“Regulation in the Age of Governance”,
ECPR Conference, Budapest, 8-11 September 2005
Session Organizers:
Dr Fabrizio
Gilardi
Prof. Jacint
Jordana
Institut d'Etudes Politiques et Internationales
Universit‫ י‬de Lausanne -- BFSH2
1015 LAUSANNE
Switzerland
Bureau 5123
Phone: +41/21/692.31.48
Fax: +41/21/692.31.45
E-mail: Fabrizio.Gilardi@iepi.unil.ch
Department of Political and Social Sciences
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
E-08005 – Barcelona
Work: +34 935 422 376
Fax: (34) 93 542 23 72
jacint.jordana@upf.edu
Dr. David Levi-Faur
University of Haifa and the Australian National University
Address:
Department of Political Science
University of Haifa
Haifa, Israel 31900
Tel: 972-4-8240025
Fax: 972-4-8257785
Email levifaur@poli.haifa.ac.il
Section Outlines
Regulation is no longer one of the defining features of American Exceptionalism. Nor is it
only a feature of European integration process in general and European public policy in particular. Instead, governance through rule-making and rule enforcement, became one of the defining features of policy change across the world and at both the national, international and
supranational levels. Indeed, the distinction between governance an d regulation is narrowing
as governments shed their responsibilities for direct service provision and shift more energies
to regulating the service provision of other actors, as well as creating and sustaining new markets (a development that might best be labelled as regulatory capitalism, or alternatively captured by the notions of the rise of the regulatory state and of regulatory society). Our section
aims to create another locus of disciplinary and interdisciplinary exchange in which political
scientists who are specializing in public administration, public policy, political economy and
international political economy can meet each other to discuss the new features of governance
through regulation, their new challenges for maintaining public interest, and the existing varieties the regulatory world. At the same time we mean to bridge between institutional theory
of governance and the literature of regulation. In doing so, we aim to bring in insights from
studies of regulation from the social sciences at large and particularly from the sub-disciplines of Law and Society, Law and Economics.
No.
1
Panel’s title
Regulating the Global Economy Convergence, Persistent, Divergence
or Hybridization of National Regulatory Regimes?
Panel’s Chair
Prof. Susanne Lütz
FernUniversität in Hagen
Lehrgebiet Politische Regulierung und Steuerung/
Dep.of Political Regulation and Governance
Universitätsstrasse 41
D-58084 Hagen
Phone (+49) (0) 2331 -987-4843/-4844
Fax. (+49) (0) 2331 -987-4845
E-mail: susanne.luetz@fernuni-hagen.de
2
The Diffusion of Regulatory Reforms
Dr. Fabrizio Gilardi
Institut d’Etudes Politiques et Internationales
Université de Lausanne
BFSH2
CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone +41 21 692 31 48
Fax + 41 21 692 31 45
fabrizio.gilardi@unil.ch
3
Theorizing Regulatory Enforcement
and Compliance
4
Regulating Privacy
5
Regulatory Agencies: Institutional
and Actors Centred Approaches
Dr. Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen
The Dept. of Political Science,University of
Aarhus
DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark
Tel: +45 8942 1130
Fax: +45 8613 9839
Email: VLN@ps.au.dk
Dr. Andreas Busch
Reader in European Politics
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford
and Hertford College
Catte Street, Oxford OX1 3BW
Tel. (+44)-1865-279 451
Fax (+44)-1865-279 437
E-Mail andreas.busch@hertford.ox.ac.uk
Prof. Jacint Jordana
Department of Political and Social Sciences
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
E-08005 – Barcelona
Work: +34 935 422 376
Fax: (34) 93 542 23 72
jacint.jordana@upf.edu
6
Liberalization, Regulation, Juridification
Prof.dr. Frans van Waarden,
University College, Utrecht University,
P.O.Box 80145, 3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands
phone: +31-30-253-4820; email:
F.vanwaarden@fss.uu.nl
7.
The Regulation of Science: Themes for
Comparative Analysis
Dr. Arco Timmermans
University of Twente
School of Business, Public Administration and
Technology
Work Room: Spiegel 336
P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands
Telephone: +31 53 489 3221 / 3260
Fax: +31 53 489 4734
A.Timmermans@utwente. Nl
Uwe Serdült University of Zurich, Department
of Political Science,
Karl Schmid-Str. 4, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
phone: ++41-1-634 38 48
fax: ++41-1-634 49 25
e-mail: serduelt@pwi.unizh.ch
Chair Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen
The Dept. of Political Science,University of
Aarhus
DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark
Tel: +45 8942 1130
Fax: +45 8613 9839
JGC@ps.au.dk
8.
