The Nile River: Challenges to sustainable development
By: Nabil El-Khodari, CEO, Nile Basin Society, Canada
Presentation to the River Symposium 2003
Introduction:
The Nile River Basin:
Fig. (1): Nile Map
Geography: The Nile is the longest river in the world extending for 6695km (4184
miles). The Nile basin, 3 million km2, covers about 10% of the area of Africa, and 2.3%
of the world’s land surface area. The Nile has 2 main sources: The Blue Nile; originating
from Lake Tana, Ethiopia and the White Nile; originating from Lake Victoria, Uganda.
Fig. (2): Nile River course, lakes and dams (Source: FAO)
Hydrology:
The trunk stream of the Nile is formed at Khartoum, Sudan, 1,857 mi (2,988 km) from
the sea, by the junction of the Blue Nile (c.1,000 mi/1,610 km long) and the White Nile
(c.2,300 mi/3,700 km long). The Blue Nile rises in the headwaters of Lake Tana, NW
Ethiopia, a region of heavy summer rains, and is the source of floodwaters that reach
Egypt in September; the Blue Nile contributes more than half of all Nile waters
throughout the year. During floodtime it also carries great quantities of silt from the
highlands of Ethiopia; these now collect in Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High Dam,
but for centuries they were left on the floodplain after the floods and helped replenish the
fertility of Egypt's soils. The White Nile (known in various sections as the Bahr-el-Abiad,
Bahr-el-Jebel, Albert Nile, and Victoria Nile) rises in the headwaters of Lake Victoria in
a region of heavy, year-round rainfall; unlike the Blue Nile, it has a constant flow, owing
in part to its source area and in part to the regulating effects of its passage through lakes
Victoria and Albert and the Sudd swamps. Other important tributaries of the Nile are the
Atbara and Sobat rivers. The Gezira, or "island," formed between the Blue Nile and the
White Nile as they come together at Khartoum is Sudan's principal agricultural area and
the only large tract of land outside Egypt irrigated with Nile waters.
From Khartoum to the Egyptian border at Wadi Halfa (now submerged) and on to Aswan
in Egypt, the Nile occupies a narrow entrenched valley with little floodplain for
cultivation; in this stretch it is interrupted by six cataracts (rapids). From Aswan the river
flows north 550 mi (885 km) to Cairo, bordered by a floodplain that gradually widens to
c.12 mi (20 km); irrigated by the river, this intensively cultivated valley contrasts with the
barren desert on either side. North of Cairo is the great Nile delta (c.100 mi/160 km long
and up to 115 mi/185 km wide), which contains 60% of Egypt's cultivated land and
extensive areas of swamps and shallow lakes. Two distributaries, the Dumyat (Damietta)
on the east and the Rashid (Rosetta) on the west, each c.150 mi (240 km) long, carry the
river's remaining water (after irrigation) to the Mediterranean Sea. Regular steamship
service is maintained on the Nile between Alexandria (reached by canal) and Aswan; the
Blue Nile is navigable June through December from Suki (above Sennar Dam) to
Roseires Dam; the White Nile is navigable all year between Khartoum and Juba in Sudan
and between Nimule and Kabalega (formerly Murchison) Falls on the Victoria Nile.
Flow:
As expected, the Nile flows from higher grounds to lower grounds (Fig. 3). The Blue
Nile is by far the largest tributary in terms of water flow. Its share of the water that
reaches Aswan in Egypt is 64%. The other two main branches that originate from
Ethiopian Highlands, Atbara and Sobat, bring 21% of the water, whereas the contribution
of the longest arm, the White Nile (upstream of Malakal, the Sudan), is only 15% (Fig.
4).
Nevertheless, it is important to caution that there are changes to the current understanding
of the actual contributions of the White Nile. Even in that small percentage, it is
important to note that it is a steady stream all year, hence its crucial importance.
Fig. (3): Altitudes of different parts of the Nile.
Fig. (4): Monthly flow of the Nile.
The Nile brings practically no water to the Mediterranean. At present, only 0.4 km3
are released annually to the sea. The rest of its waters are being evaporated either from
natural ecosystems or, increasingly, from irrigated areas. Therefore, water use can be
increased only through improved efficiency and cutting evaporation losses (Asheesh,
2002).
Political (hydro-politics):
Ten countries share the Nile Basin. These are Burundi, DR Congo (Zaire), Egypt, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Conflict (both inter- and intrastate) characterizes the Nile Basin.
Egypt, the lowest riparian country uncharacteristically controls the Nile. This was
achieved mainly through the influence of England during the colonial period.
Historical background:1
In the early 1900's, a relative shortage of cotton on the world market put pressure on
Egypt and the Sudan, then under a British-Egyptian condominium, to turn to this summer
crop, requiring perennial irrigation over the traditional flood-fed methods. The need for
summer water and flood control drove an intensive period of water development along
the Nile, with proponents of Egyptian and Sudanese interests occasionally clashing
within the British foreign office over whether the emphasis for development ought to be
further up-stream or down.
With the end of World War I, it became clear that any regional development plans for the
Nile Basin would have to be preceded by some sort of formal agreement on water
allocations. In 1920, the Nile Projects Commission was formed, with representatives
from India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Commission estimated that,
of the river's average flow of 84 BCM/yr., Egyptian needs were estimated at 58 BCM/yr.
Sudan, it was thought, would be able to meet irrigation needs from the Blue Nile alone.
The Nile flow fluctuates greatly, with a standard deviation of about 25%. In recognition
of this fact, an appendix was added which suggested that any gain or short-fall from the
average be divided evenly between Egypt and Sudan. The Commission's findings were
not acted upon.
The same year saw publication of the most extensive scheme for comprehensive water
development along the Nile, now known as the Century Storage Scheme. The plan, put
forth by the British, included:
o
o
o
a storage facility on the Uganda-Sudan border
a dam at Sennar to irrigate the Gezira region south of Khartoum, and,
a dam on the White Nile to hold summer flood water for Egypt.
The plan worried some Egyptians, and was criticized by nationalists, because all the
major control structures would have been beyond Egyptian territory and authority. Some
Egyptians saw the plan as a British means of controlling Egypt in the event of Egyptian
independence.
