The Ethics of Neurobiological Narratives
Darcia Narvaez, Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame1
Narvaez, D. (in press). The Ethics of Neurobiological Narratives. Poetics Today, special issue on
Narrative and the Emotions
Abstract
Narratives are embedded in human biology. Each individual’s emotion system is shaped by early
experience and can be viewed as a biosocial personal grammar for the social life. A child builds
a biosocial grammar initially from caregiver treatment. Caregivers and cultures help structure
event memory and co-construct the narratives children use for self and moral identities. The bioemotional landscape formed by experience influences the narratives that shape the life course.
Initially, this occurs nonverbally through touch and emotional response; later, it occurs through
explicit discourse and cultural practice. Triune Ethics Theory draws on evolutionary
neurobiology, virtue ethics and multiple human sciences to illustrate three ethics that represent
basic neurobiological narratives that are formed by early experience and by climates and cultures.
The three basic ethical orientations that underlie human moral behavior are called Security,
Engagement, and Imagination. One or more can become a dispositional orientation and each can
be situationally primed. Cultures encourage one or another ethic through their support systems
and common discourse. Mature moral functioning in most traditions involves self-actualization
in selecting and self-cultivating the moral narratives that lead to peaceful coexistence.
Research in affective neuroscience has uncovered how brain development, including
emotional circuitry design, is shaped by early life experience (e.g., Panksepp, 1998). With only
25% of the brain developed at birth, caregivers in early life co-construct its emotion structures
and circuits, influencing personality formation (Schore, 1992; 1994), cognitive development
(Greenspan & Shanker, 2004) and subsequent moral functioning (Narvaez, 2008). The view
presented here is that the manner in which emotion systems are fostered in early life affects the
unconscious processes used to understand socio-emotional events and the narratives used to
explain and understand life experience. Moreover, the moral narratives that become attractive are
those that resonate with the emotion circuitry shaped by early experience (Tompkins, 1965).
After a very brief description of emotion development, it is linked to moral development. Then
an application of these topics to culture and education narratives is outlined.
Emotion systems generally facilitate learning and represent “psychobehavioral potentials
that are genetically ingrained in brain development” as “evolutionary operants” (Panksepp, 1998,
p. 55). These operants are inherited emotional command systems that help animals behave
adaptively in the face of life challenges. Throughout the brain, emotion systems (e.g., separation
distress)2 are placed centrally in order to dynamically interact with more recently evolved
cognitive structures (e.g., prefrontal cortex) and more basic physiological outputs (e.g.,
adrenaline). As a result, there is no emotion without a thought and most thoughts evoke emotion
and there is no emotion without a behavioral or physiological outcome. Emotions guide animals
in their aims and inform them about what has or has not worked in the past to meet needs or
reach goals.
Emotional signaling and response drive adaptation from the beginning of life (Schore,
1994). Early experience of care, emotional resonance with others, reciprocity, tension and
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reconciliation (or their opposites) influence the neurobiology of emotion systems upon which the
psyche builds its core (Schore, 2003a, 2003b). Infants seek to connect with others, to woo them
into relationship (Hrdy, 2009). Actions are effective or not in reestablishing equilibrium or
satisfaction. When a baby successfully communicates a need and it is satisfied by caregivers, the
episode fosters a sense of self-efficacy, whereas if there is a recurrent pattern of failure to
successfully communicate or receive care, a sense of insecurity is fostered along with a mistrust
of the world for getting needs met (Tronick, 2007).
For each set of repeated experiences in life, the individual constructs a corresponding set
of socio-cognitive-emotional responses. These patterns of response are generally formed during
sensitive periods (such as early life) and later become triggered by particular events that are
evocative of earlier experience. These patterns can be termed a personal biosocial grammar (an
idea similar to, but individualized and not universal, to Mikhail’s, 2007, universal moral
gramma) . Every individual’s “grammar” is unique and corresponds to a singular merging of
“fantasy” and reality as discussed by Freud (1887-1902) and that can be demonstrated in an
individual’s unique neuronal signature (Ansermet & Magistretti, 2007). Each person’s biosocial
grammar provides a causal map for the individual’s social behavior. In a situation that evokes a
response, there is an initiating event (an external or internal event), the internal (emotional and
cognitive) response, and a reaction (usually a goal attempt)3 to re-establish equilibrium (Piaget,
1954). For example, internal (physiological signals such as pain in the stomach) and/or external
signals (e.g., an expression on the face of another) provide initiating events for responses within
a particular setting. When a basic emotional system is activated, goal setting and goal-focused
action follow. A precipitating event (e.g., hunger) triggers an emotion system (e.g., seeking)
which results in action to complete the goal of satisfying the need. The particular outcome of one
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episode may be the initiating event for the next. If these need-response-outcome patterns become
frequent and predictable, the infant takes the internalized pattern into his/her personality. Thus, a
baby begins to develop a habitual, biosocial personal grammar from caregiver treatment (similar
to “internal working models” by Bowlby, 1951). As illustrated in Table 1, caregivers coconstruct an individual’s personal biosocial grammar and resulting personal narrative through the
repetition of social interactions.
