1
TRUTH AND REASONABILITY
(ADEVĂR ȘI REZONABILITATE)
Abstract
In the economic (more generally, social) field the factual testing of the opinions (either theories or
hypotheses) is compromised by at least five non-orthodoxies: non-invariance of the initial
conditions, teleology (purposes), hermeneutics of the factual experience, normativity inside the
explanation, and non-verifiability of the isomorphism model-phenomenon. As consequence, in this
field, the truth is problematic and it seems be more convenient to accept a quasi-truth, that is, a
reasonable acceptability of the result of such a testing. The paper examines the concept of
reasonability as substitute of the truth and discusses some crucial issues linked to this concept. Also,
the paper argues the concept of reasonability doesn’t allow the entering of the pragmatism into the
economic (or social) explanation. Finally, some theoretical and methodological precautions in using
the concept of reasonability to test the economic (social) propositional statements are identified
and evaluated.
JEL Classification: B41, C00, E17
Key-words: truth, reasonability, normativity, hermeneutics
1. Introduction
As it is generally accepted, the reality is of two kinds: a) subjective reality; b) objective reality1.
Knowledge always introduces an order in the reality (be it either objective or subjective). This order
is, in its turn, subjective, better said, it is an objectivised expression of the collective subjectivity. So,
the objective reality is not the result of the subjectivity2, but the order of the reality is subjective.
The order instituted on the reality is less a discovery but an invention. Especially in the
social/economic field, the order introduced by knowledge into the reality is based on heuristic
fictions. Even the famous true values of the bivalent logic (true and false) are our heuristic fictions
to order the subjective way to think. In this conditions, what is the statute of the true value of our
propositions about the economic (more general, about the social) phenomena and processes? In
additions, how could we (if we can) test the true value of our propositions in this field? And, if we
will establish the problematic character of such issues, what can we say about the economic
discipline as science and about the result of Popper-ian testing of our hypotheses and conjectures?
2. Five reasons to delimitate the economic knowledge from the natural knowledge
I think there are four reasons (issues) that make problematic the way in which the economic
knowledge is generated and used in instituting an order into the reality (especially in the objective
reality, but not only):
a. change of the initial conditions: the initial conditions are not invariant, due to the necessary
presence of the subject in the economic object, that necessarily generates the novelty. The
novelty modifies the initial conditions based which the economic phenomenon is
developing on;
1
Although Karl Popper requires also a third world (that world is an objectivised of the relationship between the
subjective reality and the objective reality), I think the objective reality can contain this third world, once it is not nonsubjective anymore (so not yet communicated to another at least one subject, in a materialized form, i.e. not through a
simple empathy).
2
Some points of view, originated in the current quantum mechanics claim the objective reality is, in fact, a simple
probability distribution that is highlighted up only by the subject (for example, by any interrogation about this reality).
These points of view reintroduce in the scientific debate the Kantian noumenon, which is completely non-productive, in
my opinion.
2
b. change of the law of phenomenological transition: the presence of the subject within the
economic object, as noted above, constitutes the causal structure of the phenomenon to
exist for (final cause). These goals are of contingent, so they are generated in the "territory"
of free will, so are characterized by novelty, so they are fundamentally unpredictable (they
are not necessary results of a calculation based on a model of rationality). This makes
changing the law of change itself. But testing the prediction implies invariance of the change
law, so from this perspective, the variability of the change law (which is absent in the case of
natural domain), makes testing (checking) the prediction in the social (economic) be
problematic;
c. interpretative theory: another lack of invariance can be brought into debate, that, this time,
is common for the social (economic) and natural fields: the non-invariance of the
interpretative theory of the factual descriptive proposition. When the descriptive
proposition of the factual which the predictive proposition was been enacted about, this
analysis is performed based on an interpretative theory (a hermeneutics). It is possible that
the structure of the interpretative theory, or its internal logic be inconsistent with the theory
that grounded the enacting of the predictive proposition. Then, any result obtained by
analysing of the descriptive proposition can be problematic: so, we never can be sure
neither on the corroboration, nor on the refutation of the predictive proposition. This is,
really, the main vulnerability of the Karl Popper suggestion regarding the falsifiability of the
scientific results. Popper didn’t suggest any solution in the matter and, as we know, even the
following epistemological developments didn’t bring clarifications. But within the science,
the truth is established rather by consensus inside the scientific community. Because always
will exist polemics regarding the appropriateness of the interpretative theory on the
descriptive proposition, it results we have a weaknesses of the prediction verification in the
social (economic) field;
d. confusion between norm and causality: we have previously discussed about the possibility
that identifying of the norm of an action (either a hetero-norm or and auto-norm) in
formulating the explanation on a phenomenon can lead to take this norm into account,
within the law of change, in order to enact a prediction (predictive proposition) on that
phenomenon. A problem arises in the case in which the norm identified inside the
explanation proposition is of „single use”. We already know that a behaviour norm
represents the formalization of a goal, of a motivation, of an intention directed towards an
object or a state of it. As the goal is contingent, the risk that it do not perpetuate into a
repeatable behaviour norm is relatively high3. So, transforming of a behaviour norm
identified in the structure of the explanation proposition into a component of the causality
vector integrated into the law of change (movement) is „illegal” from the theoretical point of
view4. Practically, this happens, however, relatively frequently5;
3
There are, of course, cases where this perpetuation has an actualization, through local protocols of behaviour (this
happens even in the case of non-cultural subjects like animals, which develops, based on memes, protocols of
behaviour generated by the previous hunting successes). The problem is not that we have such cases also, but that we
cannot know this happens necessarily or it remain a contingent phenomenon. If the perpetuation occurs necessarily,
then its predictability would be ensured.
