International Relations and EU Foreign Policy
Lecture 1:
International Relations Theory
Discussion questions:
● what are the main premises of structural realism?
● is European integration an anomaly for realist theory of international relations?
● is structural realism still a relevant theory after the end of the Cold War?
Mearsheimer (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
● Anarchy. There is no higher authority than the sovereign states in the Int. system.
● Military power. Every state has some measure of offensive military capability.
● Intentions. No state can be certain of the intentions of other states.
● Survival. The central goal of every state is survival, other goals are secondary.
● Rationality. States take into account preferences of other states.
Under these conditions the best strategy for survival is to strive for hegemony. Relative power
gains are the main concern of states, because any edge that rivals get over you can turn out to
be a danger in the future.
Collard-Wexler (2006). ‘Integration under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union’.
The facts of European Integration can not easily be squared with the predictions of realist
theory.
● Cooperation. Evolution of the ever closer Union, including high-politics.
● Institutions. Independent role EC and ECJ, outcome is usually consensus.
● Relative Gains. Redistribution of wealth, little concern for relative gains.
● Balance of Power. EU provoked bandwagoning rather than balancing in Europe.
● Interdependence. EU has an agenda of increasing interdependency.
Lecture 2:
EU Foreign Policy
Discussion questions:
● Does the EU have a common foreign policy? if no, why?
● Is the EU an economic giant and a political dwarf? if so, what are the implications for EU
foreign policy?
● What effect does enlargement have on the future of EU foreign policy?
● Can the development of EU foreign policy be explained by international relations
theories? if no, why?
● How will EU foreign policy develop in the future?
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union.
● Military. The EU sets goals for composition and number of forces ready for deployment.
For military operations the EU can act autonomously, using member states (limited)
resources, or work via NATO which then allows the EU to request NATO resources.
● Civilian. The EU sets similar goals for civilian capabilities. For civilian operations the EU
makes use of relatively large pools of experts since its quite difficult for civilians to pack
up and leave on short notice.
●
Industrial and Technological. To reach goals of military capabilities the EU has set up
the EDA, which can help create more of a real European defense market. In addition,
community budget is used for dual purpose R&D such as space technology.
● Political. The European Council is responsible for ESDP and, aside from issues in
parliamentary oversight, this creates the problem that it remains uncertain if the EU can
act swiftly and effectively in crisis situations.
The main concern that Keukeleire and MacNaughtan express is the speed at which ESDP
develops compared to CFSP, this may become a problem when issues get out of hand and
clear leadership and responsibility is necessary.
Posen (2004). ‘ESDP and the Structure of World Politics’.
The developments in ESDP can be explained from structural realism as a form of balancing
behavior:
● Unipolarity. End of cold war means a change in structure of world politics to U.S.
hegemony. It is expected to organize international politics to suit its interests, have few
constraints in foreign policy, and will be insensitive to the wishes of allies.
● ESDP. There are roughly four explanations for the development of ESDP
○ EU-ism. EU inevitably needs foreign policy so it needs defense policy.
○ Britain. Needed to justify position in EU, military capability is its specialty.
○ Capabilities. concerted effort required to build some usable capabilities.
○ Balkan failures. EU needs capabilities to be able to secure its own backyard.
● Balancing. Although individual reasons may vary, outcome is that EU is building military
capabilities autonomous from NATO which classifies as balance of power behavior.
○ Alternative option means agenda setting power in NATO
○ Exit option means increased bargaining power over U.S.
○ U.S. opposition may produce more balancing
Howorth and Menon (2009). Still not pushing back: Why the European Union is not
balancing the United States’.
ESDP is structurally limited as a military project because it is affected by internal balancing as
much as it is by concerns of balancing U.S. power. However, it will continue anyway because of
high demand for the civilian capabilities that the EU can provide.
● Soft balancing. To seek the ability to act autonomously to gain bargaining leverage over
the hegemon. This concept is problematic because.
○ indistinguishable from policy bargaining, just normal diplomatic friction
○ cause and effect unclear in U.S. withdrawal of influence and EU autonomy
○ requires intent, or any act with relative power implications is balancing
● Hard balancing. To build up military capability autonomously or in alliances in order to
survive confrontation with a would be conqueror.
● Testing. no evidence of balancing behavior in motives, outcomes and U.S. reaction
○ ambiguous rhetoric in France, no notion of balancing in U.K.
○ collective defense remains with NATO, Berlin Plus agreement
○ U.S. looks forward to partnership, redeploying troops elsewhere
● Institutions. EU was created to constrain Germany, thus binding nature of arrangements
and voice for small Member States. Consequently, small states have played a big role in
developing civilian side of ESDP.
