Philosophy 190: Plato
Fall, 2014
Prof. Peter Hadreas
Course website:
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas
/courses/Plato
LACHES
Characters in Laches
I. Lysimachus and Melesias.
Two elderly men. Lysimachus is the son of Aristeides "the
Just" and Melesias is the son of Thucydides the Elder (not the
historian). Both fathers were well-known political figures of
the previous generation and thought by many as exemplars of
virtue.)
II. Nicias and Laches.
Two main generals of the Peloponnesian War.
Characters in Laches
III. Stesilaus
He never appears in the dialogue itself, but he has just given a
demonstration of hoplomachia, or the art of fighting with
heavy arms. Perhaps, he’s a teacher, an athlete, technician,
actor, and artist. He does not use his skill to actually fight
the enemy.
IV. Two boys.
The sons of Lysimachus and Melesias.
V. Socrates
In his late 40s, when the dialogue takes place. Socrates is
younger than Lysimachus, Melesias, Nicias and Laches.
Grandfathers and fathers in the Laches
Aristides, nicknamed
Thucydides (not the historian)
‘The Just’1
led the conservatives in
opposition to Pericles
during the period preceding
the Peloponnesian War
Lysimachus
Melesias
Aristides, a boy in the Laches
grandson of his namesake
Aristides ‘The Just,’
mentioned in
Theaetetus, 151A
Thucydides, also a
a boy in the Laches
who has the namesake
of his grandfather
1. The ancient historian Herodotus cited him as "the best and most honorable man in Athens,”
Herodotus, Histories, 8.79
Thematic Question: Are Lysimachus and Melesias suited or
unsuited to develop the character and well-being of their
sons?
What Lysimachus and Melesias have in common
1. Both quite old men, older than Nicias and Laches.
Lysimachus 180D speaks of his advancing years.
2. They are undistinguished
“But neither of us has a word to say about his own
accomplishments. This is what shames us in front of them
[our children]...” 179D, p. 665
3. Their fathers were the main Athenian leaders of the early
fifth century. They were known as especially virtuous men.
Thematic Question: Are they suited or unsuited to develop
the character and well-being of their sons?
What Lysimachus and Melesias have in common
[continued from previous slide]
4. Their fathers were too occupied with public affairs to give
them a good education:
Lysimachus: “… and we blame our own fathers for allowing
us to take thing easy when we were growing up, while they
were busy with other peoples’ affairs.” 179D, p. 665
Laches agrees, 180B: “ …everyone engaged in public affairs,
because this is pretty generally what happens to them – that
they neglect their private affairs. Children as well as
everything else …”
The Procedure by which Lysimachus and Melesias Decide How
To Teach Their Children to be Courageous
Laches 184D-E
Lysimachus: Well, I do ask your opinion, Socrates, since what might be called
our council seems to me to be still in need of someone to cast the deciding vote.
If these two [Laches and Nicias] had agreed, there would have been less
necessity of such a procedure, but as it is, you perceive that Laches has voted in
opposition to Nicias. So we would do well to hear from you too, and find out
with which of them you plan to vote.
Socrates: What’s that, Lysimachus? Do you intend to cast your vote for
whatever position is approved by the majority of us?
Lysimachus: What else could a person do, Socrates?
Socrates: And do you, Melesias, plan to act in the same way? Suppose there
should be a council to decide whether your son ought to practice a particular
kind of gymnastic exercise, would you be persuaded by the greater number or
by whoever has been educated and exercised under a good trainer?
Melesias: Probably by the latter, Socrates. [added emphasis]
Who Was Nicias?
Nicias (c. 470 BC – 413 BC), was an Athenian politician
and general and a member of the Athenian aristocracy. He
became the main opponent of the demagogue Cleon for
leadership of the Athenian state after the death of Pericles
in 429 BCE. He was opposed to the imperialist designs of
Cleon and the democratic faction. His aim was to achieve
peace with Sparta as soon as it could be obtained on terms
acceptable to Athens.
Nicias
The temporary peace that quelled the Peloponnesian War
in 421 BCE was known as the Peace of Nicias.
Nicias objected to the resumption of war and the ambitious
plans of Alcibiades to invade Sicily. Even so, Nicias was
designated to be a leader in the invasion of Sicily. Upon the
defeat of the Athenian army in Sicily, Nicias was executed.
