On Counterinsurgency-The Two Methods that Win
by -Fabius Maximus
HTTP://FABIUSMAXIMUS.COM/2012/11/26/COUNTERINSURGENCY-CREVELD-45992/26 NOVEMBER 2012
tags: coin, counterinsurgency, ireland, irish republican army, martin van
creveld,northern ireland, syria, united kingdom
Summary: In this second chapter of “On Counterinsurgency”
Martin van Creveld describes the two methods of crushing
insurgencies. We have tried neither; we might lack the capacity to
use either method. Note that both successes were, like almost all
defeats of insurgencies, done by governments fighting domestic
insurgencies.
As the first phase (Iraq, Af-Pak) of our mad foreign wars winds
down — and the second phase expands — we can still learn from this
analysis by one of the West’s greatest living military historians. We
can still turn off this path. The passage of time closes options; we
might soon pass the last exit to avoid serious war.
Counterinsurgency in Hama, Syria
—————————“On Counterinsurgency”
…by Martin van Creveld
From Combating Terrorism,
…edited by Rohan Gunaratna (2005)
Introduction
For background see The first lesson of our failed wars: we were
warned, but choose not to listen.
This paper falls into four parts, each posted separately.
1. How We Got to Where We Are is a brief history of insurgency
since 1941 and of the repeated failures in dealing with it.
2. Two Methods focuses on President Assad’s suppression of the
uprising at Hama in 1983 on the one hand and on British
operations in Northern Ireland on the other, presenting them as
extreme case studies in dealing with counterinsurgency.
3. On Power and Compromises draws the lessons from the
methods just presented and goes on to explain how, by
vacillating between them, most counterinsurgents have
guaranteed their own failure.
4. Conclusions.
Part two. Two Methods to defeat insurgencies
(a) Syria
In early 1982, President Hafez Asad’s (In Arabic, Asad means
“Lion“) regime in Syria was twelve years old and was meeting
growing opposition that did not make its future appear rosy. Part of
the opposition came from the members of various ethnic groups
who took issue with the fact that Asad, like his most important
collaborators, was an Alawite. Now the Alawites are one of the less
important Islamic sects, traditionally poor and discriminated
against. Many in the Islamic world do not even regard them as true
Moslems and claim that, instead of Allah, they worship the moon
and the stars; it as if Germany had been ruled by a Serbic Mafia or
Italy by a Greek one.
.
A form of counterinsurgency, in Syria (AP Photo)
.
Even more dangerous was the Islamic priesthood, or Ulama. During
the early years after seizing power Asad had made some concessions
to them, promoting priests, increasing their salaries and even giving
them limited freedom of speech. They, however, saw the secular
Ba’atist state as opposed to everything they themselves believed in
and were determined to wage holy war against it. To make things
worse for Asad, for a number of years a large part of his Army had
been involved in Lebanon. Originally its mission was to put an end
to a vicious civil war that had broken out in 1976. That proved hard
to do and the Syrians found themselves trying to run the country;
which, early in 1982, was also being threatened by a possible Israeli
invasion.
As the Muslim Brothers, a religious terrorist organization with
branches in practically every Arab country, mounted a wellorganized and effective terrorist campaign against him, Asad’s
response was similar to, though perhaps more brutal than, that of
countless others before and since. His first move was to abolish
what limited civil liberties existed-compared to its predecessors,
originally his regime had been relatively liberal. Next he used his
Army and secret police to persecute, arrest, and torture thousands,
going so far as to order the inmates of entire prisons stood against
the wall and shot. Nothing worked and the bombings, in which
hundreds lost their lives, went on.
With his regime disintegrating and his own life increasingly
threatened, the Syrian leader resorted to desperate measures.
Though clashes between terrorists and the security forces took place
all over the country the center of the rebellion was known to be the
city of Hama, called “the head of the snake“. Even as the repression
campaign continued in full swing twelve thousand soldiers,
commanded by Asad’s brother Rifat, surrounded Hama. The way
the Syrian newspapers told the story later on, they started combing
the city house by house, making arrests.