Early experience has long term effects that reside in brain and body systems (Bowlby,
1962; Lupien et al., 2009). How well emotions guide adaptive behavior is dependent on how
well emotion systems were developed in early life (Schore, 1994). Poor care leads to
disorganized emotion systems which form the basis for further psychopathology (Cole, Michel &
Teti, 1994). Caregivers intentionally and unintentionally foster particular grammars in children
through their caregiving practices throughout childhood. For example, caregivers help structure
event memory in older children through how and what they elaborate in conversations with the
child (Nelson & Gruendel, 1981), establishing interpretive narratives for children’s self and
moral identities (more below).
Early experiences set one on a course of emotional and social habits even before selfconsciousness sets in around 18 months (Schore, 1994; Stern, 1999). Later in life one’s
conscious, explicit aims and goals are affected by the implicit views of one’s relation to others
(e.g., trusting or untrusting) and the world (benign or dangerous) that were established in early
life. These “feelings” or intuitions about others and the world underlie the biosocial personal
grammar but may be made conscious and explicit, unlike the grammar itself. As described
further below, such intuitions influence which personal, cultural and life narratives attract and
guide the individual (Tompkins, 1965) and lead to particular propensities in moral functioning.
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The neurobiological underpinnings of morality and moral narratives are becoming increasingly
clear (Moll, Zahn, de Olivera-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Narvaez, 2009). Triune ethics
theory links early life experience, emotion development and subsequent functioning, with moral
functioning. We discuss this next.
MORALITY AS NEUROBIOLOGICAL NARRATIVE
Human morality has neurobiological roots that are apparent in several biological
structures. For example, the limbic system, the source of our social emotions, is only partially
constructed at birth. Caregivers co-construct the functioning of the social emotions in the limbic
system through their responsiveness, influencing for example how easily distressed (and selffocused) the individual’s brain turns out to be (Henry & Wang, 1998). In conditions of early
neglect or abuse, the emotional circuitry linked to social functioning is underdeveloped and selfcalming mechanisms are faulty (Schore 2003a; 2003b), leading to a propensity to focus on self
needs. Sensitive and responsive parenting from an early age shapes a more agreeable and
conscientious personality (Kochanska, 2002). Early care influences the development and
functioning of multiple biological and psychological systems, including for example, the vagus
nerve which affects cardiac, digestive, respiratory and other systems (e.g., Calkins, Smith, Gill &
Johnson, 1998; Porter, 2003), and is linked to compassionate response (Eisenberg & Eggum,
2008, for a review). The most recent addition to the evolved brain, the prefrontal cortex which
controls executive functions, is also affected during early life and during other sensitive periods
(Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Goldberg, 2002; Kodituwakku,
Kalberg, & May, 2001; Newman, Holden, & Delville, 2005).
In previous work (Narvaez,
2008a; 2009; in preparation; Narvaez & Brooks, 2010), I developed Triune Ethics4 Theory
(TET) as a way to integrate findings from evolutionary neurobiology, neuroscience, virtue ethics
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and multiple psychological disciplines into a theory of moral development. TET distinguishes
three basic moral orientations (or central motives that drive moral functioning; Moll, Zahn, de
Oliveira-Souza, Drueger, & Grafman, 2005). These propel human moral action on an individual
and group level: the Ethic of Security, the Ethic of Engagement, and the Ethic of Imagination.
The three ethics and their subtypes draw on different parts of the brain. Each ethic draws on a
different set of activated emotion systems that influence cognition and action. Subjectively, each
ethic presents a different orientation to the moral life. When a particular orientation is used to
guide action, thereby trumping other values or goals, it becomes an ethic. An ethic can be
habitual or dispositional but also evoked by the situation. An individual’s grammar can resonate
with others and promote a group orientation. Each ethic influences perception (e.g., vision: Rowe,
Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; Schmitz, de Rosa, & Anderson, 2009), affordances (action
possiblities) and the attractiveness of particular rhetoric.
Ethic of Security. The Ethic of Security is rooted in emotional instincts for survival that
are present at birth (the emotional systems for exploration, fear, panic, rage, as well exploration;
see Panksepp, 1998). The Security ethic emerges from the extrapyramidal action nervous system
(Panksepp, 1998) that attends to basic survival and relates to territoriality, imitation, deception,
struggles for power, maintenance of routine and following precedent (MacLean, 1990). When
this system drives social functioning, it becomes an ethic. One might call this a “first-person”
morality—‘it’s all about me’. The security ethic emphasizes self-protection, autonomous seeking,
status enhancement (hierarchy or pecking order), and ingroup loyalty (maintained with rules for
purity of belief or action, e.g., virginity). The security ethic can easily dominate thought and
behavior when a person or group is threatened, leading to action that appears moral subjectively
but is objectively immoral. It is evident in Othello’s jealous rage and MacBeth’s ruthless grab for
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power. When the security ethic is triggered, tribalism predominates, rivalry and the pecking
order are stressed, and mob behavior can be set in motion (Bloom, 1995). The Security
personality is a type of human nature that is expressed typically only under conditions of threat
or perceived injustice (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Indeed, laboratory studies show that when
people feel threatened, they are less responsive to helping others and more focused on selfpreservation (e.g., Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005).