Nicias’ advice about the teaching of courageous
behavior
Laches 181E-182E
Nicias
Nicias: . . . I think that knowledge of this branch of study
[fighting in armor] is beneficial for the young in all sorts of
ways . . . . necessarily improves their bodies . . . . this and
horsemanship are forms of exercise especially suited to a
free citizen. . . . every man who learns to fight in armor
will want to learn the subject that comes next, that is the
science of tactics . . . he will press on to the whole art of the
general . . . . this knowledge will make every man much
bolder and braver in war than he was before. . . .
Location where
the Battle of
Mantinea took
place as it looks
in modern times.
Who Was Laches?
Born approx. 470 BCE. In 427 BCE, Laches was the
admiral of a fleet sent to Sicily – not the main invasion of
Sicily in the Peloponnesian War in which the Athenians
were defeated but an earlier and lesser battle. When
Laches returned to Athens he was prosecuted by the
populist demagogue Cleon, but was acquitted of any
wrongdoing.
Laches helped Nicias to negotiate the Peace of Nicias.
But in 418 BCE the peace broke down and war was
resumed. Laches was again appointed general and was
killed in the Battle of Mantinea, 418 BCE, a battle that
took place near Argos in the Peloponnese. The battle
ended in an extreme defeat of the Athenians and their
allies.
Laches’ Thoughts About Teaching Courageous Behavior
Laches 183A-184E
Laches: “ . . . The reason I say these things about it [either fighting with
armor is not a real study or it is not worth learning] is that I consider
that, if there were anything in it, it would have not escaped the attention
of the Lacedaemonians [Spartans], who have no other concern in life
than to look for and engage in whatever studies and pursuits will
increase their superiority in war. . . . Then again, Lysimachus, I have
encountered quite a few of these gentleman on the actual field of battle
and I have seen what they are like . . . . Not a single practitioner of this
art of fighting in armor has ever become renowned in war. . . . For
instance this man Stesilaus, whom you and I have witnessed giving a
display before such a large crowd and praising himself the way he did . .
. In the course of the fight it [Stesilaus’ combination of a scythe and
spear] somehow got entangled in the rigging of the other ship and there
it stuck. So Stesilaus dragged at the weapon in an attempt to free it, but
he could not . . . .For a time he kept running along the deck holding fast
to the spear . . . And when somebody hit the deck at his feet with a stone,
he let go the shaft, then the men on the trireme could not help from
laughing when they saw that remarkable scythe-spear dangling from the
transport. . . .”
Laches’ Summary Remarks about the value of training in
fighting with armor
184B-C Laches: “So, as I said at the beginning, either it
[fighting in armor] is an art but has little value, or it is not an
art but people say and pretend that it is, but in any case it is
not worth trying to learn. And then it seems to me that if a
cowardly man should imagine he had mastered the art, he
would, because of his increasing rashness, show up more
clearly the man he was, whereas in the case of a brave man,
everyone would be watching him and if he made the smallest
mistake, he would incur a great deal of criticism. The reason
for this is that a man who pretends knowledge of this sort is
the object of envy, so that unless he is outstandingly superior
to the rest, there is no way in which he can possibly avoid
becoming a laughingstock when he claims to have this
knowledge.” [added emphasis]
Socrates at the Battle of Delium (or Delion, a city in Boeotia), 424 BC. The
Athenians lost the battle. Laches: “He [Socrates] marched with me in the
retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if the rest had been as willing
to behave in the same manner, our city would be safe and we would not
suffer a disaster of that kind.” 181B
FIRST DEFINITION
OF
COURAGE
Laches: “ Good heavens, Socrates, there is no difficulty about
that: if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend
himself against the enemy without running away, then you
may rest assured the man has courage.” p. 675, 190E
SECOND DEFINITION
OF
COURAGE
Laches: “Well, then I think it is a sort of endurance of the
soul, if it is necessary to say what its nature is in all these
cases.” p. 677, 192C
THIRD DEFINITION
OF
COURAGE
Nicias: “What I say, Laches, is that it is the knowledge of the
fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other human
situation.”
p. 680, 195A
Transition from the Third Definition of Courage to the Fourth.1
Socrates reminds Nicias of his earlier assertion that
1. Courage is part of virtue. (198A)
Nicias proposes that
2. Courage is knowledge of what is to be feared and hoped for (199B)
Socrates points out that that’s equivalent to saying:
3. Courage is the knowledge of future goods and evils (198B-C)
Socrates points out knowledge applies to past, present and future so:
4. The knowledge of past evils, the knowledge of [present evils, and the
knowledge of future evils is the same knowledge (198D-199A)
It follows that:
5. Courage is knowledge of the past, present and future goods and evils
(199B-C)
1. adapted from Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Smith, Nicolas D., The Philosophy of
Socrates, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 200), pp. 162-3.
