South China Sea Dispute
January 9th, 2016
Edina High School
Edina, Minnesota
Background Guide
Edina Model United Nations Conference 2016
Disarmament and International Security Committee
Post-Conflict Economic and Social Recovery
Description of Committee
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) concerns itself primarily with issues of
global security and threats to peace. In DISEC, each member nation of the UN is allowed a delegation of
no more than five representatives, and the body meets for a four to five week session every year
beginning in October.
DISEC has a very wide range of duties in that it is charged with dealing with every threat to global peace
mandated by the Charter of the United Nations. The purpose of the General Assemblies is to provide a
forum for discussion and debate amongst all member nations of the UN (under some circumstances, nonmembers), allowing for a diversity of opinion that is hard to find in smaller decision making bodies such
as the Security Council. However, DISEC, like all other general assemblies, maintains an advisory role
rather than one of direct action. In fact, Article 10 of the United Nations charter limits the power of the
general assemblies, stating that their ultimate power is to “make recommendations to the Members of the
United Nations or to the Security Council.”
Despite its inability to pass treaties or laws that bind Member Nations, DISEC nonetheless remains an
integral part of the United Nations, as it serves as an invaluable measure of global opinion and a fair
forum for international debate. The resolutions, the main instrument of legislation for DISEC, are
carefully considered by the rest of the General Assembly and voted on. The Security Council depends on
DISEC for input on its decisions. The Disarmament and Security Council has a mandate to protect the
peace and stability of the world through open discussion and discourse, and has shown that this is an
effective tool in the past. The role of DISEC and the importance of this role are only set to grow as
matters of international security become polarizing and increasingly difficult to understand.
Background
The South China Sea (SCS) encompasses 1.351 million squares miles of open water, abundant with
natural resources such as oil reserves and marine wildlife. Over half of the world’s merchants pass
through the SCS in addition to one third of global naval traffic per annum (L1). However, the SCS is not
only used for the transportation of energy; “Navy Adm. Robert Willard estimated in 2011 that the region
accounts for $5.3 trillion in bilateral annual trade” (L3). The sea itself is centrally located and contains
over 200 islands (above and below the water), coral reefs, rocky outcrops, and large fisheries. The most
prominent disputed islands are the Spratlys: “The 35 islands and hundreds more reefs and guano-covered
rocks are spread across an area the size of California but comprise less land area than San Francisco”
(L4). In spite of the little value the land itself has, the surrounding countries are in a heated debate over
ownership.
The oil delivered to East Asia, from the Indian Ocean and then through the SCS by way of the Malacca
Strait, is three times the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount
transported across the Panama Canal each year (L1). The SCS is crucial to nations in southeast Asia for
trade, specifically energy transport and imports roughly 60% of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy
sources, along with 67% of South Korea’s and 80% of China’s unrefined petroleum (L1). Much of the
crude oil traveling to the SCS stops in Singapore or Malaysia to be processed, and finally shipped in the
form of a “refined petroleum product, such as motor gasoline and jet fuel” (L2). The SCS is considered to
be the “second Persian Gulf” by many Chinese observers, who estimate it to yield 130 billion barrels of
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oil. If this is true, then the SCS currently contains more oil than any section of the world excluding Saudi
Arabia. China has already invested $20 billion into offshore drilling in hopes of tapping into a new oil
reserve to support their rapid consumption, “Chinese oil reserves account for only 1.1 percent of the
world total, while it consumes over 10 percent of world oil production and over 20 percent of all the
energy consumed on the planet” (L1).
The South China Sea has been a
breeding ground for conflict within the
last 100 years, and tensions continue to
escalate. According to research from
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the South China Sea has a “far
greater chance of unmanaged escalation
between China and Vietnam, and the
Philippines” (L5) than the United States
and China. However, the dispute over
the South China Sea involves and
endangers a far greater number of
nations than merely China, Vietnam,
and the Philippines: moving clockwise
from the north, the SCS borders 8 states
and territories including People’s
Republic of China, the Republic of
China (Taiwan), the Philippines,
Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam (L6). The ongoing argument will likely set a
precedent for maritime disputes in the future, which attracts international concern. In sum, Vietnam,
Taiwan, and China all claim substantial amounts of the South China Sea territory and islands. (O1)
International Action
United Nations
The United Nations “Law of the Sea Treaty”, known more formally as the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, set international guidelines for the “rights and responsibilities of nations with respect
to their use of the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the
management of marine natural resources” (L7) in 1982. Established at the third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS replaced four treaties created at the first Conference in
1958. UNCLOS continues to be ratified around the world and as of January 2015, 166 nations along with
the European Union have ratified and joined the convention (L8). Although the Convention clearly
presents guidelines, the UN has no direct power to enforce it; but, multiple organizations have taken up an
enforcement role.