Although the security ethic is useful in moments of actual physical threat, it can dominate
one’s personality as a result of poor early care. A dispositional security ethic can be exhibited in
the self-focused orientations of narcissism, depression or aggression which are seen among
abused and neglected children. The externalizing form I call bunker security. It is defensive
aggression that is used to protect the physical or psychological self (i.e., ego). In this case the
individual tends to perceive threat everywhere. Because the preservational system is so strong,
the urge to self-protect becomes overwhelming, reflecting Simone Weil’s view, “Evil when we
are in its power is not felt as evil but as a necessity, or even a duty.” The internalizing form I call
wallpaper security. It tends towards a submissive, emotionally withdrawn response to authority.
The virtues of the security ethic are loyalty and obedience, depicted perhaps in Hester at the end
of The Scarlet Letter (Hawthorne, 1981) when she returns voluntarily to the colony to live out
her life wearing the scarlet letter.
Ethic of Engagement. Rooted physiologically in both the brain and the heart, the second
ethic, the Ethic of Engagement, involves the emotional systems that drive us towards intimacy. A
well-functioning visceral-emotional nervous system on the hypothalamic-limbic axis (Panksepp,
1998) and a well-developed right brain (Schore, 1994) allow for here-and-now emotional
signaling. Found among mammals and particularly primates, these systems were identified as the
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locus of human moral sense by Darwin because they are the root of our social and sexual
instincts, empathy, parental care and playfulness (Darwin, 1891; Loye, 2002). I call the
Engagement ethic a “harmony morality,” focused on love/care/attachment, play and ‘being-inthe-moment’ (relational flow) with others where egoistic self-interest is minimized. One might
call this a “second-person morality,” in which the focus is on the Other.
When the security ethic runs amok, the more humane engagement ethic may provide a
counter pressure if aroused by particular events, as in Saul Bellow’s, Herzog, when the titular
hero is about to avenge himself on his ex-wife and her lover. Seeing his wife bathing their
daughter, his humanity is touched and his heart melts. Similarly, in To Kill a Mockingbird,
Atticus by the jailhouse is confronted by a mob. His children come up to protect him and his
daughter recognizes a man in the crowd. She starts talking to him regarding his son, whom she
knows. The man does not reply. She asks what is wrong, saying she was just trying to be polite.
He “awakens” from the trance of mob violence to his softer emotions and he turns to leave,
taking the crowd with him.
When empathy is strong but self-regulatory systems are weak, one may experience what I
call engagement distress. Feminist literature, such as Alice Walker’s, The Color Purple, often
reflects the struggles within the engagement ethic of caring or attaching too much to another.
More rarely, the engagement ethic may predominate to such an extent that it leads to a type of
‘donor fatigue’ as in Graham Greene’s Heart of the Matter where Scobie becomes a victim of his
own compassion for others. The Ethic of Engagement is suppressed in some societies, including
the USA, especially in boys, being regarded as feminine and “weak” to show much empathy for
others (but this may be an attitude widely accepted for all, see XXXXX). James Joyce, in A
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Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, artfully describes the type of ridicule that a “mama’s boy”
encounters in patriarchal societies.
Ethic of Imagination. The third ethic, the Ethic of Imagination is grounded in a wellfunctioning somatic-cognitive nervous system on the thalamic-neocortical axis (Panksepp, 1998),
It is based in the more recently evolved parts of the brain and is the source of deliberative
reasoning and imagination. One might call this a “third-person morality” because of the ability to
detach emotionally from the present moment and use abstraction adaptively. Although humans
have evolved to favor face-to-face relationships and have difficulty imagining those not present
(such as future generations; see Trout, 2009, for a review), the prefrontal lobes provide a means
for a sense of community that extends beyond immediate experience.
In my view, the Imagination Ethic has three forms. Detached imagination occurs when
the mind is dissociated from emotion and presence in the here-and-now, which means
functioning is dominated by the left brain (McGilchrist, 2009). Such an intellectualized morality
uses abstraction to solve moral problems, analyzing discrete pieces of life without attending to
the rich context. Morality can degrade into a set of procedures. Futuristic novels, such as
Orwell’s 1984, Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, often envision nightmares of bureaucracies
operating from a detached imagination ethic. It can also be seen in characters who are dissociated
from their emotions, like Daisy, in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s, The Great Gatsby.
When the left brain is dominant but additionally fueled by anger, the result is vicious
imagination, driven by a clever seeking of power. This ego-centered morality is more
sophisticated and reflective than Bunker Security (which is more reflexively aggressive)
producing a sophisticated reptile. Literary narratives often depict such individuals, as in Thomas
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Mann’s Adrian Leverkuhn’s lust for success at the cost of his soul in Doktor Faustus. Colonel
Miles Quaritch in the film, Avatar, also exhibits this type of ethic.
Communal imagination is the capacity for a sense of connection to others who are not
present. It combines social rich experience on the ground with an ability to envision realistic
consequences of potential action with deep prosociality. Andy Griffith, as sheriff on the Andy
Griffith Show, is an exemplar of communal imagination. He manifests little egoism or selfpromotion. He is sensitive to the needs and foibles of townsfolk and navigates leadership with a
deep regard for the common good.