FOURTH DEFINITION
OF
COURAGE
Socrates: “Nicias, whereas we asked you what the whole of
courage was. And now it appears, according to your view,
that courage is the knowledge not just of the fearful and the
hopeful, but in your own opinion, it would be the knowledge
of practically all goods and evils put together. Do you agree to
this new change, Nicias, or what do you say?”
p. 684, 199C
Reduction of Fourth Definition to an ‘elenchus’ or
contradiction.
1. Anyone who has knowledge of all goods and evils – past,
present and future – has complete virtue. (199D)
2. Courage is not part of virtue but the whole of virtue (199E)
which contradicts Nicias’ earlier affirmation:
Socrates: And didn’t you [Nicias] give your answer supposing
that it [courage] was a part, and, as such, one among a
number of other parts, all of which taken together were called
virtue?”
(198A).
Unity of the Virtues
The Equivalence thesis:
Each individual virtue names and there are five -- courage, self-control,
justice, piety, and wisdom – refers to different types of moral knowledge.
They each have their own definition and the knowledge of one does not
imply the knowledge of another. There is a unity of the virtues, but that is
because one of the virtues, wisdom, is a necessary condition of all the
virtues. Most influential proponent of the ‘equivalence thesis’ is Gregory
Vlastos.1
1. Vlastos, Gregory, Platonic Studies, 2nd ed. , (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 221-269;
418-423.
Example: Euthyphro, 12C-D
Socrates: “This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether there is
piety there is also justice but where there is justice there is not always
piety, for the pious is part of the just. Shall we say that or do you think
otherwise.”
Unity of the Virtues
Identity thesis:
The individual virtues refer to one power and function so that one cannot
have one virtue without the others.1,2,3
1. Penner, T., “The Unity of Virtue, “ Philosophical Review, 82, 1973, pp. 35-68.
2. Irwin, Terence, Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 86-90
3. Woodruff, Paul, “Socrates on the Parts of Virtue,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1976, supplement
to vol.2, 101-106.
Example: Protagoras 349A-D
Socrates:
“So right now I want to remind you to remind me of some the of questions
I first started from the beginning . . . I believe the first question was this:
Wisdom, temperance, justice, courage and piety—are these five names for
the same thing, or is there underlying each of the names a unique thing, a
thing that has its own power and function, each one unlike any of the
others?
Unity of the Virtues
Identity Thesis [continued from previous slide]:
The individual virtues refer to one power and function so that one cannot
have one virtue without the others.
Example: Protagoras 349A-D [continued
Socrates: “You said that they are not names for the same thing, that each
of these names refer to a unique thing, and that these are all parts of
virtue, not like parts of gold which are similar and to the whole of which
they are parts, but like parts of a face, dissimilar to the whole of which
they are parts and to each other, and each one having its own unique
power or function. If this is still your view, say so; if it’s changed in any
way, make you new position clear, for I am certainly not going to hold you
accountable for what you said before if you want to say something
different now.”
Euthyphro
Proposed definitions of piety
1. “Well then, what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is
impious,” (7A)
Refutation:
i) Different gods consider different things to be right,
honorable, base, good, and bad, (7E-8B)
ii) Depending on which gods are considered, something can
be both pious and impious.
iii) Something cannot be both “A” and “not A”.
