NEG
***TOPICALITY***
topicality – “its” – 1nc
(A) violation: the aff has a different actor besides the United States Government do the ocean exploration and development
1. “Its” denotes possession
Glossary of English 05. (http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)
Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG.
This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)
2. Possession means control over
Oxford Dictionaries 11. http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/possession
Possession Pronunciation:/pəˈzɛʃ(ə)n/ noun 1 [mass noun] the state of having , owning, or controlling something: she had taken
possession of the sofa the book came into my possession he remains in full possession of his sanity
(B) This is a voter:
1. unpredictable research burden ---- can’t predict the “country or company of the week” kind of affirmatives
2. extra-topical advantages, which is independently a voter because this gives the aff an unfair set of literature base which they
can access for all kinds of nefarious purposes, which makes us have to go for T to just get back to square one
***DISAD WORK***
politics link – 1nc
the plan triggers political firestorms for Obama
RESTUCCIA ’12 – energy reporter for Politico, previous energy reporter for the Hill (Restuccia, Andrew. “High U.S. oil production
leads to partisan debate”. June 12, 2012. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77356.html)
U.S. oil production reached its highest level since 1998 in the first three months of 2012, providing fodder for more political wrangling
about who should get the credit. Last week’s Energy Information Administration data came as welcome news for the Obama
administration, which has been working for months to combat Republican allegations that the president is blocking expanded oil and
gas production. But some experts say the credit largely belongs to the private sector. “In the end, the president and Congress can’t take credit for what price and
technology have delivered,” Tom Kloza, chief oil analyst at the Oil Price Information Service, said in an email. “It would be akin to taking credit for the iPad.” Kloza
said high oil prices have created incentives for expanded exploration of unconventional oil plays like the Bakken Shale in North Dakota and the Eagle Ford Shale in
Texas. There, he noted, advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have led to a “land rush.” “Unless there is a price collapse, or a true scientific
indictment of fracking, one can expect to see plentiful growth in light sweet crude coming from the Rockies, North Dakota and even Ohio or West Virginia,” Kloza
said. Richard Newell, who served as head of the EIA from 2009 to 2011, agreed. “In a political year, different parties would like to take credit for
positive news in the energy sector, and I think here the credit largely goes to technology,” said Newell, who is also a professor of energy economics
at Duke University. He added that high crude oil prices are also a major factor. EIA’s June 5 monthly petroleum supply report said domestic oil production this
year went above 6 million barrels a day in the first quarter for the first time since October-December 1998. The report said the increase is a result of “higher output from
North Dakota, Texas and federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico.” Amy Myers Jaffe, an energy fellow at Rice University, said shale production in North Dakota and Texas
is largely on private land outside the control of the federal government and that increases in production in the Gulf are a result of the actions of previous presidents.
Both points echo common arguments from GOP and oil industry critics of President Barack Obama. “Production rises from Gulf of Mexico would have been in the
hopper way before President Obama took office,” she wrote in an email. Department of Energy spokesman Damien LaVera touted the data Monday on Twitter, the
latest effort by the White House to counter GOP criticism of the president on drilling. “New @EIAgov report: In first quarter of 2012 domestic #oil production at
highest level in 14 years. #AllOfTheAbove,” he wrote. But Republicans quickly pushed back. “It’s the private and state lands that have really
helped keep production moving,” Robert Dillon, spokesman for Senate Energy and Natural Resources ranking member Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), said when
asked about the new data. “We think more could easily be done if the president lived up to his ‘all of the above’ energy strategy.” Administration officials have
aggressively defended Obama’s energy record , pointing to efforts to expand oil leasing in the Gulf and an ongoing review of Shell’s permit to drill in the
Arctic, among other things.
oil link
Increased production threatens China economy and position
Obel 2013. Mike Obel. US Oil Boom May Spell Danger For Import-Dependent China: Germany's BND Spy Agency
http://www.ibtimes.com/us-oil-boom-may-spell-danger-import-dependent-china-germanys-bnd-spy-agency-1030550
The boom in U.S. crude oil production could threaten China’s access to as much as half the crude oil needed to support its economic
growth, according to a published report. Germany’s BND, the nation’s Bundesnachrichtendienst spy agency as its known, has leaked a
“confidential” report concluding that soaring U.S. crude oil production could -- in less than a decade -- sharply lessen the U.S. need
for imported oil, particularly Arabian oil that has to be shipped out of the volatile Persian Gulf and through the treacherous Strait of
Hormuz, website Testosterone Pit reported Sunday. The web site did not disclose details of how or when it obtained the BND report.
Whether the crude oil production boom in the world’s No. 1 economy will make the U.S. the world’s top oil producer, as the
International Energy Agency recently predicted would happen by 2020, or simply mean that the U.S. will no longer need OPEC oil,
the consequences for China could be severe. China’s growing economy will force the nation to import as much as 50 percent of its
crude oil from Persian Gulf producers, including Iran and the Arab states, the BND report states. China’s maritime access to that
source has been secured by U.S. military forces, at massive expense expense to U.S. taxpayers. But if the U.S. no longer depends on
OPEC crude oil, it would have no reason to spend billions on naval and Air Force assets to guarantee the free flow of oil from the
Persian Gulf at market prices. Without U.S. military protection, China’s oil imports suddenly become vulnerable along their 10,000plus mile maritime route from the Persian Gulf to Chinese ports. Further, China’s military has no current ability to take the U.S.
military’s place in securing the sea lanes that must remain undisturbed for China to sustain its economic growth. Further, China’s
vulnerability to disruptions of its seaborne oil imports would give the U.S. leverage in dealing with the world’s most populous nation,
particularly as U.S. allies clash with China in the eastern Pacific.
***CANADA DISAD***
canada da – 1nc
continuing massive imports from Canada is key to keeping them as our ally and away from other investors
KELLY 4/28/2014 – former U.S. diplomat in Canada and Mexico and is the associate director of Canadian Studies at Duke
University (Kelly, Stephen R. Saying no to Keystone XL is saying yes to uglier alternatives, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globedebate/saying-no-to-keystone-xl-is-saying-yes-to-uglier-alternatives/article18297849/)
TransCanada Corporation applied for a permit to build Keystone XL nearly six years ago, the pipeline was supposed to move 830,000
barrels of crude oil a day from the Alberta oil sands to the U.S. Gulf Coast. There it would supply U.S. refineries originally built to
handle heavy, sour crudes from Venezuela and Mexico, countries whose oil output has dropped sharply in recent years . Given that
For those who can barely remember why the
Canada has become the United States’ largest foreign oil provider by far, and that the surge in Canadian crude, also
has overwhelmed the existing network of north-south pipelines, Keystone XL made good business and energy security sense. After all, would you rather
import oil from a known America hater like Venezuela, or from a reliable ally right next door that is also our
largest overall trading partner? This logic, however, has failed to sway many environmentalists, who have opposed Keystone XL for three main reasons. First, they worry the
heavy and sour,
pipeline could leak, as other pipelines carrying Canadian crude have recently done. They also object to the kind of oil the pipeline would carry. The extraction of oil sands bitumen is more energy intensive, and therefore more
view cheap
Canadian crude, which sells at a sharp discount to other crudes due to its low quality and oversupply, as an enabler to an oilpolluting, than the average crude produced in the United States. If the U.S. would import less of it, they argue, Canada would produce less of it, reducing the global environmental damage. Finally, they
addicted U.S. economy
. If getting an oil fix weren’t so easy, goes this thinking, perhaps we would find renewables more attractive. But on all three counts, killing Keystone will have either no effect, or
make matters worse. Pipelines are by far the safest and most environmentally friendly way to move oil. A badly managed leak of Canadian crude from a pipeline near Kalamazoo, Mich., in 2010 released roughly 20,000
barrels of oil into a local stream, the largest inland oil spill in U.S. history. But this pales by comparison with the 257,000 barrels of crude the shipwrecked Exxon Valdez poured into Prince William Sound in 1989, or the five
million barrels the Deep Water Horizon blowout pumped into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Perhaps more important, inadequate pipeline capacity aggravated by Keystone XL’s delay has led Canadian and American energy
companies to move more oil by train. From just 2012 to 2013, rail shipments of crude oil in the U.S. jumped 74 per cent. Canada has announced plans to expand its rail transport capacity for crude oil by an amount that would
more than replace Keystone XL. Over this same period, three major derailments have demonstrated the dangers of this new mode of oil movement, especially the 2013 Lac-Mégantic, Que., explosion that left 47 dead. Crude
As for keeping Canadian oil in the ground if Keystone XL is killed, foreign
investment, surging demand for energy in China and India, and new pipelines in Canada will provide sufficient impetus to produce
Canadian oil and alternate ways to get it to world markets.
oil pipelines aren’t perfect. But unlike locomotives, they don’t emit greenhouse gases. And they rarely blow up.
shunning Canadian imports hurts their economy and they’ll pivot away from the US to China, crushing US-Canadian
relations
Morris ’12 – Professor at University of Alabama,
“An energy policy that shuns Canadian oil will push America's best ally into the arms of China”,
http://juneauempire.com/opinion/2012-06-08/energy-policy-shuns-canadian-oil-will-push-americas-best-ally-armschina#.UVB2rTeRcmz
Or ask Canadian Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver, who told the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. that same month that “we currently have one customer (the
U.S.) for our energy exports. That customer has said that it doesn’t want to expand at the moment . So it certainly intensifies the broad strategic objective of
the government to diversify to Asia.” Will China want to buy Canadian oil? Absolutely! China’s hunger for petroleum products will continue to grow. Chinese car
ownership is still below U.S. levels in 1920. Even if all future car sales in China are hybrids and even if China’s frenetic economic growth slows, as Chinese car ownership rises, the demand for petroleum
will soar over the next two decades. And India is also developing a taste for automobiles. If we don’t want Canada’s oil, there are many who do. This is a major mistake for three reasons. First, domestic oil production is insufficient to
meet U.S. needs. According to the Energy Information Administration, oil provides 94 percent of our transportation energy and 37 percent of our total energy. But domestic production met only 45 percent of our 2011 oil needs. Oil also is a key raw material for the U.S.
Our
largest foreign suppliers are Canada
chemical, plastics, and pharmaceutical industries. It is impossible to avoid importing oil.
three
(29 percent), Saudi Arabia (14 percent) and Venezuela (11 percent). Of those, only Canada
both respects human rights and shares our commitment to democratic government. In short, Canadian oil is what Canadian journalist Ezra Levant terms “ethical oil” — oil that does not undermine our values by funding corrupt and hostile regimes. Second, buying
Canadian oil puts dollars in the hands of one of our best trading partners. In 2009, Canadians invested $261.3 billion here. Canada is the No. 1 export market for 34 U.S. states; $1.6 billion in goods and services cross the U.S.-Canada border daily. By contrast, sending
dollars to Saudi Arabia and Venezuela does little for the U.S. economy. Third, Canada is a reliable energy supplier. With approximately 12 percent of total world reserves, Canada ranks third in the world. And Canadian oil largely comes to us via pipeline,
environmentally safer and militarily more secure than ocean transportation. Why is the Obama administration so set on delaying a decision on a secure source of ethical oil? A crucial financial element in Obama’s re-election strategy is the support of environmentalists
such as Hollywood’s Robert Redford and Laurie David. These activists don’t mind if oil prices go up as they can afford higher gas prices. But they are passionately committed to reducing other Americans’ use of oil and so object to any efforts to tap into Canadian oil.
And — at least until recently — the administration’s top energy policymaker explicitly focused on raising gasoline prices. In 2008 Energy Secretary Steven Chu said his goal was to raise the price of gasoline to European levels — about $8 a gallon. Although Chu has
Canada is one of our oldest allies
and best trading partners. “Defriending” Canada on energy is not in our national interest — militarily, economically or
environmentally.
since said he no longer holds that view, the National Journal notes that Chu “seemed to equivocate, pause, and stumble over his words” when backtracking, making his disavowal less than credible.
Canada imports key to crushes Chavez --- solves terrorism and Venezuela/iran alliance
O’grady 2012, Mary, The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204792404577229533441470866.html
Numerous sources in Venezuela say Mr. Lugar has this problem backward. His logic, which has dominated thinking in Washington since Chávez first came to power, is
that Chávez has an "oil weapon" that he can use against the U.S. by cutting off supplies. But the Venezuelan strongman needs the U.S. more than it
needs him. He is heavily dependent on the greenbacks he receives for his oil, and the authoritarian populist is unlikely to walk away from them in an election year in
Venezuela.¶ That doesn't mean Venezuela is not a threat. As Mr. Lugar rightly points out, Iran has shown that it is eager to practice terrorism in the West
if given the chance, and Venezuela provides a trampoline to plan and launch attacks from nearby.¶ With this in mind, the U.S. should be
seeking to defund the Chávez machine, and there is no better way to do that than with approval of the Keystone XL. The Alberta crude that
will travel through the XL is of a similar quality to Venezuelan oil, and the U.S. could begin buying from Canada instead of from Venezuela if a pipeline
were put in place.¶ There is one thing that Mr. Lugar and Venezuelans who don't believe that Chávez has an oil weapon agree on, and that is the Venezuelan dictator's
vulnerability. "Divisions in Venezuela's Russian-armed military, an inflation rate over 30 percent, a dilapidated oil infrastructure,
widespread food and energy shortages, and soaring crime rates are all putting heavy pressure on [him]," the senator writes. Losing a
customer like the U.S. might just push him over and with him, Iran's strongest base of support in the hemisphere.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction
Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of
Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33,
Issue 7. InformaWorld.)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that
some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange
of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place
allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war
between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear
proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear
terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just
how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or
encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as
well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material
used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct
attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris
resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth
of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear
material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was
fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France,
and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and
possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act
of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats
had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the
chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if
they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too:
should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and
Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early
response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place
the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the
friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and
possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption
would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to
order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group.
Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and
potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a
judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison
claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in
Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of
how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear
terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States
in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For
example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found
the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group,
increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in
areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them,
what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability
***nuts and bolts***
Uq/link – 2nc wall
plan changes perceptions of decisionmakers in canada by substantially expanding domestic oil production --- that’s 1nc morris
and Kelly --- it’s future predictive. Even with keystone, the plan changes the policylevel makeup of how much oil we can
import from canada
prefer future predictive evidence --- our disad assumes their advantage because Canada is producing as much as the US is
importing from them
MANNING 4/27/2014 - Energy Economist working for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada in Vancouver. The views expressed
here are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Manning, Ned, US
dreams of energy independence, 27 April 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/27/us-dreams-of-energy-independence/)
When Americans talk about ‘energy independence’ they are talking about oil and the Middle East. Forecasts that the US may become
close to energy self-sufficient in net terms by 2035 have once again made this verbal icon of US energy policy a popular ‘sound
bite’. But its use is both inaccurate and misleading, and without a seismic shift in American’s attitude towards transport, it is fundamentally unachievable. Although the US now sources the
majority of its oil imports from the ‘Western Hemisphere’, the perception amongst the American public that the US still imports most of its oil from the Middle East persists, along with the
belief that the US main strategic priority in the region is securing its own oil imports. The United States has a broad and complex relationship with the Middle East and its energy priorities do
not solely determine its strategy and presence within the region, as the US also has other non energy priorities in the region that will remain important regardless of the amount of oil that it
itself imports from the region. The conclusion that America can finally ‘pack up and leave’ the Middle East because they have entered a ‘shale energy revolution’ is too simplistic and any longterm major changes in US strategy towards the Middle East must be considered against the increasing presence and influence of China in the region, with America not wanting to be
Both the ongoing ‘shale gas revolution’ and the more recent shale oil ‘surge’
have dramatically changed the US domestic energy landscape, but the country is still, and will remain, far from
‘energy independent’. Over the next two decades, even as shale oil production peaks, the US will still import over 25 per cent of its total oil consumption. The shale oil surge and
significantly displaced in the region over the coming decades.
reduced oil consumption have reduced US oil import dependence significantly over the last five years, from 56 per cent in 2008 to 32 per cent in 2013. Although the huge increase in Canadian
oil imports — from 16 per cent in 2004 to 32 per cent in 2013 — has significantly altered the composition of the US imports portfolio, Saudi Arabia and the wider Persian Gulf today still
contribute around 20 per cent. Increased
shale oil output coupled with higher imports from both Canada and Mexico will see the relative
contribution of the Persian Gulf decline in the medium-term, but as the shale oil surge tapers off in the second half of the next decade
this contribution will rebound. Even during this medium-term downturn the Persian Gulf will remain one of America’s top three oil sources. The cost advantage that Persian Gulf
suppliers enjoy means that there will always be a significant market for their oil in the US.
status quo imports from Canada will increase, but the plan kills it --- our ev is future predictive
Koring et al ‘12 - International Affairs and Security Correspondent (Nathan VanderKlippe and Paul Koring, “U.S. boom in oil
production spells peril for Canadian crude”, Sep. 10 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/us-boom-in-oilproduction-spells-peril-for-canadian-crude/article4535525/)
A torrent
of oil pumped from new wells across the U.S. is setting in motion a decade of dramatic change that promises to wean the
country off OPEC, and threatens the growth of energy imports from Canada. The U.S. is now staring at an energy future awash
with its own crude, with far-reaching consequences for Canada’s oil sands, the U.S. economy and global geopolitics. This massive shift has been
sparked by changing political sentiment and technological advances that have allowed crude to be tapped in new places – from North Dakota to Oklahoma, Colorado, Michigan, and even
Florida. The United States, according to new data released Monday by Bentek, a U.S. energy analysis firm, will see its oil production rise nearly five million barrels a day, or 74 per cent, in the
next decade. In that time, reliance on countries outside Canada will largely disappear. The U.S. today imports 45 per cent of its petroleum, half from OPEC countries. But
by 2022, Bentek projects, only a million barrels per day will be delivered to U.S. shores by tanker – down from 6.7 million in 2011 and just 5 per cent of total demand – and at least some of
those won’t come from OPEC, but from countries like Mexico and Brazil. The coming change, according to Bentek, is startling: By 2016, the U.S. will surpass its 1970 oil production peak of
9.6 million barrels a day; by 2022, it will have leapt to 11.6 million barrels a day. For Canada, the news is both good and grim: Canadian
crude, flowing by pipeline, will continue
to be a substantial source of U.S. energy. But growth in Canadian exports south of the border could face a wall in 2018, when the
combination of U.S. oil output and pipeline constraints raise the possibility for new “Canadian production to get pushed out,” said Jodi Quinnell, one of
the Bentek report authors. “What comes in to the U.S. will slow and basically remain flat from 2018 to 2025.” That projection suggests the coming half-decade will see
Canada, and its fast-growing oil sands, struggle against the tide of U.S. oil. It also substantially raises the stakes for a country in the midst of two contentious applications to
carry Canadian crude to the British Columbia coast for export to Pacific markets. It should “cause us to, even more than we are today, realize the importance of creating additional channels to
the world,” said Wayne Chodzicki, the Calgary-based global head of oil and gas for consulting firm KPMG. The Bentek projection is, however, an ambitious one, surpassing the 2022
expectations of the federal U.S. Energy Information Administration by a full five million barrels per day, although the EIA forecast is in the midst of an upward revision. And the
Canadian oilpatch expects U.S. growth to be substantially slower than Bentek suggests, in part because of the difficulty in building the new pipelines and rail cars
to move that much new oil. Plus, U.S. companies are in the midst of a boom, and may need to take a break . “I think there will be a pause or at least a partial
slowdown over the next two or three years to drive costs down. So the growth profile won’t be as strong,” said Scott Saxberg, the chief executive of Crescent Point
Energy, a Calgary company with wells in North Dakota that provides it a window on U.S. activity. As a result, Mr. Saxberg and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers believe
Canada will have little trouble sending oil to the U.S. in coming years. No one, however, questions the U.S. oil boom, which has come amid a
drilling frenzy. Three years ago, 288 U.S. rigs were drilling for oil. Last week, according to data tracked by energy services firm Baker Hughes, 1,409 rigs were chasing oil, a nearly fivefold
increase. The eruption of local oil is a tremendous boon. Producing an additional 5 million barrels a day will require an investment, conservatively, of at least $125-billion, based on current
costs. And it portends substantial change in a global military-strategic arena that has long been driven by the need to move oil to the thirsty U.S. At least one, and often two, U.S. naval carrier
battle groups still prowl the Persian Gulf. Keeping open the Iran-threatened Straits of Hormuz – through which a stream of tankers move a staggering 17 million barrels daily, or one-third of all
seaborne oil – remains a vital American military role. Ending all, or nearly all, U.S.
imports from the volatile Middle East might fundamentally change the geo-
political view from the Oval Office, although broader threats to global economic disruption would remain.
domestic shale production in the squo is light crude --- we’re importing heavy crude
Phillips ’13 – Oil Business Analyst, Bloomberg; Matthew Phillips, Falling U.S. Oil Imports Will Reshape the World Crude Market,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-16/falling-u-dot-s-dot-oil-imports-will-reshape-the-world-crude-market
Most of America’s new shale production is light, sweet crude that can be easily refined into gasoline and that is prized around the world. Light,
sweet crude is less viscous than heavy, sour crude, which has more sulfur. But heavy, sour crude tends to be a few dollars per barrel cheaper than
light, sweet crude, and the Canadians and Venezuelans have vast reserves of it. That’s why in the years before the U.S. shale boom hit, some
of the biggest U.S. refiners spent more than $20 billion upgrading their refineries so they could process the gunky stuff into gasoline,
asphalt, and other products.
that makes Canada our biggest supplier in the squo
Phillips ’13 – Oil Business Analyst, Bloomberg; Matthew Phillips, Falling U.S. Oil Imports Will Reshape the World Crude Market,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-16/falling-u-dot-s-dot-oil-imports-will-reshape-the-world-crude-market
demand for heavy, sour oil from abroad will be high in the years to come. For those
reasons Canada will remain America’s biggest supplier. Not only is Canada close and able to pipe its oil over the border, but its heavy, sour crude is also what U.S. refiners want.
Thus, despite the abundance of high-quality crude,
Canadian pipeline operator TransCanada (TRP) is trying to get U.S. approval of its Keystone XL pipeline, which would eventually move 1.5 million barrels a day of heavy, sour Canadian crude to Gulf Coast refineries. The
pipeline would lower shipping costs for the Canadians and make their oil even cheaper than the crude sold to the U.S. by Mexico (it sells 1 million barrels a day to the U.S.), Saudi Arabia (1.2 million), and Venezuela
The Gulf Coast market’s not big enough to take new Canadian crude and maintain current imports
(950,000). “
,” says Edward Morse, head of commodities
research at Citigroup Global Markets. “Something has to give.” While the demand for heavy, sour crude will be good news for Canada, the shale oil revolution in the U.S. will likely result in a steep drop in oil imports from
Africa, mainly from OPEC’s biggest West African members, Nigeria and Angola. Both are suppliers of light, sweet crude. Since July 2010, the U.S. has cut its Nigerian imports by half, from more than 1 million barrels a day
to 543,000 as of October 2012, according to the most recent data available through the EIA. Imports from Angola have dipped below 200,000 barrels a day, from an average of 513,000 in 2008. “By the second quarter of this
Sometime before mid-2014, he says the U.S. and Canada will stop importing crude
from West Africa altogether. Those barrels will have to find another home. The surplus African oil could end up competing with Mideast suppliers for customers in India, China, Europe, and Korea. As the
year, we will stop importing West African light, sweet crude into the Gulf,” Morse predicts.
global competition heats up, oil prices the world over will probably drop. Morse says that $90 will be the new ceiling for oil prices rather than the floor it’s been in recent years, a transition he anticipates will be “highly
The geopolitical fallout from this shift in the global oil trade could be disruptive too. Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela are heavily dependent on oil revenues to keep their
governments afloat and maintain popular subsidies that lower the price of food and fuel for their citizens. If Morse is right and the average global price of oil drifts below $90 a barrel, the pressure on the weaker
disruptive.”
oil states could become intense.
Xt - uq – Canada growing
canada’s energy infrastructure good
FP ’12, http://business.financialpost.com/2012/07/19/13-ways-to-make-canada-worlds-most-energy-productive-nation/?__lsa=3050e892
The Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources has launched a new blueprint outlining 13 priorities to ensure
Canada ‘will be the most energy productive nation in the world with the highest level of environmental performance.’ The committee sat
through hundreds of meetings, spoke to 250 stakeholders and solicited public advice over three years to outline 13 key focus areas for the country. “We see
Canada’s potential as the most productive energy nation in the world, with the highest levels of environmental performance,” said
Senator David Angus, Committee Chair. “But we also conclude that there is a great sense of urgency — and we need an energy literacy that
includes a profound recognition that energy pervades all aspects of our lives, and is a key element of our social fabric. The future is fraught
with peril if we don’t get it right.”
***canada relations/imports impacts***
Canada relations – water infrastructure [trade leadership]
Energy ties key to coop over border waterways
Ek and Fergusson 2012 – Specialist in International Relations and Specialist in International Trade and Finance at the Congressional
Research Service (Carl and Ian, “Canada-U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-397.pdf)
The United States and Canada maintain the world’s largest bilateral trading relationship , one that has been strengthened over the past two decades by
the approval of two major free trade agreements. Although commercial disputes may not be quite as prominent now as they have been in the
past, the two countries in recent years have engaged in difficult negotiations over items in several trade sectors, including natural
resources, agricultural commodities, and intellectual property rights. The most recent clash centered around the Buy America provision of the 2009
economic stimulus law. However, these disputes affect but a small percentage of the total goods and services exchanged. In recent years, energy has increasingly
emerged as a key component of the trade relationship. In addition, the United States and Canada work together closely on environmental
matters, including monitoring air quality and solid waste transfers, and protecting and maintaining the quality of border waterways.
Waterway infrastructure improvements are key to boost exports now - establishes trade leadership
Independent Record, 12 (January 12, 2012, Independent Records, HelenaAir- Montana Daily News, “Efficient waterways key to exports,”
http://m.helenair.com/mobile/article_622a021e-3ced-11e1-9a56-001871e3ce6c.html)
A major infrastructure project near the bottom of Central America could have major repercussions for Montana mining and agriculture — but only if the U.S. keeps pace with infrastructure
investment of its own. This week our editorial board visited with a pair of officials from the Waterways Council, the Washington-based industry group that represents producers and shippers
Much of that infrastructure has been forced into use long past its
expected and efficient lifespan, the group says, and it’s gearing up to ask Congress for some major funding over the next two decades to replace and/or improve a number of
decaying locks and dams that are causing, well, logjams in the system. So how does Central America factor into the discussion? In coming years the Panama Canal will be
greatly expanded, allowing for more and larger ship traffic. Volume through the canal is expected to nearly double by 2025. That
increase will make New Orleans and other Gulf/Atlantic ports more economical for shippers to and from the Pacific Rim — whose
countries happen to be some of the largest consumers of Montana grain and coal. But making it easier to get Montana’s
goods to the Pacific isn’t worth much if it’s not made easier to get those goods to the coasts in the first place. Improving shipping
efficiency on the Mississippi River will make for a new path to market for Montana raw materials. And that’s where the Waterways Council comes
who depend on the country’s inland waterways and its system of rivers, canals, locks and dams.
in, with its efforts to improve the inland nautical infrastructure. One 15-barge tow can move as much material as 216 rail cars, or 1,050 semi tractor-trailers, the council says, and the industry’s
claim of being able to move a ton of freight 576 miles on a gallon of fuel makes it more efficient than rail or road. Those modes are absolutely necessary too, but without barge traffic, our
railroads and highways would be overwhelmed with the additional demand. The council says an annual appropriation of $380 million from Congress, coupled with improvements in the way
the Army Corps of Engineers gets projects done, will allow 20 major jobs to be completed within the next 20 years — versus the six that stand to be finished under the status quo. Shippers are
putting their money on the line as well. They already pay a tax of 20 cents per gallon of diesel into a trust fund that pays for half of each project, and they’re willing to pay another 6 to 9 cents
more per gallon, although that self-tax notion isn’t gaining traction with the no-new-tax crowd in Washington. Congress — i.e., the American people — typically spends billions a year on
highway projects, and railroads too were heavily funded by the public. The country showed great foresight in building its system of locks and dams on many of our major rivers — but that
investing was done close to a century ago, and the system needs repair. We don’t know whether $380 million a year is the right number, but we do urge Congress to do all it can to improve the
efficiency of the nation’s interior shipping channels.