Warntjen lecture notes. Does the EU have a common foreign policy?
● legal provisions. Treaty says there is a CFSP so...
● voting rules. There are rules on how to decide a CFSP
● institutions. High Representative, EDA, EEAS
● capabilities. military and civilian
● preference homogeneity. Not always, but agreed on principles
● power of supranational institutions. Commission in aid & trade negotiations
● (external) perception. EU position in climate, trade, Human Rights treated as one
Lecture 3:
International Regimes and Institutional Design
Discussion questions:
● What effect does the structure of international relations have on cooperation among
states?
● What function do international regimes have in world politics?
● How can international institutions facilitate cooperation in world politics?
● What determines the institutional design of international organizations?
Frieden, Lake, Schultz (2010). World Politics.
Provided that long-term benefits outweigh short-term costs, states will comply with decisions
that go against their immediate interests. Even though institutions are always biased to reflect
the policy bargain at the time of creation, the cost of creating a new institution or finding a
solution via bargaining may be greater than those of using the existing institution. International
institutions make compliance more likely by determining the terms of cooperation, providing
information, and lowering the costs of joint-decision making.
● Setting standards of behavior. Standards define behavior as ‘cooperation’ and
‘defection’.
● Verifying compliance. Institutions provide information on the actual behavior of states.
● Reducing costs. Procedures reduce the number of interactions needed for an outcome.
● Resolving disputes. (Judicial) mechanisms clarify standards and identify defection.
Interaction can also take place outside of institutions, but any interaction takes the form of:
● Cooperation. Occurs when at least one actor is better off and none is worse off. More
likely when incentives to defect are few, number of actors is low, interactions are
repeated or linked, and information is readily available.
● Bargaining. Occurs when at least one actor is better off and at least one is worse off.
Outcome determined by reversion outcome, outside options, net cost of coercion, and
agenda-setting power.
Wagner (2003). ‘Why the EU’s CFSP will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist
institutional choice analysis of EU crisis management policy’.
International regimes are designed to overcome specific cooperation problems. Different types
of cooperation problems, or games, require different institutions. Real-world cooperation
problems consist of some mix of compliance and distribution problems.
● Coordination games. Actors benefit from making the same choice and no further
incentive to defect. Distribution of benefits the issue, decision-making rules the solution.
● Collaboration games. Actors benefit from working together but nonetheless have
incentives to defect. Compliance the issue, surveillance and enforcement the solution.
Crisis management is a fast-paced coordination game and thus benefits from QMV. Most action
in CFSP involves formulating a common position in response to an international crisis. A
Common position means greater influence and backing up on a statement brings no benefits.
Time limit is short so it is not possible to cycle proposals between institutions, voting rules help.
What would be the effect of various forms of delegating sovereignty?
● Formal agenda setting. To avoid endless cycles of proposals on an issue.
● Monitoring and sanctioning. To make compliance more likely.
● Executive powers. To make commitments more credible and actions more coherent.
● ‘Locking in’ agreements. To avoid defection of future governments.
Analytical tool. Game theory.
A Nash-Equilibrium exists where no player has an incentive to change his strategy, given the
strategy chosen by the other player.
A Pareto-Optimum exists where there is no option that improves the situation of one player
without negatively affecting the other player.
● Assurance (Stag Hunt). Two NE where players match strategies, one of which is PO.
Problem is that each player must be convinced of the others’ cooperation first.
● Prisoner’s dilemma. One NE where both players defect, PO where both players
cooperate. Problem is that both players have a dominant strategy of defecting, leading to
the worst possible outcome.
● Battle of the Sexes (Chicken). Two NE which are both PO where players diversify
strategies. Problem is predicting who will pick what strategy as they have opposing
preferences.
Lecture 4:
International Negotiations
Discussion questions:
● Why, when and to what effect does the decision-making threshold in the European
Union determine international outcomes?
● What are obstacles to successfully concluding international negotiations? How can these
obstacles be overcome?
Jupile (1999). ‘The European Union and International Outcomes’.
The importance of decision-making rules on the spatial location of EU common positions.
● Pivotal player. The member state closest to the status quo who is still needed for a
winning coalition. Range of agreement is determined by his indifference curve.
● Change to QMV. Means altering the pivotal player, increasing the range of possible
common positions and increasing the power of revisionist states.
The importance of an EU common position in international negotiations.
● Majority voting. Combined weight of votes possibly makes EU a formal veto player.
