level of correspondence between person, biography, and activity. Here too, I used a high
threshold for inclusion in the analysis as “organized activity”, excluding all organizations that
were not clearly identified, that included one person serving as founder and member, and all
candidates described as “community activists” whose activity was not specified. As a result, the
analysis included relatively established, quite conventional, and recognized groups in Chicago.
Independent Variables
Gender: Of the total 1199 first time candidates, 951 were men (79.5%) and 245 were
women (20.5%). Data on gender was missing for three cases, resulting in a pool of 1196 cases.
Racial Composition of Wards: wards are divided in four categories: “White”, “African
American”, “Hispanic”, and “Mixed”, according to a dominant majority of at least 60%. For
21
each candidate, ward category corresponds to the elections he or she ran in at the time. Data
that systematically traces changes in ethnic composition of wards does not exist. I reconstruct
changes using several sources, each concerned with a particular period and ethnic group. I
combined information from the 2000 reports by the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission,
the Department of Planning and Development of the City of Chicago, the Metro Chicago
Political Atlas 1997- 1998, and Fremon, 1988.
The number of wards changed over time. White wards declined from 32 in the 1970s, to
20 in 1983-1991, 15 in 1995-1999 and 11 in 2003-2007. African American wards increased from
15 in the 1970s, to 16 1983 and 18 in 1987, 19 in 1991-1999, and 20 in 2003-2007. Although in
1986 there were four wards recognized as Hispanic, only three included a Hispanic majority.
There were six in 1995-1999, and eight in 2003-2007. The number of “Mixed” wards, without a
majority of any group, increased from 3 in the 1970s to 14 in 1983, declined to 9 in 1987 and 8
in 1991 and increased to 10 in 1995-1999, and 11 in 2003-2007. African American wards show
the highest number of first time candidates – 561, and the highest number of female candidates,
141 (25.1%). White wards follow with 378 candidates, 56 of them women (14.8%), and Mixed
wards with 177 candidates, including 32 women (18.1%). In the Hispanic wards, the most recent
to establish and smallest group, there were 80 candidates, 16 of them women (20%).
Timing: elections are divided to three periods: 1971-1979, 1983-1991, and 1995-2007.
The first corresponds to the last decade of the Daley machine, and the end of White demographic
dominance. It includes 3 elections and 285 candidates, including 37 women (13.0%). The second
category, 1983-1991, corresponds to the period of increased political heat of the Washington
elections, and the regular elections concluding the period in 1991. It is also the first introduction
of Hispanic wards in the city. It includes 3 elections, 485 candidates, 98 of them women
22
(20.2%). The last category corresponds to Daley’s continuous terms in office, and general
stability. It includes 4 elections, 426 candidates, 110 of them women (25.8%). Table 1 shows the
percentage of male and female candidates in each ward category and period category.
Dependent variables
There are two independent variables: public backing, and winning the first attempt. Each
Backing: the media provided information on parties’ ward organization and independent
organizations who “sent” candidates or backed them, as well as public endorsements and help
provided by individual politicians, mayors, leaders, and interested persons. Backers and
endorsers may provide funding, “lend” campaign managers, office space, or volunteers. Two
categories of backing are included: “Organizational” and “Individual”. The first refers to formal
organizations that publicly support or endorse candidates, or “run” them for office. This includes
the Democratic ward organization, the Republican Party, and a variety of other organized groups
that “send” a candidate to the elections. The category “Individual” refers to persons endorsing,
providing help or even publicly running a candidate, but not as part of a sending organization.
Thus, for example, ward regular organization’s backing and the backing of the committeeman in
that ward are same - organizational. On the other hand, an alderman in another ward or a former
alderman backing a candidate, even if they use an orchestrated network of allies and volunteers,
was defined as individual. Here relations between candidate and backer, or volunteers and
candidate are based on the personal, even if political, tie between them or between common
allies, but not on the basis of an organizational interest. Mayors were also defined as individuals
when backing candidates.
23
Results
Gendered Politics: Components of Available Paths in Chicago’s Political Arena
The first task was “mapping” the organizational routes to the election, examining whether
men and women inhabit different niches. The search resulted in several niches, or categories of
activity, in partisan or electoral organizations, and in civic organizations. By “partisan”, I refer to
any organization, registered as a party or not, whose goal is “sending” persons to policy-making
positions. About a third of all candidates (448, 37.4%) were involved in some organized fashion
in the public life of their community before running for office. For most candidates, electoral or
partisan engagement and civic engagement were mutually exclusive. There were 245 exclusively
electoral candidates, constituting 54.7% of “activist” candidates (20.5% of all candidates), and
164 exclusively “civic” candidates (36.6% of “activist” candidates, 13.7% of all candidates).
There were 39 candidates who did both. In total, there were 284 “electoral” candidates (23.7% of
all candidates) and 203 civic candidates (17% of all candidates).