The ability to grow our country’s exports depends upon it.
US Trade leadership is critical to multilateral trade – which solves all global problems
Panitchpakdi ‘4 (Supachai Panitchpakdi, secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2/26/2004, American
Leadership and the World Trade Organization, p. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp22_e.htm
The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing
poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or
another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are
inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its
prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is
something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have
done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of
the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the
recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how
essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries
have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts.
The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with —
everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate
actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers
like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as
well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral
system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has
inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how
challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision.
Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to
the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether
the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that
we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The
achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the
inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership
comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization.
We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic
growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it
involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening
for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped
by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US
threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is
approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage.
We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create
an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the
source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s
worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard
in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the
foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for
competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills
of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to
service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong
competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake.
The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way.
They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the
world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is
compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply
sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or
regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would
be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to
matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a
complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute . There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries
preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of
liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect : bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral
deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we
see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a
basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade,
they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral
system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's
vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world
trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals
and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO —
would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free
democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade
has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All
the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly
increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained,
not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules.
Canada relations – cyber security
Cooperation with Canada key to cyber-security
Carafano et al 2010 – James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis
Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Jena Baker McNeill is Policy Analyst for Homeland Security and Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior
Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and
Director of the Center for Political–Military Analysis at Hudson Institute (“Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America,”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/07/expand-norad-to-improve-security-in-north-america)
Addressing the wide range of threat s confronting America’s security interests in North America will require NORAD’s involvement. Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to blow up a U.S.-bound jetliner was al-Qaeda’s most recent effort to cause mass casualties in America.[22] In addition, threats
to energy, communication, and computer networks persist. Malicious third parties can attack the United States through vulnerable
intermediaries, such as Canada, which offers a huge backdoor into the U.S. computer networks. Much of the infrastructure of the two
nations—from railroads to aviation to pipelines and electrical systems—is inextricably intertwined. Canada is also America’s largest trading
partner, accounting for many links in U.S. supply chains. NORAD and NORTHCOM have partnered with a number of agencies—including the U.S.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Strategic Command— to protect U.S. networks. This cooperation will help
United States needs to deepen
cooperation with its North American partners on cyber security. Both the Canadian and U.S. economies depend on a secure and
NORAD to secure U.S. systems against potential attack, but NORAD does not currently have a lead cyber-security role.[23] The
functioning cyberspace. Computer systems and infrastructure in both countries are linked and a substantial amount of bilateral trade is
conducted through the Internet. Since cyber terrorists and criminals can operate from anywhere, integration of cyber-security efforts is
essential to protect computer infrastructure. Integration is especially necessary for Canada because its 200 law enforcement and 2,500 military personnel
dedicated to cyber security are insufficient to prevent cyber attacks effectively. Through NORAD, Canada and the United States could coordinate cyber
security with the various military commands and civilian agencies.[24] Cooperation with Mexico as its economy and cyber infrastructure develop is also
vital, as the U.S. and Mexican governments acknowledged by creating the Working Group on Cyber-Security in 2004.[25]
Cyber attack would destroy critical infrastructure and ensure US retaliation --- expands arid lands and ag collapse
Habiger, 2/1/2010 (Eugue – Retired Air Force General, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism, The Cyber Security Institute, p. 13-15)
There is strong evidence to suggest that al Qaeda has the ability to conduct cyberterror attacks against the United States and its allies. Al Qaeda
and other terrorist organizations are extremely active in cyberspace, using these technologies to communicate among themselves and others, carry out logistics, recruit
members, and wage information warfare. For example, al Qaeda leaders used email to communicate with the 9‐11 terrorists and the 9‐11 terrorists used the Internet to
make travel plans and book flights. Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members routinely post videos and other messages to online sites to communicate. Moreover,
there is evidence of efforts that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are actively developing cyberterrorism capabilities and
seeking to carry out cyberterrorist attacks. For example, the Washington Post has reported that “ U.S. investigators have found evidence in the logs that mark a
browser's path through the Internet that al Qaeda operators spent time on sites that offer software and programming instructions for the digital switches that
run power, water, transport and communications grids. In some interrogations . . . al Qaeda prisoners have described intentions, in general terms, to use those tools.”25 Similarly, a 2002
CIA report on the cyberterror threat to a member of the Senate stated that al Qaeda and Hezbollah have become "more adept at using the internet and computer technologies.”26 The FBI has issued bulletins stating that, “U. S.
law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that Al Qaeda members have sought information on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA‐related
web sites.”27 In addition a number of jihadist websites, such as 7hj.7hj.com, teach computer attack and hacking skills in the service of Islam.28 While al Qaeda may lack the cyber‐attack capability of nations like Russia and
China, there is every reason to believe its operatives, and those of its ilk, are as capable as the cyber criminals and hackers who routinely effect great harm on the world’s digital infrastructure generally and American assets
specifically. In fact, perhaps, the most troubling indication of the level of the cyberterrorist threat is the countless, serious non‐terrorist cyberattacks routinely carried out by criminals, hackers, disgruntled insiders, crime
If run‐of‐the‐mill criminals and hackers can threaten powergrids, hack vital military networks, steal vast sums of money,
take down a city’s of traffic lights, compromise the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic control systems, among other attacks, it is overwhelmingly
likely that terrorists can carry out similar, if not more malicious attacks. Moreover, even if the world’s terrorists are unable to breed these skills, they can
certainly buy them. There are untold numbers of cybermercenaries around the world—sophisticated hackers with advanced training who would be willing to offer their
services for the right price. Finally, given the nature of our understanding of cyber threats, there is always the possibility that we have already been the victim or a
cyberterrorist attack, or such an attack has already been set but not yet effectuated, and we don’t know it yet. Instead, a well‐designed cyberattack has the
capacity cause widespread chaos, sow societal unrest, undermine national governments, spread paralyzing fear and anxiety, and create a state of
utter turmoil, all without taking a single life. A sophisticated cyberattack could throw a nation’s banking and finance system into chaos causing
markets to crash, prompting runs on banks, degrading confidence in markets, perhaps even putting the nation’s currency in play and making the
government look helpless and hapless. In today’s difficult economy, imagine how Americans would react if vast sums of money were taken from their
accounts and their supporting financial records were destroyed. A truly nefarious cyberattacker could carry out an attack in such a way (akin to Robin Hood) as to
engender populist support and deepen rifts within our society, thereby making efforts to restore the system all the more difficult. A modestly advanced enemy
could use a cyberattack to shut down (if not physically damage) one or more regional power grids. An entire region could be cast into total darkness, power‐
dependent systems could be shutdown. An attack on one or more regional power grids could also cause cascading effects that could jeopardize
our entire national grid. When word leaks that the blackout was caused by a cyberattack, the specter of a foreign enemy capable of sending
the entire nation into darkness would only increase the fear, turmoil and unrest. While the finance and energy sectors are considered prime targets for a
cyberattack, an attack on any of the 17 delineated critical infrastructure sectors could have a major impact on the United States. For example, our healthcare system is
already technologically driven and the Obama Administration’s e‐health efforts will only increase that dependency. A cyberattack on the U.S. e‐health infrastructure
could send our healthcare system into chaos and put countless of lives at risk. Imagine if emergency room physicians and surgeons were suddenly no longer able to
access vital patient information. A cyberattack on our nation’s water systems could likewise cause widespread disruption. An attack on the control
systems for one or more dams could put entire communities at risk of being inundated, and could create ripple effects across the water, agriculture,
and energy sectors. Similar water control system attacks could be used to at least temporarily deny water to otherwise arid regions, impacting
everything from the quality of life in these areas to agriculture. In 2007, the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit determined that the destruction from a single wave of cyberattacks on critical infrastructures could exceed $700 billion,
syndicates and the like.
which would be the rough equivalent of 50 Katrina‐esque hurricanes hitting the United States all at the same time.29 Similarly, one IT security source has estimated that the impact of a single day cyberwar attack that focused on and disrupted U.S. credit and debit card
transactions would be approximately $35 billion.30 Another way to gauge the potential for harm is in comparison to other similar noncyberattack infrastructure failures. For example, the August 2003 regional power grid blackout is estimated to have cost the U.S.
economy up to $10 billion, or roughly .1 percent of the nation’s GDP. 31 That said, a cyberattack of the exact same magnitude would most certainly have a much larger impact. The origin of the 2003 blackout was almost immediately disclosed as an atypical system
failure having nothing to do with terrorism. This made the event both less threatening and likely a single time occurrence. Had it been disclosed that the event was the result of an attack that could readily be repeated the impacts would likely have grown substantially, if
a
not exponentially. Additionally,
cyberattack could also be used to disrupt our nation’s defenses or distract our national leaders in advance of a more traditional conventional or strategic attack. Many military leaders actually believe that such a disruptive cyber pre‐
offensive is the most effective use of offensive cyber capabilities. This is, in fact, the way Russia utilized cyberattackers—whether government assets, governmentdirected/ coordinated assets, or allied cyber irregulars—in advance of the invasion of Georgia. Widespread
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks were launched on the Georgian governments IT systems. Roughly a day later Russian armor rolled into Georgian territory. The cyberattacks were used to prepare the battlefield; they denied the Georgian government a critical
communications tool isolating it from its citizens and degrading its command and control capabilities precisely at the time of attack. In this way, these attacks were the functional equivalent of conventional air and/or missile strikes on a nation’s communications
infrastructure.32 One interesting element of the Georgian cyberattacks has been generally overlooked: On July 20th, weeks before the August cyberattack, the website of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a more narrowly focused, but
technologically similar DDOS attack.33 This should be particularly chilling to American national security experts as our systems undergo the same sorts of focused, probing attacks on a constant basis. The ability of an enemy to use a cyberattack to counter our
offensive capabilities or soften our defenses for a wider offensive against the United States is much more than mere speculation. In fact, in Iraq it is already happening. Iraq insurgents are now using off‐the‐shelf software (costing just $26) to hack U.S. drones (costing
$4.5 million each), allowing them to intercept the video feed from these drones.34 By hacking these drones the insurgents have succeeded in greatly reducing one of our most valuable sources of real‐time intelligence and situational awareness. If our enemies in Iraq are
capable of such an effective cyberattack against one of our more sophisticated systems, consider what a more technologically advanced enemy could do. At the strategic level, in 2008, as the United States Central Command was leading wars in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, a cyber intruder compromised the security of the Command and sat within its IT systems, monitoring everything the Command was doing. 35 This time the attacker simply gathered vast amounts of intelligence. However, it is clear that the attacker could
have used this access to wage cyberwar—altering information, disrupting the flow of information, destroying information, taking down systems—against the United States forces already at war. Similarly, during 2003 as the United States prepared for and began the War
in Iraq, the IT networks of the Department of Defense were hacked 294 times.36 By August of 2004, with America at war, these ongoing attacks compelled then‐Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to write in a memo that, "Recent exploits have reduced
operational capabilities on our networks."37 This wasn’t the first time that our national security IT infrastructure was penetrated immediately in advance of a U.S. military option.38 In February of 1998 the Solar Sunrise attacks systematically compromised a series of
Department of Defense networks. What is often overlooked is that these attacks occurred during the ramp up period ahead of potential military action against Iraq. The attackers were able to obtain vast amounts of sensitive information—information that would have
certainly been of value to an enemy’s military leaders. There is no way to prove that these actions were purposefully launched with the specific intent to distract American military assets or degrade our capabilities. However, such ambiguities—the inability to
specifically attribute actions and motives to actors—are the very nature of cyberspace. Perhaps, these repeated patterns of behavior were mere coincidence, or perhaps they weren’t. The potential that an enemy might use a cyberattack to soften physical defenses, increase
the gravity of harms from kinetic attacks, or both, significantly increases the potential harms from a cyberattack. Consider the gravity of the threat and risk if an enemy, rightly or wrongly, believed that it could use a cyberattack to degrade our strategic weapons
Such an enemy might be convinced that it could win a war—conventional or even nuclear —against the U nited S tates. The effect of
this would be to undermine our deterrence‐based defenses, making us significantly more at risk of a major war .
capabilities.
Canada relations – Afghanistan
Canadian contributions to Afghanistan are vital to the long-term growth and stability of the state
Bergen ’12 – research fellow at the CDGAI
(Bob, Canada’s Afghan contribution needs to be seen in proper context, Canadian Defence and Global Affairs Institute, 2012,
http://www.cdfai.org/bergenarticles/Canadas%20Afghan%20contribution%20needs%20to%20be%20seen%20in%20proper%20conte
xt.pdf)
MacKay announced from Afghanistan where he was visiting Canadian troops and Afghan President Hamid Karzai that Canada will contribute $10 million
toward the salaries of Afghan police officers through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. The enabling of officers’ salaries to be paid to them by
LOTFA directly through banks would not be remarkable to Canadians to whom direct bank deposits are routine and the announcement made few headlines. Still, in a
was a crucial step toward building a paid professional police force and improving stability and
security because it is widely acknowledged that the Afghan national police force is rife with corruption and incompetence . The $10 million
deeply-troubled state like Afghanistan, that
builds upon $7 million previously committed by the Canadian International Development Agency and comes at a time when Canada is poised to double its cadre of
civilian RCMP police trainers in Afghanistan from five to 10 in March 2007. Now the bad news: Largely ignored were announcements made at roughly the same time
that Canada would be providing $1.75 million to UNICEF for Afghan women’s health and literacy and another $11.5 million over two
years for provincial reconstruction. International Co-operation Minister Josée Vernier and Pubic Works and Government Services Minister Michael Fortier made
the announcements in Montreal. The $11.5-million contribution to the Accelerated District Reconstruction program is part of a nearly $1billion 10-year Canadian
commitment to stabilization, reconstruction, poverty reduction and improving Afghanistan’s governance. Unfortunately, the good news about Canada contributing to
health and education programs, the building of roads, aqueducts, sanitation infrastructure, schools and clinics throughout Kandahar has been juxtaposed with reports based
on excerpts from the Jan/Feb 2007 edition the America-centric journal Foreign Affairs. The article "Saving Afghanistan" by Barnett Rubin, a long-time critic of the
American military’s conduct in Afghanistan, was seized upon as background context for an argument that Afghanistan is “sliding into chaos” and that a bad end looms
over Canada’s Afghan mission. In fact, what U.S. scholar Rubin wrote about is what it would take to save Afghanistan and a key point he made
was that the United States all but abandoned Afghanistan after it drove al-Qaeda and Taliban core leadership into Pakistan and failed to
consolidate that tactical advance. NATO countries, including Canada, have leapt in to the breach, but Rubin argued that if America is to
succeed in its war on terrorism, it must refocus its attention on securing Afghanistan and stabilizing it through reconstruction.