The most exemplary moral orientation I call Mindful Morality, which is a combination of
Communal Imagination and Engagement. Mindful morality coordinates the right and left parts of
the brain, intuition and conscious reason, emotion and abstraction. It combines the
intersubjectivity and resonance with the other (Engagement ethic), with the use of abstraction
capabilities grounded in experience (Communal Imagination). This is moral wisdom. Mindful
morality guides the intuitions and instincts of the other ethics, able to counter instincts with “free
won’t” (Cotterill, 1999), the ability to stop an impulse or talk oneself out of taking rash action, an
ability most other animals do not possess I am reminded of the old television show, Maverick, in
which the star would avoid taking violent action unless it were absolutely necessary. The Na’vi
creatures in Avatar also exhibit this wisdom.
Both the engagement and imagination ethics rely on early experience, specifically
conditions that best match the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” (EEA; Bowlby, 1951).
The EEA represents what human mammals need for optimal development and functioning.
Based on research of nomadic hunter-gatherer bands around the world, the type of society in
which the human genus spent 99% of its history (Fry, 2008), anthropologists have identified
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what the EEA looked like for young children (breastfeeding for 2-5 years, nearly constant touch
in first years of life, prompt response to expressed needs, multiple caregivers, free play with
other children of various ages; Hewlett & Lamb, 2005). In the presumed EEA environment,
anthropologists find consistent evidence for what I call the Engagement and Communal
Imagination ethics. In the EEA, human basic emotional needs (for belonging, autonomy,
competence, trust, understanding, self-fulfillment; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Staub, 2003) largely were
met (the 99% of our history spent in small-band foraging communities). Elsewhere I describe in
more detail the expected environment for optimal moral functioning (e.g., Narvaez, 2008;
Narvaez & Panksepp, 2010).
EEA characteristics have been disappearing from early childhood in the USA (Narvaez &
Panksepp, 2010). A habitually-neglected (not responded to) young child has weaker social
satisfaction, and becomes more self-centered in the biosocial grammar and narratives that carry
her along. When a particular need is not met in early life, the personality may form around this
need in a polarized way. For example, children who are not cherished by their caregivers may be
driven to seek freedom from the demands of others or narcissistic love from others (Bowlby,
1982); such children may adopt a narrative of independence or self-aggrandizement.
There is a broader picture to address. The culture is influential in promoting one ethic or
another. For example, how caregivers care for a child and how the child understands him or
herself are influenced by the narratives of a culture, affecting personal grammar and favored
ethical orientation. We examine further the influence of culture on ethical orientation.
CULTURAL NARRATIVES
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Cultures provide narratives that promote different emotions, different selves, and
different moralities in group members. For example, 99% of human genus existence over
millions of years took place without war, yet the cultural narrative in the USA assumes that
humans are warriors by nature (Fry, 2009). Over 99% of human existence occurred in egalitarian
bands (Lee & Daly, 1999), but the cultural narratives that dominate the world emphasize
hierarchy as natural. Through 99% of human existence humans thrived without obedience to
authority, yet for many cultures today obedience is the number one virtue. Whereas 99% of
human existence was spent in a loving kinship community (mother, father, extended family
members), narratives in the 19th century began to adopt the nuclear family (mother, father, child)
as normal (Coontz, 2002). This was accompanied by the narrative that children should be treated
harshly (although that is a longer Judeo-Christian tradition).
The view presented here is that modern beliefs and corresponding social practices have
contributed to the predominance of the Security Ethic in Western human religion, culture and
everyday life today. Personal gain is emphasized, generalized fear is common, and relationships
are minimally nurtured relative to what mammals need for flourishing (Narvaez & Panksepp,
2010). These poor nurturing conditions lead to greater propensities for violence and disregard for
life of all forms.
Since the 1960s, psychologists have been lamenting the individualistic emphasis of
psychology with its “systematic denial of man’s social nature” (Hogan and Emler 1978, p. 487)
and berating the U.S. culture, suggesting that it fosters “alienation and estrangement,” separating
the person from the nutrient-rich relational source from which each person is cast, with the
culture espousing as an ideal the breakdown of attachments (Sampson, 1977, p. 780). A culture
that emphasizes self-reliance tends to make it more difficult to maintain a focus on empathic
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helping. Thus a self-focus, whether it arises from threat or from a culture that emphasizes selfconcern, will dampen the engagement ethic. Berkowitz (1970) points out how self-concern was
emphasized not only by Rousseau and other Romantic philosophers, but by psychologists such as
Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, who emphasized self-actualization with little regard for
others. A similar emphasis is found in the works of Ayn Rand and the neo-conservatives of the
turn of the 20th century (Burns, 2009; Rand, 1964). Extreme Western individualism, adult selfpreoccupation and a culture of fear and distrust establish conditions that emphasize a security
ethic and hijack the imagination to focus on survival, status, and power, as in Stanley Kubrick’s
film, Dr. Strangelove, and John Dos Passos’, USA.