I divide candidates’ profiles in seven categories, by combination of activity, ties, and
location. Three reflect any kind of electoral and political work, unpaid and paid, for politicians or
political organizations. Two categories reflect campaign experience in larger campaigns: serving
as precinct captains in Chicago’s ward organizations, and serving on campaigns for politicians
unaffiliated with the ward organization. The category “staff” includes all candidates who served
on the staff of another politician at some point or another. The three are mutually exclusive, and
so precinct captains or activist who later went on one’s staff, which is a possible link, as I will
soon show, are defined as staff. The category “civic engagement” represents members and
leaders of neighborhood associations, local nonprofits, and advocacy groups or national ones,
and a variety of local community based initiatives and government.
24
In addition, I include a category “family ties” that captures the degree to which
candidates were family members of politicians and power brokers. Kinship is not considered an
integral part of the modern political arena. It is included because, at least in Chicago, kinship
constitutes political capital. It is quite acceptable for sons or daughters to inherit their father’s
seat, by appointment or election, or for, usually fathers, but sometimes mothers, to appoint or run
family members or family members of allies, to a variety of city, county and state elected and
non-elected positions.
Two categories reflect prior political aspirations and elected positions. The category
“Elected Officials” includes candidates who had held an elected position prior to the race, from
state congressmen to committeemen. I include all persons who ever ran to another elected
position in the category "prior aspirants”.
The Precinct Captain: the precinct captain in the ward organization was the most frequent
electoral experience for candidates. There were 65 persons who, when running for office did not
hold in any higher position in the political hierarchy (5.4% of all candidates) but a total of 107
who have served at some point or another as precinct captain but since then moved to other
positions in the system (8.9% of candidates). These 65 persons constitute 5.4% of all candidates,
and about 28.4% of all persons who were engaged in some electoral or partisan activity.
Precinct captains and assistant precinct captains are members of the ward organization
and serve as liaison between local leaders and the constituents throughout the year all in order to
mobilize voters in elections. The power of the precinct captain I seemingly limited to the number
of precincts he is responsible for where he maintains interaction with constituents. He is one of
several precinct captains who may also have political interests of their own, but may also serve
as a basis for alliance. He has ties to the key power broker in the ward, the committeeman, and
25
with his or her backing, he gains the loyalty of the organization as a whole. The precinct captain
position is not only the gateway to the ward but to city jobs, reward for loyalty and work, and for
politically skilled precinct captains, to the committeeman’s alliances. Precinct captains may get
on a politician’s staff, elected committeemen, and up to city, county, or state office.
It is a man’s job and a characteristic of White wards. Men constituted 89.2% of
candidates with only precinct captain experience, higher than their percentage in the population
(79.5%), and women 10.8%, lower than their proportion in the population (20.5%). All male
precinct captains, including those who moved to bigger things in politics, constituted 9.7% of
male candidates (92 persons) and 6.1% of female candidates (15). Of only precinct captains,
53.8% ran in White wards (compared with the 31.6% of White wards candidates), 32.3% in
African American wards (compared with 46.9% in the population), 12.3% in “Mixed” wards,
and only one person in Hispanic wards. Over time, the number of precinct captains declined,
reflecting among other things, decline in the number of White wards.
Campaign Activists: independent campaigns are an alternative way to acquire campaign
experience. Like precinct captains, they mobilize voters in elections, but their location in the
arena and duration there are different. The precinct captain in the ward organization is part of a
complex and longtime operation of power. The “campaign activist” has the potential of ties to
political alliances, but outside the major center of power, and in Chicago, usually challengers of
centers of power. About 55 candidates did campaign work for candidates or other political
organizations outside the Democratic establishment in Chicago. Proportionally to their size in the
candidate population, women were slightly more likely to engage in this activity. They
constituted 30.9% of campaign workers (17 women), somewhat higher than their 20.5% of the
population. The proportion of candidates in Hispanic and “Mixed” wards among campaign
26
workers was higher than their proportion in the population, and the opposite in White and
African American wards. A small increase in the number of campaign activists in the last
decades may reflect the increase in Hispanic and “Mixed” wards.
Staff: the category “staff” includes aides, assistants, chiefs of staff and others on the staff
of aldermen and elected officials in the city, county, state, or national legislatures. About 81 first
time candidates served as staff members. Employment on a politician’s staff is a way to reward
and nurture loyal operators and protégés or potential protégés and a way to maintain allies in
close distance. Assistants arrive from within the circles of loyal activists, friends or allies, and
not least important, family members or family members of allies and friends. Ties are direct to
the boss, who may serve as a potential sponsor or patron. Proportionally, women are more likely
to serve as staff members (30.9%). There is little difference between wards, but a higher number
of “staff” candidates proportionally to the number of candidate that decade.
Civic Engagement: about 203 persons or 17% of first time candidates since 1971 were
engaged in at least one civic organization. It should be noted, that this is not a representative
sample of civic engagement in Chicago, but the civically engaged among electoral aspirants.