Obviously Canada is not America and Canadians have different aims in Afghanistan, but that is precisely what the Canadian Forces are
doing there. Rather than the American aim of destroying poppy fields that supply U.S. drug users with 14 per cent of their opium, for
example, the Canadian Forces are involved in not only defeating the Taliban and its alQaeda supporters in the interest of security, but
in infrastructure reconstruction that will enable the growth of alternative crops such as grapes and their delivery to markets.
Afghanistan instability will cascade to nuclear war
Hellman 10 – professor at Stanford University
[Martin
Hellman,
“Could
Afghanistan
Lead
to
a
Nuclear
Disaster?”,
http://nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2010/08/19/could-afghanistan-lead-to-a-nuclear-disaster/]
Nuclear
Risk,
While now a professor of history and international relations at Boston University, Andrew Bacevich is also a West Point graduate and
retired Army Colonel with service in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. Bacevich has an uncanny ability to combine his academic and military perspectives
to produce a brilliant, common sense approach to international issues, especially those involving war and peace. In this post, I recommend his most recent OpEd , which
appeared today in the LA Times. In it, he relates Afghanistan to Kennedy’s disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion – an event that helped
lay a foundation for 1962’s Cuban Missile Crisis. While the linkage between Afghanistan and nuclear war is not the point
of Bacevich’s OpEd, the danger should be obvious in light of what transpired in those fateful thirteen days of October 1962.
But, just as almost no one saw how supporting the overthrow of Castro could lead to a nuclear war, almost no one today is concerned that the war in
Afghanistan has a similar potential. The risk analysis approach that I have been advocating is helpful for illuminating that danger. Last May, as part of my
Defusing the Nuclear Threat series at Stanford, former Director of Los Alamos Dr. Siegfried Hecker spoke on “The Greatest Nuclear Risks.” In that talk, he explained
why he saw Pakistan as the greatest nuclear risk we face. The war in Afghanistan adds to an already unstable situation in nuclear-armed
Pakistan. If that instability should lead to a coup by Taliban sympathizers within the Pakistani military, the risk becomes
much clearer. To avoid disaster, we need to stop seeing dangers only in hindsight. We need to start thinking through the possible consequences of our actions, before
they occur. If we do that, we can not only avert a nuclear disaster, but also build a better, safer world.
***ADVANTAGE ANSWERS***
A2 solvency – 1nc
production will slow ---- OPEC will take over
REUTERS 1/7/2014 – (UPDATE 2-U.S. oil output growth to slow in 2015; OPEC to pump more –EIA,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/energy-data-eia-idUSL2N0KH1HR20140107)
The pace
of U.S. oil production growth will begin to slow in 2015, even as global demand continues to rise, allowing OPEC to
pump more crude for the first time in three years, U.S. government forecasts showed on Tuesday. In its first projections for 2015, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration said U.S. output will rise by 9 percent or 750,000 barrels per day next year to reach 9.3 million bpd, the highest in 43 years. That rate may seem heady but is
less than the breakneck 1 million bpd growth seen last year and forecast for 2014, the result of the biggest oil boom in a generation as fracking and horizontal drilling
technologies make millions of barrels in domestic on-shore oil reserves more accessible. The data arm of the U.S. Department of Energy, like many other
analysts, has consistently underestimated the scale of the U.S. shale oil boom and these estimates may yet prove low, analysts said. "I
think the EIA recognizes that they have been too conservative and is marking to market now," said Katherine Spector, with Canadian bank CIBC in New York. Spector noted Tuesday's
forecasts follow revisions in the Annual Energy Outlook that boosted estimates for output through 2019, some 22 percent higher than previous forecasts. The EIA's latest report also suggests
the administration is taking a slightly brighter outlook on supplies from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, which is struggling to come to grips with the shale revolution.
World oil demand will rise 1.5 percent to 92.96 million bpd next year, a record high and the fastest growth rate since 2010, the
agency said. It also raised its forecast for this year's demand growth by 60,000 bpd . That will allow OPEC to boost supply by 0.4 percent to 35.6 million bpd
next year after it fell 1 percent this year, the EIA said. But that extra oil comes at a cost - lower prices. The agency forecast global benchmark Brent crude oil prices at an average $101.58 a
barrel in 2015, down from $105.42 a barrel this year. "EIA
expects the downward trend in Brent crude oil prices to continue over the next two years as
growing non-OPEC oil supply continues to outpace world consumption," administrator Adam Sieminski said in a statement.
No solvency – domestic production is unsustainable and takes too long
TOD ’12 (The Oil Drum. “Tech Talk - New Energy Report from Harvard Makes Unsupportable Assumptions”. July 1, 2012.
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/9292?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+theoildrum+%28Th
e+Oil+Drum%29&utm_content=Google+Reader)
The Tech Talks of the last few months have followed a path of looking in a relatively realistic manner at crude oil production with emphasis on that coming from the United States and Russia, as well as Saudi Arabia, the
current focus of my weekly pieces. An earlier piece looked at a Citigroup report of considerable optimism, and the post explained why, in reality,
it is impractical
to anticipate much
increase in US production this decade. Since then, after reviewing the production from Russia, several posts have shown why the current lead in Russian daily crude oil
production is likely to be soon over and then decline, as the oil companies are not bringing new fields on line as fast as the old ones are running out. Saudi Arabia, as the current posts are in the process of explaining, is
unlikely to increase production much beyond 10 mbd, since Ghawar, the major field on which its current production level is built, is reaching the end of its major contribution, though it will continue to produce at a lower rate
there
now comes an Energy Study from Harvard which boldly states that this is rubbish - that by 2020, global production will be at 110.6 mbd and these concerns that most of
us have at The Oil Drum (inter alia) are chimeras of the imagination. It is therefore pertinent to begin with examining where the study (which was prepared with
BP assistance) anticipates that the growth in supply will come from. That too is shown as a plot: [omitted – in original URL] It is instructive, in reading this plot, to first recognize
into the future. The bottom line, at least to date, is that there is no evidence from the top three producers that their production will be even close, in total, to current levels by the end of the decade. So, (h/t Leanan)
that it is a plot of anticipated production capacity rather than projected actual production. The reason for this can perhaps be illustrated by an example. Within the current production capacity that Saudi Arabia claims adds up
increase in production will, to some
degree, offset the declines in existing wells and producing fields that will become more severe as more existing horizontal wells water
out. Manifa is not currently in significant production, and is unlikely to be at such a level for at least another 18 months, with production being tied to the construction of the two new refineries being built to handle the oil.
It is not, therefore, a currently instantaneously available source of oil. At a relatively normal 5% per year decline in production from existing fields, Saudi Arabia will have to bring on
to 12 mbds, is the 900 kbd that will come from Manifa as it is further developed and comes on line within the next few years. However, at that time. the
line (and sustain) at least 500 kbd per year of new production. While it is likely that it can do this for a year or two more, betting that it will be able to do this plus raise production 2 mbd or more in 2020 is on the far side of
optimistic. Just because a reserve exists does not mean that it can be brought on line without the physical facilities in place to produce it. It is interesting, however, to note the report’s view on field declines in production:
***THEIR EVIDENCE*** Throughout recent history, there is empirical evidence of depletion overestimation. From 2000 on, for example, crude oil depletion rates gauged by most forecasters have ranged between 6 and 10
percent: yet even the lower end of this range would involve the almost complete loss of the world’s “old” production in 10 years (2000 crude production capacity = about 70 mbd). By converse, crude oil production capacity
in 2010 was more than 80 mbd. To make up for that figure, a new production of 80 mbd or so would have come on-stream over that decade. This is clearly untrue: in 2010, 70 percent of crude oil production came from
oilfields that have been producing oil for decades. As shown in Section 4, my analysis indicates that only four of the current big oil suppliers (big oil supplier = more than 1 mbd of production capacity) will face a net
reduction of their production capacity by 2020: they are Norway, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Iran. Apart from these countries, I did not find evidence of a global depletion rate of crude production higher than 2-3
with the change in well orientation from vertical to horizontal , that
there was a change in the apparent decline rates. When the wells run horizontally at the top of the reservoir, they are no longer reduced in productive length each year as vertical wells are,
because the driving water flood slowly fills the reservoir below the oil as it is displaced. This does not mean that because the apparent decline rate from the well has fallen that it will ultimately produce more oil. The
amount of oil in the region tapped by the well is finite, and when it is gone it is gone, whether from a vertical well that shows gradual
decline with time, or from the horizontal well that holds the production level until the water hits the well and it stops. I am not sure
that the author of the report understands this. The point concerning support logistics is critical in a number of instances. The political difficulties in increasing production from the oil sands in
percent when correctly adjusted for reserve growth. ***/THEIR EVIDENCE*** Sigh! I explained last time that
Alberta, through constraints on pipeline construction either South or West, are at least as likely to restrict future growth of that deposit as any technical challenge. The four countries that the report sees contributing most to
future oil supplies are (in the ranked order) Iraq. the United States, Canada, and Brazil. For Iraq, he sees production possibly coming from the following fields within the next eight years. I understand that one ought to show
some optimism at some point over Iraq, but it has yet to reach the levels of production that it achieved before the Iran/Iraq War, and that was over some time ago. The EIA has shown that it is possible to get a total of over 13
mbd of production, but it requires investment and time, and some degree of political stability in the country. That is still somewhat lacking. Prior to that war, Iraq was producing at 3.5 mbd, the production curve since then has
not been encouraging: Recognizing that the country has problems, the report still expects that there will be a growth in production of some 5.125 mbd by the end of the decade. This appears to be a guess as to being some 50%
US production, this is tied to increasing production from all the oil shales in the country, which will see spurts in growth
similar to that seen in the Bakken and Eagle Ford. I estimate that additional unrestricted production from shale/tight oil might reach 6.6 mbd by 2020, or an
of the 10.425 mbd that the country could potentially achieve. As for
additional adjusted production of 4.1 mbd after considering risk factors (by comparison, U.S. shale/tight oil production was about 800,000 bd in December 2011). To these figures, I added an unrestricted additional production
of 1 mbd from sources other than shale oil that I reduced by 40 percent considering risks, thus obtaining a 0.6 mbd in terms of additional adjusted production by 2020. In particular, I am more confident than others on the
prospects of a faster-than-expected recovery of offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico after the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010.
xt – long solvency
The plan is woefully insufficient and takes decades to solve
Colagiovanni 2012 Lou, activist, journalist, and political consultant for the Detroit Examiner – citing a CBO report, “CBO report
finds 'drill baby drill' in practice produces little revenue or oil”
It has been confirmed in a new report by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office that the
benefits of opening up and leasing protected federal lands
for the development of oil and natural gas are next to nothing. The estimated profit would be as little as $500 million a year which is only 0.7% of the total
gross take of revenue of $150 billion that is expected to be generated over the next decade from leases already in place. A favorite cheer of the Republican party has
been "drill baby drill ." Some would now say that talking point has been proven impotent. The analyzed issue was the opening of ANWR, The Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, and off-shore drilling sites between 5 and 200 miles away from both coasts. Certain parts of the Outer Continental Shelf were also included in
the analysis. The United States allows individual corporations and private businesses to bid on leases for resource development already, with 70% of these areas already
operational, which in some areas may take as long as 25 years, the report finds a revenue of $2 billion a year may be
possible but not sustainable. For those who say that any revenue generated is acceptable and desired, they should know that up to 90% of the profits will be
in use. Once
paid to Alaskan residents. The remaining 10% would have nearly no bearing on the federal debt or deficit. This figure is based on the speculation that if new contracts
were to be signed, they would be similar to those already approved, which do pay up to 90% of generated revenue to Alaskans. Finally the CBO report summarizes the
situation succinctly: Production from newly opened areas over the 2023–2035 period would be far less than the amounts produced by current operations in the Gulf of
Mexico. Therefore, American citizens are left with a decision. Do they wish to proceed allow the destruction of protected lands for a measly $500 million a year, or will
they see the costs far outweigh the benefits. The United States uses between 6.8 - 8.3 billion barrels of oil per year. Today's current oil price is $96.21 per barrel.
Therefore, The United States annually spends $798 billion a year for oil. In other words it would take 1,596 years for these new drilling operations to generate
enough oil or revenue to cover the US for a single year.
xt – certainty
History Proves: The plan can’t attract investment and uncertainty is inevitable –leasing delays magnify our time frame
arguments – this is the most credible source
EIA 2009 U.S. Energy Information Administration - Independent statistics and analysis - “Impact of Limitations on Access to Oil and
Natural Gas Resources in the Federal Outer Continental Shelf” AEO2009
The U.S. offshore is estimated to contain substantial resources of both crude oil and natural gas, but until recently some of the areas of the lower 48 OCS have been
under leasing moratoria [56]. The Presidential ban on offshore drilling in portions of the lower 48 OCS was lifted in July 2008, and the Congressional ban
was allowed to expire in September 2008, removing regulatory obstacles to development of the Atlantic and Pacific OCS [57, 58]. Although the Atlantic and
timing issues constrain the near-term
impacts of increased access. The U.S. Department of Interior, MMS, is in the process of developing a leasing program that includes selected tracts in those
areas, with the first leases to be offered in 2010 [59]; however, there is uncertainty about the future of OCS development .
Pacific lower 48 OCS regions are open for exploration and development in the AEO2009 reference case,
Environmentalists are calling for a reinstatement of the moratoria. Others cite the benefits of drilling in the offshore. Recently, the U.S.
