Political Science 510-- World Politics
Emory University
Fall 2001
Wednesdays, 1-4 pm; 313 Tarbutton Hall
Professor Dan Reiter
Office: 334 Tarbutton Hall
Office Hours: Tuesdays 9-11, or by appointment
Phone: 727-0111
Email: dreiter@emory.edu
Webpage: http://www.emory.edu/POLS/about/reiter.html
This is the field seminar in international relations for graduate students in political
science. It is designed to begin students’ training in teaching and conducting research in
international relations. Anyone other than political science graduate students or
undergraduates in the political science honors program must receive the instructor’s
permission to take this course.
The books listed below are available for purchase at the Druid Hills bookstore.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986).
Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2000).
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954).
The following books are listed as “recommended” at the book store. The readings in
them are required for the course, but since I have assigned only a smaller portion of each
book, you may wish to read or photocopy the library’s copies rather than purchase them
yourself.
Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics
Reconsidered (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1994).
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
All readings are on reserve at the library. Readings must be done for the class for which
they have been assigned. Readings listed as “suggested” are not required.
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Class Requirements
Semester grades are composed of three components. The first is class participation.
Students are required to attend class, do the reading for each week, and participate in
discussion. Each student must also write down and bring to class one question or
comment about the reading each week. Two students will be assigned to present orally
each week’s reading. Each presentation should run no more than ten minutes, and should
state the question in the reading, the answer given by the author, and an assessment of the
argument and/or evidence. Students must prepare presentations, and give them from
notes rather than extemporaneously or directly from photocopies of the reading. Students
may not read word-for-word texts for the presentations. Second, students will write short
papers. Each week, a student may submit a 3-4 page paper which summarizes and
evaluates one of the readings assigned for that week. Each student must submit five of
these short papers over the course of the semester. A student can only submit one paper
per week. A student cannot submit a paper the same week he or she is presenting the
reading. Late papers will not be accepted. Third, there is a final exam which is
structured to be similar to a comprehensive exam, with the exception that the final will be
closed book, closed note. It will be an eight hour take-home exam, administered in the
final week of the semester.
*= This reading available for purchase
I. BIG THEORETICAL ISSUES.
September 5-- Introduction to Course; Levels of Analysis
*Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954).
Suggested:
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 2.
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York:
Scott, Foresman, 1971).
September 12-- Neorealism
*Kenneth N. Waltz, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), pp. 27-130.
Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17-33.
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999), 3-25.
Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, and John Pritchard, Total War, volume 1: The Western
Hemisphere, rev. 2nd edition (Pantheon: New York, 1989), 40-109.
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Edward Hallett Carr, “The Realist Critique,” The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1964), 63-88 in 1964 edition.
Suggested:
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, expanded edition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984).
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1955).
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.
Donald Kagan, On The Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York:
Anchor Books, 1995).
September 19-- Cooperation
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1-65.
*Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 3-69,
109-141.
Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” in Kenneth Oye, ed.,
Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 1-24.
James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,”
International Organization 52 (Spring 1998): 269-305.
Suggested:
Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, American Political Science
Review 80 (December 1986): 1095-1111.
James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of Cooperation: Distribution versus
Information,” International Organization 48 (Summer 1994): 387-423.
Per Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organization 36
(Summer 1982): 511-536.
September 26—Institutionalism and Realist Critiques
*Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News About
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?” International Organization 50
(Summer 1996): 379-406.
Stephen Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David
Baldwin, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 234-239.
Suggested:
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Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence Revisited,”
International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987): 725-753.
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of Institutionalism,” International Security 19
(Winter 1994/95): 5-49.
Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International
Security 20 (Summer 1995): 39-51.
David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
October 3—Ideas, Learning, and Liberalism
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic
Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48 (Spring
1994): 185-214.
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change, Goldstein and Keohane, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 33-30.
Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past,”
World Politics 46 (July 1994): 490-526.
Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), 15-42.
Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”
International Organization 42 (1988): 427-460. Available at
http://www.jstor.org/
Suggested:
Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,”
International Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 491-517.
Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables,” in International Regimes, Stephen D. Krasner, ed. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983), 1-21.
Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,” International Organization 46 (Winter 1992): 1-35.
Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996).
Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold
War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
October 10—Constructivism and Norms
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Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1995), 13-35.
Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of
Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53 (Summer 1999): 433-468.
Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and
Culture in National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), 33-75.
Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American
Political Science Review 88 (June 1994): 384-396.
Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization 49 (Spring 1995):
229-52.
October 17— An Application: The European Union
Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” International Organization
45 (Winter 1991): 19-56. Available at http://www.jstor.org/.
Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European
Community’s Internal Market,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992):
533-559. Available at http://www.jstor.org/.
Kathleen R. McNamara, “Consensus and Constraint: Ideas and Capital Mobility in
European Monetary Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37
(September): 455-76.
Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of
Legal Integration,” International Organization 47 (Winter 1993): 41-76.
Available at http://www.jstor.org/.
Stone Sweet, Alec and Thomas L. Brunell, “Constructing a Supranational Constituion:
Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community,” American
Political Science Review 92 (March 1998): 63-81.
Suggested:
Wayne Sandholtz, “Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht,” International
Organization 47 (Winter 1993): 1-39.
II. DECISION-MAKING.
October 24-- Rational Choice Theory
*Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1994), chapters 1-3, 5.
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*Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics
Reconsidered (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), chapters by Abelson,
Lohmann, Ferejohn and Satz, Shepsle.
Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,”
International Security 23 (Spring): 5-48.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow, “Sorting Through the Wealth of
Notions,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999): 56-73.
Suggested:
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and
International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
James G. March, “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice,” Bell
Journal of Economics 9 (Autumn 1978): 587-608.
Frank Zagare, World Politics (1989)
Herbert A. Simon. “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political
Science,” American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985): 293-304.
October 31-- Challenges to Rationality
Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 101-147.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 3-20.
Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,”
International Studies Quarterly 41 (March 1997): 87-112.
James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International Relations
Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 67-92. Available at:
http://polisci.AnnualReviews.org/
Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative
Case Studies,” World Politics 41 (January 1989): 143-69. Available at
http://www.jstor.org/.
Suggested:
Deborah Larson, The Origins of Containment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), chapter 1.
Jack S. Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 13:2 (1993):
171-186.
Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,”
International Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 279-312.
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976).
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Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996).
III. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT.
November 7-- Dyadic Theories of Conflict
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 3.
James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49
(Summer 1995): 379-414. Available at http://www.jstor.org/
*Thomas C. Schelling, “The Art of Commitment,” Arms and Influence (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), chapter 2.
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics (1978): 167214.
R. Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science 44
(July 2000), 469-484.
Suggested:
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,”
International Security 9 (Summer 1984): 58-107.
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960).
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to
1980,” World Politics 36 (July 1984): 496-526.
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent
Variable,” World Politics 42 (April 1990): 336-69.
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,”
World Politics 42 (1990): 466-501.
November 14—Domestic Politics and International Conflict
*Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 43-124.
*Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 1-117, 265-311.
James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 577-592.
Suggested:
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” American
Political Science Review 92 (June 1998): 377-389.
Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review
80 (December 1986): 1151-1169.
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John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly 41
(June 1997): 267-294.
T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use
of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (March 1992): 25-52.
Alastair Smith, “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,” International
Studies Quarterly 40 (March 1996): 133-153.
James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press, 1995), chapter 1.
November 21-- Systemic Theories of War
John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International
System,” in The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, expanded edition, Sean
M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
Lars-Erik Cederman, “Emergent Polarity: Analyzing State-Formation and Power
Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (December 1994), 501-533.
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984), 19-46.
Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics
40 (October 1987): 82-107.
Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies
Quarterly 37 (March 1993): 73-105.
Suggested:
Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, D. Scott Bennett, “The Escalation of Great Power
Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural
Realism,” American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 609-623.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, “Empirical Support for Systemic and
Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict,” World Politics (1988): 1-20.
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981).
Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994).
Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 (Spring 1990):
137-168.
Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal
23 (April 1904): 421-444.
Ted Hopf, “Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance, and War,” American Political
Science Review 85 (June 1991): 475-493.
A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980).
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IV. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY.
November 28-- Systemic Theories
Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World
Politics (1976): 317-347.
Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization
39 (Autumn 1985): 579-614.
David A. Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988), 1-88.
James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Tressa E. Tabares, “The Political
Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-1990,” American
Political Science Review 92 (September 1998).
Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic
Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978): 881-912.
Suggested:
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 8-64.
December 5—Domestic and State-Level Theories
Barry Eichengreen, “The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,” in
International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 3rd
edition, Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, eds. (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1995), 37-46.
*Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 218-228.
Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American
Political Science Review 81 (December 1987): 1121-1137.
Peter J. Katzenstein, “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign
Economic Policy,” International Organization 31 (Summer 1977): 879-920.
Available at http://www.jstor.org/.
Marc L. Busch, Trade Warriors: States, Firms, and Strategic-Trade Policy in High
Technology Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-31.
Helen Milner, “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade
Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s,” International
Organization 41 (Autumn 1987): 639-665.
Suggested:
Ronald Rogowski, “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions,” International
Organization 41 (Spring 1987): 203-223.
Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Toward a Business-Cycle Model of Tariffs,” International
Organization 39 (Winter 1985): 155-187.
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Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical
Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 223-246.
Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and
U.S. National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 5-34.
Beth A. Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During
the Interwar Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
December 10-14-- Take Home Exam
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