Cohn
Syllabus: International Security
International Security
Course hours: MWF 12.00-12.50
Class location: SAB 25
Office hours: M 13.00-14.30
T 14.00-15.30
or by appointment
Professor: Cohn
Office: 354 Sabin Hall
Office phone: 319 273 2647
Email: lindsay.cohn@uni.edu
Overview of the Course
This course explores enduring problems of the causes, conduct, resolution, and aftermath of
conflict in world politics. It is assumed and recommended that students have already taken an
introductory course in International Relations (if you have not, please come see me early and we
will discuss some additional readings you may need to do). We will cover theoretical and
philosophical issues such as why war occurs, when war is legitimate, and the morality of various
state and non-state actions. We will cover practical issues such as what purposes force can serve
and how wars are won. We will also cover domestic issues such as war and public opinion and
civil-military relations. The reading load will be significant. Students are expected to complete
all the reading prior to the class for which they are assigned. Class will consist of lecture,
discussion, and debate, and if you have not read the texts, it will be difficult to participate in or
benefit from the class. Indeed, any benefit you get will depend primarily on how much effort you
put into reading and understanding the texts and then thinking/talking through them in class.
Please be aware of the reading load for the week and budget your time accordingly.
Course goals:
** You will become broadly conversant with “what we know” about the use of force, the course
of conflict, and the requirements for peace in the world.
** You will learn how to read and think critically. This means you will learn to understand
complex arguments, how to determine whether the argument is logical, how to determine
whether the evidence provided supports the argument, etc.
** You will learn how to communicate clearly and convincingly through both oral and written
means. In particular, you will learn to make your sentences short and simple, discipline yourself
to stick to the point, and speak persuasively in front of others.
** You will learn the basics of social science research design, such that you can both read texts
critically and figure out how to answer questions according to scientific method.
These are skills which you will find helpful in any field and any situation, and I encourage you to
ask questions about writing, argumentation, and logic as well as research and current events.
Plagiarism and Cheating
You are here in order to learn, grow, and expand your minds. Any action on your part which is in
essence an attempt to get a grade better than the one that your current levels of effort and
understanding deserve, is an act of cheating and will be punished as such. Plagiarism is when
you take someone else’s words or ideas and submit them as your own without giving the other
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Syllabus: International Security
person due credit. This is an act of dishonesty and will not be tolerated. Cheating and plagiarism
are both ways to avoid learning. Since you are paying to learn something here, you should
probably give it a shot. Should I catch you doing either of these things, you will receive a zero on
that assignment, and potentially more serious punishment including recommendation for
suspension. It’s not worth it. Don’t do it.
Requirements and Grading
All written assignments are to be turned in online through e-Learning.
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Research question (5%)
Literature review and Theories (10%)
Hypotheses, Methods, and Data (5%)
Final Research Design (25%)
Debates (25%)
Class participation (incl. peer evaluations) (30%)
Research Design: All students will produce a research design. The point of a research design is
to plan out how you would answer a question, without actually going through the work of
collecting and analyzing the data to answer the question. You will select an international security
issue of interest to you either from the news or from the syllabus. I will dedicate class time to
explanations of the various stages, and you are of course encouraged to ask me any questions
you have about the assignment. This assignment will happen in four stages:
The first stage of the assignment, due 25 January, will be to tell me what question you want to
answer. This should be less than a paragraph. In order to produce this paragraph, however, you
will need to come up with a topic that interests you, read a little bit about it (start with the
readings in the syllabus on that topic), and do a little brainstorming about what you already
know/think you know about the topic, and what questions you have about it. This must be a
CAUSAL question (e.g. does targeted killing actually degrade terrorist organizations? Does
nuclear deterrence work?). It cannot be normative (e.g. should the US attack Iran?), or
descriptive (e.g. what is the international law relating to drone strikes?). You will also need to
formulate the question in a general rather than specific sense (e.g. if the question that comes to
your mind is whether President Obama can force Binyamin Netanyahu to refrain from attacking
Iran, the general question you would need to answer is, what factors cause heads of state to
attack other states? If one of the answers is: what their allies want, then we have fair ground to
believe that President Obama can in fact exercise some influence. If the answer, on the other
hand, is that heads of state always attack other states when they perceive a major threat, then we
conclude that President Obama probably can’t do much to stop Netanyahu).