Department of the Interior extended the period for comment on oil and natural gas development on the OCS by 180 days and established other processes to allow more
careful evaluation of potential OCS development. Assuming that leasing actually goes forward on the schedule contemplated by the previous Administration, the
leases must then be bid on and awarded, and the wining bidders must develop exploration and development plans and have them
approved before any wells can be drilled. Thus, conversion of the newly available OCS resources to production will require
considerable time, in addition to financial investment. Further, because the expected average field size in the Pacific and Atlantic OCS is smaller
than the average field size in the Gulf of Mexico, a portion of the additional OCS resources may not be as economically attractive
as available resources in the Gulf .
A2 exports advantage – no internal link
Oil boom now –squo triggers the impact or impossible to solve because OPEC is too powerful
Hussain 2012 Gulf Business |World Oil Markets: Is US Set To Overtake OPEC? As US crude production rises, is OPEC’s influence
on global oil markets in danger of waning? By Syed Hussain December 31, 2012
Consider the facts: US oil production has been at its highest level since 1998, while natural gas production reached its highest level ever. Meanwhile, the US
became a net exporter of petroleum products for the first time in 49 years and is now actively looking to export natural gas to
Asian and European markets. In the north, the Canadian oil sands, considered the third largest crude reserves in the world after deposits in Venezuela
and Saudi Arabia, have ramped up production and aim to be the fourth largest oil produce r in the world by 2025. Finally, Mexico, the world’s 8th
largest crude producer, is also ramping up production, making the three friendly states powerful allies against OPEC influence. Combined,
North America oil production is projected to average 16.43 million barrels per day in 2012, larger than the 12-million bpd capacity of top producer
Saudi Arabia. Indeed, North America is expected to have the highest growth among all non-OPEC regions in 2012, as supply growth marks the
highest level in terms of volume since 1970. “The forecast calls for healthy growth from the US and Canada, as well as relatively steady supply
from Mexico,” noted the latest OPEC report. “According to preliminary data, North America oil supply increased by 1.27 million bpd in the first half of 2012
compared to the same period in 2011. On a quarterly basis, North America oil production is expected to average 16.48 million bpd, 16.45 million bpd, 16.33 million
Citibank calls this change in global energy supply chain ‘transformational’. “With no
signs of this growth trend ending over the next decade , the growing continental surplus of hydrocarbons points to North America effectively becoming the
bpd, and 16.46 million bpd, respectively.”
new Middle East by the next decade,” Ed Morse, managing director and the head of global commodities research at Citigroup Global Markets, wrote in a report earlier
in the year. The US alone could add 6.6 million bpd to bring crude from nine million bpd at end-2011 to over 15.6 million bpd in 2020- 22. In total, North America as a
whole could add over 11 million bpd of liquids from over 15 million bpd in 2010 to almost 27 million bpd by 2020-22, notes Morse. Global investment data
underlines that trend. North America is expected to attract 26 per cent of the $1.23 trillion being poured into the global energy sector this year, according to energy
consultants IHS International. “The brief lull in expenditures in 2009 and 2010 caused by the Great Recession is behind us,” said David Hobbs, IHS chief energy
strategist. “Robust oil prices and the growth of North American unconventional gas – which already accounts for $128 billion in 2012 spending – will create new high
water marks for investment in capital expenditure and operational expenditure that surpass pre-recession highs.” Meanwhile, Middle East energy companies will spend
$135 billion, or 11 per cent of total global spend. Naturally, Middle East oil and gas companies have been distracted over the past two years due to
the Arab Spring. While Gulf states have ramped up production and made up for the shortfall in OPEC production, there are huge question marks
over the future of other Middle East producers. Iran’s oil and gas output has been falling due to crippling sanctions, while
Syrian and Yemeni production has been decimated. Iraq and Libya have ambitious plans, but their plans could be derailed by a range of investment issues,
infrastructure challenges and political instability. Hungry Asian consumers are also hedging their supply risks by investing in North America.
Burnt by their dependence on Iranian crude, Chinese, Japanese, South Korean and Indian state-owned companies are seeking investments in North America, Africa,
non-OPEC production. Another key reason for the rise of non-OPEC production is OPEC’s own rising
domestic expenditures and consumption. Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation (Apicorp) data shows Saudi Arabia’s fiscal breakeven oil price stands at
$94, while OPEC’s median fiscal breakeven price stands between $90-100. In the past, OPEC’s low-breakeven fiscal price meant that many reserves
such as the Canadian oil sands, Gulf of Mexico and Brazilian deepwater reserves, and Arctic resources were economically unviable. But market observers
are certain most OPEC producers will act to ensure oil prices remain high, making the more expensive non-OPEC production
possible. “Those whose fiscal break-even prices are higher than market price should not be expected to be comfortable with the status quo,” wrote Ali Aissaoui,
thereby accelerating
senior consultant at Apicpro, in a research report. “They would try and persuade the opposite side to lower the aggregate production ceiling and individual output quotas
either pro-rata or otherwise. The expectation would be for market prices to increase to meet their higher break- even prices, even if that means losing some volume.”
Don’t expect the Saudis and other OPEC countries to give up their influence on global oil markets easily. As other
OPEC countries faltered during the Arab Spring revolution, Saudi Arabia played the soothing role of the responsible and influential global supplier of crude to world
markets and has earned global praise for ensuring oil prices don’t spiral out of control and derail fragile global economic recovery. Saudi, and other influential
suppliers such as Kuwait, UAE and Qatar, are securing long-term contracts with Asian customers to ensure demand security. Earlier this
year, South Korea’s Korea National Corporation’s took a 40 per cent stake in three oil production blocks in Abu Dhabi at a cost of $2 billion, which gives it access to
43,000 bpd. Saudi Arabia is trying to invest in solar energy for domestic use to free up more crude for export purposes. It has also begun
tapping its shale gas reserves in the Red Sea. Oil services giant Baker Hughes estimates Saudi Arabia may hold the fifth-largest deposits of shale gas, after
China, the US, Argentina and Mexico, with as much as 645 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves. Crucially, Saudi Aramco owns half of Motiva Enterprises, which
operates the United States largest refinery. The move has reversed the decline of Saudi oil exports in the US and gives the Kingdom a foothold in the burgeoning energy
centre. Kuwait, meanwhile, is looking to ramp up its oil production once the political climate improves, and is reportedly in talks with a Canadian company to take a
stake in an oil sands’ project. BERNSTEIN’S RESEARCH Not everybody believes the North American production surge is a fait accompli. A Harvard University
Belfer Centre research notes that the biggest threat to North America output is a collapse in oil prices, especially as production surpasses
demand during economic fragility.
Increased US production doesn’t threaten OPEC
Jahn 2012 OPEC not concerned about US pickup in oil output| GEORGE JAHN | December 13, 2012 10:16 AM EST | The
Huffington Post
VIENNA — OPEC does not see increased U.S. oil output as a threat to its interests but is skeptical about current forecasts on the
boom of American shale oil production, a senior official of the 12-nation cartel said Thursday. OPEC Secretary General Abdullah AlBadry also said that figures supplied by Iran show it producing around 3.7 million barrels a day. That is the same amount as Tehran
pumped before international embargos on its crude that took effect this year and is estimated to have cost it hundreds of thousands of
barrels a day in sales. Al-Badry spoke to reporters a day after OPEC ministers agreed to keep their daily crude production target
unchanged at 30 million barrels. They also extended his term for a year after failing to agree on a successor for the post because of
rivalries among Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, which nominated candidates. OPEC, which accounts for about a third of the world's oil
production, is projecting a slight fall in demand for its crude next year, and world inventories are well stocked, in part because of
resurgent production by the United States, which is tapping into oil extraction from shale. The Paris-based International Energy
Agency is predicting that America will be a net exporter of oil by the next decade and could overtake Saudi Arabia – OPEC's
powerhouse – as the world's top crude producer by 2020. Analysts have suggested a looming dent in OPEC influence as a result. But
Al-Badry told reporters his organization "is not really concerned" about any increase in world supply due to U.S. shale extraction. He
questioned industry estimates that U.S. shale extraction could amount to an extra 3 million barrels of oil a day within 20 years as well
as forecasts of U.S. energy independence. At the same time, he said any extra supply was welcome. "It's fine with us, it's another
source of energy and the world really needs this oil, I don't see it as a threat to OPEC" he said.
xt – production high
Boom now solves dependence
Williams 2013. N America Shale Oil Boom To Put Pressure On OPEC. Published January 16, 2013. Dow Jones Newswires.
http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2013/01/16/n-america-shale-oil-boom-to-put-pressure-on-opec/#ixzz2IkUp9foz
Boom now solves dependence
BP's forecasts illustrate the extent to which the North American boom, first in shale gas production and now in shale oil, has redrawn the
global energy map. However, the company doesn't expect the shale revolution to spread by 2030 on any great scale to Asia or Europe, where conditions for
investment in unconventional oil and gas fall short of those in North America, BP said. In the U.S. alone, shale oil production is expected to grow
around 5 million barrels a day by 2030, said BP's chief economist Christof Ruehl. This is likely to be offset by reductions in supply from the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, which has been pumping at historical highs in recent years to compensate for
output losses in Libya due to the civil war there and more recently to compensate for Iranian sanctions, he added. "This will generate
spare capacity of around 6 million barrels a day, and there's a faultline if there is higher shale [production] then the consequences
would be even stronger," he said. OPEC spare oil production capacity last exceeded 6 million barrels a day in February 2002, when the price of U.S. crude
benchmark West Texas Intermediate averaged just under $21 a barrel, according to data from the International Energy Agency. But the shale revolution will remain
largely a North American phenomenon, Mr. Ruehl said. "No other country outside the U.S. and Canada has yet succeeded in combining these
factors to support production growth. While we expect other regions will adapt over time to develop their resources, by 2030 we expect North America still to
dominate production of these resources," said Mr. Ruehl. The growth in shale oil and gas production is expected to remain concentrated in North
America over the next two decades thanks to favorable investment conditions, technological advances, a competitive services industry and a nimble financial
sector able to fund the large numbers of drilling rigs required, said Mr. Ruehl. Growing production from unconventional sources of oil, including tight
oil, oil sands and biofuels, is expected to provide all of the net growth in global oil supply to 2020, and over 70% of growth to 2030,
the BP report said. Increasing production from new tight oil resources will result in the U.S. overtaking Saudi Arabia to become the
world's largest producer of liquids in 2013 . By 2030, the U.S. will be 99% self-sufficient in net energy, compared to 70% in 2005. This comes
as major emerging economies such as China and India will become increasingly reliant on energy imports.
xt – opec still top dog
U.S. oil restrictions don’t impact energy independence
Menenburg 2012 Aaron graduate student in international relations at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University. "Let’s Get Real:
Energy Independence is an Unrealistic and Misleading Myth" http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/06/lets-get-realenergy-independence-is-a-unrealistic-and-misleading-myth/
By 2030, the world is expected to consume over 100 million barrels of oil per day, and it is far from conclusive that the impact of the
additional 10% of supply achieved by producing North America’s near-full capacity would have any meaningful effect on oil prices
given the continued rise in demand up to and beyond 2035 expected by every projection, especially when US proven oil reserves are
only the twelfth largest in the world.[17] Getting every little bit of additional supply from domestic reserves will require increasingly
elaborate operations, many of which may be prohibitively expensive if proper environmental safeguards are factored in and if world
prices sag, as they have repeatedly in the past 15 years. In a global market, it is hard to see how such projects could compete with
various foreign sources where production costs are much lower. Most of the oil extracted by OPEC countries costs less than $5 per
barrel to produce[18] with total upstream costs of Middle Eastern crude at $16.93 per barrel.[19] Conversely, the Department of
Energy reports US average upstream costs of $74.20 per barrel between 2006 and 2008, which is a good reference point for current
production costs given recent dynamics in global oil production costs.[20] Even if all government regulations on oil production
and refining were removed, the cost of domestic production would be more expensive than OPEC production by multiples.
Your authors don’t assume a global market – U.S. production can’t solve
Menenburg 2012 Aaron graduate student in international relations at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University. "Let’s Get Real:
Energy Independence is an Unrealistic and Misleading Myth" http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/06/lets-get-realenergy-independence-is-a-unrealistic-and-misleading-myth/
Oil is a global market and therefore a globally priced commodity, and so long as America consumes oil and abstains from protectionist
policies, self-sufficiency of oil would still mean buying and selling oil at the world price. Because oil is available from dozens of
countries and hundreds of companies, and because it is relatively easily shippable, there is only a single global market for oil no matter
where the consumer is located. Oil prices are set in open commodity markets, and oil is traded globally, which means that prices are
affected by events around the world and decisions made by countries and companies unassociated with the United States. The way the
oil production supply chain functions means it would be impossible to separate domestic and foreign gasoline. William Nordhaus of
Yale University illustrates the globally integrated oil market nicely as a “bathtub” that: “…contains the world inventory of oil that has
been extracted and is available for purchase. There are spigots from Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United States, and other producers that
introduce oil into the inventory; and there are drains from which the United States, Japan, Denmark, and other consumers draw oil
from the inventory. Nevertheless, the price and quantity dynamics are determined by the sum of these demands and supplies and the
level of total inventory, and are independent of whether the faucets and drains are labeled “U.S.,” “Russia,” or “Denmark.”[3] A
useful example of how oil consumers are beholden to the global oil market is Europe’s experience in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. After Katrina, gas prices in Europe soared as a result of the damage to US refineries even though those facilities sent very
little gas to Europe. Even if the US does not import one barrel of oil from the Middle East or any other region, the price US consumers
pay at the pump would still be a function of worldwide supply and demand, just as it was for Europeans after Katrina.[4] The extent of
our vulnerability is not a function of how much oil we produce domestically. Britain produces more oil than it needs, but its selfsufficiency does nothing to alter its gasoline prices or its vulnerability to global price volatility.[5] Likewise, the US, so long as it uses
significant amounts of oil, will be susceptible to the global oil market no matter how much of our consumption comes from
domestically produced oil.
The thesis to this advantage is wrong – 3 warrants
MORRIS et al ’12 – Adjunct Professor @ Georgetown; fellow and the policy director for Brookings Climate and Energy Economics Project (Morris, Adele C.