From Monopoly to Market via Regulation: Comparative Perspective on
Public Service Utilities
9
Behind and Beyond the Border: Regulation in an International Context
Alasdair Young
Department of Politics
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, G12 8RT United Kingdom
a.young@socsci.gla.ac.uk
10
Regulatory Governance and the
Representation of Diffuse Interests
11
Internet Regulation: Challanges of
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Neyer
Professur für Politikwissenschaft mit dem
Schwerpunkt Internationale Beziehungen
Robert-Mayer-Str. 5
Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe Universität
60054 Frankfurt
Deutschland
+49-(0)69-798-22075 (Sekretariat)
+49-(0)69-798-22877 (Direkt)
j.neyer@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
Christopher T. Marsden LL.B., LL.M.
Governance
12
The Rise of European Regualtory
State(s)?
Research Associate, Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies, Manor Road, Oxford OX1.
Scholar in Residence, Stanhope centre for
Communications Policy Research,
Hyde Park Corner, London W1
Mobile: +44 777 926 0376
chris.marsden@socio-legal-studies.oxford.ac.uk
David Levi-Faur
Department of Political Science
University of Haifa,
Haifa, Israel 31900
Tel: 972-4-8240025
Fax: 972-4-8257785
Email levifaur@poli.haifa.ac.il
Panel No. 1: Regulating the Global Economy - Convergence, Persistent, Divergence or
Hybridization of National Regulatory Regimes?, Chair: Prof. Susanne Lütz
Whether distinct national “varieties of capitalism” will survive in an increasingly globalizing
economy has become one of the most hotly debated issues in Comparative Political Economy. While institutionalist approaches emphasize the stickiness of national institutional configurations which create powerful incentives for political and social actors to respond to external pressures in path-dependant ways, studies in International Political Economy perceive
the global diffusion of a neo-liberal version of market capitalism and regulation. The panel
seeks to address regulatory responses to economic integration by focusing on different regulatory regimes such as finance and corporate governance. Both are core elements of national
models of capitalism and have been subject to increasing state regulation in recent years. Do
we witness the emergence of new European regimes of regulation or do national models of
regulation persist? Is the evolution of these regulatory regimes characterized by growing
convergence, persistent divergence or processes of hybridization? How does the interaction
of national and transnational actors and institutions shape regulatory reforms? How can we
account for the growing judicialization in these sectors in an era that is supposedly marked
by the diminution of state power and control over economic forces?
Panel No 2. The Diffusion of Regulatory Reforms Dr. Fabrizio Gilardi
The past couple of decades have been a period of intense regulatory reform in Europe. Utilities have been liberalised and re-regulated, regulatory agencies have been established, and
new practices such as regulatory impact analysis have been developed, just to name a few of
the trends. As Majone has famously stated, we have witnessed the “rise of the regulatory
state”.
Recently, the literature has increasingly insisted on the fact that the reforms carried out in the
various countries have been interdependent. Taking up insights from several literatures such
as those on policy transfer and policy convergence, and especially by the more recent diffusion literature in comparative and international political economy, scholars have argued that
regulatory reforms carried out in one country affect the decision to enact reforms in other
countries, or, conversely, that the decision to reform regulation in one country is affected by
the reforms enacted in other countries. In other words, the point has been made that regulatory reforms have diffused across countries.
While most researchers agree in principle that regulatory reforms can be subject to diffusion,
the conceptualisation of these processes is still rudimentary, and empirical evidence is sparse. This panel seeks to advance the study of the diffusion of regulatory reforms by discussing
the processes that make policies spread across countries. At the theoretical level, how can
diffusion processes be conceptualised, and what are the mechanisms and channels that lead
to the diffusion of regulatory reforms? At the methodological level, how can such diffusion
processes be analysed, both qualitatively and quantitatively? At the empirical level, what is
the evidence that regulatory reforms have been subject to diffusion?
The panel is not focused on specific policies, and welcome papers that address the diffusion
of regulatory reforms from a theoretical, methodological or empirical point of view.