About a third (67, 33.0%), were involved in more than one such organization either
simultaneously or in a series of commitments. About half (101, 49.8%) were presidents,
chairpersons, directors, board members or committee chairs. In addition, about 42 individuals
(20.7%) were employed coordinators, directors, or administrators. They include neighborhood
associations, organizations with a particular cause for social change, as well as bureaucratized, or
less bureaucratized community organizations. This also includes community based participative
governing such as local school council that replaced PTAs, or local policing committees.
27
Men are the majority of candidates and are also a majority among “civic” candidates, but
women’s proportion among civic candidates (31.0%) is somewhat higher than their proportion
among candidates. Among women, civic candidates constituted 25.7% compared with 14.7%
among men. Rates were highest for candidates in Hispanic wards (12.3% of civic candidates
compared with 6.7% of candidates), followed by Mixed wards (18.2, and the opposite for White
and African American wards. The proportion of civic candidates in 1995-2007 exceeded their
proportion among candidates (47.3% compared with 35.5%) and the opposite for the two other
periods, reflecting for some degree the increase in candidates in Hispanic wards.
Among presidents, directors, board members, or committee chairs men were about two
thirds and women a third (63.3% and 36.7%) or 6.7% of male candidates (64 men) and 15.1% of
female candidates (37 women). Women were more likely to be involved in more than one
organization: 10.2% of female candidates (25 women) and 4.4% of male candidates (42 men).
Family Ties: there were 72 individuals, whose family ties in Chicago known to the public
through the media, and who ran for office, constituting 6% of first time candidates. They
included 24 wives, sons, or daughters, 12 siblings or members of the extended family, and 31
other relatives and members of prominent families. In fact, 27 of the aldermen who ran for the
first time since 1971 were family members of established political players in the city. The family
route is another alternative for women. Among female candidates, 9.8% (24 women) arrive from
“political families” compared with 5% among male candidates (48 men).
Elected Officials: about 44 individuals (43.1%) held an elected office at least once before
running for alderman. Majority of about two thirds, are 29 ward committeemen (and ran as such
in the election). The rest held, for the most part, seats on county boards, or state legislatures.
Among them were 10 women (22.7%) and 34 men (77.3%) corresponding to the distribution
28
among candidates (20.5% women and 79.5% men). Several state representatives attempted to
translate incumbency to the ward level, and others ran as part of “personnel reshuffle” in
accordance with organizational needs.
Prior Aspirants: this category reflects general political aspirations, regardless of status
and position, reflected in running for another office at some point in one’s career prior to the first
attempt at the aldermanic seat. About 102 first time aldermanic candidates (8.5%) have tried
their luck elsewhere before, in elections to county boards (41 candidates), ward committeeman
(33), in primaries for the state House, state Senate, or the United States House (17), and for judge
or mayor (25). Over time, their number declined from 33 or 11.6% in the 1970s to 47 or 9.6% in
the 1980s, and then to 22 or 5.2% in 1995-2007. The proportion of prior aspirants among men
was slightly higher than among women: 84 men (8.8%) and 18 women (7.4%). When only losing
aspirants are included, there are 50 men and 8 women.
Summary: the descriptive data suggests that the organizational environment where
persons who end up running for office are engaged in, is gendered. First, it is gendered in the
sense, that men dominate the field of political aspirants, even if not the field of winning political
aspirants. More important for this discussion, they are gendered in terms of distinct niches that
are available for men and women in the arena, and from which persons end up running for office.
The data suggests that the precinct captain in the ward organization is a masculine niche, in the
sense that it is a niche available particularly for men. This niche serves Chicago’s traditional
hierarchy of power, with the ward organization at the basis of the machine, and the basic unit
where a person may develop his political ties. The ward organization as a location that “creates”
electoral aspirants, or that recruits and sends aspirants has declined over the years, as did the
number of White wards in the city.
29
The results also suggest that other niches, outside the inner circle of political power in
Chicago serve as “feminine” niches, in the sense that they serve as an alternative niche for
women. Women are more likely to be active in campaigns outside the ward organization and
more likely to be involved in civic organizations. In that sense, women “begin” their political
involvement in locations that have the potential to form ties that are outside the traditional
centers of power in Chicago. Alternative ties for women are the seemingly apolitical family ties,
although in Chicago they may serve as a political capital in its own right and in that sense an
“internal” component, at least in comparison to the “external” civic or “campaign” categories.
Another feminine niche is position on the staff of a politician. Much like the family, and unlike
the three components mentioned, this position is tied directly to a particular political person, and
therefore, its ”internal” or “external” depends on the status of the boss.
At this point, it is important to examine whether positions are in fact “masculine” and
“feminine” as such, or that gendering is a matter of constellation of political context, or structural
factors. For this purpose, I have included a logistic regression analysis to examine whether it is
gender, political context in terms of period or ward, and structure in terms of available positions.