4
There are four basic propositions that cab be enacted about a phenomenon: a) explanation propositions; b)
prescriptive (normative) propositions; c) predictive propositions; d) descriptive propositions. In the case discussed here,
we talk about the transformation of prescriptive propositions into predictive ones, via explanation propositions (the last
delivering a king of „password” for this transformation).
5
One of the „places” where this taking over of the norm into causality happens is the probability field, either objectives
(based on observed frequency archives), or subjective (based on expectations distributions). Especially in the case of the
subjective probabilities a „gate is generated”, through which the norms observed (recorded) in the explanations
become causes within the next predictive propositions.
3
e. non-isomorphism between the model and the reality: in the most cases, the models about
the social (economic) reality are data-oriented, but not theory-oriented. This leads to a
violation of a crucial condition of modelling: the structural and functional isomorphism
between the model and reality6. As a result, the models about the reality can be far of that
reality, because the incompleteness or the irrelevance of the signals (available data) from
the reality modelled. In fact, for the social (economic) field, the theoretical bases of the
explanation, prediction, and the behaviour are still simple and inconclusive (figure 1 shows
the image of such a non-isomorphism risk).
Figure 1. The risk of the non-isomorphism in the comprehension model
3. What the reasonability is it?
As it is well known, the scientific knowledge must verify, by specification related to the knowledge
in general7, the followings: a) for the second condition: the opinion must be of economic8 type;
b) for the third condition: the opinion must be accepted in an inter-subjective way; d) for the fourth
condition: the grounding principle must be of a comprehensive type.
For the goal of the present study the (b) and (d) points are of the greatest interest.
Regarding the (b) point, we have to say that the opinion is not anymore required be true, but be
inter-subjectively accepted only. Although in the natural sciences such an inter-subjective
acceptation is required too, it is based on the factual non-rejection of the opinion (hypothesis,
model, theory etc.). In the social field, as result of the ambiguity on the interpretative theory on the
factual (descriptive) proposition, the factual rejection is very problematic, as it was shown above.
So, the correspondence truth is not anymore working. In this case, we believe the opinion is
accepted based on a kind of reasonability. What implies such a reasonability?
Firstly, the reasonability must be understood as a trans-individual platform for acceptance of
opinions. However, that platform is not a global one (i.e., comprising all the individuals,
contemporary each other) but refers a set of individuals that are homogeneous from a preestablished point of view. For example, the poor individuals could form such a cohort, for which a
given opinion (for example, „the poor individuals have not the right to vote”9) has the same
signification, so it is accepted under the same reasonability. It seems the reasonability is, for a first
6
This means the modematic discourse, which identifies the modems (the modems are the „atomic” items of the model,
bijectively corresponding to the items of the reality modelled) are either incomplete or wrong.
7
The general knowledge implies four conditions: a) a cultural subject (endowed with conscious); b) an opinion; c) the
truth of the opinion; d) a grounding principle of the opinion.
8
An opinion (generally expressed by a verbal proposition, in a common known language) is of economic type if it is
related, in a last instance – explicitly or implicitly – to the entropic exchange between the individuals and their
environment in the largest sense, that is which contains the nature, other individuals, and anthropic objects.
9
We have here a prescriptive proposition, but a similar judgement can be made on descriptive (affirmative of negative)
propositions. For example, the opinion „the economic inequality is caused by the free market” has a specific relevance
for the cohort of poor individuals, which is very different from its relevance for the cohort of rich individuals.
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instance, simply a set of values based on which any interpreting or meaning is made. We can name
the reasonability as an axiological framework (AF).