1
See The Nile Water Agreement:
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/casestudies/nile_agreement.html
The most important treaties2 that still control the Nile are:
The 1902 treaty (between Great Britain and Ethiopia):
The aim of this treaty was to establish the border between Ethiopia and the Sudan. One of
its articles, number III, related to the use of Nile water. The English version, as reviewed
by Britain and later by the Sudan, read: "His Majesty the Emperor Menilik II, King of
Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not
to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Bile, Lake Tana, or the
Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement with His Britannic
Majesty’s Government and the Government of Sudan" (Okidi, 1994:324; Tilahun,
1979).3
Great Britain receives all of the waters of the Blue Nile, unless they agree with Ethiopia
on a given project. Ethiopia agreed not to interfere with the flow of the Blue Nile (or lake
Tsana) "except in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's government and the
government of the Sudan..."4
The 1929 treaty:5
In 1925, a new water commission made recommendations based on the 1920 estimates
which would lead finally to the Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan on 7
May 1929. Four BCM/yr. was allocated to Sudan but the entire timely flow (from
January 20 to July 15) and a total annual amount of 48 BCM/yr. was reserved for Egypt.
Egypt, as the downstream state, had its interests guaranteed by:
o
o
o
Having a claim to the entire timely flow. This meant that any cotton cultivated in
Sudan would have to be grown during the winter months.
Having rights to on-site inspectors at the Sennar dam, outside of Egyptian
territory.
Being guaranteed that no works would be developed along the river or on any of
its territory, which would threaten Egyptian interests.6
Egypt accepted the findings of the1925 Nile commission restricting the amount of water
impounded by Sudan exc. during the flood period. Egypt and Sudan would agree before
any new construction took place to increase local water supply.7
2
See http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Africa.htm#Nile%20River
See The Defects and Effects of Past Treaties and Agreements on the Nile River Waters: Whose
Faults Were they? By Kefyalew Mekonnen (Engineer)
http://www.ethiopians.com/abay/engin.html#1902
3
4
Exchnge of Notes between Great Britain and Ethiopia Mar 18 1902 12:00AM
http://mgd.nacse.org/cgi-bin/qml2.0/watertreaty/intl_treaties.qml?qml_screen=full&TN=8
5
See Appendix of "Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Lessons Learned", a thematic paper of
the International Conference on Freshwater, Bonn, Germany, December 3-7, 2001
http://www.water-2001.de/co_doc/transboundary_waters.pdf
6
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/casestudies/nile_agreement.html
The 1959 agreement8:
Fig (5): The Aswan High Dam9
History:
The Aswan High Dam, with a projected storage capacity of 156 BCM/yr., was proposed
in 1952 by the new Egyptian government, but debate over whether it was to be built as a
unilateral Egyptian project or as a cooperative project with Sudan kept Sudan out of
negotiations until 1954. The negotiations which ensued, and carried out with Sudan's
struggle for independence as a back-drop, focused not only on what each country's
legitimate allocation would be, but whether the dam was even the most efficient method
of harnessing the waters of the Nile.
The first round of negotiations between Egypt and Sudan took place between September
and December 1954, even as Sudan was preparing for its independence, scheduled for
1956. The positions of the two sides can be summarized as follows:
Egyptian Position




Existing needs should take priority. These were described as being 51 BCM for
Egypt and four BCM for Sudan, out of an average flow of 80 BCM as measured
at Aswan.
Any remainder from development projects should be divided as a percentage of
each country's population after subtracting 10 BCM for evaporation losses. The
respective population and growth rates led to an Egyptian formula for 22/30 of the
remainder, or 11 BCM for Egypt, and 8/30, or four BCM for Sudan.
There should be one large storage facility, a high dam at Aswan.
Total allocations would therefore be 62 BCM for Egypt and 8 BCM for Sudan.
7
http://mgd.nacse.org/cgi-bin/qml2.0/watertreaty/intl_treaties.qml?qml_screen=full&TN=23
United Arab Republic and Sudan Agreement (With Annexes) For The Full Utilization of the Nile Waters,
Signed at Cairo, on 8 November 1959; in force 12 December 1959, Registered by the United Arab
Republic on 7 February 1963, 6519 U.N.T.S. 63
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/RegionalDocs/UAR_Sudan.htm
9
Picture courtesy of PBS, © 2000 WGBH Source:
8
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/buildingbig/wonder/structure/aswam1_dam.html
Sudanese Position




Sudan insisted on using the standard value of 84 BCM for average Nile
discharge, and insisted that Egypt's acquired rights were for 48 BCM, not 51
BCM that Egypt claimed.
Sudan also suggested that their population was actually 50% larger than Egypt
had estimated, and that resulting population-based allocations should be
adjusted accordingly, giving Sudan at least one third of any additional water.
Storage facilities should be smaller and upstream, as envisioned in the
Century Storage Scheme. Consequently, if Egypt insisted on one large project,
with comparatively high evaporation losses, these losses should be deducted
from Egypt's share.
Total allocations, therefore, should be approximately 59 BCM (69 BCM less
evaporation) for Egypt and 15 BCM for Sudan.
Negotiations were broken off inconclusively, then briefly, and equally inconclusively,
resumed in April 1955. Relations then threatened to degrade into military confrontation
in 1958 when Egypt sent an unsuccessful expedition into territory in dispute between the
two countries. In the summer of 1959, Sudan unilaterally raised the Sennar dam,
effectively repudiating the 1929 agreement.
Sudan attained independence on 1 January 1956, but it was with the military regime
which gained power in 1958 that Egypt adopted a more conciliatory tone in the
negotiations which resumed in early 1959. Progress was speeded in part by the fact that
any funding which would be forthcoming for the High Dam would depend on a riparian
agreement. On 8 November 1959, the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile
Waters (Nile Waters Treaty) was signed.
Provisions:
The Nile Waters Treaty had the following provisions:




The average flow of the river is considered to be 84 BCM/yr. Evaporation and
seepage were considered to be 10 BCM/yr., leaving 74 BCM/yr. to be divided.
Of this total, acquired rights have precedence, and are described as being 48
BCM for Egypt and 4 BCM for Sudan. The remaining benefits of
approximately 22 BCM are divided by a ratio of 7 1/2 for Egypt (approx. 7.5
BCM/yr.) and 14 1/2 for Sudan (approx. 14.5 BCM/yr.). These allocations
total 55.5 BCM/yr. for Egypt and 18.5 BCM/yr. for Sudan.