The second stage of the assignment, due 11 February, will be a literature review. This means
that you must read the scholarly literature dealing with your general topic (in the example above:
what causes international uses of force?). You must have at least 5 scholarly sources – that
means peer-reviewed journal articles or books published by a university press, NOT news
articles or websites. Keep in mind that this is NOT the point where you want to be reading up on
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Syllabus: International Security
the relationship between the US and Israel or on Netanyahu’s personality or on the reality of the
threat from Iran. You want to be reading the theoretical literature about general cause and effect.
The best way to do this will be to start by looking at the syllabus to see if there is any literature I
have assigned that might be relevant, and then use citations from those sources, searchable
electronic databases in the library, and the librarians themselves, to help you find more. Skim
through these to find pieces that are relevant, and take notes on the central argument of each
piece, its major evidence/findings, and any significant holes or weaknesses in it. Once you have
done that, you should be able to summarize at the end at least two major theories about that
cause-effect relationship.
The point of this assignment is two-fold: first, it will help you think more clearly about the
problem you have chosen to address by showing you “what we already know” about such issues.
Second, it will help you learn how to search for information efficiently when you have a question
that needs to be answered. You should also use the opportunity to learn how to stop following an
unfruitful line of inquiry. Curiosity is both a blessing and a curse; if you find yourself going off
on tangents, make a note of how interesting this other issue is, and then put it away and go back
to YOUR issue.
This assignment should be about 5 pages, written in standard prose with attention to structure,
grammar, and spelling. This should show me that you have found, read, understood, and begun
to synthesize the scholarly literature on your topic.
The third stage of the assignment, due 4 March, is the hypotheses, methods, and data section.
You now have a question you want to answer, and you will have at least two alternative theories
about the answer to that question. At this point, you need to figure out how you would test those
theories against each other. Your hypotheses are the observable implications of the theories. If
you have a theory that says that allies’ preferences matter in the initiation of hostilities, what
kind of historical data would you expect to see? You would expect to see things like Britain and
France backing down from Egypt because the US told them to, etc. In short, you need to come
up with lists of things that you would expect to see happening in history IF each of your theories
were true, in its turn. If you find yourself listing the same things for both theories, that means
they are analytically indistinguishable and cannot be tested against each other. Then you need to
find another alternative theory. The data is what you would need to know in order to see which
hypotheses are true. For example, for the above question, you’d need a list of all the crises in
which a state has contemplated using force, a list of all those states’ alliance structures, an
historical understanding of how those states’ allies felt about the use of force, and an historical
understanding of how the states viewed the threat in question, at the very least. Finally, the
method is how you would analyze and interpret those data. We will talk more about this in class.
The final stage, due by 5pm on 6 May is the full research design, which is basically just the
three preceding stages FULLY REVISED AND CLEANED UP and stuck together. It should
look like this: research question, literature review, theories, hypotheses, data, methods. There is
no conclusion because you are not actually going to do any of the research. Unless you did
amazingly stellar work on the three sections turned in during the semester, I will expect you to
do significant revision for the final. It should be clean and pretty.
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Syllabus: International Security
Debates: You will be broken up into groups near the beginning of the semester, and will stay
with these groups all semester. One of the things groups will do is participate in debates over
topics we read about for class. I will have a sign-up sheet available early on, and each group will
sign up for two debate topics. Debate teams consist of 2-3 people, so group members will decide
amongst themselves who wants to debate which topic.
Groups will also be responsible for reading each other’s research designs and giving feedback to
one another BEFORE they are turned in to me. This is how teams often function in work
environments, and you should get used to it.
Finally, all students will write up short evaluations at the end of the semester on their own
performance in the group and how the other members of their groups performed. This is of
course to guard against free-riding.
Class participation: You are expected to do the readings and think about what they mean. I will
do some lecturing, but classes will consist primarily of discussion/debate, and you are expected
to attend class and engage in the discussion in an intelligent, respectful, and considerate way.
This does not mean that you will get a better grade the more you talk; it means that I will take
note of thoughtful participation in the discussion, and I can’t evaluate your participation if you
never say anything. If discussion is lacking, I may conduct a pop quiz, and points from that quiz
will go towards your participation grade. I will not penalize you automatically for missing class,
but obviously if you are not there you cannot be making informed contributions to or learning
from the discussion, and that will affect your grades. If you are going to miss class, please e-mail
me before-hand (if possible) to let me know. Include your reason. Be honest. I’m a social
scientist. I like to know why people do things.