UNCLOS defines and sets limits to the ownership of the sea. Beginning from a defined baseline along the
shore of coastal nations moving outward, UNCLOS specifically outlines the consecutive zones of water.
A baseline is usually established according to the low-water line but if the country has an indented
coastline or has skirting islands, the baseline may be adjusted. The first water zone is termed internal
waters, meaning all the water or waterways inside the baseline. The next zone is defined as the territorial
waters of each nation. By international law, territorial waters only extend 12 nautical miles from a
baseline with the right of “innocent passage” given to vessels passing through (L8). However, if a nation
is defined as an “Archipelagic State”, it may draw its baseline around the outermost points of its islands.
All waters that fall within this baseline are considered Archipelagic Waters. Like internal waters, the state
has full sovereignty over Archipelagic Waters.
A state’s territorial sea may extend further (as far as 200 nautical miles) with economic justification. The
“Exclusive economic zone (EEZs)” are most prominent in areas rich in natural resources, such as the Gulf
of Mexico (L8). Within an EEZ, a nation has sole “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources” (L9). Originally created to subdue overfishing
and halt disputes over fishing rights, EEZs have become more prominent in the last 30 years for the
purpose of claiming oil reserves.
ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was originally formed in 1967 to promote cultural,
economic, and political development in the region (L15). Country membership has doubled since its
formation and membership includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam in present day (L16). While ASEAN has 10
member states, in many committees and meetings they invite other countries from around the world that
currently are invested in the Southeast Asian region.
On August 6th, 2015,
ASEAN convened at the 5th
East Asia Summit (EAS)
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
to discuss recent tensions in
the South China Sea among
other topics. While the
Ministers restated their goal
of “maintaining peace,
stability, security, and
freedom of navigation in and
over-flight over the South
China Sea” (L17), ASEAN
observers and members
expressed “serious concern”
about the developments in
the area. The on-going land
reclamation by China has
struck down trust and confidence among the Southeast Asian states and their subsequent allies. In hopes
of regaining stability, the EAS meeting “emphasised the need for the ASEAN Member States and China
to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC)” (L17). DOC frames the necessity to build and maintain trust and relations, avoid
threats and force, use self-restraint in conduct of activities, use peaceful means to resolve disputes, and act
in accordance with international law on both land and sea specifically all law framed in 1982 UNCLOS.
Following ASEAN’s request for the DOC, the members called for a required code of conduct in the
disputed waters (L17). Suspicions have arisen about the code of conduct and its effectiveness in the grand
scheme of the dispute. But, many would support any public decision over none at all (L18). ASEAN was
very careful about restating the importance of peace and stability in the South China Sea in the presence
of the United States and China. US Secretary of State John Kerry warned the committee that the United
States would not allow any restrictions on trade or travel in the disputed areas. The Chinese restated their
position that “territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be settled between claimants” (L18).
However, ASEAN has concerns that recently China has been minimizing communications with its
member states. “Four ASEAN members have competing claims in the waters with China. The four are
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. In addition, China's territorial claims conflict with
exclusive economic zones of two other ASEAN members: Indonesia and Singapore” (L19). Without
China’s involvement and communication to ASEAN, member states have little control over China’s
actions in the disputed territory. ASEAN plans to reconvene in December in hopes to take steps closer to
resolving the tension.
Maritime Precedent
There are myriad land and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, with almost every Member State
making mutually incompatible claims. Such claims have contributed to high levels of interstate tension
and impositions on sovereignty. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has
made great strides in establishing a set of laws with which to govern maritime interactions and territorial
claims, attempting to alleviate existing tensions and establish precedence for the entire region. Two such
contributions of UNCLOS are the concepts of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the Continental
Shelf. EEZs are areas delegated to a country that span 200 nautical miles from the state's shore and
provide for total control of all the resources contained within said zone. Other states may travel through a
country's EEZ so long as sovereignty is respected. Next, the introduction of the Continental Shelf helped
to further extend the land claims by adding up to 12 additional nautical miles under the state's jurisdiction.
