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Hama Rules
From Beirut to Jerusalem
Thomas L. Friedman
Introduction
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Hama, a once-picturesque city in Syria, was the site of a brutal massacre in February of
1982 (Friedman 76).
The massacre, undoubtedly the work of the Syrian government, specifically the
Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, was estimated to have left 10,000-25,000 dead
and thousands more homeless (77).
The cause of the massacre was mostly friction between the Sunni Muslim guerilla
groups of the city, called the Muslim Brotherhood, and the mainly Alawite
Muslim/Christian government and military (77-78).
It is from his visit to the city of Hama post-attack and the tragedies he witnesses
that Friedman formulates his “Hama Rules,” a set of rules that not only pertain to
Syria but to most of the Middle East, highlighting the ruthlessness and gore of the
conflict in the area.
The logic of Hama Rules is “a combination of three different political traditions all
operating at the same time” (87).
Tribe-Like Politics
–
The first tradition is tribe-like politics,
“characterized by a harsh, survivalist
quality and an adherence to certain intense
primordial or kin-group forms of
allegiance” (87).
•
Groups are bound together by
solidarity and allegiance to the tribe
takes precedence over the national
community (87).
•
Alliances begin with “the most basic
blood association” of the family and
slowly expand to the tribe (88).
•
When a tribe is dishonored, a price
must always be exacted to the furthest
degree. Otherwise, the tribe looks
weak and will be attacked again. The
only way a tribe will make
compromises with another tribe is
“from proven strength or
magnanimity in the wake of victory”
(88).
•
When the Muslim Brotherhood seized
control of Hama, al-Assad saw it as a
threat to his Alawite tribe and
retaliated (90).
Authoritarianism
–
The second political tradition in the Middle East is authoritarianism, “the
concentration of power in a single ruler or elite not bound by any
constitutional framework” (91).
•
•
People of the Middle East rarely created nation-states of their own because
various tribe affiliations negated the need for people to rule themselves and
defend themselves against foreign invaders (92).
Clans and sects would rarely submit and allow themselves to be governed by
others. Rather, when a government was in place, it was usually imposed by sheer
physical force. (92).
Authoritarianism Continued
• “The ruler was often a stranger: someone to be feared, dreaded, avoided, submitted
to, and, occasionally, rebelled against, but rarely adored; there was usually a
tremendous gulf between the ruler and he society at large” (92).
– Gentle Authoritarianism: A government sustained through negotiation and
less by brute force (92-93).
– Brutal Authoritarianism: A government sustained by beating the population
into submission (94).
“Hama was not just what
happens when two tribe-like
sects – the Alawites and the
Sunnis – decide to have it out;
it was also what happens
when a modern Middle
Eastern autocrat who does not
enjoy full legitimacy among
his people puts down a
challenge to his authority by
employing twentieth-century
weapons without restraint”
(96).
Modern Nation-State
–
The modern nation-state is another factor in tragedies
such as Hama – most states in the Middle East today
“were not willed into existence by their own people or
developed organically out of a common historical
memory or ethnic or linguistic bond,” but were instead
imposed upon the people of a country (98-99).
•
•
•
Not only were borders and leaders imposed, political institutions,
too, were forced, often with the imperial powers leaving before
these institutions could fully take root (99).
The leaders boosted into power by imperial invaders most then
search for ways to legitimize their new governments (100).
The Hama massacre, then, can be seen as “the natural reaction of
a modernizing politician in a relatively new nation-state trying to
state off retrogressive… elements aiming to undermine
everything he has achieved) (100).
Conclusion

Friedman ends the chapter with an anecdote about
a landlord in Beirut who would not only eat an egg
for breakfast, but also its shell. He closes: “That
was what Hama was all about and that is what
politics in places like Syria, Lebanon, the Yemens,
and Iraq are so often about – men grabbing for the
egg and its shell, because without both they fear
that they may well be dead” (105).
Bibliography
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