This is a place of learning and therefore ideas are open to question and discussion. This includes
ideas in the readings, things that I say, and things that you and your classmates say. You are
welcome to question; you are not welcome to abuse, deride, or dismiss. If you want to make a
claim or question a claim, you should feel free to do so, but be prepared to present reasons and
evidence for your position, and be prepared to meet questions and criticism.
Grading – all assignments will receive letter grades based on qualitative criteria (see below). All
letter grades will then be transposed into the 4-point scale for calculation of the final grade.
Letter
A
AB+
B
BC+
C
CD+
D
DF
100 pt
(93-100)
(90-92)
(87-89)
(83-86)
(80-82)
(77-79)
(73-76)
(70-72)
(67-69)
(63-66)
(60-62)
(0-59)
4pt
4.0
3.67
3.33
3.0
2.67
2.33
2.0
1.67
1.33
1.0
0.67
0
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Syllabus: International Security
A – if you go beyond simply addressing all the aspects of the question/assignment by introducing
novel ideas or perspectives or by addressing an additional aspect of the topic which seems
relevant; if you successfully integrate course materials in a way that shows you understand and
are not simply repeating back what someone else has said; if you give proper credit wherever
credit is due in a way that anyone reading your work could follow the academic conversation; if
your work is well organized, concise, and effective; and if your work is written in good English
with good style, grammar, and spelling (the Above and Beyond response).
B – you will receive a B if you address all the aspects of the assignment and meet the
requirements; if you integrate course materials correctly in a way that shows you understood
them; if you give proper credit most of the time; if your work is somewhat well organized; and if
your work is written in decent English with no major flaws of style, grammar, or spelling (the
Unobjectionably Decent response).
C – you will receive a C if you address most of the aspects of the question but either fail to
address important parts of the assignment, fail to integrate much course material, or include
course material in a way that indicates you have not understood it; if you fail to give proper
credit at least most of the time; if your point is either lacking, buried, or confused and the paper’s
organization does not contribute to its readability; and/or if your writing contains flaws of style,
grammar, or spelling which detract from its readability and clarity (the Bare Minimum Required
response).
D – you will receive a D if you address few or no aspects of the assignment; integrate little or no
course material (or have failed to understand the material); include little or no citation; have no
point and/or no organization (stream of consciousness); and/or write so poorly that I have trouble
reading the paper. The main criterion for getting a D rather than an F is that you appear to have
made an honest effort to do the assignment and have simply failed (the You Just Did Not Get
This response).
F – you will receive an F if you fail to turn in the assignment, if you turn in something that is
clearly plagiarized, or if you turn in something into which you clearly put absolutely no effort
(the You Clearly Don’t Care response).
A grade of I will be given only if a student has completed most of the work for the semester and
is prevented from completing assignments before the end of the semester by sudden and/or
traumatic events, such as a sudden illness or injury, or the death of a loved one. In order to
receive an I, the student must commit (in writing) to complete the work by a time agreed upon
between the student and the professor.
Books and Readings
Greg Cashman and Leonard C. Robinson, 2007, An Introduction to the Causes of War, Rowman
and Littlefield (listed below as CR ICW)
Required readings are marked with **, those marked with just one asterisk are optional.
All the readings can be found either online, through the electronic databases available through
the library website, or on e-reserves, but they should all be free. If you cannot figure out how to
find a reading on your own, try again. Part of what you are supposed to learn in college is how to
find things by yourself.
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Syllabus: International Security
Late Policy
I will accept late work, but the lateness will be reflected in the grade. The last day to turn in
anything except the final paper is the last day of class.
Technology
It is university policy that you may not use your cell phones while in class. This includes texting,
looking things up, surfing, and (obviously) talking. You may have them on, since the university
alert system goes over text, but I expect you to have them on silent mode, and if I see anyone
using a cell phone I reserve the right to confiscate it until the end of class.
Disabilities
If you have a disability of any kind (learning, mental, or physical) for which you need
accommodation in the classroom or with assignments/exams, you MUST contact the Student
Disability Services Office and get certification from them. I am afraid I cannot offer any
accommodations unless you have the paperwork from the SDS. If you have a non-disabilityrelated issue for which you feel you need special consideration (e.g. if English is not your native
language), please come talk to me about it, but I cannot promise anything.