U.S. popular and mainstream culture makes salient a security ethic orientation on a daily
basis. Whereas the security ethic is vital in moments of real threat, focusing attention on survival
interests, when it is activated on an everyday basis its social presence discourages helping and
prosocial behavior (Berkowitz, 1970). For example, studies showed that when self-focus was
heightened experimentally, people’s helping behavior diminished, especially in males. In one
study (Brehm & Cole, 1966) control subjects helped with a dull task 93% of the time in contrast
to 13% when self-focus was aroused. When a self-focused person receives an unrequested favor,
he or she feels a restriction on his subsequent behavior (i.e., the obligation to reciprocate) often
reacts with hostility, and has even less inclination to help others (Brehm, 1966). Whereas when a
person has salient the view of self as a helper, it doesn’t matter what the external forces are (i.e.,
someone doing an unrequested favor for them), he is more likely to help than are those without
such a self view. Cultures that emphasize group-beneficial acts and discourage selfishness are
less aggressive than cultures that encourage individual gain at the expense of others (research by
Ruth Benedict presented by Maslow, 1993, and Fromm, 1973).
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Similarly within religious cultures, group narratives can emphasize different ethics of
those describe here, evoking different emotion systems. When fear of the stranger is emphasized,
actions taken against the stranger are viewed as moral and actions to protect the stranger are
considered immoral (Wright, 2009); this is a characteristic of fundamentalisms around the world
(Marty & Appleby, 1995). When compassion is emphasized, prosocial actions towards the
stranger are considered moral and aggression considered immoral; this is a characteristic of the
major religions and traditions around the world (Wright, 2009).
So we can imagine the power of these cultural stories as they line up with biological
narratives. If the culture emphasizes individual independence over cooperation, self-concern is
triggered. If the culture depresses or discourages emotion, then detached or vicious imagination
ethic may be fostered. When religions or social groups emphasize “dangerous ideas” (e.g., sense
of helplessness, superiority, injustice, suspicion or vulnerability, Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003),
they foster vicious imagination and aggression. In contrast, in communities like the Amish,
compassion, humility and forgiveness are deliberately fostered towards both insiders and
outsiders (Hostetler & Huntington, 1971). Recently when several children were killed in an
Amish school by a neighbor who then committed suicide, local Amish elders immediately went
to forgive and comfort the wife of the murderer (Kraybill, Nolt, & Weaver-Zercher, 2008). If the
culture emphasizes cooperation over individual passions, the engagement ethic is likely evoked.
Communal imagination is encouraged by an emphasis on the common good (Daly & Cobb,
1989) and on ecological interdependence (Worster, 1994).
Although the macro level (culture) is influential so too is the micro level (situational
climate). Situational climates—the established culture for a local group setting—also effect how
people view themselves and others, and how they behave. Climates at schools and workplaces
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support different narratives about the purpose of the community and its members (de Vries &
Zan, 1999), fostering different ethical orientations (see Narvaez, 2009; 2009). A competitive,
uncaring environment fosters self concern, encouraging a security ethic orientation. As extreme
cases, school shooters typically feel bullied and do not feel as if they belong to the school
community; these circumstances encourage a revenge narrative (vicious imagination) (Newman
et al., 2004). A positive, caring climate, particularly one that meets basic needs, fosters the
engagement ethic.
Traditionally, families and communities tell the stories that children, after infancy, adopt
as frameworks for life. Those who tell the stories establish the culture. In contrast, many argue
that children today are hearing and seeing stories that lead them away from a moral life (Linn,
2004; Narvaez, 2005). First, in the USA many stories about “the good life” are generated by
public relations or advertising firms whose aim is to shape positive attitudes towards
consumerism generally and buying their products in particular. As a result, children are
“branded” from a young age (Quart, 2003) and children’s lives have become controlled by
corporate interests (Rushkoff, 2009). When corporate messages are infused in the school day, for
example through sponsored classroom materials and Channel One television, and consumerism
is a primary leisure activity in society, families no longer have control over the stories their
children hear and adopt.
Children and adolescents spend on average forty hours a week with electronic media
(Rideout, Foehr & Roberts, 2010). Children and family programming has become much more
violent than in previous generations (Aust, 2007). Increased television viewing is related to all
sorts of problems including aggressive behavior, like bullying, and other social issues, obesity,
ADHD, sleeping problems, among other negative effects (e.g., Acevedo-Polakovich et al., 2006;
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Christakis et al., 2004; Collins et al., 2004; Gidwani et al., 2002; Hancox et al., 2005 ; Johnson et
al., 2004 ; Lumeng et al., 2006 ; Ozmert et al., 2002; Zimmerman & Christakis, 2005). Electronic
media today model for children immense amounts of graphic violence, aggression, sexuality, and
disregard for human dignity and life in general with multiple ill effects (Singer & Singer, 2000).
At no previous time in history have children been so systematically inundated with immoral
examples of how to live. Moreover, seeing violence is related to lowered empathy, greater fear
of the world, and a propensity to act in harmful ways towards others (Mundorf & Laird, 2002).
Additionally, tools that are supposed to help parents in guiding choices for children are not
always reliable. For example, the Motion Picture Association ratings of movies have shifted over
prior decades (“ratings creep”), counting as “G” films that were once “PG,” and so on through
the ratings (Thompson & Yokota, 2004).
