POL-GA 1750 International Politics Core Course:
Cooperation and Political Economy
Department of Politics
New York University
Wednesday 2:00 - 3:50
19 West 4th Street Room 217
Instructor: Michael J. Gilligan
19 West 4th Room 426
Phone: (212) 998-8519
email: mg5@nyu.edu
Office hours: Wednesday 12-2 and by appointment
Course Description
This is one of a two-course sequence designed to introduce Ph.D. students to the literatures,
questions and puzzles in the international subfield of political science. While the other course
focuses on international conflict and security this course addresses international cooperation
and political economy. As the name implies political economy covers the politics of
international economic issues like trade and finance, however international economic policy is
often carried out through international cooperative agreements and so questions about
international cooperation are a large part of this literature. The topic of international
cooperation obviously transcends purely economic issues, so we will also cover topics like
peacekeeping and human rights.
The course is divided into two sections. The first covers general theories of cooperation.
This part of the course addresses questions like: Why do states choose to cooperate with each
other? Why do states comply with their agreements even under conditions of anarchy? How
are international agreements created? What is the proper size of international agreements?
The second part of the course will turn to particular policy issues. The topics in this second part
of the course include human rights, peacekeeping, trade and international finance each of
which enjoys its own rather specialized literature.
Evaluation
For your written work for the course you choose one of the two options:
Short papers: Each week you submit a short paper (no more than five pages) containing your
thoughts on the week's readings. These papers should be more than just summaries of the
readings. They should pose questions raised by the readings and present ideas for future
research following the readings. The papers should be posted on NYU Classes site for this
course no later than 5pm on the Monday before class.
Seminar paper: Alternatively you can write one long paper on a topic related to the course.
This is a good option for students who think they may wish to write their MA papers, qualifying
papers or dissertations in this field. The paper should be journal-article length (in the
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neighborhood of 10,000 words). Although a literature review will undoubtedly be part of this
effort the paper should involve some original research as well. Students interested in this
option should get permission from me before embarking on the project.
The sum of your written work regardless of the option you choose is worth three-fourths of the
final grade.
In addition to your written work you will be graded on class participation. Students will be
required to make occasional presentations in class on the week's readings. Students who are
not presenting in a given week are still responsible for taking part in the discussion. This course
is a seminar not a lecture. If it is to work properly you must offer your insights to your student
colleagues. You will be graded on the quality of your comments not just the quantity. Class
participation is worth one-fourth of the final grade.
Schedule and Readings
Jan 29: Introductory Session: Gilligan and Johns (2011)
Feb 5: Cooperation and Compliance: Rosendorff and Milner (2001); Downs, Rocke and Barsoom
(1996); von Stein (2005); Morrow (2007);
Feb 12 Cooperation, Compliance and Commitment Problems: Powell (1991); Powell (1994);
Powell (2004). Recommended: Grieco (1988)
Feb 19: Bargaining over Cooperative Agreements: Fearon (1998); Blaydes (2004) (For a
correction and discussion on Blaydes (2004) see Goodrich (2006) and Blaydes (2006))
Feb 26: Bargaining over Cooperative Agreements (Domestic Political Considerations):
Milner and Rosendorff (1997); Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000); Dai (2002)
Recommended: Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002)
Mar 5: Multilateral Cooperation: Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1998); Gilligan (2004).
Recommended: Ruggie (1992);
Mar 12: Human Rights I: Hathaway (2002, 2007); Hafner-Burton (2008, 2005);
Mar 26 Human Rights II: Bracic (2013); Gilligan (2006); Kim and Sikkink (2010), Sikkink (2013).
Take a look at a few of the many projects and great data they have at The Human Rights Data
Analysis Group.