Illness
If you are sick and believe you may be contagious, please do us all a favor and stay home. Please
let me know (before class if possible) that you will be out because of illness. It will be your
responsibility, NOT MINE, to get notes from a classmate and/or from eLearning. If you are out
frequently for illness and are afraid that this will adversely affect your grades, you may speak to
me about doing extra work for extra credit.
Confidentiality
I am certainly open to anyone who needs help or guidance, but you must know up front that I am
legally required to inform the Office of Compliance and Equity Management and/or the Dean of
Students if I believe there is harassment, discrimination, violence, abuse, or other prohibited
activity going on. I am not allowed to keep your secrets. In cases of alcohol or substance abuse, I
strongly encourage you to seek counsel and advice from the Counseling Center or the Student
Health Center, as they are in a far better position than I am to help.
Course Outline
Week 1
1. Introduction: What is Security? (14 Jan)
* Get to know the professor
* What is security?
* Groups; explain assignments and objectives
2.
Argument, Logic, and Criticism (16 Jan)
** Charles Krauthammer, Aug 30, 2012, “The ‘Deterrence Works’ Fantasy,” Washington Post,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-30/opinions/35491847_1_deterrence-iran-soviet-union
** Colin H. Kahl, Mar 2, 2012, “Before Attacking Iran, Israel Should Learn from its 1981 Strike on Iraq,”
Washington Post, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-02/opinions/35450430_1_nuclear-weaponsisraeli-strike-tuwaitha
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Syllabus: International Security
3.
Research Design (18 Jan)
* How do we know things?
* Empirical questions, causal questions
* Theories and hypotheses
* Definition, operationalization, and data
* “The Literature”
Week 2
4. ***NO CLASS*** MLK Day (21 Jan)
5.
The Logic of Force (23 Jan)
** Carl von Clausewitz, 1874/1976, “What is War?” and “Ends and Means in War,” On War (use the URL
below if you do not have access to the Paret/Howard translation) Princeton: Princeton University Press,
Ch.1-2. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.htm
** Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1890, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Introduction (required) and
Chapter 1 (optional) www.gutenberg.org/etext/13529
** Schelling, Thomas. 1966. “The Diplomacy of Violence,” Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale
University Press. At http://www.americaandtheworld.com/assets/media/pdfs/Schelling.pdf
6.
World War I (25 Jan)
** CR ICW, “World War I” 27-87
** Keir Lieber, 2007, “The New History of World War I and what it Means for International Relations
Theory,” International Security 32(2): 155-191
*** Research Question Due ***
Week 3
7. ***NO CLASS*** (28 Jan)
8.
Causes of War (30 Jan)
** CR ICW, “Introduction” 1-25
** Kenneth N. Waltz, 1988, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, 18(4): 615-628
** Robert Jervis, 1978, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30(2): 167-214
** Alexander Wendt, 1995, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20(1): 71-81
* Jack S. Levy, 1998, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” Annual Review of Political
Science 1: 139-165
* Paul R. Hensel, 2000, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,” in John
Vasquez (ed.), What Do We Know about War? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield: pp.57-84.
http://www.paulhensel.org/Research/terr2000.pdf
* Boaz Atzili, 2007, “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness,
and International Conflict,” International Security 31(3): 139-173
* Taylor Fravel, 2008, “Power Shift and Escalation: Explaning China’s use of Force in Territorial
Disputes,” International Security 32(3): 44-83
9.
Offense-Defense Theory (1 Feb)
** Charles L. Glaser, 1997, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50(1): 171-201
** Stephen Van Evera, 1998, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22(4): 543
** Keir Lieber, 2000, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International
Security,” International Security 25(1): 71-104
* Stephen G. Brooks, 1997, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51(3): 445-77
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Syllabus: International Security
Week 4
*** NO CLASS THIS WEEK *** (4-8 February)
These classes will be made up with an exercise at the end of the semester
Work on your literature reviews.