Garbarino (1999) suggests that we are raising our children in a toxic social environment
that has all sorts of ill effects. Schore (2009) suggests that the right brain (related to engagement)
is undernourished by current child rearing. McGilchrist (2009) describes how the left brain view
of the world (re-presented, discretely parceled) has dominated Western civilization from its
inception, at the expense of right brain emotional “presence,” contextual awareness, and
ecological respect. And so we have a society that maximizes bunker security, vicious and
detached imagination in contrast to the societies of our ancestors that fostered a right brain,
engagement orientation. Korten (2006) has suggested that the predominant USA narrative of
dominance, exploitation and empire, reflected in the media, be replaced with one emphasizing
collaboration and sustainability or earth as a community. Next, we examine how narrative
literature can help us move in this direction.
THE BENEFITS OF LITERATURE
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Although some argue that in an era when science seems on the verge of answering every
question, literature is irrelevant (Eastman, 1931), this is far from the case. Scientific thought
more often than not is rooted in the left brain’s detached imagination. The rich context,
uniqueness and nuance of everyday life is often discarded as “error.” In contrast, literature offers
a right-brain, contextualized and embodied sense of the world. Literature engages the heart and
expands the imagination (Roche, 2004). Denis Donoghue comments that the “pleasure of reading
literature arises from the exercise of one’s imagination, a going out from one’s self toward other
lives, other forms of life, past, present, and perhaps future ..This denotes its relation to sympathy,
fellowship, the spirituality and morality of being human” (Donoghue, Practice of Reading, 73).
Narratives engage all three ethics, cultivating imagination and engagement, as well as
satisfying the exploration orientation of the security ethic. Good literature provides exemplars of
virtue and of vice, coaching the reader on what to seek out and what to avoid. Watching someone
take action, literally or imaginatively as in reading, appears to be mirrored in the mind as if
personally rehearsed (“mirror neurons;” Rizzolatti et al., 2004). Virtuous behavior links the
engagement ethic with the communal imagination ethic. For example, Atticus Finch in To Kill a
Mockingbird is able to set aside personal safety interests, empathize with his client and challenge
the status quo imaginatively. In contrast, the villain, Bob Ewall, displays a character in which the
security ethic has killed off sociality and moral imagination. How did these two men become so
different? Whether vice or virtue, it is cultivated through extensive practice under the guidance
of a mentor or exemplars, as Aristotle emphasized (Urmson, 1988).
Suggestions for Fostering Engagement and Imagination Through Literature
Advocates of ethical and character education have often encouraged parents and
educators to expose children to stories and films that teach morality (Bennett, 1993; Kilpatrick,
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1992). But which stories are these? Some of the best-loved storybooks and films appear to be full
of morally focused messages (e.g., Walt Disney’s film, Pinocchio). Others are not (e.g.,
Disney’s Lilo and Stich which has a few closing minutes of remorse for the blatant disregard for
morality in the rest of the movie, or A.A. Milne’s Winnie-the-Pooh stories in which the
characters spend most of their time being self indulgent).
Further, how do we know what children are learning from “moral stories”? Some writers
have organized books of stories into categories like “honesty” or “compassion” (e.g., Bennett,
1993) and suggest that children read the stories to develop moral literacy. But these are adult
categorizations, made after a lifetime of learning from experience. In fact, the lessons adults
think a story teaches are not necessarily the lessons that children derive. To test the assumption
that children understand the moral lessons of stories as adults do, Narvaez and colleagues
conducted a series studies using theme generation and multiple-choice tasks (Narvaez, Bentley,
Gleason & Samuels, 1998; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell & Bentley, 1999). In Narvaez et al.
(1999) across four experimenter-constructed stories, the 9-year-olds selected the intended theme
about 10% of the time, Eleven-year-olds selected it about 45% of the time, college students over
90% of the time. Other studies by Narvaez (Narvaez, 1998; 1999; Narvaez & Gleason, 2007;
Narvaez, Gleason & Mitchell, in press; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele & Lasky, 2006) show that
even adults do not always comprehend stories in the same way (due to differences such as moral
judgment development, cultural background, or moral identity; Narvaez, 2002).
Should we care what messages or lessons children take away from media? Again, those
who tell the stories shape the culture. Perhaps adults should attend to the lessons of the media to
which they expose their children. But how can we figure out what lessons stories are teaching—
or what specifically children might learn from them? Rest's four-component model of morality
18
(Rest, 1983; Narvaez & Rest, 1995) is helpful in providing a framework for moral education
(Narvaez, 2006) and for analyzing the moral content of media and what it may be teaching. It is
an empirically-derived model of the components required for ethical behavior: (1) Ethical
Sensitivity, the ability to notice a need, feel concern, and imagine possible ways to help; (2)
Ethical Judgment, thinking about and selecting the most ethical action from among the imagined
choices; (3) Ethical Focus, prioritizing the ethical action over other goals; (4) Ethical Action,
carrying out the ethical action by knowing what steps to take and persevering. These four
components offer a way to assist children in perceiving the morality in a story, and developing
both the Engagement and Communal Imagination ethics. For a number of years, my students and
I have attempted to operationalize these four components in a ratings system that can be used
with children’s media (Gomberg, A., Zadzora, K., Walter, R., & Narvaez, D., 2005; Narvaez,
1998; Narvaez, D., Endicott, L., Bock, T., Mitchell, C., & Kang, Y., 1999; Narvaez, D.,
Gomberg, A., Matthews, A., 2004; Orlova, D., Gomberg, A., Squillace, M., & Narvaez, D.,
2005). These attempts have resulted in the Rating Ethical Content Scale (RECS; Narvaez,
2008b).5 We also suggest questions that educators and parents can use when discussing a story
with children (from Narvaez, 2008b). See Table 3.
