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Diego Garzon
Professor Douglas Lemke
PL SC 014U
Term Paper
Friday April 4th 2014
La Guerra del Cenepa (Cenepa War)
1. Antecedents:
After separating of the Great Colombia and constituting itself in republic in
1830, Ecuador undergoes several territorial dismemberments because of the voracious
ambition of Peru, (Bargain Tobar - Rio Branco 1904, Bargain Muñoz Vernaza Suarez 1916, Bargain Salomon - Lozano 1922, Protocol Mosquera - Pedemonte 1830,
Protocol de Río de Janeiro 1942) that based on its armament policy and of superiority,
in diverse occasions imposes its will through the force and the diplomatic cleverness.
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This causes, that Ecuador loses approximately 600 thousand kilometers
squared by means of three treaties and two protocols. Celebrated in negative
conditions more for our country. Such as the subscription of the protocol of Rio de
Janeiro in 1942, where Ecuador is forced and pressed to sign by the international
community after the war maintained with Peru in 1941, where our territories were
invaded.
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This protocol aside from unjust, is
not executable because it presents an
essential geographic error that is the
existence of the Cenepa river in the
bordering point based on the water
division between the rivers Zamora and
Santiago. During 1978 (Condor Mirador), 1981 (Paquisha), 1989 (Pachacutec) and
1991 (Pacto de Caballeros), Ecuador and Peru maintain their borders in military
tension by the existing discords in the area non limited. Finally in 1995, the bordering
problem ends at warlike confrontation with serious consequences for both countries.
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2. Analysis:
2.a) War.
It is very important to start conceptualizing War in order to verify if the data
from Cenepa war is consistent with the theory we study in Political Science
International Relations; “A war is an event involving the organized use of military
force by at least two parties that satisfies some minimum threshold of severity.”
(Frieden, Lake and Schultz, p.84).
The concept is divided in three types: Interstate wars, Civil wars, Extra-state
wars. La Guerra del Cenepa is an Interstate war because interstate violence is a
conflict between two or more states who are members of an international system
(Ecuador and Peru) and who use their respective national forces in the conflict.
The legal definition says that war is observed when states make legal
declarations of war against each other. A major problem is that since creation of the
UN (United Nations), no states declare war against each other anymore. Hence, there
was no formal declaration of war between the two countries due to having the same
common border. Military operations took place in a territory that until then was not
defined, corresponding to the Cenepa River basin, which is an area of difficult access
with high jungle, where weather and logistical factors hindered the military
movements.
Correlates of War (COW) Project defines war as: Between 2 states
governmentally-sanctioned, sustained combat
civilian)
Features
At least 1000 battle fatalities (not
At least 100 per state, or 1000 troops in area
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To conclude about Wars, they are the variable outcome in almost all
International Relations research on interstate conflict. Clearly, wars are extremely rare,
but still uncommon. So any explanation for war must really be about when peace
fails. Peace fail when borders are still not limited and the conflicted states are still
able to get a larger pie from the territory dispute. A territorial disagreement lends
itself nicely to analysis via the bargaining model.
2.b) Bargaining and War.
Bargaining is an agreement between parties in exchange for something from
the other party. Bargaining and war have a significant correlation level that is about to
be explored. Given that war is costly; lives lost, property destroyed, military spending,
opportunity costs, leaders lose jobs. Why is it ever fought? Why don’t states identify
bargains that would prevent wars?
War as coercive bargaining; is a conflict over the things that states value the
most, such as territory, policies, and regime type. In this case we are talking about a
large proportion of territory that was lead after the separation of the Great Colombia
and in in dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Hence, war is bargaining. Threats to use
force to resolve crises are efforts by states to convince each other that the reversion
point (non-agreement) is costly. There ALWAYS exist bargains that could prevent
wars. Why states fail to perceive these bargains is the main insight of the bargaining
approach.
The Bargaining Range:
Let’s assume that State A is Ecuador and State B is Peru.
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a) At point “x” both countries are in a state of peace in which none of the
countries are willing to start a war over the other.
b) As said before, war is always costly and that cost is represented in the diagram
as “–a” and “+b” keeping each state more distant than the ideal point “x” that
now is called “p”. The distance between “p-a” and “p+b” is the range in which
deals within the countries can be made instead to preferring war.
Bargaining and the Status Quo:
Let’s assume that State A is Ecuador and State B is Peru.
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This diagram provides a graphical explanation of undesired outcomes that
serve to overcome the status quo of each state seeking for a better outcome. At some
point, both states agree on the same range in which status quo of neither will change,
that is the range in which negotiations can be made instead of preferring war that is
called the “Bargaining range”. In the case of the Cenepa War, it was a matter of
everything or nothing (each state on seeking its ideal point) because we are talking
about territory and that is one of the things that states value the most. Therefore both
countries were not able to set a bargaining range. Ecuador has a strong position and
was tired of being tolerant about giving up territory due to the better-played
diplomacy of Peru (bargains and protocols). Peru also had a strong position and was
not willing to give up.
2.b.i) Bargaining Failure Due to Incomplete Information
Ecuador and Peru had private information about the way they want to address the
problem, their war-fighting strategy, the quality of their armies, etc. This private
information has lead each of the two countries to have inconsistent views of the
bargaining space. The reason why neither of the states tells each other their private
information so as to harmonize expectations and avoid war is because if revealing
their private information to the other would weaken their bargaining position, they
may be better off fighting. This will make the other more aware of your game plan
and therefore it’s a threat. In crisis time, nobody wants to look weak. In the other hand,
states can also bluff. For example: State A may lie to B about its resolve, to get B to
make larger concessions. Therefore incentives to misrepresent prevented Ecuador and
Peru from telling each other the truth. Well, the truth was that each country wanted to
win this conflict by war or diplomacy, either way. Thus created uncertainty about the
final outcome.