Week 5
10. Polarity and Balancing – Debate: US Primacy is the best strategy (11 Feb)
** Stephen M. Walt, 1985, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security
9(4): 3-43
** Thomas J. Christensen, Jack Snyder, 1990, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance
Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44(2): 137-168
** Christopher Layne, 1993, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” International
Security, 17(4): 5-51
** Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, 2005, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing
Back,” International Security 30(1): 109-139
** Steven R. David, 1991, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, 43(2): 233-256
** F. Gregory Gause III, 2004, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf,”
Security Studies 13(2): 273-305
* Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg, 1997, “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats:
Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Security Studies 6(3): 112-53
* Christopher Layne, 1997, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand
Strategy,” Internationial Security, 22(1): 86-124
* William C. Wohlforth, 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, 24(1): 5-41
* Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 2005, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International
Security 30(1): 72-108
* Robert Jervis, 2009, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics 61(1): 188-213
***Literature Reviews Due***
11. Continued (13 Feb)
12. Rationalism, Bargaining, and War – Debate: We cannot live with a nuclear Iran (15 Feb)
** James Fearon, 1995, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49(3): 379-414
** Erik Gartzke, 1999, “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization 53(3): 567-587
** Dan Reiter, 2003, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics 1(1):27-43
** James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, 2013, “Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical
Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” International Security 37(3): 52-91
Week 6
13. World War II in the Pacific (18 Feb)
** CR ICW, “World War II” 89-154
14. Power, Coercion, and Compellence – Debate: Ground troops are not necessary for coercion (20 Feb)
** Robert Pape, 1990, “Coercive Airpower in the Vietnam War,” International Security 15(2): 103-146
** Stephen Biddle, 1996, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells us About Future Conflict,”
International Security 21(2): 139-79
** Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, 2001, “When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical
Tests, 1917-1999,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(2): 147-173
** Eliot A. Cohen, 2004, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of Strategic Studies
27(3): 395-407
** Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, 2006, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate
and its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security 30(3): 47-86
* Robert A. Pape, 1997, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22(2): 90-136
* Daryl G. Press, 1997, “Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and
Technology,” International Security 22(2): 137-146
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Syllabus: International Security
* Thomas A. Keaney, 1997, “The Linkage of Air and Ground Power in the Future of Conflict,”
International Security 22(2): 147-150
* Thomas G. Mahnken and Barry D. Watts, 1997, “What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about the
Future of Warfare,” International Security 22(2): 151-162
* Stephen Biddle, 1997, “The Gulf War Debate Redux: Why Skill and Technology are the Right Answer,”
International Security 22(2): 163-174
* Daryl G. Press, 2001, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”
International Security 26(2): 5-44.
* Daniel R. Lake, 2009, “The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO’s ‘Victory’ in Kosovo Revisited,”
International Security, 34(1): 83-112
15. Laws of War: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello (22 Feb)
** Peter Malanczuk, 1997, “International Wars, Civil Wars and the Right to Self-Determination: Ius ad
Bellum” and “Means of Waging War and Criminal Responsibility: Ius in Bello” in Akehurst’s Modern
Introduction to International Law (7th ed), London: Routledge. pp. 306-363 (on e-reserve/eLearning)
* Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627
* Ward Thomas, 2000, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” International
Security 25(1): 105-133
Week 7
16. The Six-Day War – Debate: The Six-Day War was preemptive self-defense (25 Feb)
** CR ICW, “Six Day War” 155-203
17. Strategy and Strategic Interaction (27 Feb)
** Barry Posen, 2003, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,”
International Security 28(1): 5-46
** Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 2005, “International Relations Theory and the Case
against Unilateralism,” Perspectives on Politics 3(3): 509-524
** Deborah Larson and Alexi Shevchenko, 2010, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US
Primacy,” International Security, 34(4): 63‐95
* Colin Dueck, 2004, “New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay,” International
Security 28(4): 197-216
* Robert Ross, 2009, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security 34(2): 46-81
* Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, 2010, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in
Pakistan,” International Security 34(3): 79-118
18. Research Design Redux (1 Mar)
Week 8
19. Civil War (4 Mar)
** Barbara F.Walter, 1997, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization
51(3): 335-364
** Stathis N. Kalyvas, 2001, “’New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” World Politics 54(1): 99118
** Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 2002, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Working
Paper. http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12055/1/2002-01text.pdf
** James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 2003, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political
Science Review 97(1): 75-90