As they did so, about 500 mujahidun, or holy warriors, launched a
counterattack. Perhaps they were deliberately provoked by Rifat’s
forces. Perhaps they were hoping that the Army’s Suni troops would
desert from their units and, possibly, join their uprising. Either way,
they emerged from hiding, took up their weapons, and engaged in
open warfare, reportedly killing some 250 civil servants, policemen,
and the like.
Whether or not it had been planned that way, the uprising provided
Rifat and Hafez with the excuse they had been waiting for. Relying
mainly on their most powerful weapon, heavy artillery, the Syrian
troops surrounding Hama opened fire. Anywhere between 10,000
and 30,000 people, many of them women and children, were
indiscriminately killed.
What followed was even more important than the killing itself. Far
from apologizing for his action, Rifat, asked how many people his
men had killed, deliberately exaggerated their number. As his
reward, he was promoted to vice-president for national security;
several of his fellow butchers were also promoted or decorated.
Later, survivors told horrifying tales of buildings that had collapsed
on their inhabitants and trenches filled with corpses. They also
described how, in an attempt to get at jewelry, Syrian troops did not
hesitate to cut off people’s fingers and ears.
Hama’s great mosque, one of the best known in all of Syria, was
razed to the ground and later became a parking lot. Years afterwards
a journalist, Scot Peterson of the Christian Science Monitor, who
had visited the city, told me that when people passed the place they
still looked away and shuddered. Some of them were so terrified
that they did not even dare pronounce the word “Alawite“; instead,
pointing at the hills, they spoke of “those people there“.
In the words of Asad’s Israeli biographer, Prof. Moshe Maoz, “the
terrible crushing of the Hama revolt not only broke the military
backbone of the Muslim Brothers but also served as a vivid warning
to them, as well as to other opposition groups, against further acts of
disobedience. And although in recent years small groups of Muslim
Brothers have occasionally conducted guerrilla attacks on army
units, themujahidun ceased for the time being to be a threat to
Assad.” Having fallen out with his brother, Rifat had to flee abroad.
Not so Hafez who went on ruling Syria with an iron fist. His son,
Bashir, continues to so today.
(b) Ireland
The other successful counter-insurgency campaign worth examining
in some detail in the present paper is, as already said, the British
one in Northern Ireland. The “troubles” in Ireland have a long
history. They go back all the way to the Irish struggle for
independence (1916-1921), King William III, Oliver Cromwell, and
even King Henry II (reigned 1154-89) who was the first English
monarch to campaign in the island.
In January 1969 they broke out again and quickly escalated as
bombs demolished parts of the infrastructure-electricity-pylons and
water pumps-and as opposing demonstrators fought street-battles
with each other. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC, a locally
recruited riot police consisting largely of Protestants), was unable to
contain the violence and so the British Army became heavily
involved from the summer on.
From this point, the situation went from bad to worse. In a single
night’s “battle” (Belfast, 14-15 August 1969) 4 policemen and 10
civilians were killed whereas a 145 civilians were wounded. Property
damage was also extensive, amounting to no fewer than 150 houses
destroyed by fire. The violence, the like of which had not been seen
in the region for almost 50 years, seems to have dampened the
enthusiasm of both sides.
However, memories proved short and there was another outbreak of
even greater violence in August of the next year. From this time on
things deteriorated as the British troops, whose number now
exceeded ten thousand, vainly sought to prevent mobs of Protestant
and Catholic demonstrators from clashing with each other and
destroying as much property as they could.
Behind their backs terrorism also escalated as 37 explosions rocked
the district in March 1971, 47 in April, and 50 in June. From
January to August of that year the total number of bombings was
311, causing over 100 injuries. In 1972 the number rose to well over
one thousand; the IRA also extended its operations from Ireland
into the United Kingdom proper. A temporary peak was reached on
30 January 1972 when Street fighting in Londonderry led to thirteen
people dying at the hand of British troops trying to quell yet another
riot. An event which is remembered as “Bloody Sunday“.