If the average yield increases from these average figures, the increase would
be divided equally. Significant decreases would be taken up by a technical
committee, described below.
Since Sudan could not absorb that much water at the time, the treaty also
provided for a Sudanese water "loan" to Egypt of up to 1,500 MCM/yr.
through 1977.



Funding for any project which increases Nile flow (after the High Dam)
would be provided evenly, and the resulting additional water would be split
evenly.
A Permanent Joint Technical Committee to resolve disputes and jointly
review claims by any other riparian would be established. The Committee
would also determine allocations in the event of exceptional low flows.
Egypt agreed to pay Sudan £E 15 million in compensation for flooding and
relocations.
Egypt and Sudan agreed that the combined needs of other riparian countries would not
exceed 1,000-2,000 MCM/yr., and that any claims would be met with one unified
Egyptian-Sudanese position. The allocations of the Treaty have been held to until the
present.
Ethiopia, which had not been a major player in Nile hydro-politics, served notice in 1957
that it would pursue unilateral development of the Nile water resources within its
territory, estimated at 75-85% of the annual flow, and suggestions were made recently
that Ethiopia may eventually claim up to 40,000 MCM/yr. for its irrigation needs both
within and outside of the Nile watershed. No other state riparian to the Nile has ever
exercised a legal claim to the waters allocated in the 1959 treaty.
As an economic and military power Egypt is superior to the other region’s nations. It
objects projects, which attempt to reduce the runoff in Aswan. Among the countries of
the region the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have suffered from serious
internal crises. Tanzania on the brink of famine, and Kenya in a continually volatile state,
are also politically unstable. Egypt has had a more stable recent history, which, however,
has not been fully free of conflicts and violence. In conclusion political instability and the
uncertainties it brings along are noticeable in the region.10
The Sudan - Ethiopia agreement (1991):11
The agreement that Ethiopia and the Sudan signed in 1991 is committing the two
countries to the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of the Blue Nile and
Atbara rivers. The two states established a technical joint committee to exchange data and
to explore co-operation (Dellapenna 1997: 132-3). By so doing the Sudan has already
moved away from the ‘united front’ which binds it with Egypt where the two countries in
the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement committed themselves to act as a 'united front' with
regard to the upstream demands for waters. The alliance between the two countries was a
serious one to the extent that it has led to the adoption of policies for economic and
10 The Nile Basin in a Global Perspective: Natural, Human, and Socioeconomic Resource Nexus.
http://butler.cc.tut.fi/~asheesh/nile.htm
11 Mahmoud El Zain (2003): Development Priorities for the Nile Basin Countries: What Difference could
the Nile Basin Initiative Make? Paper presented at the 3rd World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan, March 17,
2003.
political integration (Dellapenna 1997: 132, also see Collin 1990). Along with Ruchdi
Saeed, Abdelmalik Owda (1999: 64) sees that the Sudan has the idea of building an
alliance with Ethiopia for mutually benefiting from water; and that this alliance should
widen to include the states of East Africa. The foreign comments on the agreement
between the Sudan and Ethiopia, according to him, indicate that had these agreements
been implemented they would have threatened what has been reached in the 1959
agreement (Owda 1999: 58).
Given the fact that the Sudan has maintained this ‘united front’ with Egypt for three
decades without interruption, despite periods of serious conflict between the two
countries, the recent move could be considered the first significant diversion from the
norms that govern the relationship between the two countries over the Nile waters. The
conditions that gave rise to this move are harsh enough to jeopardise the historical
alliance with Egypt. We believe that the major development that has led to this move is
the severity of drought and desertification and their repercussions in the Sudan in the
1980s and 1990s.
The seriousness of the agreement between the Sudan and Ethiopia in changing the old
formula is seen in its strengthening Ethiopia's position in its contest with Egypt. Shapland
(1997: 82) sees that the agreement that Ethiopia signed with the Sudan appears to
concede more to Ethiopia’s position, which appeals to equitable entitlement, as the
guiding principle in international law of shared rivers. As for Egypt, the Sudan started to,
partly, be similar to Ethiopia (the historical source of threat to the Nile flow) in Egypt’s
image and reaction and a tense atmosphere had taken place (see Bleier 1997: 116).
Framework for General Cooperation, July, 1993 (Egypt & Ethiopia):12
But soon after that another move by Ethiopia and Egypt has cooled down this tension
when the two countries have signed a ‘Framework for General Cooperation’ in July 1993
which included reference to the Nile. The two sides specified that neither of them would
do anything with the Nile that causes ‘appreciable harm’ to the other. The two countries
went further to agreeing to consult and co-operate in projects of mutual advantages such
as projects that would enhance the volume of flow and decrease the loss of water through
a comprehensive and integrated development schemes (Shapland 1997: 81).
According to Shapland (1997: 81) the agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia
“safeguards Egypt’s supply of the Nile from Ethiopia by giving prominence to the
principle of the avoidance of appreciable harm: the Egyptians would almost certainly
argue that any reduction of flow in the Blue Nile caused by works in Ethiopia would
constitute such harm. The concomitant gain for Ethiopia is Egyptian cooperation in
developing the Blue Nile Basin for Ethiopia’s benefit as well as for Egypt’s.”
12
Mahmoud El Zain (2003): Development Priorities for the Nile Basin Countries: What Difference could
the Nile Basin Initiative Make? Paper presented at the 3rd World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan, March 17,
2003.
It is evident from Table 1 that the Nile Basin countries depend on the Nile waters in
varying degrees, depending on the availability of other water resources as rain and
underground water. Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea are the most dependent countries on the
Nile with a dependency ratio of 97, 77 and 56% respectively.
Table (1): Water resources in Nile Basin countries and their dependency on the Nile
(FAO: Aquastat).
