Roosevelt, Kermit. “The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics.” The Middle East Journal 2.1 (1948): 1-16. ~observes that Americans were not very involved with the Middle East before World War II. If anything they were concerned for private reasons for the selfdetermination of the Arabs. Other Americans came out more directly since World War I for the support of the Zionists in Palestine. It was more humanitarian than political. Two reasons why the US’s position on the Middle East changed: -“its economic and strategic interests in the area assumed obvious and increased importance. A national Middle East policy became for the first time an imperative necessity” (2). -“American support of Zionism grew more and more official in character, committing not merely groups of American citizens but the government as well. . . . the cause supported came to be a political rather than a purely humanitarian one: this dual development climaxed in the aggressive support given by the United States Government and private citizens at the United Nations General Assembly to the proposed partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish political state” (2). Two processes: RECOGNITION of NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ME and SUPPORT OF POLITICAL ZIONISM are they at odds or complementary? 1922: Congress states US recognizes the need to establish in Palestine a home for the Jewish people “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected” (quoted from Esco Foundation for Palestine, 1947) (2). If differs from the Balfour Declaration: does not mention protection of Jews in other countries; also points out that the US “favors” such an event, but does not go as far as the British in stating that they will use “their best endeavors to facilitate” such an event. 1924: US/British conference on Palestine where the US says that it views Zionism as purely a private enterprise, nothing more. If Britain was powerful enough in the Middle East, the US really had nothing to be concerned with in the region. All that was asked of American Jews was financial support. British Jews provided more of the directive for the Middle East Zionist campaigns. 1939: British change their policy toward the idea of Zionism and Palestine. A growing need for Britain to consider how such support for Zionism would affect Arab interests and Palestinian Arabs. WHITE PAPER: placed a limit on Jewish immigration into Palestine and restricted how much land could be purchased by the Zionists already there. Roosevelt (author) suggests what Zionists really wanted was stronger British action and not US action: the US was helpful only if it was able to change the British policy. 1942: Zionist leaders visit the US for the American Zionists of NY. They approve of the BILTMORE PROGRAM > “recognition of a Jewish Commonwealth and a Jewish army, urged that responsibility for immigration into Palestine be removed from Britain and vested in the Jewish Agency, and denounced the White Paper of 1939” (4). This then becomes the transitional point between the Zionist interest in Britain’s support to that of America’s support for Zionist objectives. Concentrated efforts were made at the local and federal level to pass legislation that supported Palestine. Without much opposition (certainly no Arab opposition in the US), such policies were accepted and even Roosevelt was supportive of the Zionist causes as stated that the US would help add Jews in immigration and establishing a free state. This support for the Zionist cause was not accepted by the State departments, Navy and War offices which could foresee the requirements such policies might make upon their offices and their personnel. League of Nations had appointed Britain as the power responsible for administering Palestine AMEICAN INTERESTS in the MIDDLE EAST & World War II ~ME almost lost by the Allied forces to the “Axis armies of General Rommel.” ~British victory at Al-Alamein : in part due to “American decision to send military supplies to Egypt at a time when MacArthur and the Russians were pleading for all we could send them” (7). ~German documents show that the Gms had plans to capture the Persian Gulf; with winning the Middle East, the Gms hoped to have won the war entirely. “With plenty of oil, and its enemies effectively split, the futility of further resistance would be plain to all” (7). ~Equally problematic was the fact that Russia wanted to gain territory in the Middle East and tried in Greece, Turkey and in Iran. This is where Britain and US have tried to hold back Russia. However, Russia does offer its support to the partition of Palestine. Roosevelt cites these reasons for Russia’s support of partition: ~to strengthen the Soviet Union among Zionists everywhere ~to gain a military foothold in the Middle East on the assumptions that partition must be imposed by force and that force used for this purpose by UN must involve Russian participation ~most important; to ensure chaos and confusion in the Middle East by creating, against Arab opposition, a Jewish state surrounded by Arabs (8) US now interested in the Middle East’s oil deposits: which could provide “Europe with cheap power for the next century” (9) ~”America’s disinterestedness in the domestic political affairs of other peoples and its profession of democratic idealism, best expressed in the Middle East through the philanthropic work of private American organizations” (9). (Interesting commentary here in 1948) “Millions of Middle Easterners regard our official sponsorship of a Jewish state in Palestine as “un-American”; persistence in such a policy will undermine the moral prestige of the United States in this area for years to come” (9). New question: “Will the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine jeopardize the position of the United States in the Middle East?” (9) Roosevelt answers “YES” and states that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine “will disrupt the Arab world and ease the path of Soviet infiltration” (10). 1946 US now has the same concerns as Britain with the Middle East question -concern for the suffering of Jews in Europe -question whether Palestine, Brazil, Australia, and US could be homes for the refugees -were the Arabs having to pay the price for Europe’s sins??? Truman suggests that 100,000 Jews be allowed to settle in Palestine Growing local pressure by Zionists in New York starts to impact local elections. Truman is pressured to come forward with a pro-Zionist statement to support local democrats Fall 1947 in the General Assembly of the United Nations: final act of partition of Palestine 2 assumptions for the US delegates’ support: -Arab opposition would be negligible -the proposed Jewish state could be made a “going concern” UN vote: 24 states support partition; 16 opposed and rest were undecided Haiti , Liberia, the Philippines, China, Ethiopia, and Greece were targeted to get a change in vote. All changed to partition or abstained except for Greece January 1948: (date of article) NOW WHAT? Partition has been approved, but no method of enforcing it This will then become a threat to peace in the region, falling to the UN Security council “The future of the Palestine itself looks blacker than ever before, and meanwhile important American economic and political interests in the Middle East have been placed in jeopardy” (15). Roosevelt ends with a lesson learned: “The process by which Zionist Jews have been able to promote American support for the partition of Palestine demonstrates the vital need of a foreign policy based on national rather than partisan interests” (15-16). Sees that every American needs to realize that there will be a growing conflict between national interests and those of a proposed Jewish state in Palestine.