However, should the Continental Shelf extend outside of the EEZ, only non-living resources may be
extracted from the region. Another important attribute of UNCLOS is the appointment of unique EEZ and
Continental Shelf jurisdictions for islands contained within the South China Sea. Thus, in order to reap
the benefits of the EEZ and Continental Shelf, Member States have an inherent interest in establishing
territorial sovereignty over the islands. An example of this idea is China laying claims on the Paracel and
Spratly Island Chains which would virtually extend to the entire South China Sea.
Although there are a number of territorial disputes, there are three that are the most pressing. First are the
mutually exclusive nature of the sovereignty claims on the Spratly and Paracel Islands, with the former
manifesting as a multi-claimant dispute and the latter primarily experienced by China, Taiwan, and
Vietnam, although almost every country is involved in some way with both archipelagos.
Brunei does not explicitly claim any of the islands, but respects the boundaries of its delegated EEZ and
Continental Shelf. This particular zone, though, includes the profitable Louisa Reef. Malaysia previously
claimed the Louisa Reef as well, but quietly dropped their claims in deference to Brunei.
China rests the majority of its territorial claims on historical precedence, with the exception of legitimacy
derived from military personnel employed in the Spratly Islands. China’s claims on the Paracel Islands
originated in 1974, when it seized the land from Vietnam, and has occupied the lands ever since.
Additionally, in 1947, China published a map of the South China Sea outlining its “nine-dash line”, which
appeared to be dotted lines designating the area China was entitled to (although not specifying
coordinates or other indicators of limits), supposedly extrapolated from records dating back to the Han
and Ming Dynasties. China also cites archaeological evidence to strengthen its historical claims. In 1992,
China published new laws bolstering its claims of ownership of the Islands, but have yet to clearly define
what specific region it is laying claims to.
Indonesia, much like Brunei, does not specifically claim any of the islands, but maintains itself within its
EEZ. However, China and Taiwan’s land claims impinge upon Indonesia’s established zone, most notably
on the highly valuable Natuna Gas Field.
The Taiwan Republic of China lays identical claims to the region, arguing that the historical claims China
makes are no longer relevant. Like China, however, Taiwan has yet to identify the actual areas it claims
within the South China Sea. In addition, Taiwan has also occupied Itu Aba, the largest island of the
Spratly chain since 1955.
Vietnam also makes significant
territory claims, using a number of
historic and UNCLOS-justified
claims. Vietnam claims the entire
Spratly archipelago to be an
extension of the Khanh Hoa
province and bolsters ownership
claims with archaeological evidence,
like China. Vietnam’s claims of
historical precedence originated with
France claiming both the Spratly and
Paracel Islands in order to extend its
then-colony of Vietnam. Upon
France’s ejection from the area,
Vietnam laid claims on both chains
of islands. Although Vietnam was
officially removed from the Paracels
in 1974, its territorial claims remain.
Vietnam’s claims also span the
Spratly Islands and the Gulf of
Thailand, arguing that its historical
records suggest it’s ruled over the
archipelagos since the 1800s.
The Philippines argue entitlement to most of the southern region of the South China Sea, occupying eight
of the Spratly Islands, but laying no claims to the Paracels. The Philippines use geographical proximity to
justify their claims (drawing upon the principles of UNCLOS), as well as the historical precedence
established by Filipino expeditions in 1956 and 1971, arguing that at the time of discovery the islands
were independent of the Spratly Island chain and that there was no official ownership, making them up
for grabs. In 1972, the Philippines officially declared these islands as part of the Palawan Province.
Malaysia has been very diligent in adhering to UNCLOS principles and has established very specific
boundaries within which to conduct their maritime activities, citing exact coordinates. Within their
boundaries lie three of the Spratly Islands, on which Malaysia has developed land and continues to do so.
An additional theater for dispute amongst Member States is the Scarborough Reef, focused primarily on
China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Above all else, though, the experience of Scarborough proved the
inefficacy of U.S. deterrence of China. Following the resignation of the Philippines on the reef, the
Chinese began developing a model based on their experiences in Scarborough, intending on employing
their plan of extended coercion in contested areas in order to extend their claims. Specifically, China
targeted U.S. allies to pressure without drawing too much attention from Washington. As the U.S. learns
from this strategy and how to counter it, so too must other countries in the SCS region. They must seek to
understand what exactly happened at Scarborough Reef, what made the Chinese strategy so effective, and
what can be done to avoid future instances of this plan.