Pietro S. Nivola. Charles L. Schultze. “CLEAN ENERGY: REVISITING THE CHALLENGES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY”. June 4, 2012.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/04%20clean%20energy%20morris%20nivola%20schultze/04_clean_energy_morris_nivola_schultze)
The only fuel the U.S imports in vast quantities is oil, so energy security as it relates to imports is really about oil. The degree to which oil dependence justifies
government investments in clean energy technology is debatable. First, nearly 90 percent of U.S. oil demand is met by domestic wells and those
of
suppliers outside the unstable Middle East, chiefly Canada and Mexico which sell America more oil than do either Saudi Arabia or
Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Second, the net benefits of importing less oil as a share of total consumption and using less oil in total are unclear. 20 The oil market
is global. Even if Americans purchased none from abroad, they would remain vulnerable to any perturbation in the
international market because they would still have to pay the world’s price . In addition, the key inefficiencies from oil dependence
derive from macroeconomic disruptions and market power by oil exporters. Policies that drive down oil consumption in
periods without disruptions or significant monopoly pricing could burden consumers while not directly correcting market failures.
OPEC not key to imports
MILLER ’12 - Energy Consultant and Professional Engineer; 35 years experience in petroleum & clean energy businesses; MBA from Saint Mary's College/U.C.
Berkley. (Miller, John. “U.S. Energy Security and the Next Energy Crisis”. July 16, 2012. http://theenergycollective.com/node/93716)
U.S. Crude and Petroleum Oil Imports – The U.S. imports are supplied by OPEC and non-OPEC countries. The security or risk of oil imports from
different countries varies due to logistics reliability (pipeline vs. marine, shipment distance, etc.), and the export country’s government stability
and relationship with the U.S. Generally, the longer the marine shipment and the more unstable or hostile an export government is
towards the U.S., the lower the reliability or higher the security risk of the imported supply . Today the U.S. imports crude and petroleum oil
from over 90 countries. The largest import volumes come from OPEC and seven non-OPEC countries. Refer to the following table. The most secure and the
largest import volumes come from North America. Canada, the U.S.’s largest and most important trade partner is also the largest
supplier of U.S. oil imports. Mexico is the second largest supplier. Canadian and Mexican oil imports are essentially as reliable
and secure as average U.S. domestic production.
Due to Iran’s threats to shutdown the Strait of Hormuz, the OPEC Persian Gulf imports
have the highest risk of disruption and lowest security level.
Will take decades to solve and multiple alt causes to the aff
(import oil from other countries, need natural gas, reduce consumption)
MILLER ’12 - Energy Consultant and Professional Engineer; 35 years experience in petroleum & clean energy businesses; MBA from Saint Mary's College/U.C.
Berkley. (Miller, John. “U.S. Energy Security and the Next Energy Crisis”. July 16, 2012. http://theenergycollective.com/node/93716)
Immediate Solutions to U.S. Energy Security – 70% of all U.S. petroleum is consumed by the Transportation Sector.
The ultimate solution to U.S. energy
security is reducing the need for petroleum by making all forms of transportation substantially more efficient (CAFE),
replacing most private/commercial vehicles with hybrids and electric vehicles (HEV/EV’s), replacing petroleum use with alternative
fueled vehicles (AFV’s), increased renewable biofuels and possibly encouraging Residents to significantly reduce annual miles traveled
(AMT). Based on the progress made in all these areas over the past 30 years, the U.S. will realistically require well over another 30 years to
accomplishing some of these envisioned improvements. During the interim the U.S. must continue to use petroleum fuels to support the economy
and the current average Resident’s standard of living. Effective and immediate U.S. energy security improvement in the interim will require eliminating the need
for the highest risk oil imports from all OPEC and possibly some non-OPEC countries. This can be reasonably accomplished by maximizing oil imports
from the most secure non-OPEC countries, further expanding domestic oil production, replacing petroleum with commercially proven
alternative fuels such as natural gas, and more significantly reducing consumption.
This advantage is a myth
LEVI ’12 - David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security
and Climate Change (Levi, Michael. “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”. August, 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom)
"The United States Could Be Energy Independent."
No. This massive new U.S. oil and gas output has brought talk of American energy independence back into vogue . Energy economist Adam
Sieminski, the new EIA administrator, captured the shift in a February interview: "For 40 years, only politicians and the occasional author in Popular Mechanics
magazine talked about achieving energy independence," he observed. "Now it doesn't seem such an outlandish idea." The numbers would appear to back up this
sentiment. Just five years ago, the experts were bracing for the United States to become dependent on imported liquefied natural gas, with uncertain geopolitical
consequences, such as dependence on vulnerable Middle Eastern suppliers and entanglement in a global gas market in which Moscow plays a troubling role. That now
seems like ancient history, as record gas production has spared the United States the need for large-scale imports. According to one only somewhat hyperbolic headline,
"We've Fracked So Much Gas We've Got No Place to Put It." The math is shakier when it comes to oil. The most bullish projections foresee around 15
million barrels a day of U.S. liquid fuels production by 2020, while the consultancy Wood MacKenzie claims that U.S. production could rise to about
10 million barrels a day by the close of this decade and 15 million before the end of the next. In
any case, U.S. consumption is vastly
greater. As of 2009, Americans burned through nearly 19 million barrels of oil-based liquid fuels each day to power their cars, trucks, and factories, and although
that figure has edged down over the past couple of years, domestic supply is still a long way from matching U.S. demand. That said, U.S.
demand for oil appears to have peaked. While part of the recent fall can be chalked up to slow economic growth, sustained high oil prices and improving automobile
technology are also at work. New fuel- economy standards, if they stick, could drive U.S. consumption down much further. Ultimately, though, it's
stretch to think the United States will eliminate the gap between oil supply and demand anytime soon.
a massive
A2 exports advantage – no heg internal link
MANNING 4/27/2014 - Energy Economist working for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada in Vancouver. The views expressed
here are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (Manning, Ned, US
dreams of energy independence, 27 April 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/27/us-dreams-of-energy-independence/)
Although the US now sources the majority of its oil imports from the ‘Western Hemisphere’, the perception amongst the American public that the US still imports most
of its oil from the Middle East persists, along with the belief that the US main strategic priority in the region is securing its own oil imports. The
United States
has a broad and complex relationship with the Middle East and its energy priorities do not solely determine its
strategy and presence within the region, as the US also has other non energy priorities in the region that will remain important regardless of the
conclusion that America can finally ‘pack up and leave’ the Middle East because they
have entered a ‘shale energy revolution’ is too simplistic and any long-term major changes in US strategy towards the Middle East
must be considered against the increasing presence and influence of China in the region, with America not wanting to be significantly
displaced in the region over the coming decades. Both the ongoing ‘shale gas revolution’ and the more recent shale oil
amount of oil that it itself imports from the region. The
‘surge’ have dramatically changed the US domestic energy landscape, but the country is still, and will remain, far
from ‘energy independent’. Over the next two decades, even as shale oil production peaks, the US will still import over 25 per cent of its total oil
consumption. The shale oil surge and reduced oil consumption have reduced US oil import dependence significantly over the last five years, from 56 per cent in 2008 to
32 per cent in 2013. Although the huge increase in Canadian oil imports — from 16 per cent in 2004 to 32 per cent in 2013 — has significantly altered the composition
of the US imports portfolio, Saudi Arabia and the wider Persian Gulf today still contribute around 20 per cent. Increased shale oil output coupled with higher imports
from both Canada and Mexico will see the relative contribution of the Persian Gulf decline in the medium-term, but as the shale oil surge tapers off in the second half of
the next decade this contribution will rebound. Even during this medium-term downturn the Persian Gulf will remain one of America’s top three oil sources. The cost
advantage that Persian Gulf suppliers enjoy means that there will always be a significant market for their oil in the US. Regardless of the actual amount of oil
that the US imports from the Middle East, there are still broader economic goals that it will pursue in the region. The US understands
stable oil and gas exports from the Middle East to the world economy are critical. And it demonstrates this understanding by its
continued ‘policing’ of the Straits of Hormuz — the world’s most important ‘oil chokepoint’, with 20 per cent of all oil traded passing
through it. Even though the US contributes the majority of military assets that allow the free flow of ships through the Straits, almost
85 per cent of this oil travels to Asian markets, while only about 10 per cent actually travels to the US. As long as the US perceives threats to energy supply
routes in the Middle East it will contribute its available security assets to the region. On top of its economic goals in the region there are also significant
non-energy priorities that the US will continue to pursue into the future. Blocking Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and the
continued support of Israel are both examples of US priorities which can ‘trump’ its energy priorities, with past US actions in relation
to these issues (US-led sanctions against Iran, the Arab oil embargo) directly and significantly reducing the supply of oil to the world
market. Additionally, any future US strategy in the Middle East must consider China. China is the world’s largest energy consumer
and currently imports the majority of its oil from the Middle East . To secure its increasing energy needs China will need to increase its presence and
influence in the region. As China’s ‘blue water’ naval capabilities expand in the future, it will want to increase protection of its energy supply routes — especially those
in the Middle East. It will also seek to strengthen its relationship with Saudi Arabia. China’s future long-term strategy for the Middle East will increasingly threaten
reduced
future US oil import dependence on the Middle East will not directly result in a wholesale shift in strategy towards
the region, it will give the US slightly more flexibility in the medium-term when dealing with specific crises or countries, generally improving Washington’s
America’s role as the dominant exterior power in the region, which is a strong incentive for the US to maintain its position in the region. Although
relative negotiating positions. A
medium-term decrease in American oil imports from the Middle East will not result in the US redeploying
one its aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific, or encourage a future US Administration to lecture Saudi Arabia about the
rights of women in the State Of The Union. America has broad long-term strategic goals in the Middle East and will have to pursue them carefully in the
future as China strengthens its position in the region.
A2 exports advantage – no heg impact
Stability will survive without US hegemony
Fettweis ‘10 (Chris Fettweis, Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international
politics of great power peace” Google Books)
Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax
Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a
level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its
dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break
out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If
the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.”
If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There
are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of
stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong
enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs,
ifs states have decided that their interest are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering
down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability . Likewise, if it is true that such
a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United
States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95 . At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a
neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the
reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always
proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic
stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or
psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S.
intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists
in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection
between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending
fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in
hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts
If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but
a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The
verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed
to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a
belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred
once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not
a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending
under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the
conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.
that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace.""
A2 exports advantage – no oil wars
No risk of access loss and no coercion
GLASER 2011 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “ Reframing Energy Security: How
Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx, )
Oil dependence could reduce a state’s security if its access to oil is vulnerable to disruption and if oil is necessary for operating the state’s military forces. Vulnerable energy supplies can leave
a state open to coercion—recognizing that it is more likely to lose a war, the state has a weaker bargaining position and is more likely to make concessions. 1 Closely related, if war occurs the
state is more likely to lose. Conflict that is influenced by this mechanism is not fundamentally over the oil; 2 rather, when states already have incentives for conflict, the oil vulnerability
Recognizing this type of danger during the Cold War, U.S. planning to protect its sea
lanes of communication with the Persian Gulf was motivated partly by the importance of insuring the steady flow of oil that was necessary to enable the United States
to fight a long war against the Soviet Union in Europe. During the Second World War, Japan’s vulnerability to a U.S. oil embargo played an important role in destroying Japan’s ability
to fight.3 This type of threat to the U.S. military capabilities is not a serious danger today because the United States does not face a
major power capable of severely interrupting its access to key supplies of oil. In contrast, China does face this type of danger because its oil imports are
influences their assessment of military capabilities and in turn the path to war.
vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy.
No need for provocative actions – no risk of war
GLASER 2011 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “ Reframing Energy Security: How
Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx, )
The vulnerability of a state’s access to oil supplies could reduce its security via a second, more complicated mechanism—if the state’s efforts to protect its access to oil threaten another state’s
security, then this reduced security could in turn reduce the state’s own security. The danger would follow standard security-dilemma logic, but with the defense of oil supply lines replacing the
standard focus on protection of territory. In the most extreme case, a state could try to solve its import vulnerability through territorial expansion. In less extreme cases, the state could deal with
its vulnerability by building up military forces required to protect its access to oil, which has the unintended consequence of decreasing its adversary’s military capability and signaling that the
state’s motives are malign, which decreases the adversary’s security, which leads the adversary to build up its own military forces.4 Just as protecting a distant ally can require a state to adopt
an offensive capability, protecting access to oil can require offensive power-projection capabilities. Thus, a state’s need to protect its access to oil could create a security dilemma that would
not otherwise exist. Conflict fueled by this security dilemma need not be over oil or access to oil; by damaging political relations the security dilemma could prevent the states from resolving
the United States does not currently face this type of danger; this is largely because the military
status quo currently favors the United States, which relieves it from having to take provocative actions. In contrast, China’s efforts to protect its access to oil
political disputes and avoiding the escalation of crises. Here again,
could be more provocative and generate military competition with the United States.
For a full analysis of the when and how oil dependence leaves states vulnerable to coercion, see Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Black Gold
and Blackmail: The Politics of International Oil Coercion” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2011).
1
2
For important exceptions, see Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail.”
3
Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1949).
On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January
1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp.
171-201.
4
A2 exports advantage – no oil shocks
Fed Reserve solves
MORRIS et al ’12 – Adjunct Professor @ Georgetown; fellow and the policy director for Brookings Climate and Energy Economics Project (Morris, Adele C.
Pietro S. Nivola. Charles L. Schultze. “CLEAN ENERGY: REVISITING THE CHALLENGES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY”. June 4, 2012.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/04%20clean%20energy%20morris%20nivola%20schultze/04_clean_energy_morris_nivola_schultze)
Third, the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to oil price fluctuations depends critically on policies outside the energy sector. Two kinds of significant macroeconomic
costs arise from oil price spikes: (1) the simple loss of national income from a large jump in oil prices sustained for any length of time; and (2) the effects of large oil
price shocks on inflation and output arising from “imperfections” and rigidities of the macroeconomic system. Experience
from the past four
decades shows that easily the most effective policy to reduce potential macroeconomic social costs from periodic oil supply
shocks is the Federal Reserve’s determination to respond promptly to any current or prospective inflationary threat. This means
that even fairly large oil price increases are now much less likely to set off a wage price spirals.