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2.b.ii) Mechanisms of Bargaining Failure
It’s hard to put labels on historic events according to “why” they happened. This
is because sometimes theories do not understand/fit completely the events, but it can
be pretty accurate some other times. When bargains cannot be reached, there are three
mechanisms to give a reason why: Private information and incentives to misrepresent,
Commitment Problems and Indivisibility.
 Bargaining Failure due to Commitment Problems:
“A credible commitment to abide by a deal is a commitment that assures
the other side that the state will not threaten force to revise the terms of the
deal” in the future. (p.105) “A commitment problem arises when a state
cannot make such a promise in a credible manner.” (p.105). Different from
previous bargaining failure (due to incomplete information), states have
complete information here. This is consistent with the events because both
countries did knew what the other wanted from them but the unknown thing
was the uncertainty if the other country is going to break diplomacy and attack.
No one was going to bend over. The current Presidents were Sixto Duran
Ballen and Alberto Fujimori from Ecuador and Peru respectively. Duran was
having a bad popularity and Fujimori was near elections, therefore both
presidents needed to re-gain people’s trust. Three years before the war they
held a meeting in Quito in order to solve the problem in the best way possible,
but there was no agreement between them. In the case that an agreement
would have reached due to same bargaining range, three categories of
commitment problem would have been likely; When the bargain is over a
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source of future bargaining power, War in response to changing power and
War in response to 1st Strike advantages.
 Bargaining over Sources of Future Bargaining Power:
A strategically important piece of productive territory was desired by
each nation. In the previous instance, concessions A would have given to B to
get the territory system could be demanded back by a now-more-powerful A.
So B can’t give in in the first place. Same results the other way around with B
and A.
Bargaining Failure due to Shifting Power:
A contrast between the initial and future bargaining ranges from a) and
b) respectively is very important. When the power of a state increases, the
future bargaining range for the other state is lower than before. This is because
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power in a state makes it have a greater advantage and therefore is closer to
it’s ideal point than before in the short run.
 Bargaining Failure due to First-Strike Advantages:
One of the principles of fighting is that the first that strikes, strikes two times.
The graph above is just a reflection of outcomes for that. Uncertainty is
concerned about this and because of that can accelerate the time to start a war.
 Bargaining Failure due to Indivisibility:
If the good in contention cannot be divided in some way between the
bargainers, then the bargaining range is empty. There could have been a way
to divide de territory BUT that is why the conflict appeared, both countries
wanted to get the largest pie.
After failed attempts to bargain, the war took place in 1995.
This
confrontation lasted five weeks and put an end to a long series of warlike incidents
between the two nations by the territorial control of a zone in dispute from beginnings
of the century XIX, that included the Mountain range of the Condor and the Cenepa
River. The war of 1995 was started by the different interpretation that both countries
gave to the application of a treaty of peace signed after the 1941 war. The famous
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Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, in which acted like guarantors the United States, Brazil,
Chile and Argentina, establishing “the limits” between Peru and Ecuador.
February 17th of 1995, the Declaration of Peace of Itamaraty was signed in
Brazil, It established the withdrawal of both countries. The responsible countries of
the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro went to the zone of the conflict as guarantees. The 2 of
March, after five weeks of confrontations and skirmishes, finished the combats. A
new round of negotiations lead to the agreement of Brasilia, signed by president
Alberto Fujimori and his Ecuadorian pair Jamil Mahuad, the 24 of October of 1998.
The responsible countries solved that the demarcation of the border would continue
being the same that established the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro of 1942.
If someone had been able to forecast the resolution, Ecuador would never even
bother to fight and lose its time. Even though they won in the field of war, they had to
give away the territory, people’s lives, resources, etc anyway due to the intervention
from the guarantees of the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro. Now, speaking as an
Ecuadorean I have a feeling of angriness and resentment towards this issue. Every
time I remember about the lost territory to Peru I start thinking in what ways my
country will be different from now in terms of progress and power if history would be
different. I just consider it so unfair when the other countries forced Ecuador to sign
the treaty giving back what just earned in war. It’s unbelievable how can my country
lost so much territory during that century, in my mind it still doesn’t fit. Probably we
are better or probably not. What I’m sure is that with the territory that we have now
we must value it.
Overall in bargaining and war, war is costly; therefore rational actors should
identify bargains to avoid it. However, it is not that easy and they may fail to identify
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these bargains due to unequal information along with incentives to misrepresent one’s
private information, issue indivisibility and problems of credible commitment. This is
what happens in history and keeps repeating not because humans don’t learn from the
past but because they want it all. Until there is no more to fight for.
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3. Works cited:
"Ejercito Del Ecuador - Guerra Del Cenepa 1." YouTube. YouTube, 24 May 2009.
Web. 01 Apr. 2014.
"Enciclopedia Del Ecuador - Efrén Avilés Pino - Historia Del Ecuador - Geografía Personajes De La Historia Ecuatoriana." Enciclopedia Del Ecuador - Efrén Avilés
Pino - Historia Del Ecuador - Geografía - Personajes De La Historia Ecuatoriana.
N.p., n.d. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.
Lemke, Douglas. “Bargaining & War, I”. Penn State University. Theatre building,
State College. 29 January 2014. Lecture.
Lemke, Douglas. “Bargaining & War, II”. Penn State University. Theatre building,
State College. 31 January 2014. Lecture.
Lemke, Douglas. “What is war”. Penn State University. Theatre building, State
College. 27 January 2014. Lecture.
Mundo, Redacción BBC. BBC News. BBC, 03 Mar. 2008. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.
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