In considering potential solutions to this problem, one must consider the precedence established by
Member States’ interactions in these contested areas, as such interactions guide all future behaviors and
courses of action.
National Perspectives
China
While the UN assigns EEZs to coastal nations, many attempt to create and expand their EEZ. The UN
allotted China’s EEZ to be 877,019 km off its baseline (L10). However, China claims that they have
ownership over the Spratly and Paracel islands therefore asserting that their baseline loops around the
collection of islands and would classify them as an Archipelagic State, expanding their EEZ. In addition
to the 877,019 km designated by the UN, China claims an extra 3,000,000 km , totaling their EEZ at
3,877,019 square kilometers (L10). While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea specifically
distinguishes zones, the UN has no power to enforce them.
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China’s energy consumption has been higher than any other nation since 2011 “and is the world’s secondlargest oil consumer behind the United States” (L2). As of 2013, China became the world’s largest net
importer of petroleum and other liquids according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
China’s oil imports have drastically increased within the last decade due to the amount of energy they
consume annually. “China’s consumption growth accounted for about 43% of the world’s oil
consumption growth in 2014… EIA projects China will account for more than one-fourth of the global oil
consumption growth in 2015” (L11). China’s aggressiveness and fixation on the South China Sea is
partially attributed to their desperate need for new sources to sustain their rapid consumption. While the
South China Sea has only produced 9 billion barrels of oil to date, China and Vietnam project that the Sea
and its islands- specifically the collection of small rocky outcrops called the Spratly islands- will yield
almost 130 billion barrels (L1). While the projections may very well be accurate, it is more than likely
that the Chinese government is more interested in the mass trade that passes by the Spratly islands every
year. Chinese ownership over the Spratly Islands would give them “sovereign right” to the water below
the surface and unofficial rule over the international waters above. Controlling one of the busiest
“shipping lanes” in the world transporting billions of barrels of oil and natural gas grants them a key to
controlling the “energy security of Asia” (L4).
Along with their claim to the islands and section of sea that surrounds them, China has begun building
sections of land on top of unused, rocky reefs. From all appearances, the small chunks of land appear to
be in military use containing airstrips, ship ports, surveillance towers, radar towers, helipads, and
solar/wind energy generators (L20). In a press release June 2015, Vice Premier Wang Yang of the State
Council touched on the purpose of land reclamation in the Spratlys. “The facilities, which mainly provide
various civilian services, will enable China to better perform its international obligations and
responsibilities in areas such as maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine
scientific research, meteorological observation, ecological environment conservation, navigation safety as
well as fishery production service. Necessary military defense requirements will also be fulfilled” (L12).
In addition to China’s expanded EEZ, their interpretation of their rights within the EEZ stated in
UNCLOS differ from other countries, most notably the United States (L21). Within the last year, the
United States has expanded their military presence in the South China Sea, angering the Chinese. While
the United States continues to state that they are traveling through international waters and seas, therefore
not posing any threat to China, the Chinese see it as a personal attack (L22). The United States traveling
through China’s claimed 3,000,000 km EEZ causes the Chinese to worry about spying and possible
military advancement. “Freedom of navigation and overflight by no means mean that foreign countries’
warships and military aircraft can ignore the legitimate rights of other countries as well as the safety of
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aviation and navigation” (L13), stated Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying in May
2015 following multiple flyovers by the United States. China’s famous Communist Party-run tabloid
newspaper Global Times stated that “if the United States’ bottom line is that China has to halt its
activities, then a US-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea” (L14). China’s threats of war expand
the conflict from a regional dispute to a serious worldwide issue (L19).
Vietnam
Contradicting and overlapping claims between Vietnam and China have also caused increased tension in
the region. In May 2009, Vietnam filed a joint claim with Malaysia to the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea with regard to the their land claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam claims sovereignty
over the Parcel and Spratly Islands, which are known as the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa islands to the
Vietnamese. (N22). The Vietnamese claim the islands belong under their control because they were under
the control of its colonial occupier, France. China and the Philippines dispute this claim, arguing that they
have been using the land and therefore should continue their occupations. (N42)
In May 2014, the conflict between the two nations became more hostile when a state owned Chinese oilcompany dispatched a deep sea-drilling rig off the coast of Vietnam in the disputed Parcel Island waters.