Panel No. 3 Theorizing Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance
Regulation is a very relevant issue in today's society. To a large degree we organize our society by regulation and law enforcement. When ever there is a disaster, scandal or social problem society expects politicians and government to solve it, and the way of solving it involves
most of the time law and law enforcement. Regulatory and enforcement agencies are increasing throughout the world in numbers and visibility.
However, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of enforcement, as the behavior of
regulatees is influenced by many other factors than enforcement alone. Therefore, a central
question in social science is which enforcement strategies result in the desired behavior of
regulatees. Early theories on law enforcement described two styles, deterrence versus compliance. The newer theories, however, go beyond these two styles. The new theories introduce ideas of responsiveness, flexibility or smart regulation and enforcement. Furthermore,
these theories introduce roles for third parties, such as NGO's, industry organizations and
citizens, in the enforcement process. Self-regulation and co-regulation are in the centre of
scientific attention. In other words: Focus today is on new ways of creating compliance and
what part interaction and cooperation between regulator and regulatees plays in maximizing
compliance.
However, existing knowledge and views on law enforcement and compliance – especially these new ways of creating compliance – are fragmented. The scientific literature contains economic, legal and administrative perspectives. The aim of our panel is to integrate
these fragmented knowledge and views through papers that analyse and/or theorize on different aspects of these new ideas about law enforcement and compliance. Problems of implementation, organizational issues in regulatory agencies because of new ways of enforcement, the effect of different kinds of interaction between regulatee and regulator, cost and
benefits of mutual dependencies between the enforcement agencies themselves, politicians,
policy-makers and the regulatees are possible tropics for t his panel.
Panel No 4: Regulating Privacy
Technological innovations in telecommunications, data transmission and computers have
altered the availability of data fundamentally and made any sort of data in principle
available everywhere at anytime. Simultaneously, data storage capacity has grown
tremendously and stored data can be digitally processed and linked.
This situation creates challenges both in the private and public sectors. Companies want to
utilize the potential economies of these new technologies (such as RFID chips) and use data
on consumption patterns to improve their marketing efforts; public authorities want to build
huge databases of biometric data or use cameras in public space to improve safety and fight
crime. Yet at the same time these legitimate uses can endanger civil rights, threaten privacy
and create a surveillance society. The question who exerts control over such "flows of data",
who has access rights, and what purposes they can be used for, therefore has immense
political ramifications.
The panel will discuss both single country and comparative studies that deal with the
political processes surrounding the introduction and regulation of such technologies in
liberal democracies; the framing of public debates accompanying these processes; and the
institutional and historical conditions that influence their outcomes.
Panel 5: Regulatory Agencies: Institutional and Actors Centred Approaches, Chair Jacint
Jordana
The number of regulatory agencies created or reformed during the last decades has been
really impressive, both in the developed and the developing worlds, and this number is still
increasing across many different sectors. The popularity that this institutional form for
public governance has reached goes far beyond its Anglo-Saxon origins, and its diffusion by
now consolidates it as one of the more extended institutional innovations in the public sector
in the late 20th century. There is now an large number of regulatory agencies in the world,
and therefore we may analyze the variations existing in their characteristics among sectors
and nations, to discuss different hypothesis about their regulatory capabilities and overall
performance. This panel aims to revise different approaches to analysis the nature of regulatory agencies. Papers are expected to discuss interpretative perspectives and empirical findings about the institutional design of the regulatory agencies, their connections to other
institutions and actors, and also about the professional behavior and technical character of
regulatory agencies.
Panel 6: Liberalization, Regulation, Juridification, Chair: Frans van Waarden
Abstract to be provided
Panel 7: The Comparative Regulatory Politics of Life Sciences Arco Timmermans (Universty of Twente) & Uwe Serdült (University of Zürich)
This panel seeks to explore and analyze emerging modes of governance of the life sciences in
Europe and North America, and discuss both empirical patterns and normative implications.
The life sciences are a field in which utilitarian and technology-driven approaches and more
sceptical views and indeed a ‘new moralism’ reinvigorating traditional values are salient.
The multiple values that many issues in the life sciences involve implies a politics on both
substance and process. For example, since assisted reproductive technologies arrived on the
systemic agenda as ‘policy problems’ in the 1980s, the debate over public and private modes
of governing these technologies is going on, and the salience of this debate even has increased in recent years. Thus, for this field, the theme of Regulation in an Age of Governance
is extremely important. The life sciences have attracted the (in part government-solicited)
attention from social science and law to consider ethical, legal and social aspects, but political
scientists, often well at home in other policy fields, are only just beginning to discover the life
sciences. This contrasts with the salience of the choice among modes of governance and arrangements for regulation in this field, and our aim with this panel is to bring the two closer
together. We believe that life sciences such as assisted reproductive technologies are a very
useful focus for the diverse subdisciplines within political science, both for empirical analysis
and normative theory development.