WATER RESOURCES
Country
Burundi
DR Congo
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Rwanda
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Average
precipitation
1961-1990
IPCC
(mm/year)
(note 6)
1 218
1 543
51
384
848
693
1 212
417
1 071
1 180
Average
precipitation
61-90
(km3/year)
IPCC (note
6)
33.9
3 618.1
51.4
45.1
936.0
401.9
31.9
1 043.7
1 012.2
284.5
Total renewable
water resources
(actual)
AQUASTAT
(cubic km/year)
(note 1)
Total renewable
water
resources
(actual)
AQUASTAT
(cubic m/capita
per year)
Dependency
ratio
AQUASTAT
(%)
3.6
1 283.0
58.3
6.3
110.0
30.2
5.2
64.5
91.0
66.0
566
25 183
859
1 722
1 749
985
683
2 074
2 591
2 833
0
30
97
56
0
33
0
77
10
41
Socio-Economic:
Population pressure:
Table (2): NB population according to AQUASTAT (FAO)
POPULATION
Country
Burundi
DR Congo
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Rwanda
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Total
Total population
in 2000
FAOSTAT
(inh)
Rural population
in 2000
FAOSTAT
(inh)
Rural
Population %
6 356 000
50 948 000
67 884 000
3 659 000
62 908 000
30 669 000
7 609 000
31 095 000
35 119 000
23 300 000
319 547 000
5 787 000
35 521 000
37 195 000
2 973 000
51 805 000
20 517 000
7 141 000
19 863 000
23 571 000
20 002 000
224 375 000
91.05
69.72
54.79
81.25
82.35
66.90
93.85
63.88
67.12
85.85
70.22
The population of the Nile Basin was 319.5 million in 2000 (Table 2) and 323 million in
2001 (Table 4). It is estimated that the current total population of the Nile Basin is about
350 million. It is expected to reach 548 million by the year 2030 (Table 3).
Population Trends:13
In the 1990s, the Nile Basin (NB) witnessed one of the highest population increments
among world's regions. Among the top 20 countries in the world in terms of population
increments in 1991, 6 were Nile riparian countries. The world's record in fertility rate was
preserved for Kenya - a Nile riparian with an average of 7.9 births per woman increased
its population five-folds between 1948 and 1990. NB population will reach 607 million
by 2025 - more than double its 1992 population of 259 million. Yet, the problem dwells
not only in population increase but also a population concentration. The latter takes place
predominantly along the banks of the Nile and its tributaries (the riverain zone),
overwhelming this river's scarce water and wasting the water of the population-sending
regions (Hamid, 2003).
Research findings (Hamid, 2003) show that in arid and environmentally degraded parts of
the NB large groups of population are moving from the non-riverain zones (NRZ) into
the riverain zone (RZ)/inside the Nile Basin. In the arid northern Sudan the population in
the irrigable areas in RZ of central Sudan increased from 38.1% of Sudan's total
population in 1983 to 43.7% in 2000, and in Ethiopia population inside the NB increased
from 37.6% in 1984 to 44.0% in 1994. If these increases maintain the shared rivers'
basins between these two countries will host 97 million in 2025 - more than Egypt's
population for that year. Urbanization in the above parts of Sudan and Ethiopia is faster
than in anywhere else in the two countries. Parts of the NRZ, once highly populated, are
witnessing relative depopulation (Hamid, 2003).
The population of Egypt exhibits trends shared by many other countries in the Third
World. The high rate of population growth, although it is by no means one of the highest
in the Third World (compared, for instance, to Nigeria) is nevertheless quite high. The
problem of a high rate of growth of the population is compounded in Egypt by
geographical factors rendering 95% of the land inhospitable and by a high rate of
urbanization (Fig. 6 & 7). Both factors have contributed to a dramatic increase in
population density over the last fifty years. Moreover, despite a slight rise in the total
cropped area from 10.79 million feddans in 1960 to 12.16 million in 1985, the rising
population in rural areas has led to a decrease in the cropped area per agricultural worker
from 3.33 feddans in 1960 to 2.8 in 1985. The harvested area per caput of the whole
population is around 0.25 feddans (Dethier 1989, p. 4-5).14
13
Unless otherwise indicated, the source is Mahmoud Elzain Hamid (2003): Population concentration
Presented at the 3rd World Water Forum, March 17, 2003, Kyoto, Japan.
14
Source: FAO http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/swlwpnr/reports/y_nf/egypt/e_etnor.htm
Table (3): An overview of critical information on the Nile Basin countries
(Source: Nile Basin Discourse [NBD])15
Country
Average
Annual Estimated Population
Population
GNP/Capita
Pop.
in the Basin
Growth
millions
%
% of total
country
Labor Force in
Agriculture
millions
US$
WDI
rank
1998
1998
1998
1970
1990
1998 2030 1980-98
Contribution
of
Agriculture
to GDP
% of total
%
Burundi
7
12
2.6
52*
3
140
5
94
92
54
DRC
48
114
3.2
5**
2
110
2
75
68
12
Egypt
61
92
2.3
95*
58
1290
86
52
40
17
Eritrea
4
7
2.7
15**
1
200
9
86
80
9
Ethiopia
61
114
2.7
39*
24
100
1
91
86
50
Kenya
29
47
3.1
40*
12
350
34
86
80
26
Rwanda
8
15
2.5
80**
6
230
15
94
92
47
Sudan
28
50
2.3
85*
24
290
24
77
69
39
Tanzania
32
56
3.0
20**
6
220
13
90
84
46
Uganda
21
41
2.7
100*
21
310
27
90
85
45
Total
300
548
158
Sources:
World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2000.
* Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Project (D-3): Consolidated Report. Unpublished Report June 1999. Population estimates are based
on Country Reports
**Berry, Len, T. Andersen & F. Pettersson: Nile Nile Basin, Human Dimensions: A Preliminary Analysis. Unpublished report prepared for the
World Bank, 1999. Source for population estimates is not specified.
N.B. Warning, as the information was not published, relies on country reports and source of population estimates are
not specified, the data in this table should be critically analyzed based on other published resources (the author). For
example, the authors used the GNP/capita rather than the Purchase Power Parity (PPP) adopted by the UN which shows
a totally different picture (see Table 4). However, part of the table was also used on the NBI NELSAP website
http://www.nilebasin.org/nelsap/intro.htm.
ETHIOPIA


15
More than eighty percent of the Ethiopian population lives in highland areas.
(Strategies for Sustainable Agricultural Development in the East African
Highlands, 1999, IFPRI).
The highlands cover approximately one-third of Ethiopia's land area. (Strategies
for Sustainable Agricultural Development in the East African Highlands, 1999,
IFPRI).
http://www.nilediscourse.org/nile_basin_intro.htm








Approximately eighty-five percent of the Ethiopian population lives in rural areas.