* Idean Salehyan, 2007, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups,” World
Politics 59(2): 217-242
* Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz, 2008, “Fighting at Home, Fighting
Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(4): 479-506
*** Hypotheses, Data, and Methods due***
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Syllabus: International Security
20. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency – Debate: Big states lose small wars because the conflict is not
existential for them (6 Mar)
** Andrew Mack, 1975, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World
Politics 27(2): 175-200
** Ivan Arreguin-Toft, 2001, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International
Security 26(1): 93-128
** Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew A. Kocher, 2007, “How Free is Free-Riding in Civil Wars? Violence,
Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” World Politics 59(2): 177-216
** Jonathan D. Caverley, 2010, “The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam,”
International Security 34(3): 119-157
* “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,
pp. 1-1--1-29 (available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf)
21. Afghanistan (8 Mar)
** Seth G. Jones, 2008, “The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” International
Security 32(4): 7-40
** Paul Staniland, 2009, “Counterinsurgency is a bloody, costly business,” Foreign Policy, Nov 24, 2009,
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/24/counterinsurgency_is_a_bloody_costly_business
** Steve Biddle, 2009, “Is There a Middle Way? The Problem with Half-measures in Afghanistan,” The
New Republic, Oct 20, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/there-middle-way#
Week 9
22. Targeting Civilians – Debate: Targeting civilians is an effective military tactic (11 Mar)
** Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, 2004, “’Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and
Guerrilla Warfare,” International Organization 58(2): 375-407
** Alexander B. Downes, 2006, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian
Victimization in War,” International Security 30(4): 152-195
** Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, 2006, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil
War,” American Political Science Review 100(3): 429-447
** Colin H. Kahl, 2007, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct
in Iraq,” International Security 32(1): 7-46
23. The Iran-Iraq War (13 Mar)
** CR ICW, “The Iran-Iraq War” 267-295
24. Continued (15 Mar)
Week 10
*** SPRING BREAK!! NO CLASS THIS WEEK *** (18-22 Mar)
Week 11
25. Ethnic Conflict – Debate: Partition is an effective way to resolve ethnic conflict (25 Mar)
** Barry Posen, 1993, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35(1): 27-47
http://legacy2.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/pdfs/posen-1993.pdf
** David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, 1996, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic
Conflict,” International Security 21(2): 41-75
** Carter Johnson, 2008, “Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars,”
International Security 32(4): 140-70
** Michael C. Horowitz, Alex Weisiger, and Carter Johnson, 2009, “The Limits to Partition,” International
Security, 33(4): 203-210
* James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 1996, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Political
Science Review 90(4): 715-735
* Nicholas Sambanis, 2000, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the
Theoretical Literature,” World Politics, 52(4): 437-483
* Stephen M. Saideman, 2002, “Overlooking the Obvious: Bringing International Politics Back into
10
Cohn
Syllabus: International Security
Ethnic Conflict Management” International Studies Review 4(3): 63-86
26. Continued (27 Mar)
27. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (29 Mar)
** CR ICW, “The Indo-Pakistani War” 205-265
Week 12
28. Terrorism – Debate: Suicide terror is driven by a feeling of occupation of holy lands (1 Apr)
** Robert A. Pape, 2003, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review
97(3): 343-361
** Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, 2006, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31(1):
49-80
** Max Abrahms, 2008, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,”
International Security 32(4): 78-105
** Assaf Moghadam, 2009, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide
Attacks,” International Security 33(3): 46-78
* Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, 2006, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,”
International Security 30(3): 87-123
* Mette Eilstrup‐Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, 2009, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,”
International Security 33(2): 7-44
29. WMD, Proliferation, and Arms Control – Debate: Nuclear deterrence works (3 Apr)
** Office of Technology Assessment, 1993, Chapter 1 in Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ota/9341.pdf
** Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, 2006, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,”
International Security 30(4): 7-44
** Dinshaw Mistry, 2009, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” Security
Studies 18(1): 148-192
** Vipin Narang, 2010, “Posturing for Peace?” International Security 34(3): 38-78
** Francis Gavin, 2010, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,”
International Security, 34(3): 7‐37
* Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 1985, “A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea,”
International Security 9(4): 154-184
* Sumit Ganguly and Harrison Wagner, 2004, “India and Pakistan: Bargaining In the Shadow of Nuclear
War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27(3): 479‐507
* Matthew Bunn, 2009, “Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism,” Daedalus 138(4):
112–123
30. The Iraq War (5 Apr)
** CR ICW, “The Iraq War” 297-363
* Kenneth Pollack, 2002, “Next Stop Baghdad,” Foreign Affairs 81(2): 32-47
Week 13
31. Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism (8 Apr)
** Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, 1995, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International
Security 20(1): 39-51