Table 3 shows the results of four regression models. Three regression models examine the effect
of being female, ward, and time on serving only as a precinct captain, as a campaign activist and
in civic organizations. The fourth model examines the effect of gender, context, and positions on
serving on the staff of a politician, who may serve as a potential patron or sponsor. In this model,
the precinct captain category is inclusive, including anyone who has ever served as a precinct
captain. White wards are reference for wards and the 1970s are reference for time periods.
Shown in table 3, it is clear that being female has a significant and positive effect on
engagement in “outsider” politics: in civic organizations and on non-ward campaigns (p<.05). As
30
for the precinct captain position, when controlling for ward and timing, there is no significant
effect for being female. There is, however, significant negative effect for serving as precinct
captain when running after the 1970s, confirming that the traditional center of power declined as
an exclusive niche for the creation of aspirants. In other words, that it is not enough to be “only”
precinct captain in order for a person to move into the electoral competition, but requires another
stop on the way. This leads to the model for staff position.
The fourth model shows that staff members, who move to the electoral competition, are
more likely to be recruited from among precinct captains (Odds 5.90, p<.001). It also shows that
staff members, especially those ending seeking electoral power are more likely to be recruited
from among loyal campaign activists, although for a lesser degree (3.34, p<.001). Being female
has a positive significant effect on serving as staff member, independent of any service to the
ward organization or to the politician on his or her campaign, and of family ties (1.98, p<.01).
The effect is smaller than that of any form of electoral work, but exists, and in similar manner, so
is the effect of family ties. Involvement in civic organizations has no significant effect.
A comment about the general involvement of men and women is in place. As shown in
Table 2, women are more likely to arrive with background in civic organizations. They are also
more likely to arrive with some experience in campaign activity. When combining all precinct
captains, campaign activists, and staff members, they constitute 15.9% of men (152 men) and
20% of women (49 women). Even with the selected number of candidates who did both civic
and campaign work, it seems that while the number of male aspirants is much higher, many more
arrive with little political background, except for aspirations, compared with women.
31
Political Consequences: Backing and Winning
Public Backing: Public backing is one of the two political gains examined here. A close
to a third of first time candidates (30.6%, 367), were backed by an organization or a politician.
Partisan, independent, and ward organizations, civic organizations and organized groups were
behind almost a quarter (23.9%, 286). Of them, about half ran with the regular Democratic ward
organization, or factions in it (49%, 140), and about a third with the backing of other parties and
“independent” organizations (36%, 103). The rest (15%, 43) had the backing of other
organizations, including 20 who ran with backing of a union local or a coalition of unions7. There
are no apparent differences between men and women. Organizations “sent” or backed 22.4% of
female candidates and 24.3% of male candidates. Individual politicians publicly supported
15.9% of female candidates and 14.2% of male candidates. Individual politicians endorsed,
donated, provided manpower or other help, to 14.6% (175 candidates). They make a diverse
group. The mayors publicly and directly endorsed about 70 candidates (40% of candidates
backed by individuals). Former aldermen or aldermen in other parts of town backed 56
candidates (32%), and the rest got backing from legislators, civic leaders, businessmen, and other
power brokers and interested individual.
Table 4 shows the results for three regression models testing the effect of gender, ward,
period, and components of political paths, on three backing variables: by an organization, by an
individual, and “any backing” – by organization or individual. The model includes mutually
exclusive categories of electoral activity: only precinct captain, campaign worker, staff member.
It includes holding elected office, prior races, civic activity, and family ties. White wards serve
as reference for wards, and the category 1971-1979 is reference for period. As Table 4 shows,
gender has no significant effect.
32
Most activities have a positive and significant effect, independent of other factors.
Serving as an elected official, who is in many cases, the leader of a ward organization had the
highest odds for the probability of organizational backing. For persons who have not yet gained
an elected position of power, serving only as precinct captain or on the staff of a politician was
the best source of organizational backing. The difference between the odds probability for the
“masculine” precinct captain (4.71) and the “feminine” staff position (4.96) is very small. The
rest of the “feminine” niches are behind, but are still positive for backing. For endorsement and
public backing of individual politicians, the “feminine” family ties and campaign work had the
highest odds (3.98 and 3.80, correspondingly), followed by serving as a precinct captain (2.59),
on staff (2.46) and civic engagement (2.31). Again, the difference between the effect of serving
only as a precinct captain or as staff is small. The only activity that did not prove to have any
significant effect on backing is running for office, including both winners and failed attempts.
Candidates in African American wards were significantly less likely to have backing
from any organization, compared with White wards, but were no different when it came to
“unorganized” individual politicians. It is possible that compared with White wards, usually the
most stable and powerful organizations, African American wards have fewer “sending”
organizations. Note, also that the number of African American candidates is very high.