The thesis to this advantage is wrong – 3 warrants
MORRIS et al ’12 – Adjunct Professor @ Georgetown; fellow and the policy director for Brookings Climate and Energy Economics Project (Morris, Adele C.
Pietro S. Nivola. Charles L. Schultze. “CLEAN ENERGY: REVISITING THE CHALLENGES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY”. June 4, 2012.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/04%20clean%20energy%20morris%20nivola%20schultze/04_clean_energy_morris_nivola_schultze)
The only fuel the U.S imports in vast quantities is oil, so energy security as it relates to imports is really about oil. The degree to which oil dependence justifies
government investments in clean energy technology is debatable. First, nearly 90 percent of U.S. oil demand is met by domestic wells and those
of
suppliers outside the unstable Middle East, chiefly Canada and Mexico which sell America more oil than do either Saudi Arabia or
Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Second, the net benefits of importing less oil as a share of total consumption and using less oil in total are unclear. 20 The oil market
is global. Even if Americans purchased none from abroad, they would remain vulnerable to any perturbation in the
international market because they would still have to pay the world’s price . In addition, the key inefficiencies from oil dependence
derive from macroeconomic disruptions and market power by oil exporters. Policies that drive down oil consumption in
periods without disruptions or significant monopoly pricing could burden consumers while not directly correcting market failures.
A2 hotspots advantage – no internal link
No Arctic infrastructure for the plan- multiple reasons
DoD 2011 [US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage” May 2011; <
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf]
Construction in the Arctic is seasonal and skilled labor is usually in short supply; therefore, costs for both construction and
maintenance are high. The need to provide room and board at remote locations, decreased efficiency of workers and machinery in extreme
environmental conditions, and the difficulties, costs, and risks in shipping materials and equipment add to the challenge. Because of the
short construction season, outside work must be accomplished quickly, dictating a high degree of expensive prefabricated construction. During icefree periods, the most economical means of transportation is by barge. During the winter, transportation over frozen rivers and lakes may be more economical than air
transportation. But delays in shipping equipment due to weather can result in prolonged construction times and expensive emergency air
freight costs. Construction in the Arctic costs, as a rule of thumb, three to five times more than comparable infrastructure in lower
latitudes. Another challenge to bear in mind is the risk to existing infrastructure posed by thawing permafrost. As the permafrost thaws, it loses
strength and volume, leading to failure of foundations and piling. The warming climate will also accelerate the erosion of shorelines and riverbanks, threatening
infrastructure located on eroding shorelines.
Unilateral efforts can’t solve Arctic leadership
Smith 2011 [Colonel Reginald R. Smith, USAF, is Professor of National Security Affairs and Senior Developmental Education
Student (Strategy and Policy) at the Naval War College, “The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm or the Next "Cold War"?”
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf]
The United States must move outside the construct of unilateral action in order to preserve its sovereign rights in the Arctic,
capitalize on the opportunities available, and safeguard vital national interests in the region. In today's budget-constrained environment and as a
Nation at war with higher resource priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan than in the Arctic, it is unrealistic to believe that any
significant allocation will be programmed for addressing this issue.3 Since the United States is too far behind in actions
necessary to preserve its critical interests as compared to the other Arctic countries, the Nation must take the lead to cultivate
a new multilateral partnership paradigm in the region.
xt – drilling fails
Arctic drilling is too unpredictable for companies- long history of empirics proves the plan fails
Beinecke 2013 [Frances, President, Natural Resources Defense Council, “A Pattern of Failure,”
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/are-arctic-oildrilling-challen.php?comments=expandall#comments]
Shell’s repeated failures in the Arctic Ocean prove that neither the company nor offshore drilling belong in these wild, remote, and
rugged waters. The company’s drilling rig, for instance, ran aground when four tug engines failed in a storm. Yet the North is region of
mishaps – mechanical, human, and natural. It is home to churning seas, punishing winds, frigid temperatures, unpredictable ice, and
months of prolonged darkness. Shell’s inability to prepare for and cope with these punishing conditions makes it vividly clear: we
have no business letting the oil industry drill in the Arctic Ocean.¶ The grounding of Shell’s drilling rig is not an isolated incident. It is
part of a larger pattern in which Shell has proven no match for the elements .¶ Last July, another of the company’s drill rigs nearly ran aground in the
Aleutian Islands. Through August, Shell couldn’t move its spill response barge—a linchpin in its emergency plan—out of Bellingham, WA because the Coast Guard
wouldn’t certify it as seaworthy until the company dealt with more than 400 issues, including wiring and other safety shortcomings. Then, when Shell started
preliminary drilling without the spill response barge in place, within 24 hours its rig had to turn tail and flee from a 30-mile long iceberg that bore
down on the drill site. And in September, Shell’s containment dome—used to capture oil in the event of spill—was “crushed like a beer can” during pre-deployment
testing.¶ Shell has poured billions of dollars into offshore Arctic drilling, but no matter how much it spends, it cannot make the effort anything
but a terrifying gamble. And if Shell, the most profitable company on Earth, can’t buy its way to safety in Alaska , nobody can.¶ That is
why the administration should halt all drilling in the Arctic Ocean. Neither the oil industry nor our government is prepared to respond to
a spill in a region where the closest Coast Guard base is 1,000 miles away from the leasing sites, no proven technology exists to
collect oil, and winter ice makes spill response impossible. Nor do we even know all the damage a spill and clean-up efforts would do to Arctic
ecosystems. Very little research has been done yet in these waters and we have only a narrow body of research focusing on just a few species. Until these gaps in
emergency response and research are filled, federal agencies cannot responsibly even weigh whether drilling in the Arctic Ocean could ever be safe.¶
Drilling is impossible- no proven tech, resources, or safety measures
Clark 2013 [Jamie Rappaport Clark, President and CEO of Defenders of Wildlife, “What Shell Has Proven,”
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/01/are-arctic-oildrilling-challen.php?comments=expandall#comments]
The series of failures in both judgment and technology that resulted in Shell’s Kulluk drill rig crashing into Alaska’s Sitkalidak Island on New
Years Eve has put wildlife and human life at increasing and unacceptable risk. Alarmingly only the latest in a series of problems with Shell’s drilling season, it should
also put an end to drilling in the Arctic.¶ The list of problems that Shell’s drilling program has had is well documented and very
disturbing—from losing control of the Noble Discovery drill ship, to the oil containment dome that was “crushed like a can” by arctic
ice, to violoations of air safety permits, and now the grounding of the Kulluk. But, in this most recent incident alone, there are three things that stand out as
indicative of Shell’s problems and as reasons why the fate of the Arctic drilling program should be sealed once and for all.¶ First, the Kulluk was hauled out to sea in
dangerously unpredictable weather putting human lives and wildlife at risk so Shell could avoid paying tax on the vessel to the state of Alaska. Shell’s willingness to
put profit above human safety and the environment is consistent with the safety commission’s warnings that the poor safety culture at BP was really an industry–wide
problem, and not the outlier that Shell and others tried to suggest. ¶ Second, it took 700 people and a fleet of Coast Guard vessels to respond to the
grounding of the Kulluk. But if this incident, let alone a major oil spill or other catastrophe, had happened in the deep Arctic there would not be
anywhere near 700 people to respond. It is clear that Shell was simply not equipped to respond when the Kulluk ran aground. How can we expect them to be
prepared if something happened in an even more remote area?¶ Third, the grounding of the Kulluk demonstrated that despite all the promises to the contrary,
the industry just does not have the technology to function safely in the Arctic environment. The Aiviq tug is a multimillion dollar ice crusher designed
specifically to handle high seas and bad weather. It’s been presented as a symbol of why we should feel safe about Shell’s drilling in the rugged and remote Arctic. But
in its first major storm, the Aiviq not only lost control of the Kulluk, it also lost power in all four of its engines and was itself at the whim of
the rough seas. According to reports, after the Aiviq restored its connection to the Kulluk the Coast Guard had it drop its line and cut the Kulluk loose again, in order to
protect the lives of Aiviq crew because of the harsh weather conditions. ¶ If the Obama administration wants to be credible when it speaks about pursuing safe offshore
drilling, then the grounding of the Kulluk must be the last straw. The lack of a demonstrated culture of safety, the obvious lack of response
resources, and the lack of proven technology capable of avoiding or addressing a crisis should be a loud and clear signal that the
administration needs to end drilling in the Arctic.
xt – leadership fails
Failure to ratify LOST is the single greatest factor in US Arctic influence
Smith 2011 [Colonel Reginald R. Smith, USAF, is Professor of National Security Affairs and Senior Developmental Education
Student (Strategy and Policy) at the Naval War College, “The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm or the Next "Cold War"?”
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf]
The significance of the declaration is paramount to cooperation in that UNCLOS provides the international rallying point for
the Arctic states. 78 Similarly important, by virtue of the unanimous and strong affirmation of UNCLOS, the declaration effectively
delegitimized the notion to administer the Arctic along the lines of an Antarctic-like treaty preserving the notions of
sovereignty and resource exploitation in the region. 79 With U.S. participation and declaration of support for UNCLOS in these venues, failure to
ratify the treaty suggests that U.S. credibility and legitimacy, and hence the ability to build cohesive multilateral partnerships,
are appreciably degraded. This conclusion is illustrated in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s refusal to join the Proliferation Security Initiative using the U.S. refusal
to accede to UNCLOS as their main argument. 80 Accession to the treaty appears to be a key first step to preserving U.S. vital interests in
the Arctic and building necessary credibility for regional and global partnerships in the political spectrum. Equally important
to political partnerships in the region are those available through military collaboration of the Arctic nations .
A2 china addon impact
econ growth is too weak --- china’s not a threat
Scissors ‘12 – Research Fellow in Economics at the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation and Adjunct Professor of
Economics at George Washington (Derek, “The Wobbly Dragon”, Foreign Affairs, January/February)
Arvind Subramanian claims that China will unquestionably replace the United States as the dominant global power in the next two decades ("The Inevitable Superpower," September/October
2011). He is right that if the U.S. economy continues on its current trajectory, the United States will not be able to maintain its position of global leadership. But he is far too bullish on China.
Subramanian overlooks Chinese policies that will complicate the country's economic rise and ignores the possibility that Chinese growth will simply stop. And he
uses a definition of "dominance" that bears little resemblance to the U.S.-style preeminence he sees China assuming. Consider how Subramanian measures China's growing power. He cites the
ability of Beijing to convince African countries to recognize it instead of Taipei, but out-muscling
Taiwan diplomatically is hardly a sign of global leadership . He
behind a foreign currency is not a sign of
sees the ease with which China undervalues the yuan by pegging it to the dollar as proof of the country's strength, but hiding
economic might. He forecasts that China in 2030 will have an economy that is one-third larger than the United States', yet he admits that it will remain only half as wealthy. These are
notable trends, to be sure, but not ones that indicate China will attain anything close to the position the United States has held over the past 60 years. The biggest flaw in Subramanian's index of
dominance is the importance he assigns to China's status as a net creditor. Based on this alone, he is prepared to say that China's economic strength is already comparable to that of the United
States. But China's
creditor status does not make up for the fact that its economy is presently less than half the size of the United States' and
its people are barely one-tenth as wealthy as Americans. Creditor status is also a misleading metric by which to judge China because it
is usually used to describe financially open economies, and China is largely closed . Countries with open economies can invest their money in many places.
Beijing, because it cannot spend its foreign reserves at home, is forced to keep buying U.S. Treasury bonds. China's creditor status
arises largely from its weaknesses, not its strengths. The country's $3.2 trillion worth of foreign currency holdings represents an imbalance
between investment and consumption. Instead of loaning money to rich countries, China should be importing capital in order to speed its domestic
development and meet its sizable needs, starting with properly capitalized pension and financial systems. China's financial books are strictly divided, with huge assets in foreign currency
(primarily dollars) on one side and huge liabilities in local currency on the other. Local governments have incurred high debts by spending heavily on programs such as railroad expansion and
by borrowing to fund the 2009 stimulus (which came mostly from local, not national, government coffers). Beijing should be paying down this debt and addressing other domestic shortfalls
with its mountain of foreign currency, but it cannot do so under its present balance-of-payments rules, which are designed to keep foreign currency in the hands of the national monetary
authorities. Due to a closed capital account, domestic holders cannot send money overseas, and foreign currency can be converted to yuan only through the state financial system. The Chinese
government has not let money flow freely because doing so would undermine its control of domestic interest rates, reducing its ability to influence economic cycles, and it would expose the
domestic banking sector to devastating competition. If domestic entities were allowed to send money abroad, hundreds of billions of dollars would flee the country for financial institutions that
operate commercially, unlike Chinese banks. Such a stark fear of competition does not suggest a country ready to exert dominance anytime soon. Lastly, Subramanian inflates China's financial
influence over the United States, forgetting that influence in a buyer-seller relationship is determined not by what-if scenarios but by who has better alternatives. The
United States has
already diversified away from Chinese debt by having the Federal Reserve flood the U.S. financial system with liquidity. This is hardly
ideal, but it has driven down the Chinese share of U.S. debt while keeping interest rates historically low. In contrast, Beijing, despite its best efforts to diversify, still holds 70 percent of its
foreign currency reserves in dollars. The reason is simple: those reserves are so large and growing so quickly that there is no alternative. The United States needs China to keep U.S. interest
rates below historic norms; China needs the United States to maintain its entire balance-of-payments system. Even if Subramanian acknowledges that China's lopsided financial system is
holding the country back now, he assumes that Beijing will soon rewrite its balance-of-payments rules and become an open economy. This assumption underestimates the Communist Party's
antipathy to change. In fact, the principal advocate for such reforms has been Washington, which hopes to encourage China's transformation from an investment-led to a consumption-led
economy. Such a transition would undermine China's net creditor status--what Subramanian sees as its main claim to dominance. But implementing market reforms would also allow China to
keep growing at its blistering pace and surpass the United States in GDP. If China insists on maintaining government control over development, on the other hand, its
long-term growth
prospects will be dim. Salvatore Babones ("The Middling Kingdom," September/October 2011) warns against drawing conclusions about China's trajectory by simply projecting its
growth rates forward. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Chinese GDP growth will simply stop. Growth depends on land, labor, capital, and innovation. China has
depleted its ecology, its labor surplus will soon begin to erode, and vast overspending has driven down the return on capital--all
discouraging trends from the standpoint of growth. As for innovation, Subramanian praises China's growing technology sector and its ability to absorb new advances. But
a true economic leader must create, not absorb, and Beijing's favoritism toward large state firms will hinder innovation. Moreover, the quality of the
Chinese higher-education system is poor and not necessarily improving. A no-growth scenario is a genuine danger --just ask the Japanese. By
underemphasizing or ignoring China's various weaknesses, Subramanian underestimates the United States' ability to influence the
competition with China. That said, his criticisms of the United States are valid; indeed, his baseline prediction of U.S. growth at 2.5 percent annually may be too optimistic. Crippled
by debt, the United States faces a period of stagnation. If the overall economy remains sluggish, a lack of import growth will cause trade to lag and further reduce the United States' global
influence. Still, the
Chinese dragon will not fly forward indefinitely, as Subramanian suggests; it may even crash. For the foreseeable future, China
will not attain the kind of dominance the United States has long held. The world should not expect to crown a new global leader but
prepare for the absence of one.