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001)
At least eight out of every ten workers in Ethiopia are involved in agricultural
activities. (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001)
Agriculture contributes about half of Ethiopia's total goods and services. (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United nations, 2001)
Half of Ethiopia's children under the age of five are malnourished. (UNICEF,
2000)
Only one-fifth of the Ethiopian population that lives in rural areas has reasonable
access to an adequate amount of safe drinking water. (Earth Trends, 2001, WRI)
It is estimated that the Ethiopian population will rise in the next twenty years from
sixty-three million to one hundred million. (Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, 2001)
Every year there is a net decline in the amount of Ethiopia's forests. Ethiopia now
has less than one-fifth of its original amount of forest cover. (Earth Trends, 2001,
WRI)
For every one thousand people in Ethiopia, it is estimated that there are one
hundred and eighty hectares of land being used for crops. This is significantly less
than the average for sub-Saharan Africa, which is two hundred and eighty-eight
hectares. (Earth Trends, 2001, WRI)
The main causes behind population concentration are the severe environmental problems:
in the northern part of the NB the desert enhanced by recurrent droughts is advancing 10
kilometers annually. Soil erosion in Ethiopia is 137 times the world's average.
Subsistence economies either collapsed or on the verge of total collapse and millions of
people are now facing famines in Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan, in particular.
Given the incredible persisting causes of population concentration, namely unequal
development and its consequences of droughts and civil wars, population concentration
will be the major problems facing the Nile Basin countries. The new challenges are,
therefore (1) meeting the increasing demand of this concentrating population from the
Nile River water, and/or (2) alternatively, equitably developing the population-sending
regions in order to maintain balanced population distribution and optimize the use of the
non-river waters (Hamid, 2003).
Economic activities in the Nile Basin:
Agriculture is the most common economic activity in the region, involving more than
70% of the population (Table 2). The dependency on agriculture by this large sector of
the population in spite of its limited share in the GDP may be the most important single
factor in poverty prevalent in the Nile Basin. It leads to fragmentation of land ownership,
subsistence farming and in some case (as in Egypt) to actively degrading the land by
selling of the fertile top soil for brick manufacturing with the aim in some cases to mark
the land for the more prosperous sale as urban development land.
Table (4): Size of the Economy of Nile Basin countries
(Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003)
Populat.
Burundi
DRC
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Rwanda
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Surface
Area
Millions
1,000
Square
km
2001
2001
7
52
65
4
66
31
9
32
34
23
28
2,345
1,001
118
1,104
580
26
2,506
945
241
Populat.
Density
People
per
Square
km
2001
270
23
65
42
66
54
352
13
39
116
Gross National
Income
Gross National
Income per
capita
$
Billion
Rank
$
2001
0.7
4.2
99.6
0.7
6.7
10.7
1.9
10.7
9.4
5.9
2001
178
122
37
179
103
84
149
83
88
107
2001
100
80
1,530
160
100
350
220
340
270
260
Rank
2001
206
208
116
199
206
174
192
175
184
187
PPP Gross National Income
$
Billion
2001
5
33
232
4
53
30
11
56
18
33
Per
Capita
$
2001
680
630
3,560
1,030
800
970
1,240
1,750
520
1,460
Gross Domestic
Product
Rank
%
growth
Per
capita
%
Growth
2001
203
205
131
189
198
190
183
169
207
177
2000-1
3.2
-4.5
2.9
9.7
7.7
1.1
6.7
6.9
5.7
4.6
2000-1
1.3
-7.1
1.0
6.9
5.2
-1.0
4.5
4.9
3.4
2.0
Figures 6 & 7 provide satellite evidence of the consequences of urban pressures on the
Nile Delta, mainly the expansion of urban centers at the expense of the most fertile lands
and pushing of agricultural activities to more marginal desert land. These images show
the dramatic urban growth within the Nile River delta and the expansion of agriculture
into adjoining desert areas.


16
Cairo, shown as the large blue-gray expanse in the southeast, increased in
population from 1.5 million to 6 million between 1947 and 1986. It now has a
population density of more than 26,000 people per square kilometer, or more than
11 million people. Urban expansion is also noticeable in the other parts of the
delta, as indicated by the increase in the blue-gray areas in the 1987 image.
The area of vegetation just outside the delta in the upper-left area of each zoomout image is new agricultural development, with some of the crops irrigated
through center-pivot irrigation.16
Source: USGS: Earthshots: Satellite images of environmental change.
http://edcwww.cr.usgs.gov/earthshots/slow/Nile/Nile
Fig. (6): Nile Delta, Egypt (1973): For comparison with next satellite picture.
Fig. (7): Nile Delta, Egypt (1987): Notice the expansion of irrigation into the desert (Left
upper corner) and the increase of urban areas (blue) at the expense of the fertile Delta.
(Source: USGS: Earthshots: Satellite images of environmental change.
http://edcwww.cr.usgs.gov/earthshots/slow/Nile/Nile)
The Nile Basin Initiative:
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is a process established by the governments of the ten
Nile River riparian countries. These are countries which share the Nile River and its
tributaries. The NBI has a Secretariat which is based in Entebbe, Uganda. 17
Shared Vision:
To achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the
equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin
water resources.18
Programs:
Fig (8): Proposed design of implementation of the SVP and the SAP
There are two main programs which are under the auspices of the NBI;
1. The Shared Vision Program (SVP) which is a basin-wide set of projects which
all the riparian countries are involved in; and,
2. The Subsidiary Action Programs (SAP) which involve specific groups of
riparian countries at sub-basin level. There are two SAP programs:
a. Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP)
b. Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP).
17
18
History of the NBI is available on its website http://www.nilebasin.org/From%20_hdromet_to_NBI.htm
During a recent change of the NBI website, the vision statement disappeared from its main page.
The challenges facing the NBI:
The challenges/problems facing the NBI may be were first formally identified during
the “7th Nile 2002 Conference” (TECCONILE, 1999) that included a series of
workshops on the visions for the Nile Basin development in the 21st Century. These
workshops were a part of the World Water Council’s Vision for the 21st Century process,
and produced the vision document for the Nile River Basin (World Water Forum, 2000).
A long list of over 100 crucial aspects to water resources development was produced.
Some of the most important identified constraints are the following:
 political instability,
 mistrust and other shortcomings to mutual co-operation among the riparian
countries,
 lack of transparency in dealing with issues of common interest,
 lack of technical, financial, and economic capacity,
 lack of long-term visions and long-term planning,
 inappropriate legal and institutional framework for water management, and
 various disparities within the region.