Euthyphro
Proposed definitions of piety
2. “. . . the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite,
what all the gods hate, is impious.” (9D)
Refutation:
i) Socrates inquires into the immediate reasons for
something being loved or something being pious.
a) Something is loved (or carried or seen) because someone
loves (or carries or sees) it, (10A-C). Thus it’s determined
the action of the agent.
b) But Euthyphro agrees that something is pious, not
because the gods love it, but because, simply enough, it is
pious, (10D). Or, in other words, something is pious because
of an object’s pious properties
Euthyphro
Proposed definitions of piety
2. “. . . the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite,
what all the gods hate, is impious.” (9D) [continued]
Refutation [continued]:
ii) But if what all the gods love defines the pious, then
certain substitutions follow, (10E). Like, piety, what is loved
by the gods should be so because of properties of the beloved
object. But this contradicts ‘i a’). On the other hand, what is
pious then should be pious just because of the agents’
pleasure. But this contradicts ‘I b’). We arrive at a double
contradiction (11A). So Euthyphro’s second attempt at
definition must be rejected.
Euthyphro
Proposed definitions of piety
3. “I think, Socrates, that the godly and the pious is the part
of justice that is concerned with the care of the gods, while
that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of
justice.” (12E)
Refutation:
A) analysis of “care of the gods” includes the notion of
“making better.” But the gods cannot be made better, (13C).
Euthyphro
Proposed definitions of piety
Refutation of Euthyphro’s third definition continued
B) Euthyphro changes “care of the gods” to “service of the
gods,” (13D).
i) “service of the gods” includes the notion, according to
Euthyphro of “knowing how to sacrifice and pray,” (14C).
ii) sacrifice is analyzed into “giving to the gods” and praying
into “begging from the gods, “ (14D).
iii) But from ‘Bii’ “service to the gods” entails “a sort of
trading skill between gods and men” (14E).
iv) The benefit that the gods receive is our honor, reverence
and gratitude, (15B).
v) But we have come again to the notion that the pious is
what is dear to the gods which was refuted in elenchus #2.
A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided
Line passage in The Republic:
Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D
Socrates: “Consider now how the intelligible is to be divided.”
Glaucon: How?
S: As follows: In one subsection, the soul, using as images the
things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from
hypothesis, not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the
other subsection, however it makes its way to a first principle
that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but
without the images used in the previous subsection, using
forms themselves and making its investigation through them.
G: I don’t fully understand what you mean.
A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided
Line passage in The Republic:
Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D
[continued]
S: Let’s try again. You’ll understand it more easily after the
following preamble. I think you know that students of
geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and
even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other
things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they
knew them. They make their hypotheses and don’t think it
necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or
others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from
these first principles through the remaining steps, they arrive
in full agreement.
G: I certainly know that much
A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided
Line passage in The Republic:
Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D
[continued]
S: Then you also know that, although they use visible figures
and make claims about them, their thought isn’t directed to
them but to those other things that they are like. They make
their claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal
itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the
others. These figures that they make and draw, of which
shadows and reflection in water are images, they now turn in
use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that
one cannot see except by means of thought.
G: That’s true.
A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided
Line passage in The Republic:
Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D
[continued]
S: This, then, is the kind of thing that, on the one hand, I said
is intelligible, and, on the other, is such that the soul is forced
to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not traveling up to
a first principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypotheses,
but using as images those very things of which images were
made in the section below, and which, by comparison to their
images, were thought to be clear and valued as such.
G: I understand that you mean what happens in geometry
and related sciences.
A section from the very well-known Analogy of the Divided
Line passage in The Republic: Republic, Book VI, 510B-511D
[continued]
S: Then also understand that, by the other section of the intelligible, I
mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not
consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses – but
as stepping stones top take off from, enabling it to reach the
unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this
principle, it reverses itself, and keeping hold of what follows from it,
comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all,
but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, and ending
in forms.
G: I understand, if not yet adequately (for in my opinion you’re speaking
of an enormous task), that you want to distinguish the intelligible part of
that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic, as clearer than
the part studied by the so-called sciences, for which their hypotheses are
first principles. . . .”
References to pictures used in this powerpoint
slide #2, bust of Plato: http://www.ancientgreece.com/s/People/Plato/
Slide # 10, field where battle of Mantinea took place:
http://www.livius.org/a/greece/mantineia/mantinea_battlefield_jvv.JPG
slide# 13& 14, bust of Nicias
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicias#mediaviewer/File:Nicias,_p_105_(World%27s_Famous_Orations_
Vol_1).jpg
slide #15, map of alliances on the Peloponne4sian War: http://www.ranker.com/pics/L284108/a-list-ofall-peloponnesian-war-battles-u3