(N41) The entrance of Chinese vessels into the EEZ, claimed by the Vietnamese, sparked fatal boat
clashes and anti-Chinese violence. In response to Chinese aggression, Vietnam filed a statement and a
report to present their complaints and views against China. The Southeast Asian nation agreed with the
Philippines that the courts have jurisdiction to arbitrate the Philippine claims against China and asked for
the courts to give “due regard” to Vietnam’s interests surrounding the Parcel and Spratly Islands. Vietnam
also rejected China’s claim of owning the nine-dash line. (N22).
In attempts to be able to compete with the Chinese military size and strength, Vietnam has also
strengthened ties with the United States in recent years. The United States and Vietnam have agreed to a
“joint vision statement” that will strengthen military ties between the two over the next twenty
years. (N23)
Philippines
In early 2014, (N39) the Philippines submitted an arbitral case against China under the backings of
UNCLOS. Years of skirmishes and disagreements over ownership of the Spratly Islands led to the
Philippines pursuing action through the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Philippines was the first
nation to legalize the conflict and effectively sued China for unlawful and aggressive behavior in the
South China Sea. (N1).
In the case against China, the Philippines has argued
that China claims the islands enclosed in its “nine
dash line,” which even if China has sovereignty
over, would not give China power over the entire
region. Along with that, China has intervened in
Philippine rights and entitlements, which goes
against the UNCLOS they signed in 1989. Lastly,
the Philippines has contended that China is harming
and destroying the marine life and environment in
the disputed territories through unsustainable fishing
and harvesting practices as well as destroying reefs
while building islands. The destruction of marine life
is not only unlawful; it also, once again, goes against the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which they signed. (N1)
The Philippines sought legal action individually; however, it has garnered the support of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has been working alongside the United States, Vietnam, and
Japan to settle the dispute. The Republic of the Philippines has conducted joint military exercises with the
aforementioned countries. (N37)
After hearing word that China plans to use the islands to build search and rescue facilities, many
Philippine officials believe that China is only covering up a large military buildup. Increased Chinese
military influence in the region appears to be “the tipping point that will plunge the entire region
including the peace-loving Chinese communities into a deeper and irreversible crisis” according to the
Philippine Foreign Minister. Many Philippine officials are optimistic that if the arbitration succeeds, it
could help other nations overwhelmed by the South China Sea dispute as well as potentially set precedent
for current and future maritime disputes. (N6)
Brunei and Malaysia
In 1984, Brunei declared an EEZ encompassing the above-water islets and the Louisa Reef, and based its
claims on UNCLOS, stating that the southern part of the Spratly Islands is a part of its Continental Shelf
and therefore a part of its territory and resources. (O2) While Brunei’s claims to the region are relatively
neutral, they do overlap with some claims made by other countries. These include the nine-dash line
claimed by China, most of its surrounding maritime boundaries, the Spratly, Paracel, Pratas Islands, and
the Scarborough Shoal. In general, while Brunei would like to profit from the abundance of natural
resources located in the South China Sea, it does not want to provoke any disputes with neighboring
countries. (O3)
Similarly to Brunei, Malaysia has laid claims on the region of the South China Sea defined by the EEZ
and the Continental Shelf. These territories include parts of the Spratly Islands that are within the
boundary of its EEZ. Because the Spratly Islands are highly sought out by other countries, there has been
much dispute over which country possesses ownership of them. Malaysia previously claimed part of the
Louisa Reef as well, but because its claim of the Reef overlapped the EEZ and Continental Shelf of
Brunei, it withdrew its claim.
Contrary to many other countries, Malaysia does not strongly oppose China’s claims over the majority of
the region. According to Tsukamoto Kazuto from The Asahi Shimbun, “Former Malaysian prime minister
Mahathir Mohamad said that China was not a threat to anyone and was not worried about aggression from
China”(O4), accusing the United States of provoking China and trying to turn China's neighbours against
China. Because Malaysia believes that it will profit from the economic growth that China will experience
after gaining control of the region, it does not oppose China’s claims to the South China Sea. (O5)This
has been shown through Malaysia’s lack of concern of China conducting military exercises in the James
Shoal in March 2013. In addition, Malaysian Defence Minister Hisamuddin Hussein was recorded saying
that Malaysia had no problem with China patrolling the South China Sea, and telling ASEAN, America,
and Japan that “Just because you have enemies, doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies.”