Apr 2 International Law and Adjudication: Posner and de Figueiredo (2005); Voeten (2008);
Rosendorff (2005), Voeten (2014)
Apr 9: International Mediation: Kydd (2010); Fey and Ramsay (2010); Beber (2013). The last
piece will be placed on the ‘Classes’ site
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Apr 16 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Gilligan and Sergenti (2008);
Mvukiyehe and Samii (2014). The last piece will be placed on the ‘Classes’ site
Apr 23 Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration. Gilligan, Mvukiyehe
and Samii (2011); Humphreys and Weinstein (2007), Humphreys and Weinstein (2007)
April 30 Fostering Grassroots Political and Social Change: Casey, Glennerster and Miguel (2012),
Humphreys et al 2013, Avdeenko and Gilligan (2013).
May 7: A history of violence. Does it have a future? Pinker (2011)
References
Avdeenko, Alexandra and Michael J. Gilligan. 2014. International interventions to build social
capital : evidence from a field experiment in Sudan. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
6772.
Blaydes, Lisa. 2004. Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of
OPEC." International Organization 58:213-237.
Bracic, Ana. 2013. EU Accession, NGOs, and Human Rights: Discrimination against the Roma in
Slovenia and Croatia.
Blaydes, Lisa. 2006. Rewarding Impatience Revisited: A Response to Goodrich. International
Organization. 60:515-25.
Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster and Edward Miguel. 2012. Reshaping Institutions:
Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 127: 17551812.
Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference
Revisited. American Political Science Review. 96:159-65.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News about
Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization. 50:379-406.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution
of Multilateralism. International Organization. 52:3978-419.
Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation. Inter
national Organization 52:269-306.
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Fey, Mark and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2010. When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute?
Information Sharing through Mediation. World Politics 62.
Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral
Agreements? International Organization. 58:459-84.
Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the
International Criminal Regime." International Organization. 60.
Gilligan, Michael J., Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus D. Samii. 2013. Reintegrating
Rebels into Civilian Life: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi. Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 57: 598-626.
Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using
Matching to Improve Causal Inference. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3:89-122.
Gilligan, Michael J. and Leslie Johns. 2013. Formal Models of International Institutions.
Annual Review of Political Science 14.
Goodrich, Ben. 2006. A Comment on Rewarding Impatience. International Organization
60:499-513.
Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization. 42:485-507.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem. International Organization 62:689-716.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements."
International Organization 59:593-629.
Hathaway, Oona. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal
111:1935.
Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? Journal of
Conflict Resolution 51:588-621.
Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. Demobilization and reintegration.
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:531-567.
Humphreys, Macartan, Sanchez de la Sierra and Peter van der Windt. 2013. Exporting
Institutions: A Randomized Experiment in Eastern Congo. Available at petervanderwindt.com.
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Kydd, Andrew H. 2010. Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution.
Annual Review of Political Science 13:101-121.
Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff. 2000. Free to Trade: Democracies,
Autocracies and International Trade Negotiations. American Political Science Review
94:305-332.
Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate
More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." International Organization
56:477-513.
Milner, Helen V. and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. Democratic Politics and International
Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization."
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41:117-46.
Morrow, James. 2007. When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" American Political
Science Review 101:559-572.
Pinker, Stephen. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Allen Lane.
Posner, Eric and Michael de Figueiredo. 2005. Is the International Court of Justice Biased?"
Journal of Legal Studies 34:599.
Powell, Robert. 1991. Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.
American Political Science Review 85:1303-20.
Powell, Robert. 1994. Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The NeorealistNeoliberal Debate." International Organization 48:313-344.
Powell, Robert. 2004. The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information.
American Political Science Review. 98: 231-241.
Pugel, James. 2009. \Measuring reintegration in Liberia: assessing the gap between outputs and
outcomes. In R. Muggah (2009). Available on the BlackBoard site.
Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTOs Dispute
Settlement Procedure." American Political Science Review 99:389-400.
Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." International Organization 55:829-857.
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1992. Multilateralism: Anatomy of an Institution." International
Organization 46:561-598.
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Sikkink Kathryn. 2013. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing
World Politics. Norotn
Voeten, Eric. 2008. The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European
Court of Human Rights." American Political Science Review 102:417-433.
Voeten, Eric 2014. International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in
Europe. International Organization. 68: 77-110.
von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.
American Political Science Review 99:611-22.
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