Though the NBI projects aimed to address these issues, e.g. lack of technical and
financial capacity, if it succeeded at all it is only in the realm of the closed doors of the
NBI. For the general public, the problems are still the same. Furthermore, the NBI
process itself created some new problems may be not foreseen by the planners, e.g.
public participation.
Conceptual challenges:
The idea that economic development alone would lead to poverty eradication and/or
conflict prevention is basically flawed. Poverty and environmental degradation can be
traced back to faulty government policies, e.g. land tenure in Ethiopia or desert
reclamation in Egypt. Unless the Nile Basin governments are willing to revise their
policies and adopt new ones conductive of sustainable development, then short-term
economic development gains, would lead to either increased discrepancy between the
rich and the poor with subsequent political instability and/or long-term environmental
disasters.
Concentrating on one pillar of sustainable development, i.e. economical and ignoring
social and/or environmental development is the wrong path.
Involvement of water technocrats in the process, even up to the ministerial level, does not
necessarily mean ‘political will’ nor does it ensure that the social and environmental
factors, not to mention poverty eradication or Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
will be met19. It can be argued that this is not the mandate of the NBI, but that it rather
serves as a ‘water authority’. The problem with that is the fact that the public cannot be
19
For example, according to a FAO expert, the budget for the shared Mara, Malab and Kagera tributaries to
Lake Victoria, was supposedly oriented to poverty alleviation, with a provision of only 15% for physical
interventions, however the funds were all spent on water testing labs and rainfall gauges!.
involved in the process. The issue of ‘equitable utilization’ means that there are political
compromises that have to be reached that would eventually affect the average individual
and/or long propagated expectations (e.g. less water for Egypt affecting mostly farmers
and/or not gaining full control by the upper riparian countries).
Secondly; the NBI process has not progressed to involve the top political powers,
whether Prime Ministers or Presidents, is a problem. These are the real decision-makers.
Even if that happens, what guarantees that a change in leadership, whether through
democratic means, e.g. Kenya, or non-democratic means, e.g. DR Congo, would not
result in a total change in policies? The only guarantee is to involve the public in a vision
that no political change can dare reverse. This is the real challenge and/or test. I do not
believe that the NBI has such a vision that is capable of involving people, or in other
words ‘sell’ the NBI to the public.
Public participation came as an after-thought, mainly to satisfy the need of funding
agencies only when the first ICCON meeting was planned. Even then, no attempt has
been spared to make such participation what really it is, just ‘window dressing’ or ‘make
belief’. The fact that the SAP projects are full underway without any real participation in
the decision-making is the main (but not the only) proof. For more details about the socalled ‘public participation process in the NBI’, please refer to the paper “NBI: Business
as Usual? The Nile Basin Discourse (NBD)”20 that was presented by the author at the 3rd
World Water Forum.
The NBI process is facing the consequences of such a major conceptual mistake both in
the form a highly incriminating IMF Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) report
regarding the Bujagali Hydroelectric Dam in Uganda21, and the crumpling of the project
itself recently (August, 2003) by the withdrawal of the US-based AES Corporation.22
20
http://nilebasin.com/wwf/doc/NBD.doc
21
In particular points 5 & 7 in the “outstanding issues” at the end of the report.


“A comprehensive study of the cumulative impact of a cascade of dams along the Nile remains a
problem, because those impacts have only been partially addressed in the EIA for the hydropower
facility and technical appendices. In addition, the use of the LAC approach in the Strategic Impact
Assessment remains a problem because of its methodology.”
“The lack of a comprehensive management plan for the Nile raises long-term management issues
for the river, people and environment.”
See the full text of the report “Assessment Report (September 2001): Complaint filed to the CAO
regarding the Uganda Bujagali Hydropower Project” http://nilebasin.com/wwf/doc/annex.htm and the
paper “The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI): Business as usual?” by the author of which the CAO’s report is an
annex. http://nilebasin.com/wwf/doc/madrid.htm
22
See AllAfrica news (16 August 2003): Uganda seeks new investor for the Bujagali project.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200308180192.html Also see the other posts regarding the project at
http://www.nilebasin.com/discus/messages/514/3023.html?1061333177
Another major conceptual problem is that Nile development is that it does not
integrate with the Millennium Development Goals except partially. A more holistic
vision is required that integrates that MDGs in the Nile Basin Initiative or the Nile
Basin countries, concentrating on and diverting resources to the water issues
alone will fail to meet these goals, particularly in education and health. The latest
statistics show the decline in primary education enrollment in all Nile Basin
countries. It is interesting to note that the DR Congo and Rwanda were among the 4
countries that showed a drop in human development index 1980-1990. Burundi, DR
Congo, Kenya and Tanzania are among the 21 who showed drop in 1990-2001.23
Procedural challenges:
Again, public participation is the major procedural issue as well as a conceptual one. The
procedure of involving the NGOs and civil society has been marred from the start by its
design, non-inclusiveness, selectivity as well as plain interference in the process staring
by its design. It is noteworthy that the design of the process is made by Len Abrams, now
a World Bank employee. Even after his employment with the World Bank he is still the
main driving force of the Nile Basin Discourse, writing its funding proposals and in total
control of its web site.24 The recent challenges to the Nile Basin treaties posed
The next most important ‘change’ to the procedure is the deviation from proposed
interaction between the SVP and SAP, that is to say SAP would progress according to the
progress of the SVP as shown in Figure 8 (which seems to have disappeared from the
NBI web site). To all purposes, it seems that the SVP is suddenly over and it is time for
the SAP. What were the results of the SVP? Did any of the Nile Basin people became
more informed of the NBI process? Apparently not, even at the level of the legislators, as
23
24
See UNDP (2003) Human Development Report, Table 2.1
For more details about the NBD, please:
 download the paper entitled “Nile Basin Initiative: Business as usual? The Nile Basin
Discourse” from http://nilebasin.com/wwf/doc/NBD.doc and other papers submitted from
other parts of the Nile Basin at http://nilebasin.com/wwf
 listen to the discussions of the 3rd World Water Forum session entitled “Role of NGOs and
Media in the Nile Basin Initiative” at http://nilebasin.com/wwf/audio.htm
 see the discussion forum http://nilebasin.com/discus under the topic NBD.