** Robert Jervis, 1999, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation,” International Security 24(1): 42-63
** Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, 2000, “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International
Conflict,” International Organization 54(4): 775-808
* Stephen Brooks, 2005, Producing Security, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3 ***on ereserves***
* Alexander Thompson, 2006, “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information
Transmission,” International Organization 60 (1): 1-34
11
Cohn
Syllabus: International Security
32. The Democratic Peace – Debate: Democracies don’t fight one another because democratic norms
prevent them (10 Apr)
** Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 1993, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 19461986,” American Political Science Review 87(3): 624-638
** Christopher Layne, 1994, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security
19(2): 5-49
** Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 1995, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International
Security 20(1): 5-38
** Zeev Maoz, 1997, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the
Wall?” International Security 22(1): 162-198
* Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, 1999, “An
Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 93(4): 791-807
* David A. Lake, 1992, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science
Review 86(1): 24-37
* Alexander B. Downes, 2009, “How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of
Democratic Victory in War,” International Security 33(4): 9-51
33. ***No Class Today*** (12 Apr)
Week 14
34. Peace Stability and Duration – Debate: Military victory is necessary for lasting peace (15 Apr)
** Stephen John Stedman, 1997, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22(2): 5-53
** Virginia Page Fortna, 2003, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” International
Organization 57(2): 337-372
** David M.Edelstein, 2004, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,”
International Security 29(1): 49-91
** Virginia Page Fortna, 2004, “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects,”
World Politics 56(4): 481-519
** Michael Barnett, 2006, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War,” International
Security 30(4): 87-112
* Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, 2007, “The Perils of Profiling Civil War Spoilers and the
Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” International Security 31(3): 7-40
* Kimberly Marten, 2007, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31(3): 41-73
* Roland Paris, 1997, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security
22(2): 54-89
35. Humanitarian Intervention – Debate: The United States should intervene in Syria (17 Apr)
** Richard K. Betts, 1994, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73(6): 20-33
** Alan J. Kuperman, 2000, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs 79(1): 94-118
** Samantha Powers, 2001, “Bystanders to Genocide,” The Atlantic Monthly,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/
** Sarah Kenyon Lischer, 2003, “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict,”
International Security 28(1): 79-109
* Barry Posen, 1996, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security, 21(1): 72-111
* Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, 2008, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about
Failed States,” International Security 32(4): 106-139
* Alan J. Kuperman, 2008, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans”
International Studies Quarterly 52: 49–80
* Elizabeth Saunders, 2009, “Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy,”
International Security 34(2): 119-161
36. Continued (19 Apr)
***STRATEGY GAME Saturday 20 April, 1pm-4pm (location TBA)***
12
Cohn
Syllabus: International Security
Week 15
37. Civil-Military Relations – Debate: Military advice about operations should be followed (22 Apr)
** Peter D. Feaver, 1996, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23(2): 149-178
** James Burk, 2002, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 29(1):
7-29
** Christopher Gelpi and Peter D. Feaver, 2002, “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the
Political Elite and the American Use of Force,” American Political Science Review 96(4): 779-793
* Elizabeth Kier, 1995, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,” International Security
19(4): 65-93
* Lindsay P. Cohn, 2011, “It Wasn’t in my Contract: Security Privatization and Civilian Control,” Armed
Forces and Society 37(3): 381-398
38. Public Opinion and War – Debate: Political leaders should follow the demands of public opinion in
foreign policy (24 Apr)
** Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, 1998, “Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War U.S. Public
Opinion on the Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(4): 395-417
** Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler, 2005, “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the
War in Iraq,” International Security 30(3): 7-46
** Daniel Byman, 2006, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs 85(2): 95-111
39. Energy and Environment – Debate: The US should focus on the supply side of the energy issue (26
Apr)
** Thomas Homer-Dixon, 1994, “Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict,” International Security
19(1): 5‐40
** Daniel Yergin, 2009, “It’s Still the One,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/its_still_the_one
** Antony Froggatt and Michael Levi, 2008, “Climate and Energy Security Policies and Measures:
Synergies and Conflicts,” International Affairs 85(6): 1129‐41. http://www.cfr.org/energy-security/climateenergy-security-policies-measures-synergies-conflicts/p20922
* David J. Rothkopf, September/October 2009, “Is a Green World a Safer World?” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/is_a_green_world_a_safer_world_not_necessarily?page
=0,0
Week 16
40. Continued (29 Apr)
41. Continued (1 May)
42. Review and Prospective (3 May)
EXAM WEEK (6-10 May)
Final Research Design Due: between 13.00-14.50 Monday 6 May
13