Had things been allowed to continue in the same way, no doubt the
British attempt to hold on to Northern Ireland would have ended as
so many others since 1941 had, i.e. in complete defeat followed by
elaborate analyses as to why it took place. If, for a change, this did
not happen and the outcome did not correspond to the usual
pattern, then perhaps there are some things to be learnt from the
effort. This article is hardly the place to detail all the many different
things the Army did during its thirty-year involvement, let alone
follow the immensely complicated political process with all its twists
and turns. Instead, all I can do is provide a short list of the things
that the British Army, having used “Bloody Sunday” to reconsider
its actions, did not do.
Old school British CI: Patrick Loughnane, tortured to death by the
Royal Irish Constabulary in 1920
First, never again did the British open indiscriminate fire into
marching or rioting crowds; in the future, however violent the riots
and demonstrations with which they faced, they preferred to employ
less violent means that led to a far smaller number of casualties.
Second, and in marked contrast to most other counter-insurgents
from the Germans in Yugoslavia to the Israelis in the Occupied
Territories, not once in the entire struggle did they bring in heavy
weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers [EDITOR:
incorrect. British used APCs extensively so they COULD withstand
attacks and not retaliate], artillery, or aircraft to repulse attacks and
inflict retaliation.
Third, never once did they inflict collective punishments such as
imposing curfews, blowing up houses, destroying entire
neighborhoods to open up fields of fire, and the like; by posing as
the protectors of the population, not its tormentors, they were able
to prevent the uprising from spreading.
Fourth and most important, by and large the Army stayed within
the law. Partly because they restrained themselves, partly because
there were other, less conspicuous organizations to do some of the
dirty work for them, they were able to refrain from arbitrary
imprisonment, torture, and illegal killings.
From time to time, this rule was infringed upon. Even without
breaking the law, interrogation-techniques could be intimidating
enough. Here and there were clear violations of civil liberties as
torture as well as false accusations were used in order to elicit
information and obtain convictions. A few known IRA leaders,
identified and tracked in foreign countries, were shot, executionstyle, in what has since become known as “targeted killings“. On the
whole, however, the British played by the rules. This remained true
even after terrorists had blown up the 79 year-old Earl of
Mountbatten, the Queen’s uncle, in his yacht. Even after they had
planted a bomb that demolished part of a Brighton Hotel where Ms.
Thatcher was due to speak; and even after they had used a van to
fire mortar rounds at a Cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street.
Passing over the details, which would suffice to fill many volumes,
the real secret behind the British success seems to have been
extreme self-control. Whatever else might happen, they did not
allow themselves to be provoked.
I myself began to get an inkling of that fact during my numerous
visits to the Army Staff College at Camberley. Each time I went there
I discussed the situation in Northern Ireland with as many officers
as I could; people whose names I cannot remember but to all of
whom I am grateful. What I still consider the most important
insight, however, was given to me not at Camberley but over dinner
in Geneva some time in the early 1990s. My interlocutor was a
British lieutenant colonel who had done several tours of duty in
Northern Ireland but whose name, alas, I cannot remember either.
What he told me can be summed up as follows.
Look at almost any one of the hundred or so major counterinsurgency campaigns that took place all over the world since 1945
(or, if you wish, 1941). However great the differences between them,
they have one thing in common. In every known instance the “forces
of order” killed far more people than they lost. Often by an order of
magnitude, as is the case in Iraq where the Americans always
emphasize how many more Iraqis died; and often in such an
indiscriminate manner (in counter-insurgency, whenever heavy
weapons are used, the results are bound to be indiscriminate) as to
make the result approximate genocide.
By contrast, up to that date the struggle in Northern Ireland had
cost the United Kingdom 3,000 casualties in dead alone. Of the
3,000 about 1,700 were civilians, most of them innocent bystanders
who had been killed as bombed exploded at the time and place they
happened to be. Of the remaining 1,300, 1,000 were British Soldiers
and no more than 300 were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. And
that, he ended his exposition, is why we are still there.