 See the NBD ‘Kyoto report’ at http://nilebasin.com/wwf/report.html including the
unspecified allegations against the NBS and the active trials to sabotage any relations with
potential funding sources for the NBS. That includes the ‘Annex 1’ “Minutes” of the
NBS/NAPE session of unknown source that does not reflect what really took place as proven
by the audio tapes of the session published on our site and undermine whatever positive
outcomes that came out of the session. The author while reviewing this paper before
departure to Brisbane, discovered that the NBD have changed the original post that is still
available on the NBS web site, after the audio records of the discussion were published by
the NBS and challenged the NBD to prove that the original minutes were those made by the
NBS or to reveal the source. The changed ‘report’ is available on
http://www.nilediscourse.org/kyoto.htm The interesting part is that they also managed to
delete the corresponding posts on our discussion forum, something that is only reserved to
the ‘super user; myself’ and needs to have my password. But this is another story.
evident from the Legislative Assembly of East African countries recent reactions.25 It
even seems that the Nile Basin ministers are not well-informed about the process, or if
they are, they do not believe in it as evident by some media outbursts, the latest of which
is by the Ethiopian Minister of Trade and Industry, Ato Girma Birru.26
Another procedural challenge is to involve UN agencies. The UNDP role in the NBI
process had obviously diminished through the appointing of the UNDP expert in charge
of the project to the World Bank. FAO is seen as a minor partner not fit to be included in
the ‘political process’, according to a FAO expert. The UNEP and UNESCO are almost
totally blocked from the process in spite of the fact that UNEP in particular is the only
agency that can be trusted with conducting the required complex EIA of the cascade of
projects proposed on the Nile.
Communication Challenges:
Though Canada (CIDA) had funded both the short-term and long-term communication
component of the SVP, yet no result were ever felt by the public. The short-term
component was supervised by a Canadian agency, and was reportedly disappointing,
though no report is available for the causes of failure of the short-term communication
component. The long-term communication component of the SVP had the funds allocated
directly to the World Bank, who in turn allocated it all to the NBI Secretary!!! Taking in
consideration the failure of the NBI secretary to achieve any success, particularly in
relation to its web site which typically lacks information or posts it very late when it is
useless, e.g. conference announcements.
The author does not exactly what proportion of the 100 million dollars was really
allocated to the long-term communication component and what they were really spent on.
The absence of public reports either from the NBI or its partners such as CIDA is a major
problem. The author tried contacting the program officers in CIDA and was always
requested to refer to the NBI website!!
Elizabeth Birabwa, a writer on environmental issues, told IRIN there was hardly any
information flowing between the NBI secretariat and the media, because the language
used by the secretariat was "too technical and distanced from us". "Few journalists know
what is happening as far as the Nile is concerned. If you go there, they just give you the
colonial treaties and some difficult-to-understand documents. We are hitting a wall," she
said. "Ugandan MPs have raised an issue that affects ordinary people. But the issues are
shrouded in secrecy, big moneys being spent, some of it to be repaid by the people who
live along the Nile, but the people know nothing," she added. Civil society groups like
IUCN have also criticized the running of the NBI and have formed a parallel initiative
See AllAfrica.com (June 23, 2003) “Legislative Assembly Wants Power Over Nile”
http://allafrica.com/stories/200306230484.html also available at
http://www.nilebasin.com/discus/messages/12/235.html#POST3409
26
AllAfrica.com (August 15, 2003): “Minister Accuses Egypt of Negative Attitude to Peace,
Democracy Here” http://allafrica.com/stories/200308150480.html
25
they say would enable them to participate in the NBI process.27 The author doubts the
IUCN allegations by Geoffrey Howard in the IRIN report. It is a known fact that the
World Bank, IUCN, GEF and the WWF are of the “Partnership on Water and the
Environment” since June 2002.28 The assertion of a difference/criticism seems only as a
trial to deflect the attention from the synergetic part played by both the IUCN and World
Bank (both are parts of the steering committee of the NBD). It is also important to
remember that the IUCN is in reality a ‘governmental organization’ to which NGOs can
be ‘Category B’ members. It was never registered as an NGO.
The communication challenge is partly due to the secrecy and lack of transparency of the
process, which Mr. David Grey of the World Bank maintains is necessary for any
political inter-governmental negotiations. Whether the ‘secrecy’ and lack of transparency
is a requirement by the NBI governments or it is only an extension of the World Bank
policies is only a hypothetical question.
Funding Challenges:
First, as the results of the first ICCON meeting only US$140 million were raised, with
the promise of US 4 billion to follow for the actual projects. I believe that these funds
cannot practically be raised mainly due to:
 Donor fatigue.
 The global pre-occupation with meeting the MDGs, which the NBI does not fully
address.
 The current international crises, whether it is Afghanistan, Iraq, drought and
famine, etc that usually take precedence to ‘development’.
 The trend by the G8 in their last meeting in Canada to condition aid to
‘democratic changes’ in Africa. Obviously, social change is not a component of
the NBI. Even the USA have created its own initiatives like AGWA which goes
along similar lines.
 The lack of transparency.
 Lack of environmental conservation.
 The reported re-allocation of funds to other purposes than what they were meant
for.
To make matters worse, the rumours of mismanagement and corruption within the NBI
and the lack of official response to these allegations (attributed to a member of the NileTAC29, who remains anonymous) nor the publishing of the audit results or the financial
27
See IRIN (2003): The Nile: water conflicts. http://www.irinnews.org/
Partnership on Water and the Environment (June 2002). See:
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/18ByDocName/GEFIUCNWBWWFPartnership
29
see http://www.nilebasin.com/cgi-bin/discus/show.cgi?tpc=5365&post=3355#POST3355 for the full
text of the allegations. The author does believe that some of the allegations do have merit in spite the fact
that the ‘TAC-member’ started it with the most trivial, i.e. abuse of cars. A financial controller position was
announced after the author had them, this was when he was certain that the allegations do have merit and
went ahead with publishing them, in spite of previous assurances to the NBI and World Bank officials,
28
statements of the NBI would certainly make donors think twice before committing
limited aid resources to the NBI.
It is also important to note that apparently the NBI does not want its projects to go
through the IMF/World Bank, where they would be certainly rejected on environmental
grounds. The Bujagali dam was obviously a mistake, that they are certain not to repeat.