○ EU unanimity. Outcome towards status quo, conservative states gain power
○ EU QMV. Outcome away from status quo, revisionist states gain power
● Unanimity. Only has an effect when QMV within EU, as conservative member states
lose voice internationally.
● Consensus. Combined bargaining weight possibly makes EU a de facto veto player.
○ EU unanimity. Outcome towards status quo, conservative states gain power
○ EU QMV. Outcome away from status quo, revisionist states gain power
Warntjen (2010). Bargaining.
In bargaining, actors typically have a common interest in reaching agreement but diametrically
opposed interests in the distribution of benefits. Tactics aimed at increasing the share of
benefits might jeopardize the goal of reaching agreement.
A representation of a bargaining situation with two actors has the following features:
● Axis. Represent the utility of both actors.
● Feasible agreements. Range of outcomes that are possible, limited by resources etc.
● Reservation level. Line that represents the utility of unilateral action or outside options.
● Non-Agreement. Intersection of reservation levels.
● Zone of possible agreement. Range of outcomes that are both feasible and higher than
the reservation level of both actors.
● Pareto frontier. The points on the circle of feasible agreements within the zone of
possible agreement, the set of agreements that is Pareto optimal.
● Nash Bargaining Solution. Point on the Pareto frontier where the product of the actors
utility is maximal and thus benefits over non-agreement are equally distributed, if
bargaining power is equal this point is determined by drawing a line at 45 degrees from
the point of Non-Agreement to the Pareto frontier.
● Welfare boundary. The line the shared utility of both actors is equal to Non-Agreement.
Bargaining can succeed when agreement is sought between the welfare boundary and the zone
of possible agreement because of:
● Side-payments. The actor who gains utility compensates the loss in utility by the other.
● Issue-linkage. Multiple agreements are made, the sum of which does fall in the zone of
possible agreement.
Bargaining does not always proceed completely rational, because of cognitive bias:
● Egocentrism. Self-serving information is overvalued.
● Framing effect. Risk aversion differs for gains and losses.
● Anchoring effect. Perception heavily influenced by early negotiation.
● Fixed-pie perception. Too focused on competition, lose sight of mutual gain.
Analytical tool. Spatial models.
Constructing a spatial model requires several pieces of information:
● Information about the issues:
○ Choices or options, arrayed on a separate scale for each issue
○ Location of the status quo, or current outcome, for each issue
● Information about the actors:
○ Location of the ideal point, or most preferred outcome, for each issue
○ Requirements for a winning coalition, combinations able to change the status quo
Most spatial models have the same basic assumptions:
● Single-peaked preferences. One preferred outcome, all others give decreased utility.
● Symmetrical utility function. Outcomes of equal distance from the ideal point give equal
utility.
● Rationality. Actors are utility maximisers.
Based on these assumptions, spatial models have a couple of important features
● Indifference curve. A set of all the outcomes an actor is indifferent to. When drawn on
the status quo, any outcome inside the indifference curve is a utility gain.
●
Win set to the status quo.. The area where the indifference curves for a winning coalition
overlap, any point in the win set creates a utility-gain for at least one of the actors.
A special feature in spatial models is the concept of Veto Power
● Veto Player. A political actor whose consent is necessary to change the status quo.
○ Constitutional veto player. Veto power derived from law.
○ Partisan veto player. Veto power derived from political circumstances.
● Core. The set of policy choices that cannot be defeated, the win set is empty, as the
actors have diametrically opposing preferences.
● Veto Points. The points in time were the decision-making process can be overturned.
In any political system, the number of veto players and the distance between their ideal points
determine the size of the core. Greater core size and number of veto points lead to policy
stability and a higher chance of political instability, because of inability to change policy to
changing circumstances.
Lecture 5:
The Politics of EU Enlargement
Discussion questions:
● What determined the decision to enlarge the EU?
● How do national interests and state power affect the outcome of the enlargement
process?
Smith (2005). ‘Enlargement and European Order’.
Enlargement has been the EU’s principal response to the end of the cold war.
● Concentric circles. Political and Economical integration in the core and progressively
downgraded relations outward, both widening and deepening the Union.
● Bilateral agreements. Prevents soviet influence, increases bargaining power EU, and
makes differentiation possible.
The Copenhagen criteria and membership conditionality were integral to the bilateral
agreements, it allowed each application to be judged on its merits.
● Any European state … (what makes a state European?)
● with a functioning market economy able to cope with competition in EU
● stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, rule of law, human right, and minorities
● ability to take on obligations of EU membership and adherence to the acquis
● (1999) has shown ‘good-neighbourliness’ by resolving all outstanding border disputes
The problem of differentiation was central to the Helsinki and Luxembourg councils, the concern
was that countries left out of membership negotiations could destabilize.
