POL-GA 1750 International Politics Core Course:
Cooperation and Political Economy
Department of Politics
New York University
Wednesday 4:00 - 5:50
19 West 4th Street Room 217
Instructor: Michael J. Gilligan
19 West 4th Room 426
Phone: (212) 998-8519
email: mg5@nyu.edu
Office hours: Wednesday 2-4 and by appointment
Course Description
This is one of a two-course sequence designed to introduce Ph.D. students to the literatures,
questions and puzzles in the international subfield of political science. While the other course
focuses on international conflict and security this course addresses international cooperation
and political economy. As the name implies political economy covers the politics of
international economic issues like trade and finance, however international economic policy is
often carried out through international cooperative agreements and so questions about
international cooperation are a large part of this literature. The topic of international
cooperation obviously transcends purely economic issues, so we will also cover topics like
peacekeeping and human rights.
The course is divided into two sections. The first covers general theories of cooperation.
This part of the course addresses questions like: Why do states choose to cooperate with each
other? Why do states comply with their agreements even under conditions of anarchy? How
are international agreements created? What is the proper size of international agreements?
The second part of the course will turn to particular policy issues. The topics in this second part
of the course include human rights, peacekeeping, conflict mediation and economic and
environmental cooperation each of which enjoys its own rather specialized literature. The
course will close by returning to a general topic in international cooperation—the importance
of international norms. Our discussion of norms will be informed by what we will have learned
in the course up to that point. The final class period is reserved for student presentations of
their paper topics.
As is evident from the reading list below the reading for the course is quite heavy. I will make
adjustments throughout the course, replacing some readings with others or even removing
readings altogether if I deem it necessary for students to be able to keep up with the readings
and focus on the most important topics. In short this document is not immutable and will serve
mainly as a guideline for our study throughout the semester.
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Evaluation
You are required to write a seminar paper. The paper should be journal-article length (in the
neighborhood of 8,000-10,000 words). Although a literature review will undoubtedly be part of
this effort the paper should involve some original research as well. Students should get
permission for their topic from me before embarking on the project. This paper is worth threefourths of your final grade.
In addition to your written work you will be graded on class participation. Students will be
required to make occasional presentations in class on the week's readings. Students who are
not presenting in a given week are still responsible for taking part in the discussion. This course
is a seminar not a lecture. If it is to work properly you must offer your insights to your student
colleagues. You will be graded on the quality of your comments not just the quantity. Class
participation is worth one-fourth of the final grade.
Schedule and Readings
Jan 28: Introductory Session:
 Gilligan, Michael J. and Leslie Johns. 2013. Formal Models of International Institutions.
Annual Review of Political Science. 14.
Feb 4-11: Cooperation, Enforcement and Compliance:
 Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? International Organization. 50: 379406.
 Simmons, Beth. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review. 94 (4):
819-835.
 Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty
Compliance. American Political Science Review. 99 (4): 611-622.
 Powell, Robert. 1991. Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.
American Political Science Review 85:1303-20.
 Powell, Robert. 1994. Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The NeorealistNeoliberal Debate. International Organization 48:313-344.
 Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. International
Organization. 59: 363-398.
 Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTOs
Dispute Settlement Procedure. American Political Science Review. 99:389-400.
 McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. Trust and Cooperation Through Agentspecific Punishments. International Organization. 54:809-24.
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Recommended:
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International
Organization 47: 175-205.
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Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization. 42:485-507.
Morrow, James. 2007. When Do States Follow the Laws of War? American Political
Science Review 101:559-572.
Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization. 55:829-857.
MacGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2008. Punishing the Prince. Princeton University
Press.
Feb 18: Bargaining over Cooperative Agreements:
 Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation.
International Organization 52:269-306.
 Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of
OPEC. International Organization. 58:213-237.
 Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the
Evolution of Multilateralism. International Organization. 52:3978-419.
 Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International
Multilateral Agreements? International Organization. 58:459-84.
Recommended
 Goodrich, Ben. 2006. A Comment on Rewarding Impatience. International Organization
 60:499-513.
 Blaydes, Lisa. 2006. Rewarding Impatience Revisited: A Response to Goodrich.
International Organization. 60:515-25.
Feb 25: Bargaining over Cooperative Agreements—Domestic Political Considerations:
 Milner, Helen V. and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. Democratic Politics and International
Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade
Liberalization. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41:117-46.
 Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade:
Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade Negotiations. American Political
Science Review. 94:305-332.
 Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic
Difference Revisited. American Political Science Review. 96:159-65.
 Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies
Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International
Organization. 56:477-513.
Mar 4: Economic and Environmental Cooperation
 Arias Eric, Hollyer James and Peter Rosendorff. 2015. Leadership Survival, Regime Type
and BITs. I will send you a link when the time comes.
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Hollyer, James and Peter Rosendorff. 2012. Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy
Uncertainty and PTA Accession. International Studies Quarterly. 56: 748-64.
Kono, Daniel. 2009. Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy.
International Studies Quarterly. 53(4): 885-906.
__________. 2007. When Do Trade Blocs Block Trade? International Studies Quarterly.
51: 165-81.
Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2015. Politics and IMF
Conditionality. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (1): 120-148.
Tomz, Michael and Mark LJ Wright. 2013. Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and
Default Annual Review of Economics. 5:247-77
Recommended:
If you don’t know anything about trade this gives you a quick and dirty summary of how
trade effects people’s welfare in the two classical two-factor models:
 Alt, James E. and Michael J. Gilligan. 1994. The Political Economy of Trading States:
Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions. Journal
of Political Philosophy. 2: 165-92.
Mar 11: Human Rights:
 Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights. Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 1-4. E-book available via BobCat.