Therefore, the ratio of organization per candidate may simply be too low. Running in a Hispanic,
or Mixed wards increased the odds for individual backing, but had no significant effect on
organized backing compared with White wards. These are the same ward with a relatively
smaller number of candidates running after serving a ward organization.
33
Winning Elections: at first attempt at office, rates of electoral success are similar for men
and women across Chicago: 13.5% of male and female candidates won their first attempt at
office. The question is whether niches have their particular contribution for winning elections.
I add a variable to control for the advantage of incumbency for first time candidates,
referring here to appointments for office prior to the elections, a common practice in Chicago.
An appointment is the surest way to the aldermanic seat. About a quarter of first time candidates
were appointed to their position (41, 24.7%), and 36 of them won their first attempt the
following elections. When illness, unexpected death, or resignation of an alderman occurs within
the second half of the term, another is appointed to complete it and stands for elections only in
the regular electoral cycle. Aldermen may resign to move to another elected office, or due to
incarceration or indictment. Resignation a few months prior to the regular elections provides a
protégé or a favorable candidate with the advantage of incumbency ahead of time. Officially, the
mayor makes appointments. However, local leaders or resigning aldermen endorse a replacement
for the mayor to appoint, and for the most parts, an alderman’s wishes prevail. Only in a handful
of cases, the mayor selected an appointee against, or regardless, of an alderman’s wishes.
A third of appointees are women (34.1%, 14). Half of the appointments were made in
1995-2007, mostly of staff members, which may explain the increase in women’s ability to win
elections in Chicago. Staff members and family members are the most likely appointee. Staff
members constitute 48.8% of appointed first time candidates, but 6.8% of all first time
candidates, and family members constitute 22% of appointees compared with 6% of candidates.
The percentage of precinct captains among appointees is lower, 14.6%, but much higher then
their 5.4% among candidates. On the other hand, persons with civic background constitute
24.4% of appointees but also 17% of candidates. It is a small difference, but it may suggest that
34
in the case of a selected set of cases, civic organizations served as a source of recruits to the
center of power. There are only two appointees who had been campaign in their past.
Table 5 shows the results for three logistic regression models. The first tests the effect of
gender, ward, and period, niches, aspirations, and family ties. The second adds political backing,
and the third controls for the advantage of appointments. The first and second models show that
organizational backing is the best predictor of electoral victory. Reflecting the centrality of the
ward organization, having being “sent” by an existing organization contributes to the odds
probability to win elections more then other factors (Odds are 11.61, p<.001). Controlling for
political backing reduces the effect of all positions that had a significant and positive effect on
winning elections. Among them, the effect of serving only as precinct captain is now highest,
replacing the advantages of holding an elected office (5.66, p<.001). It suggests that serving only
as a precinct captain is still meaningful for a political player. This is true, to a somewhat lesser
degree for the staff position (Odds = 3.84). Elected office, in it and of itself, when controlling for
backing, has no dramatically more or less advantages than working for the ward organization or
on politicians’ staff. For civic engagement, family ties, as well as holding an elected office,
effect decline and so did significance (p<.05 in Model 2). In it and of itself, that is, when
controlling for backing, elected office is advantageous for winning elections in levels that are in
between the precinct captain or the staff position.
Model 3 adds control for appointments. Here only organizational backing and the
precinct captain position remain significant. The alternative “feminine” niches are no longer
significant, as they are the most likely appointees. Finally, there are two positions that have no
advantages or disadvantages for winning elections: campaign outside the ward and running for
another office. Campaign activists may enjoy some backing, but since most of their ties are
35
outside the center of power, backing does not guarantee, nor prevents, success. It also seems that
political motivation as such, has no implication for success or failure. There is a negative effect
for timing, because since 1983, the number of candidates was much higher, compared with the
1970s. Mathematically, the likelihood of winning for a candidate running against just one
opponent in the 1970s is higher than for a candidate running against five in the 1990s.
In summary, the results suggest that political gains measured in backing and victory do
not vary for men and women independently of structural factors in the political arena in Chicago.
This “ungendered” pattern is shaped by the gendered patterns through which men and women
participate in the arena, and their path to the competition itself. There is correspondence in time
and location, of an increase in the number of women, and increase in the recruitment or entry of
actors that have spent their public career outside Chicago’s traditional organized power – the
Democratic ward organization, and decline in the status of ward organization as a “sender” of
candidates. It is true that the precinct captain position continues to hold a political advantage,
controlling for timing, but it is also true that the actual number of only precinct captains running
for office, or the wards where they do so, declined.