The Rating Ethical Content Scale, based on Rest’s four components, provides a way to
find stories (books, television, movies) that are highly conducive to fostering Engagement and
Communal Imagination ethics. For example, E. B. White’s, Charlotte’s Web, and L. Frank
Baum’s, The Wizard of Oz, emphasize relationships, self-sacrifice for others and imaginative
problem solving. Stories can foster understanding of others, awareness of possibilities for action
and a moral identity. For example, The Andy Griffith Show generally demonstrates all four
components. Andy is considerate of the feelings of others (sensitivity), seeks to do the right thing
19
(judgment), taking steps to make it happen (action) while maintaining his integrity (motivation).
Some stories can be interpreted in different ways. For example, The Little Engine That Could can
be interpreted from an ethical perspective—that the engine was working hard and persevering to
help the children on the other side of the mountain, or from a self-centered perspective—that the
engine could be strong and confident if he talked himself into it. Here are a few more examples
of stories that emphasize one or more of the four components.
Ethical Sensitivity. A story with ethical sensitivity dramatizes concern for others,
empathy and awareness of the consequences of one’s actions. How do characters feel? How do
other characters respond? How does the action or outcome affect others? Sensitivity is part of the
engagement ethic. In “Old Mr. Rabbit’s Thanksgiving dinner” (Bennett, 1993), Mr. Rabbit
shows compassion for his hungry neighbors by inviting them to dinner and demonstrates
thoughtful insight by selecting food for them that is sure to please them. He is happy even though
he there was not enough food left for him. The film, Avatar, shows the exquisite sensitivity of
the indigenous people to the natural world.
Sometimes a negative example can teach (although children need lots of positive
examples of moral sensitivity and what to imitate). For example, the story about King Midas, the
author describes the feelings of the daughter who is neglected by her father because of his focus
on acquiring riches. The reader learns about the importance of caring for others instead of for
material wealth. In the Pixar film, Up, the main characters increase in sensitivity to one another
and others.
Ethical Judgment. A story with ethical judgment shows the character wrestling with
determining the right thing to do in relation to rules or codes and personal integrity. What is the
best action and why? A character exhibiting mindful morality focuses on the common good and
20
what is fair for all, thinking through options and consequences. To Kill a Mockingbird is
particularly adept at raising issues of moral judgment. The challenge in moral education is to
learn not detached imagination or vicious imagination but communal imagination. J.K.
Rowling’s characters in the Harry Potter series demonstrate both vicious imagination
(Voldemort) and communal imagination (Dumbledoreis the latter more evident in the books than
in the films).
Ethical Focus. Generally, ethical focus concerns the ethical demand in the situation—to
what will the character pay attention? What does the character value? In “The Indian
Cinderella,” (Macmillan, 1920) the good sister is motivated to be honest, kind and gentle
(engagement ethic); the motives of her evil sisters are to gain advantage over their sister by
destroying her beauty (vicious imagination). In the story, both moral and immoral points of view
are dramatized, allowing the reader to see injustice on one side and perseverance on the other.
The chief’s two eldest daughters lie to reach their goal of winning the heart of the great Indian
warrior, Strong Wind. Jealous of their younger sister, they maim her and mistreat her, lying to
their father about the cause of her misfortune. Their younger sister is patient and does not lie
when given the opportunity to win the heart of Strong Wind. In the best of films and books,
characters struggle with a good action that will have ramifications that put themselves in danger.
J.K. Rowling’s character, Harry Potter, often faces choices like these.
Ethical Action. In stories, this component refers to what kinds of action the reader or
viewer sees the characters actually take. What standards are followed? What kind of self-control
is displayed. What steps are taken and how? Is the character able to persevere despite setbacks
and obstacles? In The Odyssey, Odysseus cleverly plans his and his men’s escape from the
Cyclops’ cave. Odysseus shows patience and persistence. He carefully takes one manageable
21
step at a time in a series of steps that leads to their freedom. J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter is a
particularly good role model for ethical action. He usually does the right thing, showing bravery
and courage in protecting or saving others (mindful morality).
These are just a few examples of how to use stories to discuss morality. If we do more of
this with children and with each other, we may influence our cultural discourse to shift from one
of self-concern and competition to one of cooperation and compassion.
Conclusion
The suggestion here is that we attend to how we build emotion systems in babies and to
which emotion systems we foster in children and in one another. First, early sensitive care leads
to more positive emotions and ethics that foster well-being in self and others. Those who
maintain positive emotions like gratitude are more likely to behave in compassionate ways
(Emmons, 2009). Second, the cultural narratives we use influence the viewpoints we adopt.
Narratives of ethical responsibility and cooperation foster engagement and imagination ethics.
