International Political Economy
Class venue: Management College Rm. 320
Instructor: Shyh-Fang Ueng
Evaluation of Learning Progress: First Essay 40%; Second Essay 60%.
I.
Introdoction
1.
Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara, 2005, “Ethnic Diversity and Economic
Performance,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XLIII, 3:721-61.
2.
Alesina, Alberto, Angeloni, Ignazio, and Etro Federico, 2005, “International Unions,” The
American Economic Review, vol95, 3:602-615.
3.
Acemoglu, Daron, 2005, “Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on
Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions ,” Journal of Economic
Literature, vol XLIII, 4:1025-48.
4.
Page, Scott, 2005, “Are We Collapsing? A Review of Jared Diamond’s How Societies
Choose to Fail or Succeed ,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol XLIII, 4: 1049-72.
5.
Gregory, Paul and Mark Harrison, 2005, “Allocation under Dictatorship: Research in
Stalin’s Archives,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol XLIII, 3:721-761.
6. Mansfield, Edward D., and Reinhardt, Eric, 2003, “Multilateral Determinants of
Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading
Arrangements,” International Organization 57: 829-62.
7. Bundy, McGeorge, 1988, Danger and Survival, New York: Vintage.
8. Pahre, Robert, 2001, “Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations,”
International Organization 55: 859-90.
II. International Bargaining
1. Drahos, Peter, 2003, “When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World
Trade Organization,” International Organization 8:79-109.
2. Daughety, Andrew F., and Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2004, “Exploiting Future Settlements: a signalling model of most-favored nation clauses in settlement bargaining,” RAND Journal of Economics 35:0467-0485.
3. Manzini, Paola and Mariotti, Marco, 2004, “Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in
Bilateral Negotiations,” The Economic Journal 114:943-60.
4. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1992, “A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information,” Review of
Economic Studies 59 (January): 187-203.
5. Cramton, Peter, 1992, “Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies 59(January):205-25.
6. Gawande, Kishore and Hansen, Wendy, 1999, “Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of
‘Free and Fair’ Trade,” International Organization 53:117-59.
7. Downs, George and Rocke, Davidd, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

8. Perry, Motty, and Reny, Phillip, 1993, “A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with
Strategically Timed Offers,” Journal of Economic Theory 59:50-77.
9. Powell, Robert, 1996, “Bargaining in the Shadow of Power,” Games and Economic
Behavior 15:255-89.
10. Steinberg, Richard, 2002, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO,” International Organization 56: 339-374.
III. International Economic Cooperation
1.
Snidal, Duncan, 1991, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,”
American Political Science Review 85: 701-26.
2.
Dinar, Ariel and Wolf, Aaron, 1997, “Economic and Political Considerations in Regional
Cooperation Models,” Agricultural and Resources Economic Review, 26:7-22.
3.
Feinberg, Richard E., 2003, “The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade
Arrangements,” The World Economy 26:1019-40.
4.
Gilligan, Michael J., 2004, “Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International
Multilateral Agreements?” International Organization 58:459-84.
5.
Grieco, Joseph, 1990, Cooperation among Nations, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.
6.
Ghosh, Madanmohan; Perroni, Carlo, and Whalley, John, 2003, “Developing-Country
Benefits from MFN Relative to Regional/Bilateral Trade Arrangements,” Review of
International Economics 11:712-28.
7.
Hu, Weixing, 1999, “China and Northeast Asian Cooperation: The Economic-Security
Nexus,” Global Economic Review 28: 50-67.
8.
Keohane, Robert, 1986, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International
Organization 40(winter):1-27.
IV. Tradeoffs between Economic Benefit and Security
1. Liberman, Peter, 1996, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,”
International Security 21:147-75.
2. Lipson, Charles, 1984, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,”
World Politics 37:1-23.
3. Martin, Lisa, 1993, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International Organization
46:765-92.
4. Morrow, James D. 1989, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A limited Information
Model of Crisis Bargaining,” American Journal of Political Science 33:941-72.
5. Snyder, Glenn, 1984, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36:
461-95.