Conclusions
The motivation behind this analysis was discomfort with available frameworks for the
analysis of gender relations in politics, particularly the discussion on “women and politics” that
construct the arena as a mass market of atomistic actors, and depoliticizes issues, actors, and
women. Feminist critique of exposing masculine underlying assumptions about political actors,
influences the analysis. There I have identified a missing conceptual bridge between the
condition of male dominated political arena and a possibility for increase in women’s
representation. This paper is an attempt to add to that aspect of the discussion, emphasizing
36
incorporation to the political arena as the bridge between the inactive external, and the insider
successful electoral candidate. In particular, the paper offers an organizational analytical
framework, calling attention to the organized structure of the political arena, and based on
organizational models focusing on organizations as sites for the negotiation of power, and social
capital as a form of political capital. The paper illustrate the organizational patterns involved in
the process of incorporation and the way gender shapes organizational structures and in return,
increased representation for women.
To do so I used Chicago’s political arena as a case study, bringing in the particular
political context, interests, constraints, identifying the main players that are specific to the arena
and the forms of interaction between corporate actors, and the arena. I examine available
gendered patterns defined as positions that are more likely to be inhabited by men or positions
inhabited by women, and the amount of potential power attached to them. Bringing the actual
political context, and the organizations, in the analysis, enables to overcome the assumption of
universality of politics in prevailing discussions on women and politics, and overcome the
assumption of hegemonic masculinity in feminist analyses of political processes. Non-universal
does not necessarily mean too particular to generalize. The relevance of the particular positions
in Chicago is in terms of general forms of social capital they provide for actors, in terms of the
type of ties they provide for actors that are translatable to political achievements. I have explored
the distribution of male and female political aspirants across positions in the organizational
environment in Chicago’s political arena, the effect of positions on political backing, and the
effect of position and backing on winning elections.
In general, the findings confirm most of the arguments and stated hypothesis suggested in
the analysis. The findings confirm the first hypothesis. The findings show that women and men
37
are more likely to arrive at the competition from different sectors or niches in the organizational
environment. Women are more likely to arrive at the competition with background in civic
organizations than men do. In fact, at least for candidates, women arrive from higher positions in
the internal hierarchy of civic organizations. I should note that the paper broadens the range of
political corporate actors assumed to play a part in the political arena, to include any organized
attempt to participate in, or influence policymaking, directly or indirectly (Burns, LehmanSchlozman, and Verba; 2001). The findings confirm the second hypothesis. Men were more
likely to have held a precinct captain position, a position that puts them in complex alliances that
tie them to peers as well as potential patrons, with the potential to create a network of allies.
Women are more likely to have arrived as former staff members of politicians, tying them
directly to one or more patrons, rather than positing them as part of a more complex alliance.
A broader view shows that the organizational environment in Chicago is gendered
beyond the distinction between staff and precinct captain. The internal structure of the arena is
gendered in a way that corresponds to two gendered dichotomies: the masculine-center/femininemargin and the private-feminine/public-masculine dichotomy (Elshtain, 1981; Baker, 1984;
Okin, 1979). Overall, women are more likely to arrive at the political competition from outside
the ward organization, traditionally the most important corporate actor in the ward. Women are
more likely to arrive at the competition with background in civic organizations, in “independent”
campaigns that usually challenge Democratic machine incumbents, from among the apoliticalpolitical arena of kinship, and as staff members. In fact, while staff members are chosen from
among precinct captains, the staff position is also an alternative route for women as such, and is
linked to other “external” statuses – the campaign activist and family members.
38
The distinction between the masculine and feminine as distinct arenas of activities
therefore remains at least in this sense, stable. This dichotomy should not be understood as a
verdict of powerlessness for women as political actors in the city. Women and men enjoy similar
levels of backing and are as able to win elections, at least when their gender in it and of itself is
examined. There is no difference between men and women when it comes to public
endorsements by organizations or individual power brokers. Men and women do not vary when
comparing backing regardless of mediating factors, and when controlling for mediating factors.
Both “masculine” and “feminine” positions provide some level of backing. In fact, any
involvement with politicians, and even civic engagement, provides some level of backing. One
conclusion is that gendering processes are not inherently masculine in nature. Rather, they hold
the possibility that gendering processes can result in power for women as a group. Moreover, the
effect on backing, of the “masculine” precinct captain, and the “feminine” position on the staff
on backing are similar. Thus, in general, the findings do not confirm the third hypothesis.
What are the machinations of gender therefore, as revealed in this analysis? The
seemingly gender neutral result in terms of backing and electoral success, are structured through
gendering processes. First, it means that organizations in the political arena play a role in
incorporating women into the electoral competition. Proportionally, women are as likely and as I
will soon show, even more likely, to arrive at the electoral competition with some background in
organized activity and crossover from one arena to another. They play a role by providing
women niches for activity that are, if not unique to women, available for them compared with
other niches, and men.
Another look into the findings reveals a more complex picture. When testing for backing
the effect of all feminine niches but the staff member is lower than that of the precinct captain.
39
When testing for winning the effect of all “feminine” niches is lower than that of the precinct
captain, and disappears when controlling for appointments, another relatively “feminine” niche.