Other Maritime Hotspots Subject to Precedent
East China Sea
The People’s Republic of China is also in a territorial dispute over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in
the East China Sea with Japan and South Korea. The fight of overlapping EEZs dates back to the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894, but has heated up in recent years due to China’s increased presence, claims, and
assertiveness over South East Asia. (N17). Japan and China have disputed claims to a small group of
uninhabited islands called the Sekaku by the Japanese and the Diaoyu by the Chinese. (N24)
These islands, according to a UN geological survey of the East China Sea, have the potential to contain
significant hydrocarbon resources. (N24) The strategic geographic location and resource rich land make
the opposing sovereignty claims over the islands even more contentious and desired. (N17) Under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China claims the disputed territory is within its EEZ
because it is a part of China’s continental shelf. On the other hand, Japan’s overlapping claims are
justified because the disputed territory is within 200 nautical miles of its coast, which is another
UNCLOS provision. (N25).
The battle for the islands with important shipping lanes, opulent fishing prospects, and potential oil and
gas reserves (N27) is provoking nationalist spirits from both sides and escalating tensions in the Pacific
further. Even though China claims to be committed to a policy of “peaceful rise” (N26), politicians and
diplomats are concerned with China’s agenda that is making a possible resolution harder to find. (N27)
The international community is concerned that the East China Sea Dispute may result in accidental
military escalation, a deep and irreversible rift between the countries, or an attempt to forcibly control the
islands by either nation. (N24).
Cyprus, Israel, and Lebanon
In the Mediterranean Sea, Cyprus, Israel, and Lebanon have overlapping EEZs and due to profitable
natural resources present in the disputed territory, the states have argued for the rights to control the
waters for years. In 2010, Israel found a profitable Leviathan gas field in their EEZ. Following this
discovery, Israel and Cyprus signed an agreement that defined their maritime borders and allowed the
nations to continue searching for
energy sources in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea. (N29).
Lebanon claimed, however, that
the agreement between Cyprus
and Israel overlapped its own EEZ
(N31) and that the Cyprus-Israel
agreement was “a violation of
Lebanon’s sovereignty and
economic rights and threatens
peace and security in the area.”
(N29). In hopes on regaining
some of the 850 disputed square
kilometers, Lebanon filed a
government commissioned study
on the coordinates of their EEZ to
the UN. Israel responded that they
would not be afraid to “use force”
to protect their resources.
UNCLOS specifies that an EEZ can contain up to two hundred nautical miles of the territorial sea and any
natural resources found in the EEZ belong to the coastal nation. If the EEZ overlaps with another
country’s EEZ, then it is left to the countries to decide how to manage the territory. (N31). In this
maritime dispute, the United Nations was not apart of mediation and instead, actors in the international
community with ties to the involved countries offered help. To date, no compromise has been made.
(N32)
Portugal and Spain
In recent years, Spain has contested Portugal’s EEZ in the area surrounding the Savage Islands. (N34)
The Savage Islands have been a Portuguese territory since 1438 (N33) and because of the Portuguese
sovereignty over the islands, Spanish vessels may not pass from Madeira to the Canary Islands without
venturing far off of the coast. Over the years, the Portuguese navy has seized Spanish fishing vessels for
violating the territorial boundaries. (N34)
Spain argues that the islands do not have a separate continental shelf, which is one of the provisions under
UNCLOS. In 2013, Spain issued a request to the United Nations to classify the Portuguese Savage Islands
as rocks, instead of islands. (N33) The change in classification would allow Spanish ships to pass,
commercial fishing endeavors, and mineral exploration. In 2014, Spain filed an application with the
United Nations to increase their continental shelf into the region hosting the Savage Islands. (N34) This
action reiterated Spanish desire to claim some of Portugal’s EEZ, which is the largest of any European
nation. (N33). The UN, however, has yet to respond to Spanish requests but plans to respond before the
close of the thirty-eighth session of UNCLOS. (N36)
Potential ramifications
Whatever action is taken in order to resolve the South China Sea dispute must take into account several
potential ramifications. Specifically, one must ponder the ever-increasing demand for energy around the
world, the increasing military presence in the South China Sea, the expanding economies of Member
States, conflicting alliances, and the gaps observed between declarations and actual behavior.