This makes the funding problem more acute.
Legal challenges:
Lack of legal agreement between the Nile Basin countries on “the equitable and just
distribution of the Nile Water”.
This may be considered as the thorniest issue that would cause the NBI to break apart.
In this regard it is important to note that:
1. As of August 26th, 2003, none of the Nile Basin countries have ratified the
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (1997) that took more than 20 years in preparation30 . According to
Dr. Patricia Wouters, director of the International Water Law Research Institute at
the University of Dundee, Scotland, the convention provides two important
principals; it stresses that states should use watercourses in an equitable and
reasonable manner, and secondly it defines a procedure to follow when planned
schemes may have adverse impacts on other states31. In fact, when the convention
was presented to the UN General Assembly, Sudan was the only Nile Basin
country in favor; Burundi opposed; Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania
abstained; while Eritrea, Uganda and DRC (Zaire) were absent!32
2. During the International Conference on Freshwater, Bonn, Germany, 3-7
December 2001 attended by the author, the Egyptian delegation objected on using
the term “International watercourses” and favored the use of “trans-boundary
waters” in formulating the conference final report.
The Nile Basin Society has called for the immediate ratification by all Nile Basin
countries as a just and fair agreement, during its session in the 3rd World Water Forum,
Kyoto, Japan, March 16th, 2003.33 The same request was echoed by Mikhail Gorbachev,
before and during the 3rd World Water Forum, that I wouldn’t. As the author was later informed, there was
a fear that the forum, session and/or the NBS press conference would be used for such announcement.
30
International Water Law Project (2002): Status of the Watercourse Convention:
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Watercourse_status.htm
31
Keith Hayward (2002): "Catchment Convention", Water 21, the magazine of the International Water
Association (IWA), June, 2002.
32
United Nations General Assembly (1997): Press Release GA/9248, Annex: Vote on International
Watercourses Convention. http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Convention_Press.htm
33 “Role of NGOs and Media in the Nile Basin Initiative”, co-organized with our Ugandan partner the
National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE). For more details, please visit
http://nilebasin.com/wwf
President, Green Cross International on his statement to the Ministerial Conference dated
March 22nd, 2003. I quote:
“Political will means:


Immediate ratification of the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses by all states, as a first step towards the
negotiation of a Global Water Convention. Agreeing this Global Convention
will take time, but will indicate that water is a universal issue and water
access is a fundamental human right.
Immediate adaptation of funding mechanisms to support activities related to
internationally shared water bodies.
Integrated Action means:


That the integrity of ecosystems must be respected in the terms of inter-state
and basin agreements.
The rights of stakeholders to take decisions regarding water resources should
be respected in trans-boundary watercourses. All stakeholders should be
helped to obtain the capacity to fully participate in the process of
development of basin and aquifer strategies, agreements and institutions,
through transparency and information.
Mediation means:

Water for Peace discussions at the Forum confirmed the need for an
International Water mediation tool. The creation of such a Water Cooperation
Facility was officially launched at the closing session of Water for Peace,
coordinated by Green Cross and UNESCO yesterday.
Respect for peoples and cultures means:

34
Community responsibility and ownership of cooperation processes, backed by
international solidarity and commitment to a alternative form of development
which respects cultural diversity and environmental sustainability.”34
http://www.greencrossinternational.net
Annex I
Nile basin: irrigation potential, water requirements, water availability and areas
under irrigation (Source: FAO (1997)35
Country Irrigation
area potential
within
the Nile
basin
Gross irrigation
water requirement
per ha
(ha)
(1)
total
Actual flows
inflow
outflow
Flows after
deduction for
irrigation and
losses
inflow
Area
already
under
irrigation
outflow
(m3/ha.year) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (km3/yr) (km3/yr)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(ha)
(7)
(8)
Burundi 80 000
13 000
1.04
0.00
1.50
0.00
0.46
0
Rwanda 150 000
12 500
1.88
1.50
7.00
0.46
4.09
2 000
Tanzania 30 000
11 000
0.33
7.00
10.70
4.09
7.46
10 000
Kenya
180 000
8 500
1.53
0.00
8.40
0.00
6.87
6 000
Zaire
10 000
10 000
0.10
0.00
1.50
0.00
1.40
0
8 000
1.62
28.70
37.00
23.83
30.51
9 120
Ethiopia 2 220 000 9 000
19.98
0.00
80.10
0.00
60.12
23 160
Eritrea
150 000
1.65
0.00
2.20
0.00
0 55
15 124
Sudan
2 750000 14000
38.50
117.10
55.50
90.63
31.13
1 935 200
Egypt
4 420 000 13 000
57.46
55.50
rest to se 31.13
minus
26.33
3 078 000
Uganda 202 000
Sum of 10 192
countries 000
11 000
124.08
Total for < 8 000
Nile
000
basin
NOTES:
35
FAO (1997): Irrigation Potential in Africa: A Basin Approach.
5 078 604
For the sake of simplicity it was supposed that if a certain quantity of water is abstracted
upstream, this same quantity is subtracted from the resource downstream, except in cases
where more information was available.
Tanzania:
(6) Equal to inflow (7.00) minus water requirement upstream countries (1.04 + 1.88).
(7) Equal to outflow (10.70) minus water requirement upstream and within Tanzania
(1.04+1.88+0.33).
Uganda:
(6) Equal to inflow (28.70) minus water requirement upstream countries
(1.04+1.88+0.33+1.53+0.10).
(7) Equal to outflow (37.00) minus water requirement upstream and within Uganda
(1.04+ 1.88+0.33+ 1.53+0.10+ 1.62).
Sudan:
(1) Not included the possibility of irrigation within the Sudd area (area about 1600000
ha).
(4) Total inflow from Uganda and Ethiopia.
(5) Attribution to Egypt according to 1959 agreement after deduction evaporation Aswan.
(6) Equal to inflow (117.1) minus water requirement equatorial plateau countries (6.50)
and Ethiopia (19.98).
(7) Equal to outflow (90.63) minus losses in Sudd (21) and water requirement within
Sudan (38.50).
Egypt:
(4) Attribution to Egypt according to 1959 agreement after deduction evaporation Aswan.
(6) Equal to outflow from Sudan after potential deductions (31.13) minus water
requirements (57.46).