Here is where Acker’s assumption of masculinity continues to hold ground. Specifically, the
positions available for women are the positions serving as an alternative to what remains, even
over time, even when the number of actual ward organizations as senders of candidates declines,
the masculine niche of the precinct captain. Once all other forms of intervening factors such as
backing, or more important, appointments, are taken into consideration, these niches lose their
effect. In terms of political capital, that is, ties that positions provide, these are also the positions
that create direct relations of dependence between patron and protégé. These are the staff
member of a politician, a family member of a politician, or campaign workers for politicians
disconnected of major powerful alliances that work in the particular context of a candidate’s
ward. When patron succeeds so does protégé and vice versa.
The pessimistic conclusion is that the heart of politics and the alliances that constitute it,
at least in Chicago, remains masculine, and that women need alternative solutions to get in. The
optimistic view is that it does not really matter, as long as women as a group gain or devise
routes to elected positions of power. To support this optimistic view I bring the reality of
Chicago into the story. In Chicago, elected aldermen for the most part, are here to stay. Most
aldermen, appointees and competitors, men and women, remain in office over many many terms,
regardless of original circumstances or patrons.
There are several directions for analysis arising from the findings. One touches a question
researchers are most concerned with: why women do not run? (Fox and Lawler, 2004) Men are
the dominant majority of aspirants in Chicago, but the findings suggest that aspirations alone did
not have a significant effect. Unless engaged in some form of activity or alliance, running
40
resulted in losing. Men are the dominant majority among aspirants, but less politically
experienced. When all candidates, including precinct captains, combined, women had somewhat
more political involvement, in civic or partisan organizations. There are more men running for
office, but even more men without any background that proves effective. The question to ask if
not why women do not run but why so many men run.
Another direction for further investigation is the gendered meanings attached to positions
and structures. This paper was limited to the structure of the political arena, and focused on the
political gains of positions that were open to women. The analysis did not focus on what Acker
defines as the organizational logic (Britton, 1997; Britton, 2000). A promising next step will be a
detailed analysis of the meanings that actors in Chicago attach to women’s political activity, and
political aspirations in general that could address the question of motivation of men and women.
Finally, findings also reveal change in the structure and identity of corporate actors
involved in Chicago’s political arena. These changes include increased participation of women,
but also varying forms of participation of the African American and Hispanic community,
combined with decline in the ward organization as the sender of candidates. A more expansive in
topic and volume of potential change in organizational form in Chicago and organizational
strategies for coping with changing arenas, will provide better understanding of the
organizational structure of the political arena, and examine women’s participation in a larger
political context.
41
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Tables
Table 1:
Percentage of Men and Women among Candidates in Each Ward and Period
(N in parentheses)
Wards
Percentage
Men
Percentage
Women
White
85.2 (322)
14.8 (56)
1971-1979
87.0 (248)
13.0 (37)
African American
74.9 (420)
25.1 (141)
1983-1991
79.8 (387)
20.2 (98)
Hispanic
80.0 (64)
20.0 (16)
1995-2007
74.2 (316)
25.8 (110)
Mixed
81.9 (145)
18.1 (32)
Table 2
Percentage
Men
Period
Percentage
Women
Distribution of Gender, Ward Category, and Period of Race, in Precinct
Captain, Campaign Worker, and Assistant Categories
(N in parentheses)
Precinct
Work
Campaign
work
5.4 (65)
4.6 (55)
6.8 (81)
17.0 (203)
Gender
Men
Women
89.2 (58)
10.8 (7)
69.1 (38)
30.9 (17)
69.1 (56)
30.9 (25)
69.0 (140)
31.0 (63)
79.5
20.5
Ward
White
African American
Hispanic
Mixed
53.8 (35)
32.3 (21)
1.5 (1)
12.3 (8)
23.6 (13)
38.2 (21)
9.1 (5)
29.1 (16)
32.1 (26)
45.7 (37)
8.6 (7)
13.6 (11)
27.1
42.4
12.3
18.2
(55)
(86)
(25)
(37)
31.6
46.9
6.7
14.9
Period
1971-1979
1983-1991
1995-2007
53.8 (35)
27.7 (18)
18.5 (12)
25.5 (14)
43.6 (24)
30.9 (17)
19.8 (16)
46.9 (38)
33.3 (27)
20.2 (41)
32.5 (66)
47.3 (96)
23.8
40.7
35.5
All
Staff
Civically
Engaged
48
Table 3
Logistic Regression Models for Serving as a Precinct Captain,
on Non-ward Campaigns, on Civic Organizations, or on Staff, 1971-2007
Only Precinct
Captain
Odds
Female
.55
African American Ward
.26
Hispanic Ward
.68
Mixed Ward
.59
1983-1991
.34
1995-2007
.30
Coef.
-.59
(.41)
-1.37
(1.05)
-.39
(.42)
-.52
(.31)
-1.09***
(.31)
-1.21***
(.37)
Non Ward
Campaign
Civic
Engagement
Staff
Odds
Coef.
Odds
Coef.