Secondly, the axiological framework form its own reasonability class, RC, (which can, then, group
the individuals into correspondent cohorts). But, these reasonability classes are not organized as a
simple continguity, so their reunion (in the set theory sense) give all the individuals. By the contrary,
the different reasonability classes are overlapped one another, so certain individuals can belong to
one or more reasonability classes, related to their own values set. This possibility is provided by the
necessary ambiguity of the values themselves. Another reason for the RC overlapping is the lack of
calculus in establishing the values which must be considered. The adherence of an individual to a
given value is not the result of a rationality model functioning, but a free will choice, based on the
whole personality of the individual10 (figure 2 shows a synoptic image of the above considerations).
Thirdly, the reasonability class must be viewed, in its turn, as a situational framework (SF). The
concept of situational framework is the results of the axiological framework („objectified” into the
reasonability class) and the individuals options for a given reasonability class. In fact, the situational
framework acts as a „geodesic line”, constraining the individuals to accept a certain explanation, or
to enact a certain prediction regarding the social (economic) phenomena. In some measure, the SF
will be an invariant for a cohort of individuals and, in such quality, it could act as a general predictor
both for accepting a given opinion or result of the social (economic) process, or to enact a
prediction in the social (economic) field (figure 3 suggests the situational frameworks emergence,
and figure 4 indicates the way in which the geodesics constraint the individual behaviour).
Figure 2. The bijective relation between AFs and RCs, and non-bijective one between individuals and RCs
Figure 3. The emergence of the situational frameworks
10
The concept of free will (or of freedom), here, is very much closed to the similar concept at Bergson.
5
Figure 4. The geodesics working
Regarding the (d) point, we have to say that the grounding principle of an opinion (hypothesis,
theory, model, conjecture etc.) about the social (economic) reality is not anymore of the causality
nature, but of intelligibility (comprehensive) nature. Here we have, with a great probability, the
most promising kernel not only for a new formalism for the social (economic) field11, but also for a
conceptual reconstruction of it. The most important idea is the comprehension doesn’t require
anymore the truth. The truth will be simply replaced with the reasonability, as we have described
above. A result of a certain effort (either scientific, or praxiological) provided by the social
community is accepted based on its own reasonability (of course, associated to a given cohort of
individuals). This situation has many similarities with the concept of paradigm12, but it is larger,
since addresses not only the knowledge processes, but also the comprehension and praxiological
processes.
4. The comprehension
Unlike the explanation (that is a verbal, in the most cases, description of a causality), the
comprehension is a verbal, in the most cases, description of a reasonability. The reasonability can
have two species: a) intelligibility; b) acceptability. So, if it is needed to talk about rationality in the
social (economic) field, then we must talk about two of the five distinct classes of rationality13:
a) intelligibility-based rationality, that gives the plausibility, and b) acceptability-based rationality,
which gives the conviction. In this key, we must say the comprehension is not publicly testable (as,
of contrary, the explanation is), except the cohort of individuals which enter the reasonability class
which the discussion is developed about, i.e. the situational framework associated. Even inside the
given cohort of individuals, the testing of comprehension, under the two forms evoked, is only
based on discourses, without any appeal to the facts implied. To say more about the specific
features of the comprehension in comparison with the explanation and with action, we provide the
figure 5 below.
11
For example, the quantifications (no matter the class of numbers used – natural, rational, real or complex) in the
social (economic) field should not be distinct (i.e., they should contain ovelappings), as the concepts in the social
(economic) field already contain (the last, from the semantic point of view).
12
Introduced by Thomas Kuhn, the concept of paradigm refers the values, attitudes and protocols of knowledge shared
by a given scientific community. The reasonability class (i.e., the geodesics of comprehension and action) acts under the
same „myopia” the paradigm does.
13
We think there are five distinct classes of rationality: 1) causality-based rationality – linked to the explanation;
2) intelligibility-based rationality – linked to plausibility; 3) acceptability-based rationality – linked to conviction;
4) conservability-based rationality – linked to justification; 5) belief-based rationality – linked to assuming.
6
Figure 5. Comprehension vs. explanation and action
So, the comprehension is linked to reasonability in a similar way in which the explanations is linked
to the explanation. However, if the reasonability as vehicle of the comprehension is very clear
related to past results (scientific or praxiological), what about the prediction based on the
comprehension? This issue will be developed in the next our intervention („Reasonability and
prediction”). Also, in the next intervention the analysis of the concept of situational framework will
be extended, since we think it could host in nuce many useful developments, both conceptual,
methodological, and empirical, in reconstructing the economic discipline and the economic action.