● multilateral relations. Help regional cooperation initiatives
● accession process. Prelude to membership negotiations
● membership negotiations for all. Because of success of accession process.
Reasons for big bang enlargement.
● sense of responsibility to candidate countries
● sense of a shared European Identity
● strategic imperatives (risk of destabilization)
● backing down would be loss of credibility and legitimacy
Schimmelfennig (2001). ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’.
Rationalist accounts of Eastern Enlargement can only explain the start of Accession
negotiations, not the decision to enlarge and the differentiation between the ten.
● State preferences. Determined by geographical proximity (benefits), socioeconomic
structure (costs), and geopolitical interests (influence).
● Interstate bargaining. Can produce policy outcome even when preferences are opposed
if benefits are sufficiently great that losers can be compensated, or credible threats of
exclusion at higher costs than agreement. Both not the case in enlargement decision.
Sociological institutionalism can explain the move from initial bargaining outcome of ‘accession’
to the final outcome of ‘enlargement’.
● Shared identity. Liberal (human rights) norms of domestic (political, social and
economic) and international (democratic peace) conduct.
● Rhetorical action. Strategic use of normative arguments to apply a standard of legitimacy
to bargaining positions, positions in breach of community norms become invalid.
○ commitment. Interpretation of historical promises.
○ argumentation. Manipulating identity and criteria, exposing inconsistencies.
○ entrapment. Explicit opposition was stifled, claims could not be denied.
Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003). ‘National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement’.
● National preferences. EU Leaders promote enlargement to be in long-term economic
and geopolitical interests, interest groups can be compensated and costs generally low.
Candidate countries have high costs and high benefits, but net benefit on the whole.
● Bargaining power. Inverse relation between preference intensity and bargaining power,
countries with high interdependency have to concede points to peripheral states.
● Institutional consequences. Little change as candidate countries can be expected to
divide along existing coalitions over controversies, although they are expected to try and
regain financial concessions with their increased bargaining power.
Lecture 6:
Spreading Democracy?
Discussion questions:
● Why do states comply with (new) norms?
● When and how does political conditionality work?
● How can the EU spread democracy?
Checkel (2002). ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’.
Why do states comply according to rationalist theories?
● Assumptions. Academics use methodological individualism to study the behavior of selfinterested actors.
● Background. Behavior is acted out in a strategic environment where each actor makes
an unilateral calculation of the preferences and strategies of others.
● Mechanism. Actors make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis of alternatives that
has a ‘logic of consequence’.
● Strategy. Collective outcomes are reached through coercion or bargaining.
Why do states comply according to constructivist theories?
● Assumptions. Academics use an holistic approach to study the mutual constitution of
actors and structures.
● Background. Behavior is acted out in a social environment where interaction leads to
mutual learning and discovery of new preferences.
● Mechanism. Interaction between actors creates socialization (social learning), followed
by internalization of new norms, a process that has a ‘logic of appropriateness’.
● Strategy. Collective outcomes are reached through deliberation and identity change.
When does argumentative persuasion, as a strategy of deliberation, foster compliance?
● Uncertainty. There is an incentive to adapt to a new environment or to seek solutions for
serious crisis or policy failure
● Noviceness. The persuadee has few pre-existing beliefs that can conflict with the
message
● Authority. The persuader is considered a senior member of the group, someone the
persuadee looks up to
● Communication. The message does not consist of ‘should and should not’, but sets
principles of how things are
● Setting. In a more private setting away from public exposure where persuadee might feel
the need to ‘act tough’
Schimmelfennig et al. (2006). ‘Costs, Commitment, and Compliance. The Impact of EU
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey’.
When and how is democratic conditionality effective? The model used is reinforcement by
reward, either through intergovernmental or transnational channels. After a period of
conditioning using rewards and sanctions, pro-social behavior becomes ‘sticky’.
● Societal conditions. Defined as influence from civil society groups as a result of
interdependence and social salience of EU, are largely irrelevant to compliance.
● Social influence. Defined as identification of elites with Europe and aspiration to be
recognized as part of the community, is no sufficient condition for compliance. It may be
a necessary condition since it makes no sense to comply with conditionality if you are
not committed to become part of the community.
● Material bargaining. Defined as calculation of benefits offered against political cost of
compliance for the government, necessary condition for compliance. EU membership is
the biggest carrot here and EU was forced to use it often to achieve compliance.
● Legitimacy. Defined as the perception of EU norms demanded in conditionality, has no
effect on compliance.