 Hathaway, Oona. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal.
1111:1935.
 Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming: the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem. International Organization 62:689-716.
 Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? Journal
of Conflict Resolution. 51:588-621.
 Hollyer, James and B. Peter Rosendorff, 2012. Do Human Rights Agreements Prolong the
Tenure of Autocratic Ratifiers? Journal of International Law and Politics. Spring 2012.
 Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the
International Criminal Regime. International Organization. 60.
 Kim, Hunjoon and Kathryn Sikkink. 2010. Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human
Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries. International Studies Quarterly. 54: 93963.
Recommended:
 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade
Agreements … . International Organization. 59:593-629.
 Sikkink Kathryn. 2013. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are
Changing World Politics. Norton.
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Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights. Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 5-9. E-book available via BobCat.
Mar 25 International Courts:
 Posner, Eric and Michael de Figueiredo. 2005. Is the International Court of Justice
Biased? Journal of Legal Studies. 34:599.
 Voeten, Eric. 2008. The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European
 Court of Human Rights. American Political Science Review. 102:417-433.
 Voeten, Eric 2014. International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT
Rights in Europe. International Organization. 68: 77-110.
 Pelc, Krzysztof. 2014. “The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network
Application”. American Political Science Review 108(3): 547-564.
April 1 Politics in International Organizations
 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2010. The Pernicious Consequences of UN
Security Council Membership. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 54: 667-86.
 Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Raymond Vreeland. 2015. Politics and IMF
Conditionality. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 59: 12-48.
 Voeten, Erik. 2000. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American
Political Science Review 95: 845-858.
 Voeten, Erik. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize
the Use of Force. International Organization. 59: 527-557.
 Dreher, Axel, Matthew Gould, Matthew D. Rablen, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2014.
The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council. Public Choice 158
(1-2): 51-83.
 Lim, Daniel Yew Mao and James Raymond Vreeland. 2013. Regional Organizations and
International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN
Security Council. World Politics 65 (1): 34-72.
 Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of
Information Transmission. International Organization 60: 1-34.
 Voeten Eric, 2012. Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly. Available
on SSRN.
Recommended:
 Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric D. Werker. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council
Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy 114,
no. 5 (October 2006): 905–930.
 Bashir, Omar S. and Darren J. Lim. 2013. Misplaced Blame: Foreign Aid and the
Consequences of UN Security Council Membership. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 57:
509-23
 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2013. Aid: Blame it All on “Easy Money.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 57: 524-37.
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Vreeland, James Raymond and Axel Dreher. 2014. The Political Economy of the United
Nations Security Council: Money and Influence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, Alexander. 2012. Channels of Power. UN Security Council and US Statecraft
in Iraq. Cornell University Press.
Apr 8: International Mediation:
 Fey, Mark and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2010. When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the
Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation. World Politics 62.
 Kydd, Andrew H. 2010. Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution.
Annual Review of Political Science. 13:101-121.
 Beber, Bernd (2013). Summer Holidays and Conflict Resolution: Event Timing as an
Instrument for the International Mediation of Wars. I will give you a link to the most
recent version of this paper when the time comes.
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Apr 15 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
 Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. Do UN Interventions Cause Peace?
Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 3:89122.
 Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. Demobilization and Reintegration.
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 51:531-567.
 Gilligan, Michael J., Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus D. Samii. 2013. Reintegrating Rebels into
Civilian Life: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
57: 598-626.
 Mvukiyehe and Samii (2014). Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Insights from a
Field Experiment in Liberia. I will give you a link to the most recent version of this paper
when the time comes.
April 22 Fostering Grassroots Political and Social Change:
 Avdeenko, Alexandra and Michael J. Gilligan. forthcoming. International interventions to
build social capital : evidence from a field experiment in Sudan. American Political
Science Review.
 Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster and Edward Miguel (2012). 2012. Reshaping
Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Pre-analysis Plan. Quarterly Journal of
Economics. 127: 1755-1812.
 Humphreys, Macartan, Sanchez de la Sierra and Peter van der Windt. 2013. Exporting
Institutions: A Randomized Experiment in Eastern Congo. Available at
petervanderwindt.com.
April 29: Norms
 Henrich, Joseph, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett,
Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie
Henrich, Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, David Tracer and John Ziker. 2010. Markets,
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Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment. Science
327:1480–84.
Downs, George W. 2000. Constructing Effective Environmental Regimes. Annual Review
of Political Science. 3:25-42.
Hyde, Susan. 2011. Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm
Diffusion. American Journal of Political Science. 55: 356-69
Checkel, Jeffrey. 2001. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.
International Organization 55: 553-588.
Bearce, David H. and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. Intergovernmental Organizations,
Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence. International Organization. 61:
703-733.
Gilligan, Michael, and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt. 2009. Do Norms Reduce Torture? Journal of
Legal Studies 38: 445-470.
Brian Greenhill 2010. The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the
Diffusion of Human Rights Norms. International Studies Quarterly. 54: 127-145.
Recommended:
 Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. Journal of
Economic Perspectives. 14:137-58.
 Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. A Behavioral Approach to Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American
Political Science Review 92:1–22.
 Xun Cao, Brian Greenhill and Aseem Prakash. 2012. Where is the Tipping Point? Bilateral
Trade and the Diffusion of Human Rights, 1981-2004. British Journal of Political Science.
43: 133-15.
 Nadelmann, Ethan A. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in
International Society International Organization. 44: 479-526.
 Finnemore, Martha. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms.
International Organization 47: 565-597.
 Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations. International Organization 53: 699-732.
 Legro, Jeffrey. 1996. Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step.
American Political Science Review 90: 118-137.
May 6: Paper presentations
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