Odds
1.95
.67*
(.31)
.18
(.39)
.90
(.59)
1.15**
(.41)
-.27
(.37)
-.58
(.42)
2.00
.70***
(.18)
-.11
(.20)
.74***
(.31)
.38
(.25)
-.18
(.23)
.34
(.23)
1.98
1.20
2.46
3.16
.77
.56
.90
2.10
1.47
.83
1.41
0.85
1.68
0.83
1.80
1.44
Any Precinct captain
5.90
Non Ward Campaign
3.34
Civic Engagement
0.58
Family Ties
2.12
Constant
.035
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001
-3.36*
(0.32)
1196
.34
1.10***
(.27)
1196
0.29
-1.25***
(.11)
1196
0.30
Coef.
.68**
(.27)
-.16
(.30)
.52
(.49)
-.19
(.40)
.59
(.34)
.36
(.37)
1.78***
(.30)
1.21**
(.41)
-.55
(.37)
.75*
(.36)
-1.20
(.28)
1196
49
Table 4
Logistic Regression Models for Organizational Support,
Backing of Individual Leader, and Any Type of Backing
Organizational
Support
Odds
Female
.85
African American Ward
.53
Hispanic Ward
.90
Mixed Ward
.94
1983-1991
.57
1995-2007
.50
Held Elected Office
Prior races
9.28
.93
Staff
4.71
Precinct captain only
4.96
On non ward-affiliated campaign
2.72
Civic Engagement
1.98
Family Ties
2.17
Constant
8.98
Observation
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001
Coef
-.16
(.20)
-.65***
(.18)
-.11
(.33)
-.06
(.23)
-.57**
(.19)
-.70***
(.21)
2.23***
(.48)
-.07
(.34)
1.55**
(.26)
1.60***
(.28)
1.00**
(.31)
.68***
(.19)
.78**
(.28)
2.20***
(.31)
1196
Individual
Backing
Odds
.88
1.02
2.63
1.81
1.23
.96
2.99
.67
2.46
2.59
3.80
2.31
3.98
2.35
1196
Coef
-.13
(.22)
.02
(.23)
.97**
(.34)
.59**
(.27)
.21
(.24)
-.04
(.26)
1.09*
(.56)
-.40
(.42)
.89**
(.29)
.95**
(.33)
1.33***
(.31)
.84***
(.21)
1.38***
(.28)
.85**
(.32)
Any Backing
Odds
.92
.63
1.61
1.29
.60
.48
12.35
.94
5.43
5.35
4.11
1.90
4.03
29.92
Coef.
-.09
(.18)
-.47
(.17)
.50
(.30)
.26
(.22)
-.51**
(.18)
-.73***
(.20)
2.51***
(.52)
-.07
(.32)
1.69***
(.27)
1.68***
(.29)
1.41***
(.32)
.64***
(.18)
1.39***
(.29)
3.40***
(.35)
1196
50
Table 5
Logistic Regression Models for Winning First Aldermanic Attempt, 19712007
Model 1
Odds
Female
.88
African American Ward
1.17
Hispanic Ward
1.55
Mixed Ward
1.04
1983-1991
.41
1995-2007
.38
Held elected office
Prior race
8.97
.62
On non-ward Campaign
1.33
Precinct captain only
8.59
Staff
6.20
Civic Organization
2.55
Family ties
3.16
Coef.
-.12
(.24)
.15
(.23)
.44
(.42)
.04
(.31)
-.89***
(.24)
-.96***
(.24)
2.19***
(.57)
-.48
(.46)
.28
(.39)
2.15***
(.29)
1.82***
(.28)
.94***
(.23)
1.15***
(.30)
Organizational Backing
Model 2
Odds
.99
1.57
1.45
.85
.41
.39
4.05
.68
.62
5.66
3.84
1.74
2.04
11.61
Backing by individual
5.24
Coef.
-.01
(.28)
.45
(.26)
.37
(.48)
-.16
(.35)
-.89**
(.28)
-.94**
(.31)
1.40*
(.63)
-.39
(.53)
-.48
(.43)
1.73***
(.34)
1.35***
(.32)
.56*
(.27)
.71*
(.35)
2.45***
(.23)
1.66***
(.25)
Appointment
Constant
Observations
Model 3
Odds
.86
1.59
1.82
.83
.33
.24
3.97
.79
.77
5.09
20.5
1.69
1.86
8.22
6.15
23.75
4.05
1.40
(.32)
1.68
1196
.52
(.37)
5.61
Coef.
-.15
(.30)
.46
(.27)
.60
(.51)
-.18
(.38)
-1.10***
(.29)
-1.42***
(.34)
1.38*
(.62)
-.23
(.52)
-.29
(.43)
1.63***
(.35)
.72
(.38)
.52
(.28)
.62
(.37)
2.11***
(.24)
1.82
(.26)
3.17***
(.58)
1.72***
(.45)
1196
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001
51