Panel 8: From Monopoly to Market via Regulation: Comparative Perspectives on Public
Service Utilities Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen
In the not so distant past the provision of public utility services in Europe was a governmental responsibility. Service provision was entrusted public enterprises that enjoyed monopoly
power. The regulatory regime was weak as public ownership was thought to provide effective protection against monopoly power.
This has changed dramatically since the 1980’es. Privatisations have taken place, markets
been opened to competition, and entirely new regulatory regimes and administrations been
created. During the same period the EU has engaged itself in regulating the markets for e.g.
telecom, energy, and public transportation.
However, the way in which the European countries have implemented this reform agenda
varies. This raises intriguing and comparative questions as to the political basis for regulatory reform, the interaction between the international diffusion, supranational regulation and
national politics and also concerning the impact of different regulatory regimes.
Panel 9: Behind and Beyond the Border: Regulation in an International Context Alasdair
Young
The intensification of international economic exchange and the increasing legalisation of multilateral commitments present challenges to national regulatory autonomy and create opportunities for transnational regulatory capacity. The papers in this panel would engage with various aspects of these issues including the contours of international regulatory cooperation in
response to the increasing internationalisation of business activity; the impact of domestic
regulatory politics on leadership in multilateral environmental agreements; and the how and
why multilateral trade rules constrain domestic regulatory autonomy;
Panel 10: Regulatory Governance and the Representation of Diffuse Interests, Chair: Prof.
Dr. Jürgen Neyer
The integration of private actors into regulatory decision-making has become a phenomenon
of eminent importance. International regulatory authorities increasingly rely on private expertise for formulating rules that are binding on economic, social and political actors. An important reason for this process is the limited capacity of public authorities to master the technical knowledge that is necessary for ever more ambitious regulatory tasks. Although the integration of private actors promises to combine governmental and non-governmental problem-solving capacities, the literature also highlights a number of risks. One of these risks is
that forms of de facto private governance might emerge which are insensitive to asymmetries
in the representation of interests and which exclude, intentionally or not, legitimate but weakly organized (diffuse) interests. The papers in this panel respond to such concerns by addressing some or all of the following questions:
1. what kind of issues are delegated to private governance arenas? Is it merely regulatory
decision-making with pareto-optimal outcomes or do we observe decision-making
competences with redistributive or otherwise politically sensitive implications?
2. How relevant is the problem of asymmetrical interest representation in the view of
both relevant public authorities (i.e. those who delegate tasks or refer to the output of
forms of private governance) and non-governmental participants?
3. What procedural rules are established in different policy arenas for re-balancing the
representation of diffuse and non-diffuse interests? In which arenas do we observe
such rules at all?
4. Can we observe any significant difference in terms of output between private governance arenas which support the integration of diffuse interests, and those which do not?
Panel 11: "Internet Regulation: Challenges of Governance, Chair Christopher T. Marsden
This panel considers the challenges to international and comparative regulation of
information and communications technologies. It particularly considers the role of the
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), an innovative forum established by the
Secretary General to provide an expert forum comprised of government, corporate and civil
society members, the latter recognized through an electronic caucus that nominated the
individuals, and with full membership status. Such a radically inclusive process of
innovative international regulation should be connected to the wider political science
discourse on international regulation. This includes the questions of comparative national,
regional and plurilateral communications regulation, and their linkage to the international
context. The new features of governance through regulation, their new challenges for
civil society, and the existing varieties of the Internet and telecoms regulatory world will be
analyzed for their wider significance to the development of regulation. Insights from Politics
and Society, Law and Economics, and International Political Economy will be utilized."
Panel 12: The Rise of European Regualtory State(s)? Chair: David Levi-Faur
This panels will discuss Majone's thesis of the Rise of the European Regulatory State: its
sources and outcomes at both the EU and the national levels. Papers that deals with
economic as well as social aspects of the rise of the European Regulatory State are
welcomed. So are papers that compare the EU with other countries and papers that looks at
the social, political and economic aspects of the expansion of regulation in Europe amidst
neoliberalism.