First, Asia’s perpetually growing economy creates an inevitable growth in demand for energy resources.
The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) speculates that total fuel consumption
throughout Asia is to increase at 2.6 percent per annum, creating an anticipated 10% rise from 20% in
total global intake by 2035. Many of these such resources are found in the South China Sea, although it’s
difficult to determine exactly how much oil is actually located in the SCS, largely attributed to lack of
exploration and territorial disputes. This potential for energy resources located within key areas of the
South China and the pressures for locating fuel sources in order to maintain and even expand their
respective economies contributes to immense tension and encourages further overlaps territorial claims.
States are also much more likely to opt for the close proximity and accessibility of the South China Sea
rather than compete in the international sphere and face undoubted price spikes and other financial
impositions.
Second, increasing military capabilities
and presence creates a precarious air
within the South China Sea. The
United States has committed to a long
term presence in the Asia Pacific, but
that doesn’t sit well with many of the
Member States, namely China, who
question the right of U.S. ships to
remain within China’s EEZ. Many
other nations fear the growth of
China’s military and its resulting
capabilities for destruction and control
within the region. China has recently began the process of bolstering their military, with special interest
on its navy, and has built up a force strong enough to potentially challenge the United States in a conflict,
thus potentially ejecting the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific which destroys the feeling of
security amongst less powerful Member States. The United States feels strongly about maintaining their
ties with the region, largely because of their economic ties, and therefore has a huge interest in preventing
military escalation. With the major consolidation of military power within each Member State, a huge
potential for violent outbreaks exists. A recent example is found in the instance of the Scarborough Reef,
with some of the most powerful countries in the region competing against each other for control of this
area. In retrospect, National Interest reported, “the crisis could have led to regional war”. The possibility
of a recurrence must be considered when resolutions are debated.
Thirdly, in addition to rapid military growth, there appears to be an observable trend of material growth as
well within Member States surrounding the South China Sea. China sports a $10.3 trillion GDP sustained
by an average of a 7.4% GDP growth per annum, as of 2014. Due to the rapid nature of development in
most of the countries within the SCS region, a constant stream of resources is necessary to fuel progress.
China is not the the only one experiencing economic prosperity; Vietnam and the Philippines are both
experiencing respectable economic growth. That being said, both countries are struggling to keep up with
demands for steady growth and have become increasingly dependent on the sea lanes by which it is
surrounded and are inclined to act now rather than later, contributing to desperation and and the potential
for rash actions.
Fourthly, internal alliances as well as alliances between SCS countries and the United States contribute to
the potential for military escalation. The U.S. has established notable relationships with many ASEAN
countries, with several of the countries citing the U.S. as an important feature in the plan of containing
China; the U.S. has committed to protect The Taiwan Republic of China from attack by China, with the
latter declaring Taiwan a direct threat to the unity of China. With such high tensions and such powerful
players, it’s not unrealistic that the South China Sea could be utilized as a theater for high levels of
competition with dire consequences, especially considering the global scope of some of these alliances.
Finally, there seems to be quite a dichotomy between what is said and what is done. The most recent
example of this occurred in January 2015 during which Philippine officials pointed out China’s declared
agreement with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) did not
match up with their recent actions, which consisted of a “demonstrated a deliberate effort by China to
alter the status quo in its favor” by further expanding their land claims in the South China Sea. There have
also been occurrences of other ASEAN countries calling out China for military buildup in the Spratlys
and claims of deliberate sabotage of Vietnam exploration missions. The latter prompted anti-China
protests within Vietnam that were not reined in by the government. The lack of interstate confidence
contributes to an overwhelming sense of uncertainty and distrust, putting immense pressure on states to
create additional alliances and bulk up their military.
Guiding Questions
1. Is your nation a member of any supranational organizations or international trade partnerships
that have been directly affected by the South China Sea Dispute?
2. To what extent is your nation involved in the South China Sea Dispute?
3. Does your country have an invested interest in the natural resources present in the SCS?
4. What, if any, legislation has your nation adopted to address the land/resource dispute?
5. Has your country’s legislation been successful in solving this dispute?
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