5. The economic discipline as hermeneutics
Based on the previous mentioned regarding the reasonability, the comprehension and the
situational framework in evaluating, accepting, and testing the results – both scientific and
praxiological – in the social (economic) field, we will discuss in the followings the state of the
economic discipline or theory. Our belief is the economic theory is rather of hermeneutical than of
scientific nature. Of course, this proposition is based on the concept of scientificity provided by the
natural sciences. We think to enlarge the concept of the scientificity so it include the social sciences
and the humanities sciences alongside of the natural sciences is not desirable, since it could
impoverish the concept of scientificity itself. As we already showed in the second of our
interventions in the Œconomica review (no. 2/2014, „Causality and truth”), the economic discipline
must be considered as a hermeneutics since it address the relation between subject and object 14. As
consequence, the economic discipline provide comprehension (i.e., interpretation), not genuine
knowledge. We can say the economic discipline provides acceptance not certitude, that is, it is
focused on connotation, not on denotation within the propositions regarding results of the
cognitive or practical activities. Also, we can say the economic discipline has as target the
hermeneutics, not the cognition. Nevertheless, between hermeneutics and cognition should not be
traced a too rigid line, since could there are „border violations” between them. This means between
hermeneutics and cognition can subsist an interference area, so there is not an arithmomorphic15
14
We remember that, in our opinion, the study of relation object-object is reserved for the theoretical activity (which
„gives” the sciences), the study of relation subject-object is reserved for the hermeneutical activity (which „gives”
hermeneutics), and the study of relation subject-subject is reserved for the practical activity (which „gives” the political
and moral disciplines).
15
The concept arithmomorphic is „borrowed” from Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, and has its primary signification. To be
remarked that Bergson, in treating the conscious states, introduced a similar idea, when discussed about the
spatialization of the time generated by considering the time moments as rather juxtaposited (i.e., as simultaneous),
than intrinsically imbedded. The Bergson-ian concept of juxtaposition can be assimilated to the Roegen-ian concept of
arithmomorphism.
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separation. In fact, this interference area is a filtering area of the suitable truth. Since the filter acts
based on the expectations generated by the geodesics of the situational framework (see figure 4
above) we can have here a „gate” for pragmatism entrance. To avoid such a danger, we think a
great and intensive theoretical work must be provided in the close future, in order to reconsider
and, eventually, to replace the unfortunate concept of utility16. The specific differences between
hermeneutics and cognition could be systematized as follows (see, also, figure 6):
(a) cognition:
- provides certitudes
- the certitudes are assimilated through the significations (denotations) associated
- the significations are derived by falsification (including inter-subjective verification)
(b) hermeneutics:
- provides acceptances
- the acceptances are assimilated through meanings (connotations) associated
- the meanings are derived by interpretation
Figure 6. Cognition vs. hermeneutics protocols
The suitable truth is, in fact, a contingent one, verified through an external principle, dependent of
the ground (the grounding principle), and under the verificationism. Figure 7 shows the truth which
must be „adopted” by the social (economic) field, namely the external coherence truth (ECT).
Figure 7. The external coherence truth (ECT) of the social (economic) field
16
Probably, something linked to the joy of living could be a solution. Of course, the quantification of such a concept
must avoid, in its turn, the current methodology provided by orthodox physics and mathematics. In our opinion, the
physics must stop its methodological negative influence on the economics (and, generally, on the social and humanities
sciences). In our opinion, the most appropriate natural sciences which economics must inspire from are: a) evolutionary
biology; b) cybernetics; c) quantum mechanics. Regarding the economic policies, they must inspire primarily from
medicine.
8
Some tentative conclusions
In our opinion, the truth as it is defined by the natural sciences (i.e., an objective correspondence
between the signification of the explanation (or, equivalently, predictive) proposition and the
descriptive proposition of a fact (state or event) is not relevant and, most probably, impossible to be
identified in the social (economic) field. In this field the validity is more important than the truth.
The validity can be carried by the concept of reasonability, which is consistent with the acceptance
of an opinion (be it either of scientific or of praxiological nature). Since this acceptance is depending
of the reasonability class to which a given cohort of individuals is assigned, we will name it as being
an external coherence truth.
Selected bibliography
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Dinga, E. (2012), Rebuilding Economics. A Logical, Epistemological and Methodological
Approach, Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrucken, Germany.
Elster, J. (2010) Explaining social behavior. More nuts and bolts for the Social Sciences,
University of Cambridge, England.
Hazlett, A. (2013), A Luxury of the Understanding, Oxford University Press.
Kincaid, H.; Ross, D. (2009): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, Oxford
University Press.
Moser, P. K. (2002), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press.
Pearl, J. (2009), Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference (second edition), New York,
Cambridge University Press.