Third, the situational climates we design also affect which emotions and ethics are habitually
practiced. Meeting basic human needs fosters more positive emotions and prosocial ethics.
Finally, if the stories that children hear are those that shape their understanding of the
world, then caring adults best pay attention to which stories children hear. Children model what
they see and need extensive exposures to good models. Drawing children back to the life of
relational engagement, a type of “slow time,” through reading and discussing good literature
with good characters, may foster the prosocially engaged and imaginative sides of their
personalities. The narratives we ponder shape our moral goals, preferences and expectations,
diminishing or enhancing human cooperation.
22
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FOOTNOTES
1 I appreciate the excellent feedback provided by several anonymous reviewers.
2 These categories are adapted from story grammars (e.g., Schneider, Dube & Hayward, 2005).
3 Several basic emotion systems have been identified and mapped in mammalian brains. These
include RAGE, SEEKING, CARE, PLAY, PANIC (separation distress), and others (see
Panksepp, 1998, for full details).
4 The name of the theory was inspired by MacLean’s Triune Brain theory (1990) that identifies
three evolved brain strata. The brain is more complex than Triune Brain theory makes it out to be
but the theory can be a useful general framework.
5 The Rating Ethical Content System (RECS) can be viewed at http://goodmedia.nd.edu/
45
Table 1
Examples of Infant Experience Leading to Differences in Personal Grammar
Humanistic1 Parenting Example
Baby
Category
Caregiver
Leilani gets hungry.
Initiating Event
Leilani cries from pain.
Action
Outcome/Initiating Event
Leilani was satisfied.
Caregiver hears the cry.
Goal
Caregiver wants to comfort Leilani.
Action
Caregiver feeds Leilani.
Outcome
Caregiver is happy.
INTERNALIZED EMOTION NARRATIVE (after frequent occurrence): I can get my needs met
when I express my needs. The world is trustworthy and so are my emotions.
Normative1 Parenting Example
Jesse gets hungry.
Initiating Event
Jesse cries from pain.
Action
Initiating Event
Caregiver hears the cry.
Goal
Caregiver wants to finish what she is doing.
Action
Caregiver keeps doing what she is doing.
Jesse becomes more distressed.
Outcome/Initiating Event
Jesse screams and screams.
Action
Goal
Caregiver gets annoyed.
Caregiver wants to quiet Jesse.
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Outcome
Caregiver shakes Jesse, yells at Jesse and
finally feeds Jesse.
INTERNALIZED EMOTION NARRATIVE (after frequent occurrence): The world is harsh and
chaotic; subtle internal signals (emotions) are useless. I cannot get my needs met very easily.
1
Humanistic and Normative refer to Tompkins’ (1965) descriptions of parenting.
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Table 2
Discussion Questions for Identifying the Ethical Components of Stories (based on the
Rating Ethical Content Scale, RECS; Narvaez, 2008b)
ETHICAL SENSITIVITY
1. Did the character care about other people’s feelings? How or how not?
2. Did the character notice what other people’s needs were? How or how not?
3. Did the character notice things that were wrong or that hurt other people? How or how
not?
4. Did the character show his or her feelings in a way that didn’t hurt other people or
things? How or how not?
5. Did the character listen and took to heart what other people said? How or how not?
6. Did the character try to understand how other people thought about things? How or how
not?
7. Did the character try to understand people who were different or from different cultures?
How or how not?
8. Did the character act like a good friend? How or how not?
ETHICAL REASONING
1. Did the character try to understand all parts of the problem before deciding what to do?
How or how not?
2. Did the character think about how others might be upset by his or her choices, actions or
decisions? How or how not?
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3. Did the character think about doing the right thing? How or how not?
4. Did the character think about his or her decision afterwards? How or how not?
5. Did the character try to follow the rules? How or how not?
6. Was the character positive or optimistic about solving the problem? How or how not?
7. Did the character try to pick goals and things to do that help the community and show
how to do the right thing? How or how not?
8. Did the character want things to be fair for everyone? How or how not?
ETHICAL FOCUS
1. Did the character show good self control over his or her own behaviors? How or how
not?
2. Did the character care about what other people thought was right? How or how not?
3. Did the character try to be the best he or she could be? How or how not?
4. Did the character think he or she really could solve the conflict or problem? How or how
not?
5. Did the character follow through on promises and agreements? How or how not?
6. Did the character choose to do the wrong thing even though it was easier to do than the
right thing? How or how not?
7. Did the character try to take care of other people first, before taking care of himself or
herself? How or how not?
8. Did the character follow high standards for his or her own behavior? How or how not?
ETHICAL ACTION
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1. Did the character try to fix problems or conflicts without hurting other people, animals or
things? How or how not?
2. Did the character speak up to help other people? How or how not?
3. Did the character try to help other people, animals, or things? How or how not?
4. Did the character try to change rules that were unfair? How or how not?
5. Did the character make a plan to solve a conflict or problem? How or how not?
6. Did the character when trying to solve a conflict or problem, overcome things that got in
the way or changed the plan when it wasn’t working? How or how not?
7. Did the character not give up on solving the conflict or problem when it was hard? How
or how not?
8. Was the character brave when helping others or solving a problem or conflict? How or
how not?
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