A2 hotspots advantage – no arctic war
No Arctic conflict
Perry and Andersen 2012 [Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen. Dr. Perry is vice president and director of studies at the Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., and vice president of National Security Planning Associates, Inc. Dr. Perry also directs and/or
contributes to a number of Institute studies that focus on specific aspects of U.S. defense reform and military transformation to meet
post-9/11 security challenges. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in
international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served as an officer in the United
States Army Reserve, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Bobby Anderson is a research
associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. She focuses on Nordic affairs, NATO and European security issues, U.S. defense
strategy, regional security developments in the Asia-Pacific, changing security dynamics in the Arctic region, “New Strategic
Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration,” February,
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf]
As the polar ice cap continues to melt, giving way to new and ever larger waterways in the Arctic, the world is witnessing nothing less than the opening of a new ocean, something that has not occurred on Earth since the end
of the Ice Age. As if its creation were not newsworthy enough, this new, fifth ocean – which will essentially be an expanded and more navigable version of the Arctic Ocean that now exists – holds out the promise as well of
new seaways linking Europe and Asia via the High North that could, in the view of numerous maritime experts, substantially reduce travel distances, transit times, and overall transportation costs by the 2030–35 timeframe.1
Adding to the Arctic’s importance even before then is the prospective extraction of significant strategic mineral supplies from the northernmost territories – especially those offshore in the Arctic seabed – of Norway, Russia,
Denmark, Canada, and the United States, commonly referred to as the Arctic Five. Most prominent in this context are the Arctic’s oil and gas supplies that are currently projected to account for upwards of 22 percent of the
the Arctic
Five have quickened their efforts to extend their sovereignty over extended continental shelves (ECS’s)2 where some of the most promising deposits are
world’s undiscovered but technically recoverable hydrocarbon reserves, the development of which will become increasingly feasible and cost-effective over the next decade. Indeed, for this reason alone,
believed to be located, while other countries with a strong interest (but no territorial claim) in the Arctic and its resource riches – including distant, but energy-hungry economic powerhouses like China, Japan, and South
time, cost, and technology constraints appear to be
working against any competitive “rush to the Arctic” fueled in part by the lure of an oil and gas bonanza beyond compare along the lines suggested by a number of the more popular studies
on Arctic dynamics published in recent years.3 Far more likely is a slow and methodical push into the High North, not the least because there is so much
yet to learn (or, in some cases, to relearn) about operating safely in the harsh Arctic landscape, so little infrastructure already (or soon to be) in place to support
such operations, and such limited capacity even among the Arctic Five to undertake and sustain Arctic operations of any kind , be they commercial or
military in nature. Moreover, while access to – if not control over – offshore Arctic resources remains a strategic goal shared by quite a few influential countries located both within and beyond the Arctic region, the
probability of serious interstate rivalry or, in the worst case, open conflict in pursuit of this objective seems quite low, at least in the near- to mid-term future. In the
first place, the vast majority of hydrocarbon deposits locked in the Arctic seabed are concentrated within the sovereign territory of one or another of the
Arctic Five, where ownership is clear and undisputed. Secondly, while there are disagreements over who owns various resourcerich
areas where two or more exclusive economic zones (EEZs)4 and potential ECS’s appear to overlap, the 2010 3 See, for example, Alun Anderson, After the Ice: Life, Death, and Geopolitics in the New Arctic (New York:
Korea – do their best to retain access to the Arctic and to avoid being marginalized in policy debates over its future. That said,
Smithsonian Books, 2009); David Fairhall, Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010); Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources
The
exclusive economic zone is the offshore zone where coastal states have jurisdiction over economic and resource management , including
(London and New York: Continuum, 2009); and Richard Sale and Eugene Potapov, The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North (London: Frances Lincoln, 2010). 4
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the seabed, subsoil, and the superjacent waters. Typically, the EEZ includes waters three
to two hundred nautical miles offshore. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, “What is the EEZ?” http:// agreement between Norway and Russia over how best to divide a
sector they both claimed in the Barents Sea, together with a commitment by the Arctic Five in 2008 to abide by procedures set forth in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for determining the dimensions of
Third, and finally, the sheer expense and technical challenges involved in
extracting oil, gas, and other strategic resources from the Arctic ocean floor argue for a joint, collaborative effort among interested
parties, Arctic and non-Arctic alike, as opposed to a “go it alone,” unilateralist approach. These and similar considerations are likely to
preserve the Arctic as a “High North, low tension” arena, to borrow a phrase popularized by Norway’s foreign minister, for some years to come. This is not to suggest, however, that the
each country’s ECS, suggests that a peaceful settlement of any territorial dispute is more likely than not.
Arctic promises to remain trouble-free as its resources and sea lanes become increasingly accessible. For one thing, it remains unclear what would happen if an Artic Five country whose ECS claim was rejected under
UNCLOS procedures refused to abide by the ruling. Given the resource wealth that could be at stake, the resulting standoff could indeed lead to disputes and military posturing by rival claimants that could trigger, in turn, a
crisis in the Arctic that might even end up with shots being fired. As for seaborne trade through the Arctic, smugglers and others involved in illicit commerce (possibly including terrorist elements) could eventually seek to
take advantage – just as legitimate shippers would – of the shorter routes and transit times offered by Arctic sea lanes, benefits that may seem especially attractive in those areas (likely to be extensive in the wide-open,
sparsely populated expanses of the High North) where transit routes are poorly policed. In addition, as its scale and importance grow, transarctic maritime traffic may be viewed as an attractive target for attack by various
disaffected groups, especially when ships pass through narrow choke points such as the Bering Strait along the way. Such scenarios may seem far-fetched at the moment, but they cannot be dismissed in the event that a
bustling trade in strategic commodities takes hold in the Arctic. This would be especially true were the Arctic to become the locus of a global trade in oil and gas, given all the vulnerabilities associated with offshore
production facilities and the supporting infrastructure required to bring supplies to market, as well as the economic costs that could be imposed if important energy flows were disrupted. At the same time, whatever the level
of regional tension at any particular time, the Arctic, situated atop three continents, has been and will continue to be, in geostrategic terms, an extremely valuable piece of real estate. Since the late 1950s, for example, the
United States has viewed the Arctic Ocean as an ideal location for ballistic missile submarine patrols, and its importance for the strategic mobility of American naval forces, including surface as well as subsurface platforms,
will almost certainly grow as Arctic waterways expand and become more navigable. In a similar vein, modern airlift and fighter/bomber aircraft based in Alaska are closer to Japan, South Korea, and China than they would be
if they operated from the west coast of the United States, and no more than eight hours’ flight time from anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere, all of which significantly enhances America’s crisis response and power
projection capabilities. Moreover, given that the Arctic would be an optimal vector for ballistic missile attacks against the United States originating from Russia, China, North Korea, or even Iran, it is also an ideal location for
missile defense and early warning systems designed to handle current and emerging threats, perhaps to include someday – in view of the Arctic’s largely maritime character – sea-based platforms, such as the U.S. Navy’s
Aegis-equipped cruisers. The ways in which these and other strategic advantages associated with the Arctic have influenced (and continue to influence) the national security perspectives of the United States, the other Arctic
Five countries, and rising global powers (such as China) are discussed in detail in later chapters of this report, but the key point to be made here is that such advantages are real and growing, and that this will remain the case,
whether or not the Arctic’s oil and gas deposits are effectively tapped, or its utility as a passageway for seaborne trade is fully exploited. Finally, developments in the Arctic may hold useful lessons for other resource-rich
regions where territorial claims remain unsettled and freedom of the seas could be challenged. More specifically, if the Arct ic states and other key stakeholders are able to develop a framework for regional collaboration that
also respects and protects the national interests of the Arctic Five, a similar approach may also be tried (and eventually prove successful) in, for example, disputed maritime zones like the South China Sea. The geopolitical
dynamics of the Arctic and South China Sea regions, of course, are not entirely similar, but there is enough overlap with regard to such issues as ensuring unimpeded maritime passage through international waters, agreeing
on procedures for defining the ECS’s of neighboring states, and developing cooperative plans for drilling offshore oil and gas deposits, to warrant some degree of investigation into how well Arctic models of cooperation
might apply, and the same may be true with regard to other areas of the globe of rising strategic importance where multiple national, regional, and international interests intersect. While the jury is still out on the best system
current trends suggest that a patchwork of relevant private, public, intergovernmental, and
nongovernmental organizations, rather than one overarching structure, is the best approach, centered perhaps around a core group of interested parties,
which, in the case of the Arctic, would be the Arctic Council.5 As this approach matures, moreover, the Arctic could serve as a valuable laboratory for testing how best to establish and maintain a safe, stable, and
of governance for the Arctic region as a whole,
secure environment in regions where a diversity of interests, ambitions, and expectations could easily clash, possibly in a violent manner, absent an effective mechanism for multinational and multilateral governance. With
these observations in mind, the analysis that follows aims to paint a comprehensive picture of the new strategic map just now emerging in the Arctic, to examine what that portends with regard to the potential for conflict or
cooperation within the region, and, on that basis, to determine as clearly as possible the likely policies and priorities of the Arctic Five and other key regional stakeholders, and the skills and capabilities to operate in the Arctic
that they will require as a result. Chapter 2 sets the overall stage insofar as major region-wide dynamics are concerned, focusing in particular on the emergence of more navigable Arctic sea lanes, the scale and accessibility of
the 5 Formally established in 1996, the Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum whose aim is to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states (which includes the Arctic Five plus
Iceland, Sweden, and Finland), with involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other key stakeholders that may be granted permanent observer status. Traditionally, the council has focused on issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic, but, as the Arctic becomes more accessible, the council has branched out to address search and rescue, oil spill response at sea, and other civil emergency
requirements. Now that the council has set up a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (following the 2011 ministerial in Nuuk, Greenland), it is poised to play a more catalytic role in future debates over how best to
manage the Arctic region. See the Arctic Council website, http://www. arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us. Arctic’s strategic resources, and ongoing challenges with regard to Arctic governance. Chapter 3 explores in
depth the strategic interests of the Arctic Five countries and the steps they are taking to safeguard those interests, while chapter 4 analyzes the priorities and programs of the other national and institutional stakeholders in the
future of the Arctic, including the non-coastal Arctic states (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland) and the major Asian powers noted above (China, Japan, and South Korea), as well as NATO and the EU. Finally, chapter 5 offers
some summary conclusions and policy recommendations, with an emphasis on what the United States needs to do to assert its leadership as this “new Arctic” described at the outset continues to take shape.
Sub dominance US would decisively win an Arctic war- no escalation
Axe 2011 [David, Military correspondent and contributor or editor to the Washington Times, C-SPAN, Wired, World Politics Review, and more, “How the U.S.
Wins the Coming Arctic War”, Wired, 1/11/11, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/how-the-u-s-wins-the-coming-arctic-war/]
But these tales, my versions included, usually omit two vital points: that Arctic conflict is unlikely to occur at all; and even if it does, the U.S. will
have an overwhelming advantage over any rival. The Washington Post was the latest to repeat the Arctic-war theme, in a story published yesterday. “The
Arctic is believed to hold nearly a quarter of the world’s untapped natural resources and a new passage could shave as much as 40 percent of the time it takes for
commercial shippers to travel from the Atlantic to the Pacific,” Jacquelyn Ryan wrote. But, she added, “government and military officials are concerned the United
States is not moving quickly enough to protect American interests in this vulnerable and fast-changing region.” Specifically, the U.S. does not have enough icebreakers
or permanent bases on the Alaskan north slope. Canada andRussia, by contrast, are buying ice-hardened Arctic ships and building new facilities to enforce their Arctic
claims, Ryan pointed out. The thing is, it’s not icebreakers and patches of wind-blasted tarmac that would really matter in some future North
Pole showdown. In the Arctic, as in any sea battle, American nuclear attack submarines — quiet, versatile and lethal — would make all the
difference. U.S. subs have been sneaking around under the Arctic ice, and occasionally surfacing, for decades. Today, they even carry geologists and other
scientists in order to help map Arctic mineral deposits. “In addition to being more heavily armed than most foreign boats, U.S.
submarines generally have superior quieting and combat systems, better-trained crewmen, and much more rigorous maintenance
standards,” Bob Work wrote in 2008, before becoming Navy undersecretary. “As a result, the U.S. submarine force has generally been confident that it could defeat
any potential undersea opponent, even if significantly outnumbered.” But in the Arctic, facing only the Canadians, Russians, Danes and Norwegians
— none of whom have large or healthy sub fleets — the U.S. Navy’s 50 Los Angeles-, Seawolf- and Virginia-class subs would be
more numerous as well as more powerful. And besides, an Arctic war is highly unlikely, at best. “Militarized conflict over the Arctic is
unlikely, and regional disputes are unlikely to cause an overall deterioration in relations between or among polar nations,” the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded in a 2009 conference. “Security issues should not be sensationalized in order
to attract attention towards the Arctic.” But it’s rare anyone writes stories about how we’ve got enough weapons — and don’t really need them, besides. After
all, it’s the sensational stories about shortages and looming disaster that sell newspapers.