Arguing with Socrates
t.chappell@open.ac.uk
Reading 1.1 (Socrates and Laches): If we want to educate our sons in virtue, we need to
know what virtue is. But looking at the whole of virtue would be too big a task. So let’s just
look at a part of it—courage. Once we know what courage is, we can investigate how it is
acquired.
Reading 1.2 (Socrates and Laches): A definition of courage can’t just give us an example of
courage; it must give us what all examples have in common. Compare the case of quickness,
which Socrates shows how to define. What is the parallel definition of courage?
Reading 1.3 (Socrates and Laches): Laches’ definition: “Courage is endurance.” Instantly
refuted, because not all endurance is good, whereas all courage is good.
Reading 1.4 (Socrates, Nicias, and Laches): Nicias’ definition: “Courage is knowledge of
what’s fearful and what’s encouraging, whether it’s in war or any other situation.”
Reading 1.5 (Socrates, Nicias, and Laches): Socrates: But Nicias’ definition implies that
lions, stags, bulls, and apes aren’t courageous. Nicias: Yes, and this is a key advantage of
Nicias’ definition: It explains why children and animals (and Nicias would add, women)
aren’t truly courageous—because they don’t have understanding or foresight.
Reading 1.6 (Socrates and Nicias): Socrates:
“Knowledge of what’s fearful and encouraging”
=
knowledge about what will be fearful and what will be encouraging
=
knowledge of what it will be right to run away from and what it will be right to stand up to
without running away
=
knowledge of what will be good and what will be evil
But there’s no such thing as knowledge of what will be F or not-F without knowledge also of
what was F or not-F and of what is F or not-F. If you have knowledge about Fs at all, it can’t
be tensed in this way.
So if courage is knowledge of what will be good and what will be evil, it is also knowledge of
what was good and what was evil and knowledge of what is good and what is evil.
So Nicias’ definition means that courage is knowledge of good and evil in general.
Reading 1.7 (Socrates and Nicias): But anyone who has a general knowledge of good and
evil has all the other virtues (temperance, justice and piety) as well as courage.
So if courage is merely one part of virtue, Nicias’ definition must be wrong.
Reading 1.8 (From Plato’s Meno: Socrates and Meno): Knowledge and correct opinion are
equally useful in practice, because both get us to the truth. But knowledge is more worth
having than correct opinion. When you have correct opinion which isn’t knowledge, you
don’t understand why your opinions are correct. (That’s the difference between knowledge
and correct opinion.) So your correct opinions will be easily changed into incorrect opinions.
When someone challenges them, they’ll be overturned just as easily as if they were incorrect.
By contrast, your knowledge will stay put when it’s challenged, because you will be able to
explain your view.
This conception of knowledge unlocks some puzzles:
● Why Nicias’ definition of courage fails in the Laches—even though Plato thinks it is
roughly correct.
The definition fails because Nicias doesn’t know how to defend it. What he should say,
according to Plato, is that courage isn’t just part of virtue: it’s the same thing as the whole of
virtue. But Nicias doesn’t see this possibility.
● Why Plato thinks that you can’t be courageous without thinking things out in advance.
You don’t have to have one think per courageous act! But you do have to sit down and do
some thinking before you can do any truly courageous acts. Until you know about good and
evil in general, you can’t be truly courageous.
● Why Plato thinks you can’t be courageous in an unjust cause.
Because if you know good and evil in general, you will see that bad ends are not worth
risking anything for. Unless you take risks only for just causes, you’re not really being
courageous at all.
● Why Plato thinks you can’t choose to do what you know to be wrong.
You can choose something that you have a correct opinion is wrong, because this opinion is
easily removed or made to “scamper off”. But you can’t choose what you know is wrong. For
when you have a full understanding of its wrongness and why it is wrong, you won’t be able
to choose against that understanding.
To think about further
Why are Plato and Socrates so interested in the virtues in the first place? The answer
is that they are trying to answer the question “How should life be lived?” (Republic 452d7-8).
To answer “How should life be lived?” we need to know what kind of people we need to be to
live well. The answer to this is given by identifying the qualities of character that we will
need to live well. These qualities are the virtues.
Plato’s view that all the virtues are the same thing, and that thing is knowledge, can
look very strange when you think about it. In our society, we happily count characteristics
like patience, a sense of humour, humility, and honesty as virtues. It’s odd to say that patience
is the same thing as a sense of humour, or that honesty and humility are identical character
traits. It’s even odder to say that patience, a sense of humour, humility and honesty are all the
same thing as knowledge.
Is this because our understanding of the virtues has changed since Plato’s time? Well,
we do recognise different virtues from Plato’s era, but the same oddity occurs with the five
main virtues that Plato’s society recognised—wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and
piety. Plato’s contemporaries were quite as puzzled as we might be by his thesis that all the
virtues are the same thing.
Plato’s view is puzzling because it’s a rationalist view, and an anti-traditionalist
view. Plato thinks that the justification for his view is (1) that there are decisive arguments in
its favour; and (2) that if his view is right, then we can decide how to live by using reason to
think out how to live. His view has the backing of reason, and it is an enthronement of reason.
Since his view has reason on its side in this very strong sense, Plato doesn’t really care if his
thesis puzzles traditionalists. Not at any rate at the early stage in his career that the Laches
represents. In later works he does try and modify his views a bit, or soften their tone, to try
and make them less puzzling to traditionalists. And he does get less confident about what
reason can achieve. But his basic rationalism never changes.